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Summary 
 
The original contribution of this work is threefold. Firstly, this thesis develops a critical 
perspective on current evaluation practice of business support, with focus on the timing of 
evaluation. The general time frame applied for business support policy evaluation is limited to 
one to two, seldom three years post intervention. This is despite calls for long-term impact 
studies by various authors, concerned about time lags before effects are fully realised. This 
desire for long-term evaluation opposes the requirements by policy-makers and funders, 
seeking quick results. Also, current ‘best practice’ frameworks do not refer to timing or its 
implications, and data availability affects the ability to undertake long-term evaluation. 
Secondly, this thesis provides methodological value for follow-up and similar studies by using 
data linking of scheme-beneficiary data with official performance datasets. Thus data 
availability problems are avoided through the use of secondary data. Thirdly, this thesis builds 
the evidence, through the application of a longitudinal impact study of small business support 
in England, covering seven years of post intervention data. This illustrates the variability of 
results for different evaluation periods, and the value in using multiple years of data for a robust 
understanding of support impact. For survival, impact of assistance is found to be immediate, 
but limited. Concerning growth, significant impact centres on a two to three year period post 
intervention for the linear selection and quantile regression models – positive for employment 
and turnover, negative for productivity. Attribution of impact may present a problem for 
subsequent periods. The results clearly support the argument for the use of longitudinal data 
and analysis, and a greater appreciation by evaluators of the factor time. This analysis 
recommends a time frame of four to five years post intervention for soft business support 
evaluation.  
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Glossary 
 
ARD Annual Respondents Database 
BERR (2007) Initial one-year Business Link support evaluation, using the same 
 firm  inventory as for this analysis. 
BLO  Business Link Operator 
BLO Survey Business Link Operator Survey – carried out for BERR (2007) 
BSD Business Structure Database 
Business Link (BL) Name for soft business support provision network (now  
 discontinued, only an online service remains) 
CIS (European) Community Innovation Survey, same UK data as the
 UKIS 
CRN Company registration number (at the companies house). Serves as
 unique firm identifier for matching to the enterprise reference  
 numbers in the Secure Lab.  
EC European Community 
Hard business support Financial support 
HGF High growth firm, defined as three years of consecutive growth of at 
 least 20 percent 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. UK tax authority.  
IA Intensive assistance / Intensively assisted firms 
IDBR Interdepartmental Business Register. 
LD / L.D. see below, “Longitudinal dataset” 
Longitudinal dataset Longitudinal dataset – the linked dataset most of this thesis’
 analysis is based on. Combines the BLO Survey’s firm and owner 
 characteristics with multiple annual editions of the BSD 
NA Non-assisted (firms), therefore the control group 
OA Other assistance / other assisted firms 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ONS  UK Office for National Statistics. 
PAYE  Pay as you earn, UK automatic income tax deduction. All employers 
 need to register.  
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SDS  Secure Data Service. Previous name of UK Data Service’s ‘Secure 
 Lab’ facility.  
Secure Lab Provided by the UK Data Service, virtual computer environment 
 allowing remote access to micro data such as the BSD and UKIS.  
SMS Scientific Maryland Scale 
Soft business support Non-financial support, such as advice 
(Storey’s) Six Steps Framework to assess the robustness of an evaluation   
 (Storey, 1998). 
UK Data Service Provider of the Secure Lab 
UKIS UK Innovation Survey 
VAT  Value added tax. Firms with more than £81,000 annual sales (in 
 2015) need to register.  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Thesis introduction 
 
It is a long-established global practice for governments to intervene in the small business 
sector to promote growth and job creation. A summary of that motivation by governments to 
intervene is provided by McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2016): 
“The fostering of SMEs, and in particular of entrepreneurship, are critical factors in 
driving economic development because of their impacts on wealth generation, 
innovation, skills and capabilities, the opening up of new markets, job creation and job 
satisfaction (Van Praag and Versloot 2007; Feldman et al. 2011; European 
Commission 2012). SME and entrepreneurship policies are governmental initiatives 
aimed at positively influencing the formation, viability and commercial success of new 
and smaller scale firms.” 
 McCann and Ortega-Argilés (2016, p. 539): 
 
With wide-spread use of small business policy a need for evaluation arises, and a swathe of 
evaluations certainly exists (WWG, 2014). However, in the large majority of cases, they take 
place after relatively short periods, normally no later than two to three years following the 
intervention. Those taking a longer perspective often seem quantitatively not very robust, and 
usually rely on self-reported data and surveys, for example: ”Did the assistance received help 
your business?”. Responses to such questions cannot provide a reliable measure of the 
difference made by the support. At the same time, the availability of firm-level records as 
- 12 - 
 
captured and held by the government has become more wide-spread, with pockets of 
researchers around the globe exploring the use of this rich source of data.  
Both of the above explain the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’ (BIS) motivation 
to fund this research, with a specific interest in the effects of ‘soft’ business support, that is, 
non-financial support such as business advice services. What happens to assisted firms in the 
longer term? Are current evaluations capturing all the effects generated by an intervention – 
or is there a case for taking a longer term view?  
Therefore, at the outset of this research is the concern that the research community and 
policy makers lack an important element – time – in their understanding of the impact 
of business support to small firms – and as such of its value.  
One problem with taking a longer term view is the availability of data. Surveying firms over 
multiple years to track performance following an intervention takes up considerable resources, 
and requires the cooperation of the participating firms. Given the increasing ease of gaining 
access to firm-level records for research purposes, a second interest by the funders (and the 
author) is to explore and evaluate the use of existing government firm-level records for an 
impact assessment over a longer term period. As part of that, providing evidence over what 
period an evaluation should be undertaken is an objective of the research. This raises the 
perennial problem of attribution: the impact of a single intervention will fade over time and 
become contaminated by other possible events or interventions which will affect firm 
performance.  
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1.2 Contribution made 
 
Two major contributions are made by this research in the field of the evaluation of business 
support policies:  
1) A critique of current evaluation practice and its timing. The current best practice 
evaluation frameworks stop short of assigning any role to the timing of evaluation. 
Some researchers have alluded to the fact that their research may be too short-term to 
fully understand the impact. Yet, for those very few examples of long-term evaluations 
that exist for non-financial business support, the role of time and choice of time period 
are not explained.  
2) The above to be underpinned by the application of a longitudinal impact study 
of small business support in England, revisiting an evaluation of Business Link 
undertaken in 2006 (BERR, 2007). The 2006 evaluation assessed a one year period 
post intervention only. Revisiting this original dataset will allow to understand how 
impact has developed over time, beyond that one year period, and across measures 
used.  It will also serve to inform as to what may be a suitable evaluation period. 
 
The research is also of methodological value for follow-up and similar studies by setting out  
3) the key component of data linking scheme beneficiary data from the support 
organisations customer relationship management system with business 
registration databases and official firm-level data records for evaluation 
purposes. Whilst it is not the aim of this thesis to make a contribution to theory, the 
methodological considerations around the used datasets and their linking will serve to 
inform future studies that seek to use these datasets for evaluation performances.  
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1.3 Structure of the thesis  
 
Chapter One – Introduction and Contribution 
The role of small business in the economy will be briefly introduced, and an understanding of 
policy-makers’ desire for intervention developed. The justification for support for small 
businesses is based on market failure arguments. In response, a high number of support 
schemes have been designed in economies around the globe, with considerable government 
resource assigned to them.  
 
Chapter Two – A Critique of Evaluation Practice 
Given the central role of small business support in policy, and the number of evaluations 
required as a result, a large body of evaluation literature has emerged over the past two 
decades. Chapter Two develops a critique of current evaluation practice and its timing, 
establishing the theoretical argument behind the contribution of this research. An initial review 
of the evidence and its quality is followed by a specific focus on long-term evaluations. The 
argument about the importance of the timing of an evaluation is then developed, which has 
been suggested as important by authors of a number of previous studies. Yet, time is 
noticeably absent from ‘best practice’ frameworks for evaluation. This apparent gap results in 
research considered as robust when no attention has been paid to the timeline of impact or 
any of the potential time lags before realisation of that impact. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the key drivers behind the short-term focus of business support evaluation.  
 
Chapter Three – Long-Term Evaluation: Methodology & Data 
This chapter will introduce the different datasets used and include methodological 
considerations with regards to data linking, and therefore, adds to the core of the 
methodological contribution of this thesis. The use of data linking is explored as an alternative 
to counter one of the key problems with longitudinal analysis, namely data availability and the 
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difficulty of collecting data from scheme participants over an extended time period. Business 
Link, as the support programme which is providing the data for this thesis, is introduced along 
with the datasets used for linking. The Business Link data captures firms assisted in 2003, as 
well as a non-assisted control group. The data linking process is detailed, and the data 
properties of both the pre and post linking samples will be reviewed and compared.  This is 
important given the substantial firm attrition as a result of the linking process, as will be 
illustrated, and as such the reduction in the size of the sample during the linking process.  
 
Chapter Four – Survival 
Using the linked dataset, this chapter will explore the survival of the assisted firms compared 
to the non-assisted. Firm survival is the underpinning requirement for any firm development 
and growth, and therefore provides a good basic measure of firm performance (‘basic’, given 
the limitations that exist around the desirability of inefficient firms surviving). This analysis only 
becomes possible with longitudinal data, and at the outset this chapter reviews the limited 
previous work on the impact of business support on firm survival, and also the general literature 
on firm survival. Comparisons are drawn between the differences in survival rates between 
supported and non-supported firms, taking into account the roles of age and size.  
 
Chapter Five – Firm growth 
This core part of the quantitative analysis focusses on the impact of business support on 
growth, as measured by employment and turnover growth. It also includes a productivity 
analysis as a function of employment and turnover. An introduction to the extensive literature 
on firm growth is provided, and the determinants of firm growth – including business support – 
are discussed. The analysis includes a number of analytical approaches. First, a variety of 
linear regression models with and without selection effect are estimated, covering the multiple 
time periods between 2004-5 and 2004-11, with and without lagged growth. This allows for 
comparison with the previous (short-term) evaluation results of the same set of support firms. 
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Quantile regressions follow, to control for the fact that impact of support is suspected not be 
equally distributed across outcome quantiles.  
 
Chapter Six – Discussion and Conclusions 
The final chapter reviews the evidence obtained from Chapters Four and Five, and links it back 
to the concerns raised in Chapter Two and the central contributions of this thesis. The research 
approach and possible extensions are discussed, and future good practice suggested.  
 
 
1.4  The justification for business support 
 
This section sets the context for the later chapters and the contribution they make. First, the 
contribution SMEs make to the economy is introduced, with focus on UK data. 
Based on that introduction, the theoretical case for policy interventions in the field of SMEs is 
introduced and discussed, based mainly on market failure arguments. A more detailed focus 
on soft business support services follows, namely business advice. The empirical elements of 
this thesis focus on such ‘soft support’ in the form of business advice impact analysis.  
 
1.4.1  The economic contribution of SMEs 
There is no doubt about the key role of SMEs in the economic fabric. More than 99 out of 100 
firms in any EU nation are SMEs (EC, 2013). And whilst the official definitions of what 
constitutes a SME may vary across other geographies outside the EU, small firms represent 
the vast majority of firms around the globe. They also provide and create the largest part of 
jobs around the globe (World Bank, 2011). 
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During the latest period of economic crisis, the total number of SMEs rose by 0.5 percent 
between 2008 and 20121 across the EU, whilst the number of large firms declined by 1.8 
percent. The UK saw its number of SMEs shrink by three percent, compared to a 6.3 percent 
reduction in the number of large firms. The employment by SMEs dropped only by 0.8 percent, 
compared to 4.9 percent of large firm jobs having been shed 2008-12. Based on these headline 
figures, SMEs are not only central to the economic makeup of the UK, but appear to be more 
resilient than their large firm counterparts. It is that sort of evidence that leads governments to 
hail small business. Since 2012, the number of SMEs in the UK has been growing again.  
The importance of SMEs in a nation’s economy may appear obvious. However, this 
understanding has only evolved over the last three decades. Storey (2005) outlines that in the 
1960s, small business was not considered fashionable by policy-makers and their ideas of the 
modern economy. Audretsch and Thurik (2004) describe how small firms “were viewed as a 
luxury” by governments. Research considered small firms as less innovative, less efficient, and 
paying its staff less. At the same time, the number of small firms and their share of total 
employment appeared to be falling during the 1960s and 1970s (Storey and Greene, 2010). In 
sum, there were few arguments in support of small business, and with small firms lacking the 
networks that large firms enjoyed with government and unions, the focus on large firms is 
hardly surprising.  
Research by Birch (1979) started to shift governments’ perception of the role of small firms. It 
is often considered as the turning point in small business policy in the developed world (Storey, 
2005; Parker, 2009). His work highlighted the major contribution of small and new firms to job 
creation. Using US data for 1969 to 1976, Birch (1979) concluded that, for example, two thirds 
of jobs were generated by those firms with less than twenty employees. This research and its 
findings were not without considerable criticism. Brown et al. (1990; in Neumark et al., 2008) 
                                               
1
 All of the figures were sourced from the European Commission’s SBA Fact Sheets for 2013. Accessed 
on 5th March 2014 and available from http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-
analysis/performance-review/index_en.htm 
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argued that rather than just focussing on the number of jobs, the quality of employment would 
also need to be considered, based on their findings that small firms offer less desirable 
employment.  Davis et al. (1996) were concerned about the model specifications as part of 
Birch’s (1979) analysis. 
However, along with an increasing interest by governments in the role of SMEs in the economy, 
regardless of how sound Birch’s (1979) findings may or may not have been, entrepreneurship 
rates started to rise in the 1980s. Audretsch and Thurik (2004) depicted entrepreneurship rates 
across six nations (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, the UK and New Zealand) and 
show how entrepreneurship rates declined until the early 1980s when all of the six nations 
show a reversal of that trend. Acs and Audretsch (1993) found this shift towards small firm 
employment to have taken place in every developed country.  
As one of the many government reports concerned with the importance of small business, a 
report by Lord Young (2013, p. 9) (“A report on growth micro businesses”) makes reference 
to Wright et al. (2010) and Scarpetta et al. (2002), by that  
 “New and growing small businesses drive economic growth by stimulating innovation, 
 by creating a competitive spur to existing businesses to increase their productivity, 
 and by making a disproportionate contribution to job creation”. 
 
One of the current UK’s government economic ambitions consequently is  
 “to make the UK the best place in Europe to start, finance and grow a business”2. 
UK’s HM Treasury (March, 2011) 
 
Job creation and innovation are most commonly highlighted with reference to the importance 
of small business (as by Wright [2010] in Lord Young [2013] above).  
 
                                               
2
 In line with that objective, the Growth Plan’s “independent review of how spending Departments and 
other relevant public sector bodies interact with the private sector, and to assess their capacity to deliver 
pro-growth policies” (BIS website, 21 June 2012) resulted in October 2012’s Lord Heseltine’s “No stone 
unturned” report, which also considers business support and its effective delivery. 
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1.4.2 Firm dynamics 
Focussing on the UK context, a recent analysis by the Enterprise Research Centre (Anyadike-
Danes et al., 2013) based on the Business Structure Database3 (BSD), which captures an 
annual ‘snapshot’ of the Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR) as maintained by the UK 
Office for National Statistics (ONS), found that: 
- “every year a large number of private sector firms are born in the UK ~ typically between 
200,000 and 250,000” 
- “most new born firms are very small ~ around 90% have less than 5 employees” 
- “a decade later between 70% and 80% of those new born firms will be dead” 
- “a cohort is born with about 1 million jobs ~ a decade later the survivors employ just 
half a million” 
- “of those which have survived to age 10 ~ around 75% of those born with less than 5 
employees will still have less than five employees” 
The central implications are that there are considerable dynamics at play, with high entry and 
exit rates. The majority of firms set up are small, and disappear again during the course of a 
decade. From a policy-maker perspective this raises the question why firms exit relatively 
quickly in the majority of cases, and whether anything can be done to support (small) business 
to avoid that quick exit. Firm exit thwarts the process of securing the economic contribution 
already generated by those businesses, for example employment. 
 
1.5 Policy justification 
 
As a group, small businesses are adding significantly to the economy, even if their individual 
impact is modest (OECD, 2013). Only the smallest fraction of small firms will ever become 
international champions, large firms that provide major economic impact (Hart and Anyadike-
                                               
3
 The BSD is also the central database for the analyses undertaken in this thesis. It is introduced in 
detail in Chapter Three. 
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Danes, 2014). But given the total impact of small firms, policy-makers’ interest is only logical, 
intending to support the success of small firms and their contribution to the economy.  
In discussions of policy the distinction between small business and entrepreneurship policy 
can be useful, and is usually made4. The data available for the subsequent empirical chapters 
draws on data from Business Link – the now (largely) defunct UK scheme. The dataset 
captured firm assistance that was provided to existing firms only (with some of those firms of 
very young age, that is, new businesses). Whilst Business Link data is used, the analysis of 
this thesis is more concerned with evaluation practice, and as such both entrepreneurship and 
small business literature are included.  
The concern by policy-makers is that small firms may not necessarily enjoy a level playing field 
with their larger counterparts. They do not benefit from the same economies of scale which 
may hinder innovation. Access to finance is harder for smaller and less established firms. 
Regulation may have a greater impact on small business, where the regulatory burden needs 
to be absorbed by smaller production volumes. They are also unlikely to have the internal 
capabilities available comparable to the regulatory compliance teams within larger firms. With 
a view on business advice, small firms may not employ the necessary overhead to understand 
any offer of support available to them. Failure to look outside their own operations may result 
in underestimating the value of any external offers available.  
Markets failure arguments such as the above have commonly been used as a justification for 
public intervention for some time. Arrow (1969) appears to be the first to have established this 
argument. The interest of this thesis is in ‘soft’ business support, business advice to firms as 
offered through Business Link5 in 2003. By comparison, ‘hard’ business support refers to 
financial assistance.  
                                               
4
 Bridge and O’Neill (2013, pp. 37-61) dedicate an entire chapter distinguishing the different uses of 
the terms “entrepreneurship” and “enterprise”, including small business. A graphical illustration of their 
definitions’ overlaps is found immediately after the cover.  
5
 Business Link is introduced in detail in Chapter Three, as part of the data introduction. 
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For Britain, Bolton (1971) is widely cited as the initial work highlighting what he perceived as 
market failure. The concern was that small business lacks the relevant size for market 
influence. Also, due to higher risks or a higher tendency to avoid risk, small business was seen 
to invest less. This lack of investment may include choosing not to invest in external expertise 
or business advice, and in Bennett (2008, p. 376) a list of further authors making this and 
similar arguments are provided (for example, Gibb and Dyson, 1984; Storey, 1994; Mole, 
2008).  
Hill (2005) discussed the rational choice perspective as the basis for public intervention. In 
summary, the argument is that the estimated cost would be compared to the estimated 
(assumed) benefit – based on what is known to the decision-maker, in this context the business 
facing the choice for support. The implications are that firstly, with the markets choosing what 
activities to engage in, small business owners may negatively assess opportunities that they 
lack information on, and avoid engaging in some activities that would be beneficial to 
themselves and the wider society. With reference to business support that means that potential 
support advisors may decide against provision of their services, either due to unawareness of 
the market place, or due to limited private benefits but therefore also failing to offer what would 
be of wider social benefit. The second implication of Hill (2005) was that public bodies would 
assess this gap of private advice provision, and decide where the benefit of intervention would 
exceed the cost of intervention.  
Based on this, Mole and Bramley (2006, p.886) developed a framework assessing the 
arguments for intervention, with three focal areas to justify any support intervention. Firstly, “Is 
publicly provided business advice a public good?” The question here is if there are 
‘externalities’ present. This refers to situations where benefits arise out of public goods to those 
not directly involved in their actual production or use (for example, policing, transport, defence, 
utilities). Secondly, “Is public advice an incomplete market?” Incomplete market refers to a 
market where the private sector considers it as too risky to engage. Thirdly, “Is business advice 
subject to information asymmetries?” This refers to scenarios where not every party to an 
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agreement shares the same information. In the context of business support, this may be the 
consultant knowing of their abilities and value-add, but the small firm unaware of the value 
such consultant would be able to provide to their firm (see also Stiglitz, 2000).  
Accordingly, if there was an incomplete market in the provision of business advice, and 
providing business advice would satisfy the requirements of being a public good (given its 
externalities), this would justify public intervention. Externalities are notoriously difficulty to 
capture, partly because any improved performance by business due to support received would 
translate into private benefits for the owners. In Mole and Bramley (2006), Lambrecht and 
Pirnay (2005) and Roper and Hart (2005) are referred to, who all suggest a lack of evidence 
to develop an understanding of externalities and their full extent. 
The incompleteness of markets in business advice is easier to determine, yet arguments differ. 
Bennett (2008), drawing on surveys from the Cambridge Centre for Business Research, came 
to the conclusion that there is little evidence of market failures being present in the business 
advice market, and little opportunity for government to enhance the supply thereof. By 
comparison, Mole and Bramley (2006) highlight that paid-for advice, for example by 
accountants or lawyers, would be for specific identified issues. To what extent these would 
advise on matters outside their area of expertise (for example, how to grow the business or 
exporting), something they would not be able to bill for, is questionable. In turn, they may 
provide more than necessary advice on matters where they can bill. Given incompleteness of 
information, with a small business potentially unaware of the value of gaining advice on any 
topic, they may not ask for advice on topic outside their ‘usual’ advisors’ remit. Given the client-
supplier relationship paid advisors could also be biased (Hjalmarsson and Johansson, 2003; 
Turok and Raco, 2000).  
Information asymmetries (the third question raised by Mole and Bromley, 2006) may not only 
mean small business not exploring the use of advice, but also that getting them engaged with 
advisors and consultants may assist small business to better assess the value of the external 
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advice (Storey, 2003). The role of government support would be to increase the overall supply 
of support schemes, and to demonstrate their value (Done et al., 2011). Where a business 
benefitted from the advice, therefore seeing value in it, the result may be in such business to 
seek out again advice in the future. Mole et al. (2014) underline this argument of ongoing 
advice, with reference to literature that highlights managers’ desire of tying in with others 
(Bozeman and Feeney, 2007; Granovetter, 1985).  
Whether or not a policy intervention is justified on above grounds is difficult to measure, and 
policy-makers usually choose other performance measures for evaluation. Employment 
presents an obvious measure for assessing firm performance. Chapter Two explores this 
process of evaluation, which seeks to provide confirmation/justification for the chosen policies, 
in detail.    
 
1.6  Conclusions 
 
Following an overview of this thesis’ structure, this chapter sets out to introduce the role of 
small business and arguments for the provision of small business support, based on market 
failure arguments. With these arguments for business support in mind, the decision to provide 
business support has been taken by many OECD countries as an explicit policy priority (OECD, 
2008). As a consequence, major public spending has been allocated to business support. 
Policy-makers are interested in how successful such interventions are in addressing perceived 
market failure, and as a result a large body of evaluation literature has developed.  
 
Chapter Two highlights the scale of the policy expense for the UK, before reviewing current 
evaluation practice. It specifically explores the consideration of time in business support 
evaluation, and builds the theoretical foundations for the subsequent analysis.  
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Chapter Two 
  
When best to undertake evaluations?  
– A critique of short-term expediency 
 
This chapter develops the central argument underpinning the idea of this thesis. It will 
commence by considering the reasons for (support) policy evaluation, and highlight the wildly 
varying quality of the evidence produced and drawn on. The Scientific Maryland Scale 
(Sherman et al., 1997) and Storey’s Six Steps (Storey, 1998) are introduced as commonly 
referred to frameworks for ensuring robust impact evaluation. These frameworks undeniably 
play an important role and had significant impact in promoting what criteria robust evaluation 
should fulfil, and continue to do so. Nonetheless, there appears to be an important gap in 
current practice and debate – the issue of how to time evaluation. A systematic literature review 
follows, seeking to identify studies that go beyond the usual short evaluation time frame of one 
to two years. On the basis of that narrative the research hypotheses and contribution of this 
thesis are developed and highlighted.  
 
2.1  Introduction – The cost of business support 
Very large amounts of public money are spent on small business support, for (market failure) 
reasons explored in the previous chapter. Few exact estimates exist as support is provided 
from local through to national and EU level. The UK Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) 
estimated the cost of support to be £5.3 billion (DTI, 2002), in addition to £2.6 billion of indirect 
support through a tax regime benefitting small firms. A more recent figure is provided by Herriot 
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and Kingham (2009), without specifying the exact period. They state that “the government 
currently spends £2.5 billion per annum on direct business support schemes”, a figure that is 
identical to an estimate by BIS (2007)6. The direct expenditure by BIS alone on “enterprise and 
economic development” was £1.8 billion in 2013-14 (HM Treasury, 2014). Forthcoming 
research by NESTA (forthcoming) considers that figure to be even considerably greater with 
around £15billion – this figure includes indirect benefits through tax reductions. Whichever of 
the previous estimates may be closer to the current cost of the provision of small business 
support, there is no doubt that the government allocates considerable resources to it7. In the 
UK, this support was delivered by more than 3,000 schemes according to a BIS (2007) 
estimate – a figure which at the time was aimed to be reduced to no more than 100 by 20108. 
At such cost, it is a logical concern by policy-makers and those that deliver support, whether 
public or private, to understand how effective their particular support programmes may be. 
Some schemes may provide more benefits than others, and an understanding of what provides 
real (measureable) benefits allows for more effective allocation of resources or an adjustment 
of programmes in the future. This has become ever more relevant in times of government 
austerity programmes and increased competition for public funds9.  
 
  
                                               
6
 Lundström et al. (2014) undertook an attempt at attaching a cost to SME and entrepreneurship policy 
cost in Sweden, where the total cost also represents a significant share of government spending.  
7
 In comparison, in 2013-14, the UK government’s spend on national roads was £3.2 billion, on public 
local transport £3.5 billion (HM Treasury, 2014), that is, of similar magnitude as business support spend.  
8
 The Business and Finance Support Finder (https://www.gov.uk/business-finance-support-finder) listed 
798 schemes in total on 17th June 2014, of which 380 are listed under “Expertise and Advice”. Sivaev 
(2013) provides a figure of 900 support schemes.  
9
 In 2009-10, £2 billion were allocated to BIS for “economic and enterprise development”. In 2013-14, 
this was down to £1.8 billion, in 2011-12 £1.2 billion (HM Treasury, 2010; HM Treasury, 2012; HM 
Treasury, 2014).  
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2.2  Evidence-based policy making 
The desire for evaluation in the field of business support forms part of a wider trend by the UK 
government for evidence-based policy making. This trend is described by Dorey (2005) as a 
shift from “merely muddling through” with small incremental changes to existing policy as 
implemented, towards an environment where the government drives research to understand 
the underlying causes of any problems to allow for the development of fitting policies.   
“Pinning down causality is a crucially important part of impact evaluation. Estimates of the 
benefits of a programme are of limited use to policy-makers unless those  benefits can be 
attributed, with a reasonable degree of certainty, to that programme.” 
         WWG (2014, p. 10) 
 
Evidence-based policy making became a key element of British policy making since the Blair 
governments from the late 1990s (David, 2002; in Dorey, 2005). When just “muddling through”, 
the resulting incremental adjustment to policy makes the implicit assumption that the policy is 
broadly justified and worth the assigned resources. It does not consider what the actual 
outcome of a policy is, and fails to measure that against the intended and defined objectives10. 
Cowie (2012) summarises these changes, resulting in an increased focus on sound 
programme evaluation along two core themes. Firstly, a move away from interventionist 
industrial policy, which was often focussed on specific sectors alone, in all major Western 
Economies (UK: Blackburn and Smallbone, 2008; USA: Ketels, 2007; Europe: Aiginger, 2007 
– in Cowie, 2012). This interventionist policy regime was replaced by a broader approach, 
looking at the wider economy and business environment. Cowie (2012) provides the example 
of the Small Business Service in the US, with its general objective of enterprise or innovation 
stimulation, rather than targeting a specific sector with a narrow set of policy tools. Secondly, 
Cowie (2012) argues that the attempt by policy-makers to correct market failures to provide a 
                                               
10
 Dorey (2005) warns in this context that evidence-based policy making does not imply objective policy 
making, “devoid of principles, priorities or preferences”. Political agenda, the evaluation design and 
interpretation of the results play a role. Hart (2007) also points out the importance of not only the 
“generative mechanism” to produce the outcome, but “the specific context in which it works”.  
- 27 - 
 
level playing field for firms (of all sizes) has led to an increased focus on evidence-based policy 
making; with justification sought for the rationale behind interventions ex-ante and then post 
intervention through impact assessments of the outcomes (see Chapter One for the policy 
justifications used).  
In line with this shift towards using evidence, numerous impact evaluations were carried out 
and added to a growing body of literature in the field. In fact, the sheer number of evaluation 
studies available could be seen as indicative of an already saturated strand of literature11.  
That is not to say, however, that policy-makers are drawing on rich evidence for policy 
formulation, and where they do so it may be wrongly applied. Gibb (2000) argues that possibly 
due to the increase in the academic understanding of the impact of enterprise policy “there has 
been a growth of ignorance”, “an absence of knowledge in a particular arena that might fairly 
be expected to be overcome” (Chambers, 1995; in Gibb, 2000). Gibb (2000) is concerned that 
policy priorities are established on the basis of “a number of mythical concepts and myths 
which are considerably influencing the establishment of policy priorities”. One example 
illustrated is that of policy-makers’ ideas about firm growth and support to small firms, which 
Gibb (2000) sees footed on little evidence, given the wide range of identified factors for firm 
growth, for example12. Bridge (2014) summarises the current evidence as inconclusive, also. 
He sees a failure of enterprise research informing policy-makers well13.  
Particularly non-academic contributions, that is, government and other institutions’ research, 
provide a good understanding of how freely the term ‘evaluation’ gets used in policy. The 
following two examples of Dutch and Finnish evaluation studies illustrate how loosely it can be 
                                               
11
 The What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth initially identified some 700 business advice 
policy evaluations and evidence review (WWG, 2014).  
12
 Chapter Five will review the Growth literature in more detail. 
13
 This gap is widely recognised, and led to policy-makers’ support e.g. for the Enterprise Research 
Centre, setup in 2013 as a collaboration between Aston, Warwick, Imperial College, Strathclyde and 
Birmingham Universities, with funding by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the 
Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS), the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) and the British 
Bankers Association (BBA).  
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used, especially in the ‘grey’ literature as produced by (or for) government and other 
institutions.  
A report by EIM Business and Policy Research (EIM, 2009), a co-production with the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and international entrepreneurship experts, focuses on reviewing 
entrepreneurship policies developed worldwide in the ten previous years. It refers to the 
“positive evaluation” a Finnish entrepreneurship programme had received. It references a 
Finnish government report, not qualifying what had actually been evaluated. Reviewing the 
latter, the positive evaluation seems to entirely rest on the fact that more firms took up the offer 
of start-up financing assistance during the policy period reviewed (MTI, 2007). That may be 
positive, but fails to shed light on whether the policy is sensible and justified given its impact.  
In another example, a review of Dutch SME and entrepreneur policy by Kuiper (2011), 
commissioned by EIM, spanning the 1982-2003 period, was designed as a “Policy Theory 
Evaluation”. One of its objectives was to consider the effects of the policies during the given 
period with its approach aiming to determine the implied effects of the policy’s “(implicit) 
assumptions”, and to check whether they “are consistent with the formal policy objectives – 
that is, ends sought”.   Links between policy and the changes in the country’s small business 
landscape are described, but no estimations provided. Rather, a link back to the anticipated 
policy effects is made to explain the shift in attitude. The study expressively points out the lack 
of certainty provided: “While a definite causal relationship cannot be proven, the policy shift 
probably did contribute to a definite change in perception of the public regarding the value of 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship as a valuable alternative to wage employment” 
(Kuiper, 2011, p. 50). 
It is beyond doubt that both the Finnish and Dutch impact assessments provide only limited 
insight into the schemes’ economic contribution and general impact, nonetheless they were 
cited along similar studies as examples of evaluation (here in EIM, 2009) and were chosen as 
they provide good examples for evaluation of questionable robustness finding their way to 
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policy-makers. The general evaluation literature agrees on a number of aspects of what makes 
good evaluation. Central to evaluation is a clear understanding of what a policy’s intent was.  
Like any policy, support policy is designed with certain objectives in mind (Spicker, 2006) for 
a group of identified beneficiaries (e.g. a particular sector, firm size, lifecycle stage, etc.), 
something Kuiper (2011) paid attention to by linking back the observed firm behaviour to the 
original policy’s aims. These objectives may or may not be articulated clearly. However, 
effective impact evaluation should also provide an exact understanding of the underpinning 
workings of the change initiated among beneficiaries, as argued by Khandker et al. (2010). 
They argue that programmes may indeed look beneficial (as in Kuiper’s [2011] case) and yet 
fail to deliver on the promised objectives. Evaluation is needed to identify whether the intended 
effects of a policy have materialised, so that the right conclusions for e.g. future resource 
allocation can be drawn. Cook et al. (2008) provide a similar summary on what evaluation 
does, adding specific reference to “the wider and longer-term effects on the behaviour and 
performance of those directly and indirectly involved in publicly-funded intervention”.  
Some evaluations include these additional dimensions of time, that is, the duration of effect, 
and externalities that are highlighted as desirable. Most, however, do not; the label “evaluation” 
can therefore be attached to a plethora of analyses and results with varying reliability or 
robustness.  
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2.3  Frameworks for robust evaluation 
For a better understanding of the quality of evaluations available, and also to promote more 
robust evaluations by highlighting just how low many studies would rank, a number of 
frameworks are detailed to assess just how robust a specific evaluation may be rated. These 
frameworks have found wide use within the evaluation community. The section introduces two 
of the most widely quoted frameworks which are Storey’s Six Steps framework (Storey, 1998) 
as well as the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (SMS) (Sherman et al.,1997), as  recently 
used by the What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (WWG, 2014) as the central tool 
in their evidence review. 
 
2.3.1. Storey’s Six Steps 
Storey (1998)14 expressed his concern at the state of evaluation, looking specifically at the 
small business and entrepreneurship field.  
 “Given the huge variety of schemes, the diversity of countries in which the schemes 
 are found, and the often inflated claims on the part of those administering the 
 schemes for their effectiveness, it is disappointing that the academic community has 
 been rather slow in seeking to address this area. Perhaps even more seriously, 
 where the issues have been addressed by small business academics, the methods 
 of evaluation employed have rarely been at the intellectual frontier.”  
         Storey (1998, pp. 3-4) 
 
This concern led Storey to look at the entire evaluation process. His first published work on 
this matter (Storey, 1998) covers two parts of what he perceived as important in evaluation, 
starting with the importance of clear objectives, which can be considered as SMART15 
objectives. Secondly, a robust evaluation approach was introduced, with its robustness 
measureable against a scale of available approaches. 
                                               
14
 The initial working paper was published in 1998, picked up in a number of later works by Storey which 
are referred to interchangeably in the context of the Six Steps to Heaven approach, e.g. Storey (2000).   
15
 A widely used term, SMART objectives define specific, measureable, assignable (later often stated 
as achievable), realistic and timed objectives (Doran, 1981). This concept will be returned to further 
below.  
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In detail, Storey (1998) describes clearly specified objectives as central to enabling any sort of 
evaluation. Examples of vague outcomes are provided – “creating an enterprising society” (see 
Cowie’s [2012] SBS example earlier), “maximising SMEs contribution to economic 
development”, “enhancing competiveness” and “creating jobs”. Arguably the latter is 
comparably easier to measure, certainly by comparison to the other examples. But it fails to 
be of a specific nature – how many jobs are sought?16 Without being clear on what outcomes 
were intended, it is impossible to measure them and to determine an intervention’s impact and 
effectiveness.  
This lack of defined objectives in entrepreneurship and small business policy was highlighted 
by Koning and Snijders (1992; in Storey, 1998). Considering SME policies in EU countries with 
an intention to provide a comparison of the same, the only comparable measure they found 
was the number of policies introduced for certain aspects of policy – hardly an insightful 
measure.   
Storey devised a framework where each ‘step’ provides a category of sophistication for the 
evaluation approach applied. These Six Steps can be summarised as follows, starting at the 
most basic level. The initial three steps consider qualitative analysis, where Step 1 would be 
an analysis considering scheme take-up only, Step 2 would include recipients’ opinions, Step 
3 their views on the assistance’s impact. Clearly, these approaches have their limitations, as 
they merely rely on observing the group that received a particular intervention. Steps 1-3 
therefore are described as “Monitoring”. The UNDP (2009) distinguishes between monitoring 
for the purpose of simply tracking progress of the implementation of an intervention or 
programme, and monitoring as a continuous process where frequent feedback is collected on 
progress towards specified goals. Either would be covered by Steps 1-3, however, given the 
                                               
16
 On a tangent, the argument may be extended further. It may also be questioned to what extent job 
creation is the actual aim of policy-makers – is policy really motivated by creating new jobs (and 
measured against), or is the actual motivation a reduction of unemployment (keeping in mind that new 
jobs created at one place may mean a reduction of jobs elsewhere among the competition).  Also 
“creating new jobs” does not make any reference to the quality of these – clearly jobs in some sectors 
are more desirable and ‘future-proof’ than others.  
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observed lack of clearly articulated intervention objectives in enterprise policy17 most such 
monitoring would automatically be limited to the more simple tracking approach, without a 
vision of what ultimately would define policy success.  
Steps 4-6, by comparison, are referred to as “evaluation” steps. The difference between 
monitoring and evaluation is the latter’s more rigorous and robust assessment of an activity 
(UNDP, 2009). As such, Step 4 would include the use of control groups, allowing determination 
of how non-assisted firms fared by comparison to those assisted. Step 5 further qualifies what 
would present a suitable control group through the use of a control group of matched firms, 
that is, firms with similar characteristics, so that any observed different outcome between the 
two groups can be attributed to the intervention assessed. However, differences are likely to 
remain between the groups even with the matching approach, and there may be systematic 
bias between the assisted and non-assisted groups – selection bias (the group getting 
assistance may be inherently different to firms not getting any, e.g. more proactive in 
researching their options, younger, in particular locations, etc.). Step 6 – “heaven” in Storey’s 
(1998) framework - would be achieved by an evaluation that considers and corrects such 
selection bias18.  
An example of a short-term study that would be categorised as a Step 2 (and rather weak) 
evaluation would be Kapareliotis and Zarkada (2012), who set out – among other things – to 
evaluate the impact of a female entrepreneurship training in Greece. The training programme 
is described as having been the foundation for a large-scale programme across the nation. 
Their evaluation entirely built on facilitators’ and participants’ feedback straight after course 
completion. No specifics were reported on most of their detailed evaluation objectives, 
including results against measures on “the degree to which female students could see 
                                               
17
 Fortunately, Storey (1998) and subsequent works triggered some change, with clearly defined 
objectives more common in enterprise policy now (certainly in the UK). An example is the Growth 
Voucher Programme (employing a random control trial approach, where eligible firms are randomly 
assigned to the assisted or non-assisted groups) with articulated objectives – even if not quantified (see 
BIS, 2014b, p. 5). 
18
 This limitation to six analytical steps is not without criticism, for example Roper and Hart (2003). 
Section 2.4 picks this up in detail.  
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themselves as potential entrepreneurs, having unique characteristics but being as competent 
as their male counterparts” and “[participants] attitude towards business ownership”. As such 
the difference the training made was not assessed (which would be Step 3).  
Just as demonstrated by Kapareliotis and Zarkada (2012) many evaluations provide dubious 
results failing to take into account the observable and unobservable differences between 
treated and untreated groups (Greene and Storey, 2007).  
By comparison, Cumming and Fischer (2012) conducted a far more robust assessment of the 
non-profit Innovation Synergy Centre in Markham. Founded in 2003 it provides a “one-stop 
shop” linking available advisory services of “experienced consultants and business 
professionals” with those seeking it, described as “senior managers of established 
businesses”. Expressly referring to Storey’s work (2000) on the Six Steps methodology, their 
research hypotheses are all phrased to allow for selection effects and endogeneity. As such, 
different models with Heckman’s selection correction regression were run. Their findings 
indicate a significant link between hours of advice provided and sales growth (and success 
with obtaining financing), whilst the impact on patents and alliance formation appears more 
dubious after allowing for endogeneity.  
Cumming and Fischer’s (2012) work provides one example of direct reference to the Six Steps 
framework. The framework has since been widely referred to by enterprise researchers when 
discussing the quality of evaluations, representing the enterprise policy evaluations’ gold 
standard. This has – no doubt – more recently also been helped by the OECD’s adoption of 
the Six Steps framework for its guidelines “for the evaluation of SME and entrepreneurship 
policies and programmes” in 200719.  
What Storey achieved through his articulation of a memorable grading scale for evaluations is 
a widely applied framework that leads to a more critical appraisal of both existing evaluation 
and (of) the design of planned evaluations. Arguably this has led to a wider use of techniques 
                                               
19 Storey was a co-author for OECD (2007).  
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involving the counterfactual and addressing selection bias. The OECD (2007), the World Bank 
(2010) or Cook et al. (2008)20 all provide fairly recent guides to what good evaluation should 
look like. The former two make express reference to Storey’s framework, whilst Cook et al. 
(2008) are also clear about the difference of monitoring and impact assessment. The 
assessments of Business Link21 by BERR (2007)22, Mole et al. (2008); Mole et al. (2009) and 
Mole et al. (2011) are all examples of evaluations adopting this type of evaluation framework.  
 
2.3.2. Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (SMS) 
 
The What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (WWG), a UK-based collaboration23 setup 
in late 2013 to provide insights into what policies are most effective for supporting and 
increasing local growth, chose to rely on the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale when 
conducting their review of evidence on business advice schemes (WWG, 2014). Devised by 
Sherman et al. (1997; in Hope, 2005) the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (SMS) ranks 
evaluations along five defined levels based on the methodological approach applied – and 
therefore allowing for a similar ranking as with the Six Steps approach. At a high level, the 
different levels of the SMS can be summarised as following:  
• Level 1: Where an evaluation would use cross-sectional data with no establishment of 
a counterfactual or consideration of any potential selection bias.  
• Level 2: The evaluation would consider the assessed group prior and post the 
intervention of interest, but again no use of a counterfactual or allowing for selection 
bias. 
                                               
20 As widely used within UK government departments. 
21
 Highlighted here with Business Link data also underpinning the analyses carried out for this thesis.   
22
 BERR (2007) was authored by K. Mole, M. Hart, S. Roper, D. Saal and D. Storey. As an important 
previous contribution on Business Link evaluation, It will be referred to as BERR (2007) throughout the 
thesis for easy recognition. 
23
 The What Works Centre is a collaboration between the London School of Economics and Political 
Science (LSE), Centre for Cities and Arup. It is funded by the Economic & Social Research Council, The 
Department of Communities and Local Government and The Department of Business Innovation and 
Skills. 
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• Level 3: Includes a counterfactual group, with some lose justification of how it would be 
suitable. Substantial uncontrolled differences are likely to be present despite controlling 
for some of the differences between the treated and untreated groups.  
• Level 4: Makes use of a more carefully chosen counterfactual group, and the 
comparability between treated and untreated group is well evidenced. Selection issues 
are well controlled for through control variables. Consideration of sample attrition, even 
if not corrected. 
• Level 5: Evaluations where treatment or assignment into the control group would take 
place entirely at random, with evidence provided on the comparability of the two groups. 
Control variables used should have no more than negligible impact on results24.  
The SMS was devised by researchers in the field of criminology, but as the WWG (2014) 
demonstrates, it is generally applicable to evaluation design. In their evidence review of 
business advice services (WWG, 2014) they considered 690 studies, ranking them along the 
SMS criteria. They found that only 19 could be categorised as a Level 3 evaluation, and 4 were 
Level 5 randomised control trials (with no studies found to fit Level 4 descriptors).  
Four of the 23 identified robust studies cover Business Link (BERR, 2007; Mole et al., 2008; 
Mole et al. 2009; Mole et al., 2011 – all described as Level 3 evaluations), using the same data 
that was used for matching with official sources in this thesis.  
The WWG’s work illustrates well how there is certainly a broad range of studies available, but 
the vast majority of such evaluations does not provide robust evidence – only 3.3 percent of 
the initially identified studies in the WWG’s case. MTI (2007) and Kuiper (2011), considered 
earlier, provide examples of studies failing to provide a robust understanding of the impact of 
                                               
24
 The previously highlighted current UK Growth Voucher scheme (BIS, 2014b) is one of the rare 
examples of a randomised control trial (RCT) study in business support in the UK, achieving SMS Level 
5, and registered with the American Economic Association (AEA RCT Registry, 2015). It illustrates how 
business support evaluation practice continues to develop, seeking to reach the most robust levels of 
technique. 
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their assessed measures – and yet finding their way into other publications with the intent to 
inform policy.   
 
2.4  Extending the evaluation framework(s)  
However, for all the obvious benefits and undeniable important contribution made by the Six 
Steps framework, the overriding concern is that it (or the SMS) fails to reach far enough for 
truly robust evaluation. There appears to be a real danger that the evaluation community 
possibly has lulled itself into some false sense of certainty around the robustness of its findings.   
This is not a novel concern. Possible extensions to the Six Steps framework have been 
suggested previously. Roper and Hart (2003) provided a tracker study of UK Business Link 
assisted firms in 1996, using 1994-2000 data. Following Storey’s (1998) suggestions, they 
included a non-assisted control group and accounted for selection bias, referring to PACEC 
(1998) and Cosh et al. (1996) in this context. On the basis of their findings, they expressively 
underline “the value of striving to achieve methodological paradise”. For the tracker study this 
included accounting for various factors beyond actual assistance. Guided by previous research 
– for example Storey (1994), Barkham et al. (1996), Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2001; in Roper 
and Hart, 2003) – market conditions, business strategy, characteristics of the owner-manager 
and firm are all emphasised as influencing firm performance (e.g. employment, turnover or 
productivity growth). The Six Steps framework would, on paper, rank an evaluation that 
excluded such environmental factors as high as Roper and Hart’s (2003) study that does 
include those environmental factors. Arguably, the inclusion of such environmental factors 
simply represents good econometric practice and does not require specific mention in an 
evaluation framework. The very same could, however, be argued around using the 
counterfactual and addressing potential selection bias, both aspects that the evaluation 
frameworks specifically make reference to. These also certainly represent nothing more but 
good econometric practice.  
- 37 - 
 
What was found to be of particular interest in Hart and Roper (2003) is their call for government 
to continue prioritising well maintained databases of “clients” (that is, firms that interacted with 
support outlets). The authors are clear in expressing the contribution such solid data makes to 
robust evaluation – arguing that without the “longitudinal databases specifically constructed for 
this purpose” they would have been unable to distinguish assistance and selection effects. 
This reference to a longitudinal database highlights an interesting aspect – that of time. 
 
2.4.1 Evaluation objectives and the role of time 
Storey (1998) attaches considerable weight to the importance of clear objectives for a policy 
intervention which later serve as reference points for evaluation. As previously referred to, 
Doran (1981) provided the most widely known criteria for defining good, or more appropriately, 
smart objectives. Smart objectives, Doran (1981) argued, are to be specific, measureable, 
assignable (later often stated as achievable), realistic and timed objectives. Storey (1998), and 
subsequently Cook et al. (2008), the OECD (2007) and the World Bank (2009) all call for well-
defined objectives to be put in place ex-ante. This would then allow later evaluation to exactly 
estimate the desired programme effects.  
Considering the individual SMART criteria, it is clear that for good evaluation specific objectives 
are called for. As these specific objectives are expressively required to allow later evaluation, 
they are also intended to be of measurable nature. Depending on the chosen definition of the 
letter ‘A’ in SMART, business support programme objectives are both to be assignable and 
possibly achievable – the latter as proven or disproven by the subsequent evaluation carried 
out. The former, assignable, is implied by the nature of these programme objectives: The 
interest lies in the impact of support provided, as such the objectives are seen as the 
consequence of the support. Objectives may be more or less realistic, this can only be based 
on previous evidence of similar schemes, and it is unlikely that policy-makers or evaluators 
would set themselves too aspirational objectives – unless they would receive some sort of gain 
from doing so, of course. Certainly though, business support evaluations have shown that not 
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all programmes make a positive contribution, but whether that is due to honest error or 
unrealistic objectives (out of whatever motivation, and around impact on the assessed 
measures) remains unknown.  
Simplistically said, the interest here is with the T of SMART in objective setting. When are the 
defined objectives to be achieved? What is the duration of the desired effects? Evaluations 
appear to be carried out on the basis of the belief that at the point of evaluation, programme 
effects have been achieved. None of the literature presented in Section 2.6 justifies its choice 
of timing, or states that it makes an assumption of impact having been achieved. It must be 
made implicitly, as otherwise an evaluation would be of little sense. Programme impact may 
not be measureable if assessed too early, or it may fade in the long-term. And even if 
measureable, would the strength of impact be constant over time? There may be instances, 
for example, where programmes have an initial positive or negative effect on performance, and 
the reverse in the longer term. King and Behrman (2009) provide one of the few examples of 
a specific call for considering the impact timescales as part of the evaluation design. 
Because of the importance of impact having been realised (and continuing) just as the 
evaluation is being carried out, this implicit assumption of evaluating at the right point in time 
should certainly be explained by evaluators. Why would the chosen point of time for evaluation 
be reasonable in the context of their scheme assessed? In fact, no evaluations – based on the 
author’s review of the evidence – appear to provide such rationale for their timing.   
The question whether the role of timing of an (business support) evaluation is rightfully ignored, 
or highlights a certain naivety or ignorance by researchers and those commissioning research, 
is inevitable. The answer is likely to be linked two central concerns faced by evaluators. Along 
with data availability, political considerations and pressures play an important role here, and 
this is discussed in Section 2.7.  
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2.5  Step seven to heaven?25 
 
“When setting performance targets, governments and agencies appear to rely often on short-
term indicators to measure what is inevitably long-term change. This can be counter-productive 
when there is also a tendency towards policy and programme implementation to be ‘target 
driven’ to achieve an easily measurable definition of success in the shorter term.”  
       Bridge and O’Neill (2013, p. 308) 
 
SME and entrepreneurship policies fall into two broad categories: They can aim at providing 
‘hard’ financial support, or ‘soft’ non-financial26 support. The evidence around the latter will be 
considered, seeking to draw on examples of evaluations of non-UK schemes where possible.  
Of particular interest is the length of the time covered by the evaluations between the business 
receiving the assistance and the evaluation occurring.  
At the outset of this review the concern is that whilst evaluations of non-financial business 
support exist, these normally only cover a limited time span with the evaluation being 
undertaken within a year or two of the intervention.  They would, therefore, be entirely robust 
from a SMS or Six Steps perspective, but limited to a very short-time frame post intervention. 
Hence despite technical robustness, they would be potentially of limited value in terms of 
understanding and assessing impact. 
Bridge and O’Neill (2013) are concerned about this perceived short-term focus of evaluation, 
and numerous similar commentaries to the same effect exist. Schwartz (2009), with focus on 
                                               
25
 The long-term evaluation literature review (from this point to the end of the chapter) was prepared by 
the author for the BIS funded “Feasibility Study – Exploring the long-term impacts of business 
improvement services”, (a number of conference papers resulted from this, e.g. ISBE 2013, NCSB 2014, 
and the main report is available by the Enterprise Research Centre Report No. 29 Mark Hart as the 
principal investigator reviewed the write-up of the literature and edited some sections, but the core of 
the work and narrative presented here is the author’s. 
26
 Examples of financial support would include loan guarantee schemes, start-up funding (which may 
aim at particular industries or groups of society) and innovation support for particular technologies; 
examples of non-financial “soft” support would include business advice provision, training and education 
measures (e.g. to foster an enterprise culture). 
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the impact of incubators, finds that “it is surprising that empirical evidence is very limited” once 
the intervention is over. Chrisman et al. (2005) are concerned that “most of the [outsider 
assistance] studies that have been done to date focus only on short-term, rather than long-
term, impacts (…)”. So whilst there is often a desire for the effectiveness of a new scheme to 
be considered, there is a concern that it is too short a time period since the intervention and 
this limits the chance of the impact of any intervention to have been fully realised.  
This argument is also made by, for example, Lundström and Stevenson (2005) who stress the 
importance of taking into account any time-lag that may exist between an intervention and its 
impact. Shapira (2001), considering manufacturing advice services in the US, is concerned 
that those advice services that would create longer term and less tangible results, such as 
training, would look comparably worse than those services that yield more immediate gains, 
for example the reduction of energy consumed, and are therefore sooner to observe and “more 
readily measureable”. The OECD (2007) also highlights this difference in time-spans between 
intervention and potential impact for the diverse forms of assistance.  
The review of a decade of entrepreneurship policy in the Netherlands (EIM, 2009), and in 
particular entrepreneurship programmes at school, found that holistic and consistent 
evaluations for the programme are missing. It concluded the ideal scenario would be one 
where a longitudinal investigation would be conducted assessing “before and after the 
educational programmes”.27  
Similarly, the earlier economic impact study of the English Business Link offer concluded that 
one of its two main limitations is its restriction to an 18-24 month period for impact assessment 
following the original intervention (BERR, 2007). More than half of the firms surveyed for that 
study suggested that the benefits from the Business Link advice will occur beyond that time 
frame, leading the authors to indicate that the true impact may have been understated in their 
study – see also Mole et al. (2008); Mole et al. (2009) and Mole et al. (2011). Their 
                                               
27
 It is remarkable just how little reference to policy evaluation is made throughout the different sections 
of this EIM (2009) report, considering it’s a review of a decade of global entrepreneurship policy.  
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recommendation, therefore, was to return to the sample to add longitudinal performance 
information at a later stage28.  
Step 7 = Time? 
It also appears that existing evaluations provide no justification for the chosen points in time 
for measurement and evaluation (see also King and Behrman, 2009). That may appear 
surprising, as this lack of discussion results in the implicit assumption of an intervention’s 
impact being linear over time, and observable pretty much with immediate effect29.  
Usually, where the timing of evaluation is discussed, the considerations focus around ex-ante 
and ex-post evaluations (Cowie, 2012). Whilst an important consideration, as ex-post 
evaluations may miss ex-ante design issues, it does not address the concern about the timing 
applied as part of the ex-post evaluation process.  
Cook et al., (2008) provide a good summary of the state of evaluation specifically with 
regards to time, referring to the longer-term effects as persistence effects.  
 “Benefits from interventions last for different periods of time – some benefits occur 
 only while the intervention is in place, others last well beyond its completion. […] 
 Despite the importance of persistence effects, it is rare for evaluations to them into 
 account or even discuss them. The consequence is that interventions with very 
 different persistence effects end up being treated much the same.  
 And that makes no sense at all.”        
         Cook et al. (2008, p.11) 
 
  
                                               
28
 The current UK Growth Voucher scheme is taking time into consideration to some extent: “Every 
business that participates in the Growth Vouchers programme will be monitored to 
examine their progress over the next two to three years.” (BIS, 2014b, p. 5), suggesting the intention of 
a (short) longitudinal evaluation, to the end of 2016. 
29
 Section 2.7 considers data availability and importantly political expediency concerns as likely reasons 
explaining this problem.  
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2.6  Systematic literature review of long-term evaluations 
A broad desire for longer-term impact analysis appears evident. There is concern that 
"persistence effects" may not be captured by what are usually fairly short timespans between 
an intervention and subsequent evaluation. 
This section of the chapter serves to test these claims, by means of a systematic literature 
review looking for examples of long-term impact evaluations of non-financial support. 
Importantly, the studies are reviewed as to whether they offer any explanation for the chosen 
timing and time frame applied. Any studies that allowed for a longer time period between the 
measured intervention and observed effects were also of interest for insights into appropriate 
methodological approaches to conduct such long-term evaluation. 
  
2.6.1  Methodology of long-term evaluations literature review 
A literature review to identify to what extent evidence on the long-term effects of non-financial 
government interventions exists in the small business policy area was carried out. The 
literature review was undertaken systematically using the following processes: 
• A database search using common relevant search terms for the area of interest, 
including multiple combinations of “business support”, “non-financial”, “assistance”, 
“small firm”, “policy”, “advice centre”.  
• An online search for relevant publications outside academic journals, specifically those 
of governments or other relevant bodies, such as the European Commission and 
OECD.  
• A search combining above keywords with identified support scheme names.  This was 
done for all international schemes considered in Mole and Bramley (2006), based on 
the assumption that the schemes considered at Mole and Bramley’s (2006) time of 
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writing would have existed sufficiently in the past for the long-term impact to have been 
reflected upon.  
• An attempt to do the above steps in German language was also undertaken to partially 
negate the risk of all non-English language research being overlooked30.  
• For any relevant longitudinal evaluations identified through the above steps, other 
articles cited in the paper were checked (on the assumption that the probably small 
number of long-term evaluations is likely to refer to the potential limited body of 
evidence existing).  
As outlined above, most known UK evaluations for non-financial small firm support consider 
impact of schemes for up to two years after intervention. Therefore, those studies that assess 
impact for at least three years after the original intervention will be considered as long-term. 
For comparison, and especially for methodological reasons, some research from outside the 
specific focus of non-financial assistance will then be reviewed. As noted earlier, no distinction 
will be made between primarily entrepreneurship policies and those aimed at existing small 
businesses; methodologically evaluations of both kinds are of equal interest.  
Given the different levels of sophistication and accordingly potential value, when reviewing the 
somewhat limited existing evidence of long-term impact by non-financial schemes for small 
firms, particular attention was paid to those that would be considered as evaluations rather 
than monitoring studies, as defined above. Of particular interest were the methodologies 
applied by such evaluations, and the data they draw upon. 
 
                                               
30
 This was determined by available language skills more than anything else, but given the economic 
significance and strength of German SMEs, Germany certainly provides a sound reference case for the 
state of evaluation of business support.  
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2.6.2  Review of the evidence of long-term evaluations of non-financial schemes 
Broadly, long-term evaluations of non-financial interventions for small firms fall into the 
following broad categories – just as studies for short-term impact do: 
• Qualitative – Survey of firms subject to intervention in the past with/-out control group 
• Quantitative – Analysis based on firm performance data with/-out control group 
• Quantitative – A combination of survey and firm performance data with/-out control group 
• Other – that is, the Dutch “policy theory evaluation”, as described in Section 2.2. 
Evaluations can be of very different quality. The OECD’s (2007) approach using Storey’s 
(2000) Six Steps framework (as reviewed earlier) was used to judge the sophistication of an 
evaluation. 
As expected, there were very few robust studies of the long-term impact of non-financial 
support programmes to small firms. Indeed there was a limited body of long-term impact 
studies of business support policies, even when including those centred around the provision 
of financial support, among government sources and bodies such as the OECD and the 
European Commission.  
However, some reviews have been undertaken that can be described as somewhat more 
sophisticated. For example, Gladys and Tan’s (2010) work for the World Bank, which provides 
a selection of impact evaluations of SME programmes, many with robust econometric 
methods.  Long-term impact studies for financial support seem more popular with researchers, 
with financial support easier to measure (and data more readily available).  Notwithstanding, 
there are still few comprehensive studies overall, especially when considering the proportion 
of government expenditure dedicated to them.  Given the potential methodological relevance 
of these, a number of the studies will certainly inform methodology of the empirical research 
to be undertaken. Table 1 provides a summary of some noteworthy contributions that should 
be considered for the design of long-term evaluations. These will be considered in some detail 
before concluding with some broader observations from the review. 
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2.6.3  Selected existing long-term studies in detail 
Table 1 details the key points from seven studies. Their common denominator for inclusion 
here is that all of them present some form of long-term evaluation. They represent evaluations 
that span several years and therefore taking that longer term perspective few studies do. This 
thesis’ focus is on the impact of non-financial support. In reviewing the studies it was decided 
to also include a couple of identified long-term financial support studies – based on the scarcity 
of appropriate long-term evidence available.   
For the in-depth review of these seven studies a number of criteria were identified for 
consideration in line with this thesis’ research objectives. Specific criteria of interest were the 
data sample and its source, how potential selection bias was addressed, the reasoning 
provided for the chosen time frame evaluated, and whether evaluation was based on two or 
multiple measurements (that is whether the long-term average effect was estimated or a profile 
of impact over time created, by comparing numerous time intervals for each measure 
available). These criteria are reflected in the summary material presented in Table 1. 
 
All schemes highlighted in Table 1 were found to be of methodological relevance and can 
serve as a representative selection of appropriate case-studies on the limited volume of 
literature available in this field. Methodologically the studies presented here are strong when 
compared to Storey’s Six Steps of the SMS, with the exception of Chrisman et al. (2005) given 
their lack of a control group.  
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Table 1 – Selected long-term evaluations (methodologically of interest) 
Author(s) Country Evaluation 
span 
Reasons 
provided for 
chosen 
evaluation 
horizon 
Scheme 
type 
Methodological 
highlights Data in detail Key Finding 
Non-financial support schemes 
Rotger et 
al. (2012) Denmark 
5 years (firm 
performance); 
7 years (firm 
survival 
Data 
availability. 
Authors 
clearly 
articulate 
desire to 
return to 
studied 
cohort with 
more data 
(p.516).  
Pre-start 
advice 
Use of official micro 
data. Data linking. Non-
parametric approach 
and propensity scoring 
(i.e. selection concerns 
addressed). "impact" 
profile for three years. 
N=464/609. 
Official micro 
data provides 
information on 
firm setup date, 
turnover, 
number of staff 
and exit date. 
Sample size 
464-609 (dep. 
on cohort). 
Scheme positive 
for survival, less 
pronounced so 
for growth. Call 
for RCTs.  
Wren, 
Storey 
(2002) 
UK 2-8 years  N/A Marketing 
advice 
Extensive 
econometrics, selection 
issues tackled 
(Heckman two stage). 
Survival, employment 
and turnover as 
outcome measures. 
Analysis based on two 
data points for growth. 
N=2840/4326. 
Data as 
captured via 
follow-up 
surveys (41 
percent return 
rate). Survival 
cross-checked 
e.g. with BT 
directory.   
Results differ, 
highest positive 
impact found for 
10-80 employee 
firms, with no 
impact for the 
smallest firms. 
Chrisman 
et al. 
(2005) 
US 5-9 years N/A Pre-start 
advice 
No control group, 
regression of hours of 
assistance and a 
number 
sales/employment 
growth controls. 
Selection issues 
discussed and 
representativeness of 
sample concluded. 
N=159, split 
across three 
cohorts. 28 
percent 
response rate. 
Limitations of 
data 
recognised. 
Significant 
impact of 
scheme, but 
diminishing 
marginal 
effectiveness 
with potential 
negative overall 
impact in case of 
too much 
assistance 
Chrisman 
et al. 
(2012) 
US 5-7 years N/A Counselling/Education 
Regression incl. 
hierarchal analysis. 
Selection issue 
discounted for given 
dataset. 
N=256. Data 
from follow-up 
survey, 12 
percent 
response rate. 
NOTE: 
"Although the 
response 
rate was lower 
than we would 
have wished, it 
is not 
inconsistent with 
other studies 
using a 
longitudinal 
survey design." 
Entrepreneurship 
education has 
positive link to 
start-up rate, 
counselling 
impacts firm 
performance. 
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Table 1 (continued) – Selected long-term evaluations (methodologically of interest) 
Author(s) Country Evaluation 
span 
Reasons provided 
for chosen 
evaluation horizon 
Scheme 
type 
Methodological 
highlights Data in detail Key Finding 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Development 
(MED, 2009) 
New 
Zealand 7 years 
Data availability: 
"our analysis is 
restricted to 2000-
2006 because of 
the 
coverage of the 
[database used]." 
Not strictly 
non-
financial: 
Funds 
provide to 
access 
expertise. 
Use of official 
micro data. Data 
linking. Wide 
range of other 
support controlled 
for. (Significant) 
selection issues 
accounted for, 
panel models and 
propensity score 
matching.  
Assisted N=1130, 
assessed against 
total NZ firm 
population 
(N=700k-1050k).  
Most robust long-
term study 
identified. All 
methods used 
suggest a 
generally positive 
impact on firm 
growth. One-off 
impacts 
observed.  
Financial support schemes 
Criscuolo et 
al. (2012) UK 19 years 
"Because the 
objective of RSA 
is to increase 
employment, we 
are interested in 
the long run effect 
of treatment rather 
than the short-run 
effects that occur 
while the firm 
receives RSA." 
Regional 
Selective 
Assistance 
programme 
Use of official 
micro data. Data 
linking. Selection 
addressed. Value 
for money. . 
N>2m (UK firm 
population).  
Scheme effective 
for smaller firms, 
no effect on firms 
with more than 
150 staff. 
Almus, 
Prantl (2001) Germany 6-9 years 
Mid-term study 
justified by the 
need to look 
beyond short-term 
effects which are 
believed to fail 
capturing the full 
magnitude of 
impact (despite 
being common 
evaluation 
standard).  
Broad 
financial 
support 
Half yearly data 
1990-1993 with 
1999 follow-up 
survey. Firm 
matching and 
propensity scoring 
to address 
selection/for 
control reasons.  
N=12k.  
Overall positive 
scheme impact, 
including better 
survival chances.  
 
The central observation relevant to this chapter are the considerations provided by the authors 
around their chosen time frames. Three of the five non-financial support studies fail to make 
any reference to timing of their study. MED (2009) refer to data availability considerations. 
Rotger et al. (2012) also point at data availability, but clearly expressing their desire to return 
to their dataset with more years of data in the future. Theirs is the only study therefore that 
does imply that evaluation timing could be of relevance, and on that basis they express their 
desire for more performance data to return to their analysis. The referenced financial support 
studies are of interest as they provide examples of express considerations around the timing 
of their evaluation. Criscuolo et al. (2012) with their evaluation of the Regional Selective 
Assistance programme make reference to the programme’s objectives, in explaining that 
“because the objective of RSA is to increase employment, we are interested in the long run 
effect of treatment rather than the short-run effects that occur while the firm receives RSA”. 
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Almus and Prantl (2001) in turn argue that their concern would be a failure to capture the full 
impact of their assessed scheme if undertaking a short-term study, even if that short-termism 
was standard for the evaluation literature. Both studies stop short of providing any evidence 
around their perceived need for taking a longer term view. Overall, the identified long-term 
evaluations illustrate the gap in current non-financial business support studies to properly 
consider the impact of their evaluation timing. This is a particularly curious finding given the 
authors’ obviously decided to undertake long-term evaluation for an unstated reason. 
The concern around data availability was raised previously in this chapter, and is referred to 
by a couple of the above studies also. The underlying sample sizes for some of the studies 
confirm this struggle. Those studies that worked with follow-up surveys to the assisted firms 
several years after the intervention struggled with low return rates (12% in the extreme), even 
if described by the authors as in-line with expectations. By comparison, sample size increases 
(and by large multiples) for those studies that used follow-up data as available from official 
sources: national firm registers and databases. MED (2009) and Criscuolo et al. (2012) rely on 
entire nations’ firm populations as control group.  The studies in Table 1 highlight another 
problem with follow-up surveys. Whilst such survey usually only looks establishing 
performance for a given time period, official databases allow to access annual data, allowing 
to understand the profile of any impact in better detail across the years. The case for and use 
of micro data will be considered in Chapter 3 in more detail. 
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2.6.4  Summary of the wider evaluation literature review findings 
 
A summary of the key findings of the broader literature review is as follows: 
- As already highlighted earlier in this chapter, robust policy evaluation in the field of 
business support policy has been called for (repeatedly) by several leading authors and 
bodies, with e.g. the OECD (2007) in their recent “OECD Framework for the Evaluation 
of SME and Entrepreneurship Policies and Programmes”, or the World Bank (2010) 
making the case for the evaluation of support schemes. 
 
- One of the key concerns with the evaluations, particularly the few long-term ones, is 
the use of self-reported impact. This self-assessment, among other factors such as a 
firm’s satisfaction, perceived difference and additionality of programme, etc. is likely to 
be highly subjective, and lead to both over- and underestimations of impact. 
 
- Studies drawing on performance data of firms such as sales and employment growth 
would be considered more reliable in that respect. Lambrecht and Pirnay (2005), 
assessing free consultancy days for a SME programme in the Walloon Region of 
Belgium, highlight the discrepancy between firms’ reported satisfaction (found to be 
favourable) and measurable performance effects – finding no significant impact of the 
programme on net job creation, turnover or financial indicators.  
 
- Key constraint to evaluation is data availability, and required long-term planning. Data 
samples tend to be small and covering specific and quite local geographies, and 
therefore the ability to generalise findings is constrained. 
 
- Increasing availability of micro-data on firms requires only the details of treated firms 
(some controls and characteristics should be available), and can then be linked to 
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performance without a need for liaising with firms. Data linking also enables the use of 
much larger samples. 
- Highlights some studies benefitting from data linking (all, by nature, longitudinal) for 
Denmark and New Zealand, however, e.g. Japan has also seen the use of data linking 
for business support evaluation (Motohashi, 2002).  
 
There were also a number of observations of interest from identified short-term evaluations 
(even if the focus was on long-term evaluations for the review): 
- Selection issues are mostly considered and treated (the latter not in the case of 
Lambrecht and Pirnay above), for instance Storey (2000) with the “Six Steps to 
Heaven” framework was very influential in pushing the wider use of this. 
 
- Selection bias is often addressed through Heckman’s two-stage model, but there is 
appetite for further advancement of methods in many studies. 
 
- Just as Heckman’s selection model has become part of the state of the art standard in 
recent years, methodologies including difference-in-difference models, instrument 
variables and propensity score matching for control purposes have all become 
widespread practice in quantitative business support evaluations. 
 
- The number of interventions and participation in other assistance programmes of an 
individual firm is vital information (the attribution problem), but difficult if not impossible 
to capture. The longer the timespan an evaluation covers, the more concern this 
causes. There are examples of studies, such as for New Zealand (MED 2009), where 
firm participation in a considerable number of schemes, additional to the one evaluated, 
was captured and controlled for.  
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 Figure 1 – Other issues with robust “sixth step” evaluations 
 
  
Issues - other than time - with robust “sixth step” evaluations 
Other problems with evaluation remain. A Step 6 evaluation along Storey’s Six Steps framework, 
with measurements taken at one or preferably multiple carefully justified points in time (assuming 
that is at all possible) will still be only a technically most robust evaluation, but will be able to 
provide no better insights than what was measured. It is reasonable to assume that not all effects 
of policy are measureable.  
Also, concerns remain about whether defined objectives appropriately reflect the expectations 
by both policy initiators and evaluators. Greene and Storey (2007) criticise what they refer to as 
the treatment of enterprise programmes as “black boxes”; in essence an evaluation construct 
where inputs such as the firm or individual are compared to the outputs (growth, survival, etc.). 
This is done to estimate the additionality of the intervention in question, but fails to account for 
the context in which the evaluation took place. Greene and Storey’s (2007) concern is that the 
expectations between those evaluating and those evaluated may deviate. On the one side 
evaluators’ objectives may be anything from attempting an objective and robust impact 
evaluation of the support provided, to using the evaluation as a mere medium to establish closer 
bonds with the evaluated. On the other hand, the evaluated may not be providing objective 
inputs due to fear of consequences (e.g. if the evaluation’s results are feared to result in the 
termination of the assessed support programme). Alongside, the financiers of an evaluation may 
have a vested interest in the outcome of the evaluation. Often evaluations are paid for by those 
who initiated a particular programme, and it is reasonable to assume that in many (political) 
circumstances a certain positive or negative outcome may be hoped for by the funders (and 
possibly explain their interest in the evaluation being undertaken at all). Further, funders may 
not have articulated programme objectives and therefore not measured and assessed these – 
Greene and Storey (2007) provide the example of funders saying they are interested in 
programme outcomes, but not highlighting the fact that they were hoping to improve the 
managerial processes used by the programme. In consequence, funders may then ignore the 
evaluation findings, claiming they are irrelevant or, worse, not delivering the “correct” message 
(van der Meer, 1999; Weiss, 1999; in Greene and Storey, 2007).  
A further concern with programme evaluation, however robust, is its failure to address the 
relative merit of one programme over another. Whilst a specific intervention may yield results 
favourable over the counterfactual, that result cannot serve as confirmation of a programme 
being an (or in fact the most) appropriate intervention. 
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2.7  Discussion and conclusion 
The summary by Cook et al. (2008 – as quoted at the end of Section 2.5) remains valid even 
when considering recent evaluation evidence. Evaluators suggest certainty around the impact 
of an intervention based on assessment time frames that are usually fairly short, and, far more 
concerning, not at all explained or justified. It does make “no sense at all” that, regardless of 
the nature of an intervention and regardless of its target group, there is hardly any discussion 
as to how timing was chosen. As explored in Section 2.4 there are calls for applying a longer 
time frame, however.  
Of course, there are good reasons for how evaluation is currently undertaken and timed. Firstly, 
the interest in a particular scheme’s success fades over time, as the policy environment moves 
on. Policy-makers are keen to understand effects quickly. Funding for evaluations is usually 
awarded close to an intervention taking place, not years later.  
Other reasons include the issue of access to data. Even if an evaluation is undertaken 
numerous years after an evaluation, the data captured as part of an intervention will usually 
not stretch much beyond the intervention period. Interest in capturing and maintaining data 
over numerous years is limited, as political and organisational changes may quickly render 
previous policies (and interest in them) obsolete. Capturing data retrospectively through 
surveys is very costly and relies on the willingness and ability of participants to remember their 
participation in the scheme of interest and provide the required insights into their business (and 
it still requires researchers to be able to identify a list of participants to survey)31.  An alternative 
approach would be for qualitative evaluation (Done et al., 2011), but that will always be limited 
to insights based on few firms, and possibly subjective data.  
With the intention to explore long-term evaluation of non-financial business support this thesis 
also ran into data availability issues. Originally, for the purpose of this thesis, it was agreed 
with BIS to work with assistance data from the UK Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). 
                                               
31
 For example, Cowie (2005), describes data collection as a key issue for any evaluating body. 
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However, by the time the funding for this research was approved and the work on this thesis 
commenced, the RDAs were preparing for their March 2012 closure and their data had become 
unobtainable for BIS32.  
In fact, the following analysis, whilst drawing on Business Link data, has been mainly funded 
to investigate the feasibility of long-term impact evaluation and to set out some methodological 
lessons for future work. With Business Link now reduced to a website, there is little appetite in 
government to understand the impact on firms originally assisted under the intervention over 
a decade ago. Other than the remaining website offer, the scheme has been replaced by 
Growth Accelerator (which in turn was set for closure at the time of printing this thesis). 
Attention has now turned to assessing its impact with the use of self-reported evaluation 
surveys undertaken independently (BIS, 2014c). However, lessons appear not to have been 
learnt as the short-term evaluation work points to a ‘positive impact’ of Growth Accelerator, yet 
such an assessment would not be ranked highly by the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (as 
in WWG, 2014) or Storey’s Six Steps framework. In addition to the main critique around the 
use of the self-reported data for, in the case of the Growth Accelerator evaluation, economic 
impact analysis and gross value added estimates is that in this instance firms were essentially 
asked to provide estimates about anticipated effects in the future as a result of programme 
participation.  
The danger that emanates from this lack of debate around the actual timing of an evaluation 
is that results are almost always presented with some certainty and confidence that “Scheme 
A was effective”, “Scheme B was not”. In response to the literature reviewed in this chapter 
and the observed short-term frames generally applied for evaluation – despite critical voices 
that long-term evaluation may be required – it needs to be empirically tested whether the 
accurate conclusion drawn from such evaluations would not be more accurately reflected by 
“Scheme A was effective for the one year period assessed, but there is no evidence to suggest 
                                               
32
 This particular challenge with preparing this thesis is revisited in Chapter Three.  
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that this snapshot in time reflects the final truth about the effectiveness of the scheme (if there 
is such thing at all)”.  
Such results would not only be quite a mouthful, but also unlikely to resonate well with research 
funders33. From their perspective, there are some obvious questions to respond to about the 
claim that time matters for evaluation purposes – in line with the research hypotheses as 
introduced previously. In line with the contributions of this thesis as specified in Chapter One, 
what is required is:  
1) Robust evidence demonstrating that short-term results do not necessarily tell the whole 
story. 
2) A methodology that facilitates a workable approach to long-term evaluation.  
The next chapter will introduce such methodology and the datasets that form the basis of my 
thesis, with the analysis and evidence undertaken presented in the chapters that follow.  
  
                                               
33
 Policy-makers met during the course of this PhD at various conferences and events were always 
reasonably keen to get an absolute response, that is, “Scheme A was effective”, or “Scheme A was 
not effective”. It is also questionable whether research results that include such caveats would be cited 
with the limitations specified – often literature reviews omit such limitations.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Developing a long-term evaluation framework  
– Methodology & Data 
 
 
The previous chapter highlights the apparent gap and desirability for long-term evaluation of 
business support programmes. This desire works against two main opposing forces. Firstly, 
political pressure will always mean a keen interest by government and other support bodies to 
quickly gain evidence on a scheme’s impact. Secondly, on the technical site, data availability 
presents a key obstacle for undertaking longitudinal impact assessments.  
 
This chapter seeks to address the second of above-mentioned forces, and presents a 
methodological approach and the datasets required that allow such an evaluation of a business 
advice programme from intervention through to the present. In this thesis, the intervention in 
question took place in 2003. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.1.1 Research methodology 
 
This section serves the purpose of briefly reviewing the research philosophy subscribed to in 
this thesis, prior to detailing the research methodology in detail in subsequent sections of this 
chapter. The purpose of this thesis is to test a number of hypotheses, that is, what is believed 
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to be true, and confirm or reject them to add to what is known to be true, as described by the 
term ‘epistemology’. To reach this truth, the distinction is made between two major research 
philosophies: positivism and interpretivism. Positivists subscribe to a reality that is observable, 
constant and – importantly – can be described objectively and without interfering with the 
subject of interest. As a result, observations would be repeatable, and individual factors 
influencing the result could be seen in isolation. On the basis of the observations and the 
understanding of reality formed, predictions can be made. By comparison, interpretivists 
subscribe to a reality that can only be properly understood through subjective interpretation of 
observations and engaging with reality. As such interpretivists may affect and interact with their 
subjects of interest through their studies, and also end up with multiple interpretations of reality 
– all equally valid and jointly informing scientific knowledge. Both research philosophies have 
their place, and in fact mixed methods research combining positivist and interpretivist 
methodologies are common. 
There are a number of factors why this particular piece of research takes a positivist stance. 
Most importantly, one of the central motivations for this piece of research is to work with a large 
longitudinal sample – investigating the use of available secondary data without the need to 
consult the firms involved. The difficulties around surveying thousands of firms over multiple 
years and the resource-intensity of doing so are considered as one of the key barriers to long-
term impact studies (more detail on this in the next section). An interpretivist stance for 
research on such a number of firms over multiple years would be even less likely in practical 
terms. Importantly, the belief is held that given the large number of firms within the sample 
available for this research, a reasonable fair and representative picture of reality can be drawn. 
A mixed methods approach would have been desirable to understand some of the firms’ 
developments better, and particularly the role of the business support received over time. What 
this positivist research will do is to average out effects and provide an idea of the general broad 
effects of business support. However, it will fail to provide a good understanding of the multiple 
individual experiences had by firms and groups of firms. An interpretivist approach may be 
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able to uncover some of the reasons as to why business support has been (or failed to) be of 
impact over time. However, as the firm data was only to be made available in anonymised 
format, identifying specific firms from within the sample was impossible – even if desirable to 
allow for a more inclusive use of research philosophies.  
 
3.1.2 Introduction to the methodology chosen 
 
With that in mind, a study seeking to investigate the long-term impact of an intervention 
(assistance) on firm performance has limited methodological options. The previous quantitative 
research introduced in Chapter Two draws exclusively on surveys of firms, whether specifically 
conducted for the presented study or as secondary data. The survey underpinning the 
Business Link evaluation in 2006 (BERR, 2007; the resulting dataset was also used in Mole et 
al., 2008; Mole et al., 2009 and Mole et al., 2011) would be an obvious example of such an 
approach, which is also recommended in Wren and Storey (2002) and Chrisman et al. (2005). 
Based on those previous studies, the desired approach to evaluate a business support 
intervention would be to undertake a survey of assisted firms, and for a more robust design, 
also of comparable non-assisted firms. 
 
As part of the review of how previous research may influence the approach chosen here, the 
findings of Chrisman et al. (2005) are of particular interest. They follow up from a previous 
survey, approaching those assisted individuals that indicated that they had started a business 
following pre-start-up advice received. But: The analysis is not based on data from both 
surveys, and uses only the second wave of results. Depending on what was covered by the 
first wave survey a time profile could have been created and analysed across the data points 
shared between the two surveys. The potential to cover such developmental dynamics 
potentially holds considerable value, but as explored in previous chapters, hardly any 
examples exist that take into consideration the time profile of impact in the previous literature.  
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The technical difficulty (ignoring political expediency issues at this point) for policy-makers and 
researchers to develop such an impact profile across a number of years is the requirement to 
gather data for a number of intervals – for business performance this means for a number of 
years. The “traditional” survey approach as mentioned above and chosen by previous research 
is highly resource intense if undertaken once, let alone if it needs to be repeated for numerous 
years. To obtain a sample with significant statistical power, a large number of firms would need 
to be included, in order to allow for firms dropping out throughout the process (whether due to 
an unwillingness to further participate, mergers or firm deaths). The willingness by policy-
makers to fund the required resources to carry out a number of survey waves is likely to fade 
over the years, as schemes might become unfashionable and/or governments change. This is 
also linked to the political expediency issue – administrators focus on fairly immediate insights. 
And clearly, with the lack of examples of previous research into the long-term impact of 
business support, these problems pose a considerable challenge.  
 
With the aim of exploring the long-term evaluation of non-financial business support this thesis 
also ran into data availability issues. Originally, for the purpose of this thesis, it was agreed 
with BIS to work with assistance data from the UK Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). 
However, by the time the funding for this research was approved and the work on this thesis 
commenced, the RDAs were preparing for their March 2012 closure and their legacy data had 
become unobtainable by BIS. Public bodies evolve all the time, so this experience is unlikely 
to be a one-off but given the scale of the public investment in the RDAs this is an indication of 
the inability of government to cope with the short-term re-arrangement of governance 
structures.  
 
With research so far limited to the short-term perspective, a new approach has to be explored 
that goes beyond what previous research has previously attempted. This thesis explores an 
approach based on data linking, using existing (that is, secondary) data as an alternative to 
the above way of (repeated) surveying. It aims to provide an assessment of the relative 
- 59 - 
 
strengths and limitations of such an approach. The reliance on secondary data for a 
comparably large sample, with no need to engage with firms directly for data collection 
purposes, holds obvious advantages. Primary data collection would be both time-intense and 
costly, and these time and monetary considerations often lead to what are relatively small 
samples informing the analysis (and fairly soon post intervention).  It also allows for the 
relatively straightforward evaluation of schemes since abandoned, or delivered by a since 
defunct body, as with the case of the RDAs. However, a transfer of the inventory of assisted 
firms to the relevant government department or body would still be required, something that 
was too late to initiate in case of the RDA data (for the UK that would be BIS in 2015, for the 
2003 intervention assessed herein, as introduced below, the then Department of Trade and 
Industry [DTI], replaced in 2007 by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform [BERR])34. 
 
In summary, a single business support product, Business Link, is matched to the ONS 
Business Structure Database (BSD), which is the business demography version of the UK 
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). The BSD provides an annual snapshot of the 
IDBR. Linking the individual annual BSD data provides a dataset that can then facilitate an 
analysis of survival and growth of recipient businesses in the post assistance period35. The 
following section first explores the data already at hand about firms that have received support 
from Business Link and the BSD. There are some caveats to the use of that data, particularly 
given the reduction in sample size between the original sample and the fully matched sample. 
This will be reviewed along the technicalities of linking the survey firms to the BSD.  
 
3.2  Data – Business Link & the BLO Survey 
                                               
34
 This would, of course, require evaluation to be woven into the fabric of the organisations and their 
schemes delivered from the beginning. It will always present a difficulty to attempt and collect such 
information post hoc, especially if it involves various organisations in the process of being dismantled. 
35
 See also Norrman and Bager-Sjögren (2010), who provide a rare example of estimating scheme 
impact over multiple years for each post intervention year, albeit with limited evidence regarding impact. 
- 60 - 
 
The decision to use Business Link as the underlying scheme to be analysed was driven entirely 
by data availability at the time of embarking on this thesis. The data was captured as part of 
the Business Link Operator (BLO) Economic Impact Survey in 2005 (referred to as the “BLO 
Survey” for the remainder). It offers a large scale and detailed evaluation survey containing 
information on businesses that received Business Link assistance in 2003, as well as a 
comparison group of businesses that did not receive support. An official evaluation on behalf 
of the then BERR was published in the year after surveying (BERR, 2007). It is based on 
employment, turnover and productivity as outcome measures, for a post intervention period of 
two years. By using the same dataset again, but adding more years of performance data, it 
allows an opportunity to profile impact over time and to compare the original evaluation results 
for two years against it.  
 
Despite using Business Link data in this thesis, it is important to keep the intended 
contributions of this work in mind. First and foremost, this research serves as an exploratory 
study into the use of using official micro data for long-term impact evaluations of business 
support. The results with regards to Business Link are essentially a by-product, likely to be of 
less interest to policy-makers as it is now an abolished scheme.  
 
3.2.1 Business Link and its evolution 
The structure of Business Link has been subject to numerous changes over time. Bennett 
and Robson (2003), BERR (2007a), Robson and Bennett (2010), Sivaev (2013) and Mole et 
al. (2014) provide details of the evolution of the Business Link product and its delivery, and 
inform this section accordingly. The main narrative follows Mole et al. (2008, pp. 317-320). 
The foundations for Business Link were laid in the 1980s with the Enterprise Allowance 
Scheme (1982-91 – allowing benefits payments to those setting up a new business). The 
Enterprise Initiative followed (1988-94 – promoting the use of external advice through 
approved consultants who are publicly funded). The previously referenced work by Wren and 
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Story (2002) based their study on data from the Marketing Initiative as part of the Enterprise 
Initiative.   
The latter type of schemes were regarded a success, providing an effective way of countering 
the perceived market failure of small firms that were underestimating the potential gains from 
seeking external expertise (Wren and Storey, 2002; Turok and Raco, 2000; Bennett and 
Robson, 2003; all in Mole et al., 2008).  
The 1990s then saw the first ‘Business Links’ by name, as part of a more local and 
decentralized approach to business support36. Support delivery in these Business Links was 
through appointed partnerships of local agents who had to be existing providers of business 
support – such as training and enterprise councils, chambers of commerce, local authorities 
and enterprise agencies (Bennett and Robson, 2003; in Mole et al., 2008). The theory behind 
this use of existing providers of support within a local Business Link was to foster collaboration 
between previously competing suppliers of advice and support. The range of partners involved 
led to “complicated local structures, with interlocking directorships and often opaque decision-
making processes” (Mole et al., 2008, p. 318).  
Notably, the support was not to be offered for free to businesses. A charge was introduced for 
the use of the support services, replacing previous public funds allocated. The hope was that 
this would improve services. By 1997, the original fee targets for the local Business Links were 
decreased, however, to provide 25 percent of the local Business Links financing (Robson and 
Bennett, 2010). The other reason for deciding against a free service was the thought that a 
free service would not be valued as highly by businesses. Part of the BLOs’ performance was 
to be measured in terms of their income generation. 
The performance between the then 89 Business Links varied greatly, with 21 percent of 
Business Links responsible for a share of 40 percent of dissatisfied customers (Bennett and 
                                               
36
 ‘Business Connect’ in Wales; in Scotland delivery was by local enterprise companies.  
- 62 - 
 
Robson, 2004; in Mole et al., 2008). It was observed that the highest satisfaction rates were 
achieved for those businesses subject to intensive assistance.  
In 1999, Business Link was reduced to 45 local Business Link Operators (BLOs). Whilst 
government continued to stress the importance of fee raising by the BLOs, specific targets for 
doing so were dropped in 2001 (Robson and Bennett, 2010). It was also removed as a 
performance measure for the BLOs. Client satisfaction remained variable and linked to the 
individual business adviser assigned. Overall, BLOs increased their reach to a third of 
businesses (Bennett and Robson, 2003; in Mole et al., 2008).  
The subsequent phase of Business Link was driven by the government’s desire to align 
Business Link with the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). This was initially piloted in 
2003 and rolled out across the regions in 2004. The intent was to be able to provide a Business 
Link offer responsive to local needs, as determined by the RDAs. The model of Business Link 
engagement also evolved, moving towards a brokerage model of advice (Mole et al., 2008). 
This was not without criticism as it required a different set of skills by the advisers, and went 
against previous research findings suggesting that Business Link clients’ satisfaction levels 
were higher for actual delivery of support than for diagnosis of what was needed (Keogh and 
Mole, 2005; Bennett and Payne, 2000; Bennett and Robson, 1999; Lambrecht and Pirnay, 
2005; all in Mole et al., 2008). The total spend on Business Link was £300m for the year 2005 
(Mole at al., 2008).  
Eventually, with the closure programme of the RDAs in the 2010-2012 period Business Link 
support in its known form was terminated in 2011. It was replaced by a website and phone 
service.  
3.2.2 Period and type of Business Link considered in this thesis 
The period of interest for this thesis relates to the period just before the switch to RDAs. In 
2003, BLOs were already operating within the brokerage model (Mole and Keogh, 2009), as 
the first port of call for small firms seeking assistance. Each BLO was free to determine their 
- 63 - 
 
own intervention strategy – which could involve a more intensive approach working closely 
with firms or an approach which is more thinly spread, focusing on specific issues only. BLOs 
were also able to seek further funding from other bodies, which meant for some BLOs to be 
able offer more intensive assistance (Mole et al., 2011).  
Intensive assistance would usually have stretched over several months and a number of 
interactions between SMEs and Business Link, probably featuring an action plan and the use 
of external consultants. In comparison, ‘other’ assistance is more likely to be a “one-off” 
interaction by phone (Mole et al., 2008).  
Mole et al. (2011) describe four intervention strategies as part of these two intensities of 
assistance. Three intervention strategies fall under IA – all of which would have required for 
the BLO to secure additional funding: 
- Managed brokerage – where interactions between the BLO and the business involved 
close relationship building 
- Pipeline forcing – where IA was provided to a higher proportion of firms but with less 
resource for each IA 
- Managed brokerage - pipeline forcing – a combination of the above, requiring particular 
high levels of additional funding being available.  
The non-intensive model of assistance (Other assistance = OA) was initially chosen by most 
BLOs prior to the acquisition of additional funding. Here, contact with businesses remained 
largely superficial. Ironically, with the little resources needed per interaction, high numbers of 
businesses could be ‘assisted’, higher penetration rates being beneficial for the metrics used 
to determine funding.  
In 2003, Business Link support was delivered by 39 BLOs; and during the 6 months from April 
through to September 2003 the BLOs recorded provision of assistance to 166,312 
businesses37. As one would expect, given the high number of support provisions recorded, the 
                                               
37
 For the avoidance of doubt, “Business Link” refers to assistance provided in England only.  
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bulk of interventions were light-touch, with 89 percent (147,650) of interactions recorded as 
Other Assistance (OA). Only around 11 percent (18,662) of interventions were classed as 
instances of Intensive Assistance (IA).  Whilst the majority of the data is complete, there are 
no reported instances of OA in Norfolk, whilst the London IA data was unusable due to a lack 
of detail provided by the available data.  
Among the remaining 37 BLOs the share of IA vs. OA differed considerably. Each BLO could 
decide on their own delivery strategy, where some BLOs chose a more intensive approach 
whilst others offered more light-touch but wider available support (Mole et al., 2008). 
Leicestershire with 2.6 percent of IAs is at the extreme end of those with a focus on broad non-
intensive advice, Northamptonshire, Wessex and the West also had less than one IA for every 
20 OAs recorded. On the other end of the scale, more than half of all support in 
Northumberland was IA, with that share being 40 percent of IAs for Cheshire & Warrington and 
Hereford & Worcestershire.  
Table 18 (in Appendix C1) provides an overview of the distribution of IAs and OAs across the 
39 BLOs. IA vs. OA differed considerably by BLO (see also Table 18 in Appendix C1), 
illustrating well the different delivery strategies BLOs could decide upon. Leicestershire with 
2.6 percent of IAs was at the extreme end of those with a focus on broad non-intensive advice, 
Northamptonshire, Wessex and the West also had less than one IA for every 20 OAs recorded. 
On the other end of the scale, more than half of all support in Northumberland was IA, with 
that share being 40 percent of IAs for Cheshire & Warrington and Hereford & Worcestershire.  
The BLOs covered areas of different size and economic activity, yet the differences in the 
numbers supported by each BLO can be vast. This illustrates both the effect of choosing 
different strategies, and the ability to attract further external funding by the individual Business 
Link Operators.  Appendix C1 reviews the data in detail.  
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3.2.3 BLO Survey – Sampling and surveying 
The firm universe of Business Link assisted firms introduced in section 3.2.2 (and described in 
detail in Appendix C1) served as the population from which, in 2005, a sample was drawn and 
surveyed by the original evaluation team (BERR, 2007). The survey’s intention was to 
understand the impact of the assistance provided over the 2004 to 2005 period (with firms in 
receipt of assistance between April and October 2003).  
BERR (2007) and Mole et al. (2008) provide a synopsis of how the survey based on this firm 
universe was conducted. This is reiterated here to provide an understanding of the data at 
hand.  
A structured survey was conducted by telephone with SMEs who had received Business Link 
assistance between April and October 2003. The interviews took place between May and July 
of 2005, with most responses being by either owner-managers or firm-managing directors. In 
addition to drawing a sample from the firm universe of assisted firms, a control group of non-
assisted firms was also surveyed. The sampling frame for these non-assisted firms was drawn 
from the Dun & Bradstreet UK database, and these respondents were asked to confirm that 
they had not received any Business Link assistance during the period of April to October 2003.   
 
The survey was undertaken with the use of a computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) 
system to automate the administration of the telephone survey, which accordingly was highly 
structured. Of those surveyed and in the survey dataset, 33 percent were intensively assisted 
(IA), 34 percent had received ‘other’ assistance (OA), and the remaining third was non-assisted 
(NA), with a total of 3,448 firms in the sample. Table 2 provides the summary descriptives for 
selected variables from the BLO Survey dataset, broken down into four groups: For all firms, 
and by type of assistance (IA, OA and NA).  
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Table 2 – BLO Survey: Descriptives for selected variables for full sample, and by type of 
assistance 
BLO Survey Sample 
(N=3448) Full sample   
Intens. Assisted 
(IA) 
  
Other Assisted 
(OA) 
  
Non-assisted (NA) 
  
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean S.D. 
  
Obs Mea
n 
S.D. 
  
Obs Mean S.D. 
Employment 2004 3320 30.20 240.39   1097 27.16 85.13   1129 39.17 
396.5
8   1094 23.98 75.94 
Employment 2005 3333 31.39 257.61   1106 28.82 86.64   1130 41.20 
427.5
1   1097 23.88 75.83 
Firm age: 2≤3 years 3424 0.09 0.29   1120 0.12 0.32   1159 0.09 0.29   1145 0.08 0.26 
Firm age: 3≤4 years 3424 0.05 0.22   1120 0.06 0.24   1159 0.06 0.25   1145 0.04 0.18 
Firm age: 4≤5 years 3424 0.06 0.24   1120 0.08 0.27   1159 0.06 0.24   1145 0.05 0.21 
Firm age: 5≤10 years 3424 0.17 0.37   1120 0.19 0.40   1159 0.17 0.37   1145 0.14 0.35 
Firm age: 10≤20 years 3424 0.25 0.43   1120 0.24 0.43   1159 0.27 0.45   1145 0.24 0.43 
Firm age: >20 years 3424 0.37 0.48   1120 0.31 0.46   1159 0.34 0.47   1145 0.46 0.50 
Formal business plan 3368 0.50 0.50   1112 0.63 0.48   1142 0.55 0.50   1114 0.32 0.47 
Multisite firm 3443 0.18 0.39   1127 0.19 0.40   1165 0.20 0.40   1151 0.16 0.36 
Exporting firm 3440 0.20 0.40   1127 0.25 0.43   1165 0.20 0.40   1148 0.15 0.36 
Legal form: Limited liability 3436 0.61 0.49   1125 0.68 0.47   1163 0.61 0.49   1148 0.54 0.50 
Owner-Manager <25 years old 2891 0.01 0.08   982 0.00 0.06   919 0.00 0.07   990 0.01 0.10 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 2891 0.08 0.27   982 0.08 0.27   919 0.10 0.29   990 0.07 0.25 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 2891 0.28 0.45   982 0.29 0.45   919 0.27 0.45   990 0.28 0.45 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 2891 0.35 0.48   982 0.37 0.48   919 0.36 0.48   990 0.33 0.47 
Owner-Manager ≥55  years old 2891 0.28 0.45   982 0.26 0.44   919 0.27 0.45   990 0.32 0.47 
OM is serial entrepreneur 3090 0.34 0.47   1019 0.39 0.49   1011 0.35 0.48   1060 0.27 0.45 
% of female directors 3249 27.01 33.02   1064 28.05 33.10   1091 26.64 32.48   1094 26.36 33.49 
% of ethnic minority directors 3234 4.11 36.01   1060 3.27 15.92   1085 5.27 49.46   1089 3.76 34.16 
SIC1: Agriculture, Hunting & Fishing 3448 0.11 0.31   1130 0.12 0.32   1166 0.11 0.31   1152 0.11 0.31 
SIC4: Manufacturing 3448 0.19 0.39   1130 0.19 0.39   1166 0.19 0.40   1152 0.18 0.38 
SIC6: Construction 3448 0.08 0.28   1130 0.08 0.27   1166 0.09 0.28   1152 0.08 0.28 
SIC7: Retail & Wholesale 3448 0.17 0.38   1130 0.14 0.34   1166 0.15 0.36   1152 0.24 0.43 
SIC9: Financial Services 3448 0.03 0.16   1130 0.03 0.17   1166 0.02 0.15   1152 0.03 0.16 
SIC11: Education 3448 0.22 0.42   1130 0.25 0.44   1166 0.26 0.44   1152 0.15 0.36 
SIC13: Other Services 3448 0.06 0.24   1130 0.07 0.25   1166 0.06 0.24   1152 0.06 0.24 
SIC14: Hotels & Catering 3448 0.05 0.21   1130 0.05 0.22   1166 0.05 0.21   1152 0.05 0.21 
Source: BLO Survey 
 
The sample characteristics are reviewed in detail below, to facilitate a better understanding of 
the data and any potential features of interest, between types of assistance but importantly 
also for a comparison of the samples before and after data linking. Data linking results in up to 
half of observations to drop out. If differences in the sample characteristics arise because of 
this attrition, it is important to understand where they have occurred.  
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Sector: 
Sector is the only variable captured for all surveyed firms. 11 percent of sampled firms were in 
the agricultural sector, compared to only 4.5 percent of firms in that sector in the (firm universe 
as the) underlying sampling frame (compare with Appendix C1). 19 percent of firms were in 
manufacturing, broadly in line with the 20 percent in the firm universe. Construction had a 
share of eight percent of firms, up from six percent in the firm universe, 17 percent of firms in 
the sample were in wholesale and retail (15 percent in firm universe), three percent in finance 
(two percent), 22 percent in education (four percent), six percent in other social and personal 
services (seven percent), and five percent in hospitality (five percent). Given the variation in 
the share of some sectors between the original sampling frame (Appendix C1) and the sample 
eventually surveyed, the sector split became relatively more representative of the actual 
sectoral distribution in the economy.  
 
Among the surveyed firms, the sectoral distribution is largely consistent across IAs, OAs and 
NAs. The only notable differences appear for the retail and education sectors. Of the surveyed 
IAs 14 percent were retailers and wholesalers, of the OAs 15 percent – compared to nearly a 
quarter (24 percent) of NAs. The reverse trend is true for the education sector, where 25 
percent of surveyed IAs and 26 percent of surveyed OAs belonged to, but only 15 percent of 
NAs. This appears to be somewhat of an oddity in the survey design. Across IAs, OAs and 
NAs these differences are no more than one percent for any other sector. For the 
characteristics other than sector, there is some considerable variation across IAs, OAs and 
NAs, as detailed in the following. 
 
Firm age: 
Nearly half (46 percent) of NAs surveyed were older than 20 years, whilst this figure is closer 
to a third for the assisted groups (31 percent for IAs, 34 percent for OAs). Accordingly, the 
surveyed firms in receipt of IA and OA were on average younger than the control group of NAs. 
IAs in turn were somewhat younger than OAs, with 12 percent of IAs younger than three years, 
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compared to nine percent of OAs; but 27 percent of OAs in the 10≤20 years age bracket, and 
24 percent of IAs (the same as for NAs in this age bracket).  
 
Employment: 
NAs on average were smaller than the IAs and OAs – somewhat counterintuitive given their 
higher age. IAs had an average employment of around 27 employees, compared to 24 for NAs 
in 2004, but 39 for OAs. The latter have a considerably higher standard deviation though, 
pointing to one or more outliers ‘inflating’ the mean. NAs were also the only group with a small 
decline in average employment from 2004 to 2005 (-0.1; -0.4 percent), whilst IAs’ employment 
rose by 1.66 (+6.1 percent) and OAs’ by 2.03 (+5.2 percent).  
These observations are of some interest as a priori:  
1. One would not expect firms that are younger  on average to be larger, and 
2. It is notable that despite being larger on average at the outset, the assisted firms’ 
employment size grows, whilst the smaller non-assisted firm size average stagnates. This 
could be linked to their younger age. The high standard deviation for the OAs suggests 
outlier effects.   
 
Owner-Manager (OM) age: 
The largest age group of OMs were between 45 and 55 years old, and this held true across 
the difference assistance groups – 37 percent of IAs had an OM in that age group, 36 percent 
of OAs, and a slighter 33 percent among NAs. Given the considerably higher firm age of NAs 
it is not surprising to see them having the highest proportion of 55+ year OMs at 32 percent, 
whilst this number is 26 percent for IAs and 27 percent for OAs. NAs also featured the largest 
share of OMs younger than 25 years, however, with a very small N it is not an observation that 
too much weight should be assigned to. For the second youngest group of OMs aged between 
25 and 35, IAs had a share of eight percent, OAs ten percent, compared to seven percent for 
NAs. The three groups have a roughly similar proportion of 35 to 45 year old OMs, 29 percent 
for IAs, 27 percent for OAs and 28 percent for NAs. 
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OM characteristics: 
Those businesses in receipt of IA most often (39 percent) had an OM that has had at least one 
business before (“serial entrepreneur”). The same is true for 35 percent of OAs, but only 27 
percent of NAs. IAs also had the highest share of female directors, 28.05 percent on average. 
However, this was only slightly less for both OAs (26.64 percent) and NAs (26.36 percent). 
OAs in turn had the highest proportion of ethnic minority directors, 5.27 percent on average. 
For IAs this was 3.27 percent, for NAs 3.76 percent.  
 
Firm characteristics: 
On average, half of all sampled firms had a formal business plan. However, this figure was 63 
percent for IAs, 55 percent for OAs and 32 percent for NAs, showing some considerable 
difference between assisted and non-assisted firms. IAs were also most likely to be exporters 
(25 percent), OAs (20 percent) with NAs least likely (15 percent). Assisted firms were also 
more likely to be multisite firms (IAs: 19 percent; OAs: 20 percent; vs. NAs: 16 percent). Finally, 
IAs were also most likely to be limited liability companies (68 percent; OAs: 61 percent; and 
NAs: 54 percent).  
 
Overall, whilst the sampling frame has what is an atypical distribution of firms by sector, this is 
somewhat corrected for in the sample drawn. For the other firm and owner characteristics, a 
comparison to the post data linking sample descriptives will highlight the representativeness 
of the linked versus the original sample. The varying characteristics between the different types 
of assistance as summarised above underpin the importance of taking into account these firm 
differences in the later analysis. It is also possible that some selection bias has been introduced 
at some stage during sampling or when providing support. This will also need to be considered 
and possibly corrected for in later analysis.  
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3.2.4 BLO Survey – Previous analysis: “Economic Impact Study of Business Link 
Local Service” – BERR, 2007 
The original evaluation study of the BLOs had four analytical objectives (BERR, 2007).  Firstly, 
it aimed to provide a national estimate of the value for money of Business Link (BL), based on 
the cost of BL during the intervention period measured and BL’s impact of firm performance. 
This part of their evaluation is my key interest in Chapter Five. 
Secondly, it analysed and compared different delivery models of assistance and their impact 
on firm performance. Thirdly, spatial analysis was conducted, exploring both a regional 
baseline model of assisted firms, and a rural perspective providing insights into BL operations 
in rural areas. This provides an area of potential future exploration based on the matched 
dataset now available. Fourthly, firms were interviewed about their views of Business Link and 
their perception on the quality and impact of the BL product. Naturally, that analysis cannot be 
extended any further through data linking.  
The interest for this research is with the first aspect BERR (2007). The value for money 
analysis38 by BERR (2007) was designed with the understanding that two main issues arise 
from the BLO Survey data. The first issue raised by the authors was in relation to the different 
firm characteristics between the IAs, OAs and NAs. The empirical analysis was designed to 
control for these differences, applying a multivariate approach and as such taking into account 
(and allowing for) these observed firm characteristics through an array of covariates. The 
second issue was the importance of accounting for selection. If selection was present, the 
effect had to be identified and included in the model to avoid estimation bias. A priori selection 
bias certainly appears a reasonable assumption. It is quite possible that those firms being 
assisted through BL may differ from those not being assisted, as seen for numerous other 
support schemes; and the reason why, for example, the Six Steps framework attaches some 
considerable weight to accounting for it, as discussed in Chapter Two).  
                                               
38
 This is reviewed in more detail in Chapter Five.  
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The original evaluation study chose to use Heckman’s two-stage procedure to account for this 
potential selection bias, that is, the estimation of two linked statistical models (BERR, 2007). 
First, a probit regression was run to model the probability of a firm receiving assistance and to 
determine the strength of the selection effects. The approach is developed in some more detail 
as part of Chapter Five.  
The selection effects were not deemed to be significant for IAs, and simple OLS without 
selection effects were reported. The weakness of the selection effect is surprising, and 
something Chapter Five looks at more closely in relation to its long-term analysis undertaken.  
The findings of the original evaluation in relation to the impact of assistance on firm growth 
were “positive and significant” for IA and its effect on employment for the one year period 
investigated BERR (2007, p. 15). IA and OA were also found to have positive but “generally 
statistically insignificant” effects on sales growth and productivity. 
 
3.3 Data: Business Structure Database (BSD) 
The Business Structure Database (BSD) contains annual snapshots of the Inter-Departmental 
Business Register (IDBR). The IDBR includes nearly all of UK’s businesses registered with the 
UK’s tax department (HMRC) for Value Added Tax (VAT) and/or Pay As You Earn income tax 
(PAYE) purposes.  The only exclusions are very small businesses: those that fall below the 
VAT threshold of currently £73,000 annually and/or those that are not part of PAYE (weekly 
salaries less than £107 [2012-13 tax year]). This is in contrast to the Annual Respondents 
Database (ARD), which would provide a wide range of data on firms, but includes few smaller 
firms (see the discussion below). When using the BSD for data on small firms this also implies 
that some of the smallest (no PAYE, no VAT) firms in a sample may possibly drop out as they 
will, by definition, be missing from the BSD. 
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The IDBR is a “live” database where data gets updated as it becomes available, from sources 
such as HMRC (VAT and PAYE participants information), and Companies House, among 
others. The BSD in turn provides a static (snapshots of the ‘live’ IDBR taken in March of each 
year, since 1997) but, of course, longitudinal view when these annual datasets are linked 
together. Compared to other datasets available on firms, it includes relatively few variables. Its 
coverage is for nearly all firms, however, a coverage not matched by other datasets available. 
Table 3 provides an overview, as provided by the ONS (2006).  
 
Table 3 – Variables in the BSD files (2006) 
 Enterprise 
Level 
Local Unit 
Level 
Entref – Enterprise Reference Number    x x 
Luref – Local Unit Reference Number    x 
WOWref – Enterprise Group Reference Number x x 
Inactive    x x 
SIC - Industry    x x 
Live_LU – Number of live local units    x x 
Live_RU – Number of reporting units    x x 
Employment    x x 
Turnover   x  
Birth of Enterprise/Local Unit    x x 
Death of Enterprise/Local Unit    x x 
Death Code    x 
Imm_foc – Immediate Foreign Ownership    x x 
Ult_foc – Ultimate Foreign Ownership    x x 
Status – Legal Status    x x 
PAYE – live PAYE indicator    x x 
VAT – live VAT indicator    x x 
Postcode    x x 
Demvar    x x 
Demred – Local Unit Demographic    x 
DTIref - Reference Number   x x 
Source: ONS (2006)  
 
Table 3 distinguishes between enterprise and local unit levels. For both a BSD dataset exists 
for each year for which the enterprise level data captures company level data. Local units 
represent the individual plants/sites of these enterprises, that is, the fictional manufacturer 
Manufacture & Co would be an enterprise (enterprise level), but could have many individual 
factories at various locations (local unit level).  The Manufacture & Co local units would all 
carry separate local unit reference numbers, but the same Manufacture & Co enterprise 
reference number. Accordingly, the BSD enterprise level dataset contains considerably fewer 
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entries than the BSD local unit level file. When working with the BSD, one of the key 
considerations, therefore, has to be whether to use enterprise or local unit level data as unit of 
analysis. 
 
For the purpose of this piece, the analysis will be carried out entirely based on enterprise level 
data. Firstly, as a study of small firms, the vast majority are single unit enterprises39, where 
enterprise and local unit level are identical. Secondly, whilst employment data is captured both 
at enterprise and local unit level, turnover data is only available at enterprise level. Enterprise 
level data therefore provides more opportunities for how to measure outcomes, productivity as 
a function of turnover over employment becoming a third possible measure. Thirdly, the initial 
data linking (with the process explained in the following sections) can only be done at 
enterprise level. In the (relatively few) cases of multiple local units per enterprise, there is a 
real risk that trying to identify the correct local unit to match the BLO Survey’s specific 
observation will introduce additional error40.  
 
An important further consideration when using the BSD is how to assign which edition of the 
BSD to which calendar year. For example, when referring to ‘BSD 2005’, this refers to the 
annual snapshot of the IBDR taken in March 2005. The IDBR is a ‘live’ register of firms, it gets 
updated throughout the year. Hence a firm’s annual VAT and PAYE returns data may have 
been updated in April 2004 or March 2005 (or any time in-between), referring to employment 
and turnover figures at some time prior to that update. Depending on a firm’s business year, 
BSD 2005, therefore, reflects company data most likely to refer to sometime in 2004, but 
possibly even late 2003 in some cases. As a consequence, to assess a 2003 intervention (as 
in this study), one would need to refer to at least BSD 2004 and BSD 2005 to have one year 
of impact data, as BSD 2003 would provide company data preceding the timing of the 
                                               
39
 Post linking, 89 percent of firms within the sample were single unit firms, that is, where enterprise 
level is identical to local unit data – this is discussed in Section 3.5.1. 
40
 This was initially attempted to explore the possibility, but it meant to take numerous ‘educated 
guesses’, introducing too much uncertainty in the reliability of the local unit matches.  
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intervention. Section 3.5.3 provides an investigation of this issue by comparing the linked BSD 
2004 and BSD 2005 employment data, as compared to BLO employment figures.  
 
A detailed explanation of the BSD is can be found in Evans and Welpton (2009). 
 
3.4 Using the BSD and other datasets through the UK Data Service 
 Secure Lab 
 
Access to the BSD (and the UK Innovation Survey, as used for Appendix C3) is available 
through the UK Data Service (UKDS) and its “Secure Lab” facility. The Secure Lab provides a 
virtual environment available to the researcher at their respective academic institution, and 
access is to anonymised data only. A number of non-disclosure rules apply for exporting any 
results from the Secure Lab environment to ensure continued anonymity of the observations 
used for analysis. This always requires all results that are to be published to be checked by 
the UK Data Service prior to output approval. In practice, this requires the removal of the 
coefficients for all constants in any regression results, as well as only presenting results that 
are based on at least 10 observations. Appendix C2 explains these requirements and the 
process in more detail. It also illustrates how care needs to be taken when using the BSD, and 
some informed assumptions are needed around the determination of firm death based on 
multiple years of BSD data for the same firms.  
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3.5 Data linking – adding the longitudinal dimension   
 
As described above, the approach for this feasibility study is to link the firms from the BLO 
Economic Impact Survey to the BSD.  Hart and Bonner (2011) in a study for DG REGIO provide 
a comprehensive summary of the basic principles for data linking, which guided the linking as 
described here.  
 
First of all, a common identifier across the datasets to be linked – the BLO Survey and the 
BSD – is required. This could be the business’ name and postcode; however, this would add 
complexity at the linking stage as it would require the use of additional algorithms to match the 
data. An alternative to name matching is the use of company registration numbers. Bureau 
van Dijk’s Orbis database was used to identify firms’ registration numbers (CRNs). This 
provides a unique identifier across the datasets involved. Given the CRNs are firm-level data, 
the initial linking described here was of enterprise-level BSD with the BLO Survey.  
 
The identification of CRNs through Orbis highlighted some of the limitations of survey data and 
the use of this approach. For the 3448 firms included in the BLO Survey CRNs could be 
identified for only 1,414 of these. There are a number of reasons for this (seemingly) low 
success rate. Firstly, Orbis only lists registered companies (and only registered firms have a 
CRN by definition). Sole proprietorships and partnerships (on the basis of self-employment) 
are excluded. As a consequence, this could imply that the characteristics of selected 
companies may differ to the actual underlying population of BL recipient businesses (as 
represented by the BLO Survey sample).  Business Link has been used by many micro and 
small businesses, and it is most likely the excluded firms (that is, those not incorporated) were 
mostly those very small firms. Firms that a CRN was identified for therefore on average were 
greater in size than the average of all firms in the original BLO Survey sample – and therefore 
average firm size of the linked dataset is expected to be greater. 
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Another reason for not being able to identify CRNs even for potentially incorporated firms is 
explained by the difference in legal name (as held in Orbis) and the name recorded by 
Business Link or those that have carried out the BLO Survey. The omission of a “ltd” or different 
spelling, for example, “limited” instead of “ltd” in the firm name would not have resulted in much 
concern during CRN identification, with the search mechanism adjusting for those subtle and 
common differences. However, it was found that names were potentially abbreviated in the 
BLO Survey when the business would be registered under its full name. In some cases a 
postcode search could help. A fictitious example would be a firm recorded in the BLO Survey 
as “Smiths”, when its actual name would have been “Gregor Smith & Sons Furniture Ltd”. 
Whilst postcodes can help in such instances, many businesses appear to be registered 
elsewhere to their operational base (with the latter recorded in the BLO Survey), again making 
a match impossible. Also, as already described when introducing the BSD above, a registered 
firm can have multiple addresses – those of where the enterprise (HQ) is located, and then for 
its local units. If Business Link support was provided to a specific local unit of an enterprise, 
and that postcode was recorded, it will be impossible to identify the corresponding CRN if the 
recorded name of the site and that of the registered firm are not identical.  
 
With the use of CRNs as the unique identifier, data was matched at firm-level within the BSD. 
The actual match was undertaken by the Secure Data Service (SDS) team to maintain data 
security. Firm names and actual CRNs get removed prior to the data being made available to 
the researcher again – an anonymous enterprise reference number takes the CRNs place as 
unique identifier within the SDS environment.  The initial data linking took place at enterprise 
level and not at local unit level. The simple reason for that is that the SDS only has a CRN-
enterprise key, since linking from CRN directly to the local unit would require a key taking 
location into account. From reviewing the survey entries and survey methodology, it is not 
obvious whether most assistance would have been recorded at the firm rather than plant level. 
The huge majority of surveyed firms were single entities (see footnote 39 above), as such the 
distinction between firm and plant level would not be an issue for data linking purposes.  
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They key variables of interest in the BSD are for annual sales and employment as performance 
indicators for the panel of firms in the original BL evaluation study. Following the data linking, 
the sample characteristics of the linked dataset will then be compared to the original BLO 
Survey data characteristics. 
 
3.5.1 Data linking: Process and data adjustments 
As aforementioned, CRNs could be identified for a total of 1,414 firms through the use of 
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis firm database. This represents 41 percent of the BLO Survey’s original 
sample size of 3,448. 
The CRNs and BLO Survey results of the 1,414 firms were passed to the UK Data Service 
Secure Lab (SL) for matching, a simple process using a CRN<->SL internal enterprise level 
reference (entref) key. With this approach the SL was able to match 1,247 of the 1,414 firms. 
The gap between the number of firms a CRN had been identified for and the number of firms 
successfully linked by the SL can appear unfavourable at first. But, as described earlier, only 
those firms registered for VAT and/or PAYE purposes are captured for the IDBR and 
accordingly included in the annual snapshots the BSD provides. 
This matched file, now containing entref, the internal firm identifier, was then used to construct 
the longitudinal enterprise level performance dataset. The BSD is not one large dataset as the 
name would suggest, but consists of individual datasets for each year (as highlighted earlier). 
These datasets were combined at enterprise level for the years 2004-2011 (where 2004 covers 
the year of the assistance received, and then seven years of data post assistance)41. This may 
seem counterintuitive given a 2003 intervention, however, the data of the 2004 BSD provide 
an April 2003 to March 2004 snapshot. This covers the intervention period in question of April 
                                               
41
 Ying Zhou and Michael Anyadike-Danes deserve special mention here. They worked on a parallel 
BSD linking exercise at the time for the Enterprise Research Centre, resulting in a number of fruitful 
thought exchanges on the technicalities and oddities of the linking process.   
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2003 to October 2003. The 2011 cut-off was simply determined by the latest data available at 
the time of linking. 
Table 4 illustrates the resulting (long) dataset’s data structure. 
Table 4 – Data Structure post matching (enterprise level) 
Obs 
Nr. 
BLO Survey 
covariates 
(2005) 
 
entref 
 
BSD 
2004 
 
BSD 
2005 
 
BSD 
2006 
 
BSD 
2007 
 
BSD 
2008 
 
BSD 
2009 
 
BSD 
2010 
 
BSD 
2011 
1 (e.g. firm & 
owner 
characteristics) 
Unique 
firm ID 
 
For each year: Employment, turnover, sector, birth, death, postcode (full list see 3) 
2           
:           
Source: own work  
 
This enterprise level dataset was then cleaned, applying a number of criteria. Firstly, using the 
indicators as obtained through the BSD, all firms outside the SME definition of employment 
(>250 employees) where removed. There are two reasons for this removal of these large firms. 
The analysis to be carried out is for small business support, and Business Link was a scheme 
designed for small business support. Applying that logic, any firms with more than 250 
employees in BSD 2004 were treated as outliers. Some of the firms removed were exceeding 
the 250 employees’ threshold quite considerably. As such, their continued inclusion skewed 
the employment and turnover figures quite considerably. Also, large firms engage in acquisition 
activities, and the employment and turnover figures as a result varied by unlikely amounts year 
on year for some of those large firms removed. The assumption made is that this variation in 
size and acquisition activity did not result from BL interventions aimed at small firms.  
There were also a number of firms with a 2003 or 2004 exit, therefore having exited prior to 
the intervention received or shortly after, according to BSD records. Three firms showed a 
growth trajectory that would have dramatically skewed the analysis, one of them with a year-
on-year growth of 40,000 percent42. The firm displaying this growth was already fairly large at 
                                               
42Figure not exact but approximated to comply with disclosure rules. Such growth is usually a result of 
merging with a considerably larger firm.  
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the outset, ruling out organic growth. Table 5 summarises the changes to the count of firms 
with >250 employees. Less than ten firms had grown from 250 or less employees in BSD 2004 
to more than 250 employees in BSD 2005.  
Table 5 – Count of firms with more than 250 employees, before and after outlier removal 
Count of firms with 
>250 employees Before outlier removal After outlier removal 
 BSD BLO Survey BSD BLO Survey 
2004 47 5 All removed. 2 
2005 50 8 x 4 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD; Reminder: BSD output <10 cannot be published.  
Table 5 also points to the effect of linking at enterprise level. Considerably more firms had more 
than 250 employees in BSD 2004 before the removal of outliers than captured by the BLO 
Survey. This means that a number of firms assisted and captured as part of the BLO Survey 
were in reality part of a larger firm. Overall, once the outliers were removed, 931 single site 
firms remained. However, 55 firms had two sites, 24 three, and 36 four or (considerably) more 
– but all with less than 251 employees in BSD 2004. Therefore, separate local analysis, with 
all problems attached to the matching problems, and limitation to employment as performance 
measure, is not needed. In a sample including more large firms, or a higher proportion of 
multisite firms, such local unit analysis should certainly be explored, however.  
Following the linking of the BLO Survey sample and the above adjustments, the final dataset 
had 1,044 firms. Out of these, 425 firms were intensively assisted (IAs), 321 had received other 
assistance (OAs), and 298 firms remained for the non-assisted control group. The size and 
other firm characteristics of this linked sample are reviewed below.  
 
3.5.2 Data linking: Comparison of the original and matched datasets 
 
The created longitudinal dataset will be used for the remainder of the analysis 
undertaken in this thesis.  
Some level of caution is necessary when using the final matched dataset. Some of the 
limitations of both using Orbis and BSD were highlighted earlier in this chapter. The BSD is 
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limited to those firms registered for PAYE and VAT. Average firm size in the BSD is, therefore, 
larger than what would be representative for the entire firm population. In addition, Orbis only 
lists registered companies, which will also be larger than the average of the entire firm 
population would suggest (OECD, 2013). As unregistered entities sole proprietorships and 
partnerships are not captured by Companies House data. Business Link advice has been used 
by many (micro) small businesses. As a consequence of the exclusion of very small firms from 
both Orbis and the BSD, the expectation would be for the characteristics of the matched 
datasets to differ from the actual underlying population of Business Link recipients. 
Table 2 (as detailed in Section 3.2.3) provided an overview of the BLO Survey’s sample 
characteristics before matching. Table 6 to Table 8 provide the summary of the relevant test 
statistics to understand the differences between the original BLO Survey sample and the 1044 
firms in the longitudinal dataset. The test descriptives for the differences in values are provided 
in the right hand columns of each table. Three tables are provided: For intensively assisted 
firms (Table 6), other assisted (Table 7) and the non-assisted control group (Table 8). 
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Table 6 – Comparison of firm characteristics: Original sample vs. longitudinal dataset (for IA) 
Intensively Assisted Firms (IA) Original Sample 
(BLO Survey) 
  Post matching: LD    Test statistics 
  
Obs Mean S.D. 
 
Obs Mean S.D. 
   LD<-Orig  
 
          t-/z-value sig. 
Employment 2004 (BLO S) 1097 27.163 85.132  416 25.844 36.840   t 0.513  
Employment 2004 (BSD)     425 23.348 36.558   t   
Employment 2005 (BLO S) 1106 28.816 86.636  418 28.148 40.607   t 0.256  
Employment 2005 (BSD)         425 23.955 36.157    t     
Firm age: 2≤3 years 1120 0.117 0.322  423 0.097 0.296   z 1.116  
Firm age: 3≤4 years 1120 0.061 0.239  423 0.071 0.257   z -0.733  
Firm age: 4≤5 years 1120 0.079 0.271  423 0.095 0.293   z -0.956  
Firm age: 5≤10 years 1120 0.194 0.395  423 0.222 0.416   z -1.244  
Firm age: 10≤20 years 1120 0.244 0.430  423 0.243 0.430   z 0.010  
Firm age: >20 years 1120 0.305 0.461   423 0.272 0.445    z 1.285   
Formal business plan 1112 0.628 0.484  418 0.706 0.456   z -2.850 *** 
Multisite firm 1127 0.193 0.395  425 0.193 0.395   z 0.022  
Exporting firm 1127 0.250 0.433  424 0.377 0.485   z -4.944 *** 
Legal form: Limited liability 1125 0.682 0.466   425 0.904 0.296    z -8.908 *** 
Owner-Manager <25 years old 982 0.003 0.055  397 0.003 0.050   z 0.168  
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 982 0.080 0.272  397 0.076 0.265   z 0.304  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 982 0.288 0.453  397 0.317 0.466   z -1.075  
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 982 0.372 0.484  397 0.360 0.481   z 0.400  
Owner-Manager >55  years old 982 0.257 0.437   397 0.244 0.430    z 0.475   
OM is serial entrepreneur 1019 0.390 0.488  395 0.400 0.491   z -0.359  
% of female directors 1064 28.047 33.099  414 24.406 30.588   t 3.578 *** 
% of ethnic minority directors 1060 3.272 15.923   411 2.835 13.696    t 0.892   
SIC1: Agriculture, Hunting & Fishing 1130 0.117 0.321  425 0.033 0.179   z 5.053 *** 
SIC4: Manufacturing 1130 0.188 0.391  425 0.273 0.446   z -3.634 *** 
SIC6: Construction 1130 0.081 0.272  425 0.104 0.305   z -1.435  
SIC7: Retail & Wholesale 1130 0.135 0.341  425 0.132 0.339   z 0.142  
SIC9: Financial Services 1130 0.030 0.171  425 0.031 0.172   z -0.051  
SIC11: Education 1130 0.254 0.435  425 0.285 0.452   z -1.227  
SIC13: Other Services 1130 0.068 0.252  425 0.040 0.196   z 2.075 ** 
SIC14: Hotels & Catering 1130 0.052 0.223   425 0.042 0.202    z 0.799   
 Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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Table 7 – Comparison of firm characteristics: Original sample vs. long. dataset (for OA) 
Other Assisted Firms (IA) Original Sample 
(BLO Survey) 
  Post matching: LD   Test statistics  
  
   
 
   
    LD<-Orig  
 Obs Mean S.D. 
 
Obs Mean S.D. 
    t-/z-value sig. 
Employment 2004 (BLO S) 1129 39.165 396.583  315 27.349 42.519    t 1.001  
Employment 2004 (BSD)     321 23.620 38.835    t   
Employment 2005 (BLO S) 1130 41.200 427.514  316 28.348 43.510    t 1.010  
Employment 2005 (BSD)         321 24.495 39.822    t     
Firm age: 2≤3 years 1159 0.093 0.291  321 0.084 0.278    z 0.500  
Firm age: 3≤4 years 1159 0.064 0.245  321 0.050 0.218    z 0.929  
Firm age: 4≤5 years 1159 0.063 0.243  321 0.065 0.248    z -0.158  
Firm age: 5≤10 years 1159 0.168 0.374  321 0.174 0.380    z -0.262  
Firm age: 10≤20 years 1159 0.272 0.445  321 0.287 0.453    z -0.526  
Firm age: >20 years 1159 0.340 0.474   321 0.340 0.474    z 0.013   
Formal business plan 1142 0.550 0.498  316 0.620 0.486    z -2.232 ** 
Multisite firm 1165 0.198 0.399  321 0.190 0.393    z 0.329  
Exporting firm 1165 0.203 0.402  321 0.280 0.450    z -2.982 *** 
Legal form: Limited liability 1163 0.606 0.489   321 0.879 0.327    z -9.152 *** 
Owner-Manager <25 years old 919 0.004 0.066  283 0.007 0.084    z -0.567  
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 919 0.095 0.293  283 0.106 0.308    z -0.563  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 919 0.273 0.446  283 0.300 0.459    z -0.893  
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 919 0.357 0.479  283 0.314 0.465    z 1.311  
Owner-Manager >55  years old 919 0.271 0.445   283 0.272 0.446    z -0.038   
OM is serial entrepreneur 1011 0.350 0.477  296 0.409 0.492    z -1.845 * 
% of female directors 1091 26.640 32.481  310 22.690 28.428    t 3.999 *** 
% of ethnic minority directors 1085 5.271 49.457   310 8.210 86.638    t 1.925 * 
SIC1: Agriculture, Hunting & Fishing 1166 0.105 0.307  321 0.044 0.205    z 3.394 *** 
SIC4: Manufacturing 1166 0.194 0.395  321 0.259 0.439    z -2.532 ** 
SIC6: Construction 1166 0.087 0.281  321 0.109 0.312    z -1.234  
SIC7: Retail & Wholesale 1166 0.149 0.356  321 0.178 0.383    z -1.241  
SIC9: Financial Services 1166 0.022 0.148  321 0.016 0.124    z 0.746  
SIC11: Education 1166 0.264 0.441  321 0.287 0.453    z -0.803  
SIC13: Other Services 1166 0.059 0.236  321 0.031 0.174    z 1.982 ** 
SIC14: Hotels & Catering 1166 0.046 0.210   321 0.047 0.211    z -0.031   
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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Table 8 – Comparison of firm characteristics: Original sample vs. long. dataset (for NA) 
Non-assisted Firms (NA) Original Sample  
(BLO Survey) 
  Post matching: LD     
  
   
 
   
    LD<-Orig  
 Obs Mean S.D. 
 
Obs Mean S.D. 
    t-/z-value sig. 
Employment 2004 (BLO S) 1094 23.982 75.944  291 28.186 37.765    t 1.828 * 
Employment 2004 (BSD)     298 27.560 40.759    t   
Employment 2005 (BLO S) 1097 23.878 75.829  291 28.893 38.991    t 2.187 ** 
Employment 2005 (BSD)         298 29.117 45.114     t     
Firm age: 2≤3 years 1145 0.075 0.264  297 0.037 0.189    z 2.334 ** 
Firm age: 3≤4 years 1145 0.035 0.184  297 0.037 0.189    z -0.175  
Firm age: 4≤5 years 1145 0.048 0.214  297 0.040 0.197    z 0.557  
Firm age: 5≤10 years 1145 0.144 0.351  297 0.165 0.372    z -0.902  
Firm age: 10≤20 years 1145 0.239 0.427  297 0.242 0.429    z -0.112  
Firm age: >20 years 1145 0.459 0.498   297 0.481 0.501     z -0.707   
Formal business plan 1114 0.322 0.468  285 0.400 0.491    z -2.476 ** 
Multisite firm 1151 0.156 0.363  297 0.185 0.389    z -1.238  
Exporting firm 1148 0.152 0.359  295 0.217 0.413    z -2.699 *** 
Legal form: Limited liability 1148 0.536 0.499   298 0.862 0.345     z -10.271 *** 
Owner-Manager <25 years old 990 0.010 0.100  264 0.011 0.106    z -0.180  
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 990 0.065 0.246  264 0.091 0.288    z -1.484  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 990 0.276 0.447  264 0.299 0.459    z -0.755  
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 990 0.328 0.470  264 0.318 0.467    z 0.311  
Owner-Manager >55  years old 990 0.321 0.467   264 0.280 0.450     z 1.274   
OM is serial entrepreneur 1060 0.271 0.445  270 0.300 0.459    z -0.959  
% of female directors 1094 26.361 33.486  288 22.922 29.662    t 3.379 *** 
% of ethnic minority directors 1089 3.758 34.164   287 2.933 15.963     t 0.796   
SIC1: Agriculture, Hunting & Fishing 1152 0.111 0.314  298 0.040 0.197    z 3.691 *** 
SIC4: Manufacturing 1152 0.180 0.384  298 0.252 0.435    z -2.799 *** 
SIC6: Construction 1152 0.083 0.277  298 0.124 0.330    z -2.176 ** 
SIC7: Retail & Wholesale 1152 0.240 0.428  298 0.238 0.427    z 0.079  
SIC9: Financial Services 1152 0.028 0.164  298 0.027 0.162    z 0.088  
SIC11: Education 1152 0.149 0.357  298 0.154 0.362    z -0.218  
SIC13: Other Services 1152 0.059 0.236  298 0.057 0.232    z 0.130  
SIC14: Hotels & Catering 1152 0.047 0.211   298 0.040 0.197     z 0.488   
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
The significant differences (at the five percent level) between original BLO sample and the 
matched dataset are summarised here. 
 
Sector: The share of “agriculture, hunting and fishing” firms drops from a range of 10.5 to 11.7 
percent down to 3.3 to 4 percent across the three groups of firms. In turn, the share of 
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manufacturing firms rises from the 18 to 19.4 percent range up to 25.2 to 27.3 percent. Not 
unilaterally significant across the three groups of firms is the change in the share of “other 
services”. This drops for IAs from 6.8 to four percent, and for OAs from 5.9 to 3.1 percent, and, 
only among NAs, the share of construction firms rises from 8.3 to 12.4 percent.  
 
Firm age: Only one significant difference exists, for NAs the 2≤3 years old category of firms 
represents a larger share pre-matching (7.5 percent) than post matching (3.7 percent).  
 
Employment: Likewise, only for NAs has the average firm size increased significantly based 
on the BLO sample’s employment figures, having risen from 24 employees pre-matching to 29 
post matching for the 2005 figures, As a result, the figures are more in line with those reported 
for the size of IAs and OAs.  
 
Owner-Manager (OM) age: No significant differences through matching.   
 
OM characteristics: The average percentage of female directors is reduced in the post 
matching sample, from a 26.4 to 28 percent range to 22.7 to 24.4 percent, across all three 
groups of firms.  
 
Firm characteristics: These show considerable change, unilaterally, across the three groups. 
Pre-matching, the proportion of firms with business plan is some seven to eight percent lower 
than post matching, keeping the absolute difference between the assisted groups and the non-
assisted one intact. For exporting, the proportion rises from 25 to 37.7 percent for IAs, 20.3 to 
28 percent for OAs, and 15.2 to 21.7 percent for NAs, widening the gaps between the IA, OA 
and NA. By comparison, the gap shrinks for the proportion of limited companies among the 
three groups, with rises from 68.2 to 90.4 percent for IAs, 60.6 to 87.9 percent for OAs, and 
53.6 to 86.2 percent for NAs.  
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These variations in sample means across the three groups of firms confirm the earlier outlined 
weak spot of the BSD. Firms not part PAYE and/or VAT are not represented. This is very likely 
to explain the drop in share of agricultural, fishing and hunting businesses in the post matching 
sample, and the increase of limited liability companies, exporting firms and companies with 
formal business plans. Importantly, no changes in sample means occurred that would look out 
of line when compared to the sample means of the other groups of firms, meaning that whilst 
these differences between the original and post matching sample should be kept in mind, there 
are no concerns about the post matching sample’s analytical validity.  
 
3.5.3 Self-reported versus official dataset performance data 
 
To develop the growth models (in Chapter Five), the self-reported firm performance for the 
years of 2004 and 2005 from the BLO Survey data was replaced by 2004-2011 employee and 
turnover data from the BSD. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter the 2004 data is most likely to be reflected by BSD 2005, 
depending on the date of a firm’s annual reports. But even when allowing for this lag of the 
BSD, the self-reported employment figures (Table 9) exceed those of both the BSD 2004 and 
2005 figures. At the same time, the BLO Survey’s recorded employment growth of 5.3 percent 
fails to match the lower 3.9 percent rate of the BSD 2005 over BSD 2004, or the higher rate of 
8.4 percent of BSD 2006 over BSD 2005. Self-reported data is often known to be unreliable, 
something of particular concern in the fields of psychology and health where no measures 
other than self-reports may be available. A summary of the potential limitations is provided by 
Stone et al. (1999).  
  
- 86 - 
 
Table 9 – Comparison of employment means and growth rates between BLO survey (self-
reported) and BSD (official statistics) 
Employment 2004 2005 Change 
BLO Survey 27.22 28.66 5.3% 
BSD 2004 vs BSD 2005 24.85 25.83 3.9% 
BSD 2005 vs BSD 2006 25.83 28.00 8.4% 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
It is not clear why such differences would arise for employment data. Even if, for example, 
different treatment of part-time employees (versus full-time equivalents) played a role, that 
would be unlikely to explain the differences in growth rates as observed. It is certainly more 
likely that the BSD figures, sourced from VAT and PAYE returns, provide a reliable measure 
of employment over time. The analysis in this thesis therefore is entirely based on performance 
data as provided by the BSD, ensuring consistency across the time periods included.  
 
3.6 Data linking: Why not use BvD’s Orbis data? 
 
Few alternatives to the BSD for the UK, or comparable official datasets elsewhere exist 
for getting access to performance data at firm level other than surveying firms individually. 
The Bureau van Dijk Orbis43 database is widely used as (the) source of secondary data 
on firms. In this thesis it was used only for identification of the company registration 
numbers to facilitate the matching process.  
Anyadike-Danes (2011) provided a detailed comparison of the BSD and Orbis, and is 
summarised here. The BSD was introduced earlier in this chapter as an annual snapshot 
of the IDBR which relies on official VAT return and employer PATE tax data. The firm 
                                               
43
 BvD’s Orbis database contains the same data as what may be referred to as BvD’s Fame database. 
The difference is that Fame contains only UK records. 
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characteristics contained in the BSD are relatively few: employment, turnover, location, 
structure and industry sector.  
Orbis relies on Companies House data and firms registered there. In theory, it has far 
more detailed records for each firm than the BSD, drawing from various sources. Data 
contained in Orbis include: employment, turnover, turnover outside the UK, balance sheet, 
profit and loss account, industry, ownership and subsidiary information, directors (and 
directors’ other businesses they may be involved with) and more. In practice, only large 
firms are required to report many of these characteristics, including employment, turnover 
and assets. Smaller businesses don’t report that data. That means its coverage is very 
limited in comparison to the BSD when it comes to details on smaller firms, but superior 
for larger firms (keeping in mind that Orbis data remains unverified, and may also include 
worldwide figures for companies with operations abroad).  
When identifying the CRNs in Orbis this problem became very apparent – only a small 
fraction of businesses contained in the BLO Survey and identified in Orbis carried any 
employment or turnover information. Orbis may therefore provide a useful ready-data 
source for analysis on large firms. But when it comes to studying small business, it lacks 
in-depth coverage and, a vital aspect for this study, performance data for a majority of 
firms.   
 
3.7  Chapter conclusions 
 
This chapter illustrates how long-term impact evaluations of business support can be enabled 
by the use of official firm-level data. Political expediency and data availability work against any 
potential will and interest in undertaking long-term evaluation. The latter problem can be 
countered through the use of firm-level data as maintained for official purposes, and as such 
the need for carrying out resource-intensive longitudinal surveys can be avoided. In its most 
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basic form this would require a list of assisted firms only; the control group could be drawn 
from the BSD.  
In essence, this simple approach provides an easy, but excellent, starting point for automatic 
performance tracking of all assisted firms in any public scheme, having the potential of carrying 
out evaluation as required, and when required. It would require for evaluation to be in 
embedded in all (UK) public (business support) bodies to such an extent that they would 
provide a timely update on the list of firms that have received an intervention, and any 
knowledge they have about these firms (and provided company owners agreed for their firm’s 
information to be shared for research purposes). Problems as encountered for this research 
initially, due to the abolishment of the RDAs, could be avoided that way.  
There are limitations to this approach, of course. Here, the list of assisted firms was already 
subject to a survey close to the time of intervention, capturing a variety of firm and owner 
characteristics. This certainly is a preferable scenario, as the BSD carries only few firm 
characteristics beyond employment and turnover data – sector, location, number of 
subsidiaries, entry and exit. Other firm-level datasets available in the UK could be used to link 
additional information to a list of firms, however, they are carried out on a sampling basis only, 
and therefore would require a very extensive initial list of firms to achieve a robust sample size 
post matching. Sample size is also important for matching to the BSD. In the case 
demonstrated here, only just under half of the original sample could be linked to a company 
registration number (partly due company names not representing actual firms’ names), 
resulting in an eventual sample of only a third in size following data linking.  
The sample means of the original BLO Survey sample compared with the post data linking 
sample underpin how the linking (and reduced sample size) may affect sample characteristics, 
the most obvious reason for this being BSD’s lack of coverage for the smallest of firms without 
PAYE/VAT registration, and firms for which an appropriate company registration number may 
not be identified and therefore no data linking is possible. Again, that would usually affect the 
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smallest of firms, trading as partnerships or sole traders, which are therefore not registered at 
Companies House. For the data linked herein, the jump in the proportion of limited companies 
post data linking illustrates this phenomenon well. But importantly, the groups of assisted and 
non-assisted firms overall stayed remarkably similar, in large parts not significantly changed 
from its original sample means.  
The use of official data may also be beneficial for the reliability of the performance measures 
used – as illustrated by the differences between the self-reported employment figures and 
growth in the BLO Survey, compared to that of the employment figures and growth for the 
same firms as based on the BSD (essentially tax data).  
The result of this data linking between the BLO Survey with its list of firms (and firm 
characteristics near the point of intervention) and the BSD’s performance data is a longitudinal 
dataset that will allow the analysis that many evaluators called for and which is discussed in 
Chapter Two. This analysis can, by default, be much richer than that of evaluations relying on 
two, or in rare instance three data points, essentially allowing the creation of a timeline of the 
impact of assistance over numerous years. This availability of numerous years of data enables 
investigating the concerns around potential time lags before (full) impact of a support measure 
can be estimated. If impact exists, its longevity can also be analysed.  
This research will make use of the data in two ways. Chapter Four will consider the impact of 
assistance on firm survival, creating an annual survival profile. Chapter Five then will focus on 
the impact of assistance on firm growth, across time.  
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Chapter Four 
 
Business support and firm survival 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Policy-makers widely regard small business creation and growth as effective stimuli to create 
jobs and accordingly counter unemployment (van Praag, 2003)44. In the UK each year between 
200,000 and 500,000 new firms are born, depending on source and measurement 
methodology45. Whilst start-up rates are often heralded by policy-makers and the media, the 
net number of births less firm exits is often not considered (examples of that practice include 
FT, 2013; CFE, 2014). There are some 5.2m firms in the UK46 (BIS, 2014a), an annual addition 
of up to 500k firms without a considerable exit rate would mean a large firm population growth. 
The scale of this attrition is substantial. Earlier research concluded that only half of the firms 
survive the first three years (van Praag, 2003). Aldrich and Ruef (2006) and Bates and Nucci 
(1990), both as cited in Amezcua et al. (2013) find that “approximately half of all new [US] 
entrants survive less than five years”. For the UK, recent research found that no more than two 
                                               
44
 Policy motives as introduced in Chapter One. 
45
 Figures vary, Anyadike-Danes et al. (2013) using private sector estimates based on the Business 
Structure Database suggest the annual figure is around 200k-250k (as aforementioned, the BSD only 
contains firms registered for VAT and/or PAYE, that is, with a certain turnover and least one employee). 
Other sources suggest up to 500k new firms each year (e.g. FT 06/10/2013 referencing Start-Up Britain). 
The difference mainly arises from including self-employed rather than focussing on employer-
enterprises.  
46
 Of these, some 3.2m are active and registered companies at Companies House (Companies House, 
2015). 
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to three start-ups out of ten will survive their first decade (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2013). The 
original employment of a million workers of these new firms – the “new jobs” figure that policy-
makers are usually keen to mention – reduces to half a million jobs among the surviving firms 
(Anyadike-Danes et al., 2013).  
Whilst these statistics are for new-born firms, they illustrate well the very dynamic firm 
environment economies face.  Governments recognise the important role of small firms in the 
economic make-up, and are keen to not only foster new business but also support established 
firms. For the UK, the annual closure rate for the entire firm population was just under five 
percent in 2013 (House of Commons, 2014). The recognition of this central role of small 
business led to a growing focus on programmes designed to support small businesses 
(Amezcua et al., 2013).  
In this chapter the effects of soft – non-financial – business support on firm survival are 
explored. Whilst the previous evaluations carried out on this set of firms were able to provide 
a short-term impact assessment (which will be returned to in Chapter Five), the data previously 
captured was too short-term for any survival analysis. The linked dataset herein, with its seven 
years of performance data, now facilitates an analysis of the impact of business support on 
firm survival.  
To provide the necessary context for the analysis, Section 4.2 provides an introduction to the 
most popular business lifecycle approaches, introducing the role of firm survival as a success 
criterion. Section 4.3 then considers the broad literature around firm survival and its 
determinants. This will be followed in Section 4.4 by a review of the somewhat limited evidence 
that exists with regards to the impact of support on firm survival. Given the limited evidence 
available the review will include the impact of financial support. Section 4.5 will then develop 
the analysis, making specific reference to the impact by size and age also, before the chapter 
is concluded.  
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4.2 Stages theory and dynamic states 
 
A widely cited model47 by Lewis and Churchill (1983) considers business growth a five stage 
process:  existence, survival, success, take-off and resource-maturity48.  
Lewis and Churchill (1983) define firm survival as a firm’s ability to balance its income and 
outgoings, having proven that it has a product or service proposition by having surpassed the 
initial ‘existence’ stage; and that its proposition is designed to serve a market need, to attract 
and retain a level of custom. Achieving a positive cash flow is of central concern at this stage, 
allowing funding not only of the already established operational activities, but much more also 
for investment in growth to reach a sustainable firm size, that is, reaching an economically 
sustainable utilisation of workforce and assets. The owner is still seen as central to the firm’s 
direction. Few formal systems exist, with planning likely to be limited to cash forecasting at 
best. Lewis and Churchill (1983) conclude that many businesses may never leave this stage, 
and potentially remain in this ‘survival space’ for some time. In that case a firm may cease to 
exist due to owner age or them giving up (whether or not for financial reasons).  
A firm may be sold to a company that believes it could unlock additional potential and success 
from the purchased entity49. Only few firms of a cohort will be moving on to what is termed the 
‘success’ stage in which a firm faces the choice of focussing on profitability or to expand, 
whether to current and/or new markets).  
                                               
47
 Based on Google Scholar, the citation count exceeded 1,750 on 30/6/2014. Numerous variations of 
stages models exist.  
48
 Whilst introduced in this chapter as part of firm survival as performance indicator, it is also relevant 
for Chapter Five and firm growth, and will be referred to from there.  
49
 Since Lewis and Churchill’s (1983) five stage model, the rise of tech firms particular in the software 
and social media space has shown that a firm does not necessarily need to prove its economic viability 
to be successfully sold on. In fact, some start-up owners begin their business with the clear intention of 
a financially rewarding exit after a few years, and not necessarily of making the firm a self-sustained 
enterprise.  
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Whilst Lewis and Churchill’s (1983) stages approach provides a popular way to understanding 
business development and growth, it is not without criticism and alternative models have been 
proposed. Levie and Lichtenstein (2010) in this context suggest a more flexible and plausible 
approach. They go as far as titling their paper “A Terminal Assessment of Stages Theory […]”, 
leaving little doubt about the authors’ view. With reference to Phelps et al. (2007) and Stubbart 
and Smalley (1999), they outline how stages theory has seen numerous criticisms, but at the 
same time a continued growth of stage models could be seen, consisting in the majority of 
three to five stages. The critique of these focusses on the lack of clarity and coherence across 
stages models as to why and how firms progress through the stages. In turn Lewis and 
Churchill (2010) propose what they term a “Dynamic States of Entrepreneurship” model, 
essentially seeing the firm as part of “a network of beliefs, relationships, systems, and 
structures that convert opportunity tension into tangible value […]”. Firm survival is seen as 
dependent on that environment. As long as survival conditions are met, a firm may then create 
value. 
In that sense both the outdated but widely quoted (static) stages and the dynamic states 
approach provide the same basic condition for any firm development: Survival.  
 “Survival is the minimum criterion of entrepreneurial success and is at first the most 
 important attribute of firm development”  
   (Schwartz, 2009, p. 403; ref. Woywoode, 2004; Tamasay, 2005).  
 
While ‘simple’ survival by a firm may not be identical to what might be considered as a success 
by a firm more broadly, survival is a fundamental condition for further firm performance. Using 
the longitudinal dataset as developed in Chapter Three, this chapter will therefore assess what 
difference (non-financial) business support makes to a firm’s survival prospects. Testing this 
using the BLO Survey data was not possible in previous evaluations (for example, BERR, 
2007; Mole et al., 2008) given the BLO Surveys limitation to two years of data.  
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4.3 Previous evidence on firm survival  
 
Given the absolute nature of the entry and exit question, survival is at the core of a firm, with 
an accordingly prominent place in the small business literature. Firm survival received little 
attention until the second half of the 1980s, when a number of studies sought to understand 
what might influence firm survival (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Lin and Huang, 2008). The 
studies agreed that the likelihood of a firm’s survival is not equally distributed across the firm 
population, but that it was influenced by a wide range of factors.  
Firstly, there is age. The initial death rates seen for young firms reduce considerably over time, 
following an exponential rather than linear pattern50. The older a firm, the less likely it is to exit; 
the larger a firm, the better its chances for survival (Wagner, 2012). There are numerous other 
studies confirming this inverse relationship between survival and age and size. Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995) provide a number of references to that effect (e.g. Baldwin and Gorecki, 
1991; Philips and Kirchhoff, 1989), rendering these two firm characteristics generally accepted 
as indicative of a firm’s survival chances.  
 “Firm size is an important dimension in our analysis for several reasons. The 
 empirical literature suggests that small firms tend to be affected by greater churning, 
 but also have greater potential expansion”. 
 Bartelsman et al. (2009, p. 35)  
 
The growth pattern of small firms is of importance for the probability of survival. Interestingly, 
growth can both endanger firm survival, whilst also being the necessary condition for reaching 
a sustainable scale – both for returns on capital employed and resilience to any external 
shocks. Sapienza et al. (2006) illustrate this paradox. Specifically considering firms’ decision 
to expand their market internationally, they describe this decision as fundamental for a higher 
likelihood of more rapid growth than enjoyed by non-international outfits. However, it may also 
decrease the probability of survival in the short-term given the increased demands on a firm’s 
                                               
50
 Of course, if it was linear, no firms would survive beyond the 10-20 years age bracket.  
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limited resources. Mortality rates do not uniformly change with firm growth (Dobrev and Carroll, 
2003; in Sapienza et al., 2006). Firm strategy also influences the growth/survival relationship, 
as highlighted by Romanelli (1989; in Sapienza et al., 2006), suggesting what is summarised 
as a “complex relationship between industry growth and mortality”. According to Romanelli 
(1989), sector growth increased the likelihood of survival; but this relationship had to be 
considered alongside firm strategy, where specialised businesses were at a higher risk of 
death in high growth sectors, whilst a firm’s high expansion rate posed a risk in low growth 
industries.  
The significance of a firms’ industry on survival was confirmed by Audretsch (1991), who 
compared survival rates of firms in different manufacturing sectors. Whilst capital-intensity was 
found to be of little deterrence to new firm foundation in a sector, firms in capital-intense 
business areas were more likely to fail. This effect was distinct for firms who faced both the 
high capital requirements and were unable to make up for it through innovative approaches 
and/or products. Those sector new-joiners that prove to engage with innovation activities were 
able to offset the negative impact of capital-intensity on survival. Dunne et al. (1989) also found 
this impact of sector on survival. Geroski (1995, p. 21; in Lin and Huang, 2008) confirm the 
role of innovation in survival, expanding the arguments presented by linking it to a sector’s 
environment: 
 “the growth and survival prospects of new firms will depend on their ability to 
 learn about their environment, and to link changes in their choices of strategy to the 
 changing configuration of that environment... the more turbulent the market 
 environment, the more likely it is that firms will fail to cope. If the process of entry 
 continually throws up new aspirants for market places, then slow learning coupled 
 with a turbulent environment means that high entry rates will be observed jointly with 
 high failure rates”.  
 
Of course, other macro-economic factors also influence firm survival, for example, at national 
level the recent financial crisis or government austerity. Both may not only impact spending 
power, but also a firm’s ability to attract capital. Local effects impacting survival may be a firm’s 
ability to attract and retain talent, or a more regionally contained economic crisis (or boom).  
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Geroski (p.23, 1995) concludes that “[new firm] entry appears to be relatively easy, but survival 
is not”. Certainly the high annual entry figures described at the outset of this section and the 
quick exit of a large number of these entities confirms the challenges small firms are facing in 
relation to survival. 
From a policy perspective, the questions that arise are whether – given the high attrition among 
new and young firms – a lower firm death rate among small firms would be desirable, and what 
measures could be taken and to yield actual impact? This chapter is concerned with adding 
evidence to the latter. On the question of desirability caution is required, and whilst beyond the 
core of this thesis, it is a valid concern. Support may help a promising business through a 
phase of difficulty, but it may also result in inefficient businesses surviving for longer. However, 
to what extent soft business support has the ability to extend an essentially unviable firm’s 
lifetime is questionable. The problem will be more acute for financial support.  
 
4.4 Previous evidence on the impact of support on firm survival 
 
Chapter One outlined the market failure arguments, as an explanation of why policy is 
concerned with providing assistance to small firms. A large number of schemes exist to support 
small firms to overcome these perceived market failures in the economy. Policy-makers’ 
intentions for specific interventions are often not well defined, leaving it uncertain as to what 
specific criteria support policy should be assessed against (as discussed in Chapter Two). 
Generally small business policy considers the array of options governments have at their 
disposal to support small firm development (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). It is a logical 
assumption that one of the intended outcomes of policy is to enhance the survival prospects 
of assisted firms. Unless firms survive, they would be unable to provide the job and other 
economic effects hoped for in the policy design (as concluded in Section 4.2 – keeping in mind 
that support could possibly also extent inefficient market contenders’ lifes). In fact, Coad et al. 
(2013) make the argument that a firm’s resource base influences the likelihood for its survival, 
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improving the odds of a (random) growth event. So if a support intervention adds to the firms’ 
resource base, this would not translate into growth, which is perceived as a random event, but 
instead would only increase the odds for growth given that longer survival51.  
Some literature considering business support and its impact on the survival of firms exists, 
usually as an addition to their actual defined evaluation objectives. Wren and Storey (2002) 
found in their assessment of marketing consultancy to SMEs that advice had a considerable 
impact on firm performance. Overall, support was not found to be of significance on firm 
survival. However, when mediating by firm size, survival effects depending on firm size (and 
stage of the economic cycle) were identified. Support benefited mid-range SMEs, defined by 
Wren and Storey as having 6-80 employees and £300k-£2m sales, with four percent higher 
survival rates in the longer run, and for the survivors up to ten percent higher growth rates. 
Supported firms were low-growth but high-survival, without taking the selection bias into 
account the survival and growth impact would be about half. This was considered as “strong 
support” for the then recent changes to the UK’s business support framework delivered through 
Business Link, with a stronger focus on those mid-range small businesses.  
Fuentes and Dresdner (2013) considered the impact of support on micro-enterprise survival in 
Chile as a developing nation. There were two assessed dimensions to the support – firstly the 
amount of funds granted to the micro-enterprise; and secondly the characteristics of the so-
called sponsors52 providing soft support to complement the financial assistance. The study was 
based on a relatively small sample of 76 firms covering nine years, and the authors conclude 
their paper with the call for “a more complete database”, to be “continuously pursued”53. It was 
found that the amount of funds granted was linked to longer firm survival, reducing their hazard 
rate minimally but significantly. Different sponsors also impacted the survival chances across 
                                               
51
 Coad et al. (2013) are not without criticism, Chapter 5 looks at that specific debate in more detail. 
52
 The concept of ‘sponsors’ is interesting in that it represents a non-financial support product. 
Generally, the limited evidence around the impact of support on firm survival focusses on financial 
support (such as grants). 
53
 This links back to Chapter Two, which discusses how data availability presents one of the major 
issues for robust long-term evaluation. 
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the firms. One obvious concern, raised by the authors, is the uncertainty around potential 
selection issues here. Have firms really survived due to higher grants and a more effective 
sponsor, or were those firms with a high probability to succeed singled out for higher grant 
awards and the “more effective” sponsors? A literature review by Schwartz (2009, p. 406) 
would suggest that substantial selection bias is highly likely in the context of such programme. 
It was not controlled for in Fuentes and Dresdner (2013).  
Drawing on a far larger sample, an earlier study of the effects of government grants on survival 
was undertaken by Girma et al. (2007), studying the case of Ireland. Whilst also investigating 
financial support, their study is of interest due to the use of official micro-data. Their final 
sample of 3,095 firms was the result of linking national Irish databases, comprised of firm-level 
performance data and covariates with a universe of assisted firms, and therefore achieving a 
far greater sample size than the Chilean case reviewed above. Propensity score matching was 
undertaken to address selection issues (which were found to be clearly present). Kaplan-Meier 
survival functions suggest a higher likelihood of survival for those firms in receipt of grants 
compared to those that were not. After ten years, the probability of survival for firms in receipt 
of a grant was 85 percent, compared to 70 percent for those firms in the non-assisted control 
group. A subsequent Cox proportional hazards model confirms a significant difference 
between the two groups, with the grants linked to firms with a higher chance of survival. The 
results also underline the important role of size for firm survival, significant at one percent level 
across all presented models54, whilst none of the other controls such as foreign ownership 
were found to be of significance. 
Financial support will quite naturally help a small business more immediately than any non-
financial support such as advice, by instantly impacting a firm’s cash flow. Overall, the small 
amount of evidence that does exist for the impact of public support on firm survival would point 
                                               
54
 An interesting additional observation is the clearly limited evidence that exists with regards to the 
effect of business support on survival. Only Wren and Storey (2002, as presented above) and Jarmin 
(1999) are highlighted as previous survival studies by Girma et al. (2007). As survival is a long-term 
evaluation matter, this again points towards the lack of evidence accounting for the longer term. 
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towards some effect on survival rates for those firms in receipt of assistance. No survival 
studies other than Wren and Storey (2002) and Jarmin (1999) focussing on pure non-financial 
assistance through means of business advice appear to exist, however. Given the more 
immediate nature of the impact of financial support, care should be taken to avoid generalising 
the results and considering the impact of financial and non-financial support to be comparable. 
There is a clear need to add to the rather scarce evidence on the impact of non-financial 
business support on firm survival. 
Given the scarce evidence in existence suggests a positive impact of support in survival rates, 
this chapter’s analysis, therefore, seeks to test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis H1 – Business support impacts firm survival rates.  
Assistance is split into Intensive and Other Assistance. A reasonable assumption would be for 
Intensive Assistance to have a greater impact on survival rates than Other Assistance:  
Hypothesis H2 – Business support impact on firm survival rates will differ by intensity of 
support.  
Survival is impacted by a variety of factors, most notably age. It appears unlikely that a soft 
support intervention would make a lasting measurable impact on survival working against 
those broader trends.  
Hypothesis H3 – Assisted firms will face the same long-term survival prospects as non-assisted 
firms.  
The hypotheses will be tested in the following analysis.  
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4.5 Survival estimates for assisted vs. non-assisted firms 
 
The effect of a firm having received assistance on its likelihood of survival is estimated using 
the BL impact dataset discussed in Chapter Three. The analysis differentiates between the 
survival effects of intensive assistance and other assistance, compared to the group of non-
assisted firms. The analysis will take into account age and size as key determinants of survival 
rates. 
In Chapter Three the longitudinal dataset of BL assistance was developed. The longitudinal 
dataset provides the underlying dataset for the survival analysis undertaken in this chapter 
(and for the growth analysis in Chapter Five). As previously outlined, the dataset allows for the 
comparison of three groups: The intensively assisted firms (IAs), those that had other 
assistance (OAs) and the non-assisted control group (NA). Assistance was provided to the IAs 
and OAs during the 6 months period between April and October of that year. With no further 
information available on the exact month of intervention, 2003 serves as the common ‘origin’ 
or base year for the analysis. The BSD is also limited to only being able to provide an annual 
insight into a firm’s live status, this somewhat broader definition of the period of intervention 
has no impact on the analysis carried out (even if assistance could be attributed to a specific 
month during that six months period, only data for the annual intervals would be available for 
the analysis from the BSD).  
The death or exit variable as provided by the BSD has been explored in Chapter Three. The 
definition of death applied here, therefore, differs from other firm death definitions. For 
example, Storey and Wynarczyk (1996) define firm death as an event where a number of 
changes are recorded simultaneously: If at least three characteristics out of name, location, 
sector and ownership change, a firm may be considered dead in their view. In the BSD, 
enterprise exit is recorded for IDs (‘entrefs’) that either cease to trade, which may be signalled 
by a lack of updates in the IDBR for more than three years for a specific firm, or gets taken 
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over by another entity and, therefore, ceases to trade as an enterprise. Name and sector do 
not make any difference.  
The full sample descriptives are provided in Chapter Three. Given the literature’s suggestion 
of the role of age and size on survival, they will be included as part of the analysis and reviewed 
in more detail in the respective following sections. 
 
4.5.1  Survival analysis: All assisted versus all non-assisted 
 
The central element of survival analysis is the hazard rate, which represents the likelihood of 
an event, in this case firm death, at a certain time. For this, the firm needs to have survived up 
to the previous time period, of course. The survival rate is the inverse of the hazard rate – the 
more firms are likely to die, the less can survive.  
The non-parametrical Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator provides a simple first step to 
explore the survival differences by type of assistance. No censoring of data is required, the 
Kaplan-Meier model has no design issues with the 75-80 percent of firms that survive from 
(BSD) 200455 all the way through to 2011, which represents the last year of data included in 
the longitudinal dataset.  
The survival rate is represented by:  
  
1
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n
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    (1) 
The literature is clear on the significant role of size and particularly age on survival (e. g. Wren 
and Storey, 2002, as introduced earlier), and this should be taken into account for any analysis 
herein. Without taking into account age (or size) the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates returned 
                                               
55
 Keeping in mind that the intervention took place in 2003, which is reflected by the BSD 2004 edition. 
Any years referred to in this analysis refer to the year of the BSD data.  
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fairly small and insignificant differences in survival between the assistance and control groups 
(graphs not shown). Appendix D applies a number of tests confirming these observations.  
 
4.5.2  Survival analysis: By type of assistance and firm age 
Given the central role of firm age with respect to firm survival56, rather than comparing the 
entire groups of IAs, OAs and NAs, the groups were split by firm age. Firm age was captured 
as part of the original BLO Survey (Table 10 – where “Firm age <5yrs” represents the BLO 
Survey age categories coded as 2<3 years, 3<4 years, 4<5 years, other categories as provided 
by BLO Survey). Age was coded with reference to 2005, that is, for the 2003 intervention the 
youngest firms in the BLO Survey must have been two years old.  
Table 10 – Age categories as available from BLO Survey 
Firm age in BLO Survey 2005 IA OA NA Total 
       
Firm age <5yrs (2003: 0-2 yrs.) 111 64 34 209 
Firm age 5<10yrs (2003: 3-7 yrs.) 94 56 49 199 
Firm age 10<20yrs (2003:  8-17 yrs.) 103 92 72 267 
Firm age 20+yrs (2003: 18+ yrs.) 115 109 144 368 
       
Total 423 321 299 1,043 
Source: BLO Survey  
 
In comparison to the BLO survey, where age was coded in above categories, the BSD allows 
determining age as a continuous variable, using its birth and death variables as discussed in 
Chapter Three. Table 11 shows age as coded on the basis of the BSD, compared to the BLO 
survey categories.  
                                               
56
 For a better understanding of the importance of the role of size and age and potential other firm and 
owner characteristics, probit regressions were run, with firm exit event as the binary dependent outcome 
variable. These confirmed the size and age impacts on survival, but provided no coherent results on 
any other suitable predictors. 
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Table 11 – Comparison of age categories, BSD and BLO Survey 
Firm age 2003, BSD vs. BLO IA   OA   NA   Total Total 
  BSD BLO BSD BLO BSD BLO BSD BLO 
Firm age 0-2 yrs. 73 111 49 64 26 34 148 209 
Firm age 3-7 yrs. 103 94 70 56 51 49 224 199 
Firm age 8-17 yrs. 134 103 112 92 103 72 349 267 
Firm age 18+ yrs. 115 115 90 109 120 144 325 368 
  
            
    
Total 425 423 321 321 300 299 1,046 1,043 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
 
Table 11 includes the age categories as based on the BLO Survey; they are for their largest 
part congruent with firm age as recorded in the BSD. Ideally, the figures should be identical. 
Especially the figures for the youngest firms are considerably lower based on the BSD. One 
likely reason for this apparent gap is the way the BSD ‘learns’ of a firm’s existence: firm birth 
will be recorded in the BSD at the time of a firm’s registration for VAT of PAYE, as discussed 
in Chapter Three. BLO Survey interviewees may therefore have provided birth dates that 
precede BSD records. Other than that, as with any survey, there is of course the risk of 
inaccurate responses to the BLO survey, or inaccurate recording of the same.  
It was chosen to work with age based on the BSD, therefore with firm age as reflected by 
official records. This allows for determining age groups that achieve a more even count by age 
band. It also ensures age was determined in a comparable way to the BSD reference group 
(introduced and used in Figure 2 and Figure 3). Table 12 shows the age categories as 
redefined on the basis of the BSD for the survival analysis within this chapter.  
Table 12 – Recoded age categories based on BSD 
Firm age 2003 (BSD), re-categorised IA OA NA Total 
       
Firm age 0-3 yrs. 102 63 36 201 
Firm age 4-9 yrs. 101 75 65 241 
Firm age 10-19 yrs. 125 110 85 320 
Firm age 20+ yrs. 97 73 114 284 
       
Total 425 321 300 1,046 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
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Figure 2 demonstrates the importance of age on survival for the sample of firms at hand.  
Figure 2 – Survival estimates by firm age group (all firms in longitudinal dataset) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
 
Figure 3 provides the same breakdown of firms by age group but for a random sample of 
197,291 firms from the BSD57. It confirms the trends as observed in the longitudinal dataset to 
reflect general survival rates fairly accurately.  
 
  
                                               
57
 The random sample was drawn from linked 2004-2011 BSD data. The total sample size of 197,291 
divides into 55,531 firm 0-3 years old, 57,721 4-9 years, 47,811 10<19 years. The use of a random 
sample rather than the full firm population was on the basis of computing power limitations.  
20+ yrs. 
10-19 yrs. 
4-9 yrs. 
0-3 yrs. 
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Figure 3 – Survival estimates by firm age group (random sample from BSD) 
 
Source: BSD 
 
Whilst the overall survival trends are comparable, the firms as captured as part of the BLO 
survey (Figure 2) enjoyed a considerably higher survival rate than the overall firm population 
(as represented by the large random BSD sample in Figure 3). The reasons for these observed 
differences may be manifold – section 4.5.4 looks at this.  
Returning to Figure 2, the question arising is to what extent these survival rates differ by age 
group when comparing assisted and non-assisted groups. Combinations for both IA and OA 
compared to NA were looked at across age groups.  
The results obtained suggest little significant impact of assistance on survival. The following 
six graphs Figure 4 to Figure 9 were chosen to illustrate the discussion of the results, split in 
pairs of both survival rate and resulting hazard rate graphs58. The results for OA were even 
                                               
58
 This analysis included the survival rates as obtained for the random sample from the BSD (introduced 
in Figure 3). They are of purely indicative nature, and no robust conclusions can be drawn on firms 
outperforming the firm population based on assistance received – again section 4.5.4 discusses this 
and any observations from the random sample’s survival rates. 
20+ yrs. 
10-19 yrs. 
4-9 yrs. 
0-3 yrs. 
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less remarkable than those for the IAs and are therefore not specifically reviewed in the 
following. 
Figure 4 shows how the youngest firms, which were no more than three years old at the point 
of intervention, enjoy no distinct advantage for survival as recipients of IA. No IAs exited in 
2005, but around six percent of NAs (and ten percent of OAs did so – not shown). Given the 
upper confidence limit for NAs is at around 98 percent, the early IA survival performance is 
significantly better for the youngest firms than the NAs. IAs then faced survival rates below 
those of the NAs, for a period of three years up to 2009, and from 2010 onwards.  
Figure 5, showing the according hazard rates, shows a high exit rate for NAs between 2008 
and 2009, but far less so for IAs. However, with the exception of the 2005 IA survival 
performance, no significant differences exist between IA, OA and NA groups for firms of less 
than three years of age, with confidence limits overlapping nearly entirely59. 
  
                                               
59
 As the relatively wide confidence limits indicate, sample size for the 0-3 year old firms, which was 
then split by category of assistance, is smaller compared to the other age groups defined in the BLO 
Survey, with particularly few NAs. 
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Figure 4 – Survival estimates IA vs. NA (for firms aged 0-3 years at intervention)  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
 
Figure 5 – Hazard rates IA vs. NA (for firms aged 0-3 years at intervention)  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
 
For the age category of 4-9 year old firms (Figure 6 and Figure 7, age at time of intervention) 
IA survival nearly always exceeds that of NAs (and OAs, not shown), with the hazard rate for 
the IAs remaining below that of the NAs until 2008. The approximate 77.5 percent survival rate 
in 2011 achieved by those 4-9 year old firms that benefitted from IA was near identical to the 
survival rate of NAs. Again, a significant difference between the survival rates was only found 
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for IAs immediately post intervention in 2005, with their 100 percent survival lying outside the 
NA confidence limits. Thereafter, confidence limits overlap, from 2008 onwards to a 
considerable degree.  
Figure 6 – Survival estimates IA vs. NA (for firms aged 4-9 years at intervention)  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
 
Figure 7 – Hazard rates IA vs. NA (for firms aged 4-9 years at intervention)  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
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Figure 8 and Figure 9 show how survival prospects increase by age, compared to the younger 
age groups discussed above. For firms aged 20 years and above at the time of the intervention, 
survival rates are better than for any younger cohorts. The hazard rates for IAs and NAs cross 
at multiple times at overall low hazard levels. Up to 2010, IA and NA survival performance is 
relatively similar. In 2011 88 percent of IAs remain against 84 percent of NAs, a non-significant 
difference in survival.  
Figure 8 – Survival estimates IA vs. NA (for firms aged 20+ years at intervention)  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
 
Figure 9 – Hazard rates IA vs. NA (for firms aged 20+ years at intervention)  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
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Overall, Section 4.5.2 confirms the role of firm age for survival. For the effectiveness of support 
it suggests that when considering assistance by firm age group, there may be some limited 
evidence for a very short-lived significant effect of IA on those firms that are relatively younger. 
Beyond that, no significant effects of assistance on survival could be identified.  
 
4.5.3  Survival analysis: The role of size 
Analogous to firm age, firm size is also considered as of relevance for survival, as introduced 
and discussed in Section 4.3. The previous sets of survival estimates and hazard rates were 
repeated: This time the groups were split by firm size category rather than age.  
 
The results confirmed the role of size: Whilst 88 percent of the largest firms (>49 employees) 
survive the entire evaluation period, only some 67 percent of the 1-5 employee firms do so – 
significantly less. The results were similar to those when assessing the role of age, if not even 
less remarkable around any potential significant differences between IAs and NAs. That, plus 
the relationship between firm size and age (as looked at in the previous section), means that 
the results do not need to be reported herein: They would offer little additional insights. 
 
4.5.4  Comparison of survival rates with BSD random sample  
The “BSD benchmark” data as included in Figure 4 to Figure 9 indicate the survival rates as 
obtained for the random sample from the BSD, introduced in Figure 3. The random sample’s 
survival performance is generally worse than the assisted firms, but also the NAs. This 
difference is often significant. 
But there are two limitations to the use of the random sample for comparison purposes. Firstly, 
the random sample’s generally worse survival performance, when compared to the NAs, hints 
at a selection effect of how the NAs were chosen to provide a representative counterfactual 
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for the IAs and OAs in BERR (2007). With little comparable owner and firm data available for 
the random BSD sample, the effect cannot be quantified, but some considerable differences 
between the firm and owner characteristics are likely. The selection effect’s role for the 
comparison between IAs, OAs and NAs will be discussed as part of the concluding section. 
The value of having at least some firm and owner characteristics available is illustrated well by 
this dissimilarity between the performance of the longitudinal dataset and random sample 
groups. Complete reliance on the BSD for carrying out this analysis would be unlikely to 
provide robust results, therefore the need remains for firm and owner characteristics to be 
added.  
The second limitation is sample contamination. The random sample was generated from the 
linked records of BSD 2004 through to BSD 2011 data. All firms born after BSD 2004, or dead 
before BSD 2005, were removed, as they would not have been live during the assistance 
period. All firms with no employment in BSD 2004 were also excluded. Of the remaining firms, 
10 percent were included for the random sample used herein – resulting in a sample of 197,291 
firms. As introduced in Section 3.2.2, 166,320 firms were assisted by Business Link in the six 
months period April to September 2003 alone – the IAs and OAs in the BLO Survey were 
drawn from that population. Based on these figures, that means some 8.4 percent of the entire 
firm population received business support through Business Link. These 8.4 percent would, 
accordingly, be reflected in the random sample used in this chapter for comparison purposes60, 
making robust analysis impossible. As a result, the random sample’s survival rates as indicated 
by “BSD benchmark” lines need to be regarded as of purely indicative descriptive nature. No 
robust conclusions can be drawn.   
                                               
60
 In addition, further contamination is possible from having received Business Link support outside the 
April-September 2003 time frame. However, this is equally true for the BLO Survey sample.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
It is obvious that the BL intervention has little impact on survival. The overarching finding is 
that neither IA nor OA make any longer term difference to firm survival regardless of age or 
size group. Occasionally, with regards to survival assisted firms may even be performing worse 
than NAs for specific age and size groups assessed. Just as with the usual superior survival 
rate of assisted firms, the observed differences are not of statistical significance, however.  
The only suggestion of a statistically significant impact of assistance exists for the immediate 
period post intervention. IAs enjoyed a 100 percent survival rate for that period for the 0-3 year, 
4-9 year and 10-19 year old firms, OAs did so for their 10-19 year old firms. As the previous 
sections show well, age (and size, not shown) had a far greater impact on survival than 
assistance, with survival rates varying from 62 percent for the youngest firms to 87.5 percent 
for the oldest and 66 percent for the smallest to 88 percent for the largest – far greater than 
the variations observed between the assisted and non-assisted groups split by age or size 
group.  
Parametric models could be used as an additional approach to further explore the impact of 
assistance on survival. However, the survival estimates suggest little value in expanding the 
analysis to include parametric approaches. An important consideration to keep in mind is the 
lack of control for the selection bias into the Business Link programme. Theoretically, it might 
be possible that selection bias has led to better or worse firms being selected into the group of 
assisted firms. There may also be selection bias introduced by the choice of IA or OA for a 
particular firm. For example, if IA was usually allocated to underperforming firms (there is no 
suggestion in the literature that it was) assistance may have brought survival up and in line 
with the NAs, leading to no observable significant difference (when in fact, IAs may have 
performed significantly worse without IA). However, as seen in Chapter Five, selection bias 
into the programme appears to have been of little significance and minimal impact for the 
results.  
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The conclusion, and response to H1 to H3 as formulated at the outset of this chapter, remains 
that assistance has – at best – a short-term positive impact on firm survival, but that depends 
on firm age and size. The effect disappears very quickly. To that effect, the results only partially 
confirm the better survival prospects of supported firms as identified – for other programmes – 
by Wren and Storey (2002), Fuentes and Dresdner (2013) and Girma et al. (2007). 
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Chapter Five 
 
Business support and firm growth  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 “Growth is a process that needs to be studied over time.” 
Davidsson (2006, p. 40: Section on “The need for longitudinal research on firm growth”) 
 
In this chapter, the interest is on the impact of business support on firm growth61 as measured 
by employment and turnover, over time. The context will be set by a review of the evidence 
around the determinants of firm growth, and how these link to business support. Using the 
longitudinal dataset developed for this research project, various analyses will be undertaken 
to understand the impact of assistance over time. First, two-stage regression models will be 
estimated, with various measures of growth as the dependent variables and accounting for 
selection bias. The role of pre-intervention growth periods will also be investigated. This 
approach will allow to compare results across time periods, and to illustrate the impact of time 
on results depending on the evaluation period chosen. As in the previous chapter, the 
performance data available covers the periods 2004 to 2011. Simple regression techniques 
may mislead by assuming the same effect of assistance on all firms over the growth distribution 
and over time. Quantile regressions explore this issue.  
This chapter, therefore, adds to the evidence around the concerns of ignoring time as an 
important factor in evaluation studies as already explored in Chapter Two. The dataset used 
                                               
61
 The long-term impact of assistance on productivity, as a function of employment and turnover, will 
also be included in this chapter. 
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is the longitudinal dataset as developed in Chapter Three and used in Chapter Four for the 
impact of business support on survival.   
 
5.2 Literature review: Firm growth 
 
 
 ”Even though there has been sustained interest in growth for almost 50 years, 
 relatively little is known about this phenomenon and much misunderstanding and 
 confusion surrounds it.”  
    Leitch et al. (2010, p. 249; in Anyadike-Danes and Hart, 2014) 
 
The central idea by policy-makers highlighted in Chapter One is that small business serves as 
a central force for economic wealth (see also OECD, 2008); a claim that appears obvious 
considering that more than 99 out of 100 businesses fall within the SME definition. The effect 
of small firms providing and creating the largest part of new jobs holds true around the globe 
(World Bank, 2011; Criscuolo et al., 2015). In line with improved employment records, other 
effects such as higher tax revenues, and a positive image for the region (and politicians) will 
also follow. 
5.2.1 Growth as an outcome 
 
The two main economic contributions of small businesses, as introduced in Chapter One, are 
their employment generation (growth) as well as innovation activities. With an interest in the 
impact of a supportive intervention on firm growth, a general understanding of the context of 
firm growth and its determinants is needed.  
Davidsson (2015, s. 3) summarised “what we know” about firm growth as: 
1) “Not all (young/small/independent) firms can grow; will grow; should grow, or even want 
to grow” 
2) “What they [entrepreneurs] say they want matters [in achieving growth]” 
3) “Growth is not a homogenous phenomenon” 
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4) Growth is not random 
5) “However, it is definitely not deterministic, either” 
6) “Growth is not necessarily ‘good performance’” 
This raises a number of important initial points in relation to the impact of business support. It 
would certainly not be the sole differentiator between a firm growing or not – the firms’ 
intentions and individual context and capabilities matter. Firms that want to grow may be more 
likely to seek out support, introducing selection bias in any analysis. Firms with no intention of 
growing may also receive support (where growth would be the wrong measure to understand 
impact, but reducing the average impact of assistance on growth)62.  
For a review of the relevant literature, McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) suggest a categorisation 
of the evidence into three main research streams: 
1) Growth as an Outcome 
2) The Outcome of Growth 
3) Growth as a Process 
With the impact of business support on growth, or capabilities fostered by receiving such 
support, as the subject of this chapter, focus is on the first stream: “Growth as an Outcome”. 
Drawing on a wide range of sources, a number of important points are made as part of the 
overview provided.  
Key summary points from “Growth as an Outcome” in McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) are: 
1) Determinants of growth: Hundreds of studies considering the determinants of firm 
growth failed to identify any “variables that have a consistent effect on growth across 
studies”.  
                                               
62
 Davidsson’s (2015) statement that “growth is not necessarily good performance” raises the important 
question as to how sensible it is to consider growth as a measure of business support impact. In a strict 
sense, evaluation ideally seeks to provide measurements against pre-intervention objectives. This policy 
design and objective setting process is somewhat outside the focus of this thesis, but will be touched 
upon in Chapter Six. 
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2) Selection bias: Many studies of growth exclude very small firms, or those that have no 
intention to grow, or achieved any (varying) number of stages in firm development. 
Many samples therefore include a bias from the outset, and also are difficult to 
compare. 
3) Growth mode: Growth is usually assumed to be internal – organic – in most cases an 
unlikely assumption63. As seen above, this may be linked to firm size and age (smaller 
and younger firms focus on organic growth, larger and older firms focus on 
acquisitions). In fact, a firm may be shrinking its ‘organic’ employment whilst still 
considered ‘high growth’ through its acquisitions – at a net loss for society. 
4) Variability over time: Growth is a process over time, between two or more points 
included for analysis. Legal form, parent and/or subsidiary status, intentions and goals 
(for example, preparation for initial public offering) of a firm may change over time. 
Especially young firms experience fast changes to their resource base, which may 
render early surveys of firm and entrepreneur characteristics out of date quickly, not 
explaining firm growth measured later.  
5) No linear growth over time: Most studies of firm growth assume a linear relationship 
among variables which is commonly depicted by regression analysis, typically for a one 
year period or over a longer temporal period for three or five years. This fails to capture 
the inherent variation in growth rates over times – plenty of evidence suggests that 
growth has ups and downs over longer time frames; it “is anything but linear and 
stable”.  
6) Impact varies by measure: Measurement of growth varies (possible dependent 
variables include turnover, employment, profits, market share) and growth in one metric 
may not equate to growth in another – this includes firms that may be described as high 
growth in a particular metric (see also Chandler et al., 2009).  
                                               
63
 Compare with Penrose (1959), given it is considered to be one of the most influential works in the 
field it surprises that growth studies treat growth largely as an internal phenomenon.  
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For the study of business support and growth this suggests a number of further important 
points. Growth determinants are not considered as having a consistent effect across studies – 
so any findings on the impact of business support on growth should be understood as possibly 
not unilaterally robust. However, as Davidsson (2015) summarises, growth should also not be 
seen as random, opposing the randomness claim made, for example, by Geroski et al. (2003) 
or more recently argued by Coad et al. (2013 and 2015) with counter-responses by Derbyshire 
and Garnsey (2014 and 2015) – considered in detail in the next section.  
Importantly, time – of central interest in this thesis – plays a role in two ways. Firstly, the firm 
characteristics measured at the outset, usually at the point of intervention, may change over 
time, which inadvertently could impact growth patterns. Of course, changes may be a result of 
the support received, but attribution of such effect becomes less likely over time. Secondly, 
studies (and this would be true especially for those studies over longer time periods than usual) 
usually compare an initial measurement of firm size with a second one at the point of evaluation 
– failing to capture variations in the growth rate that is described as anything but linear and 
stable. To assume that business support would have an average impact on firm growth over 
numerous years (when undertaking a long-term impact evaluation) should be avoided, in line 
with that commentary.  
The summaries by McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) and Davidsson (2015) indicate the complexity 
of the growth phenomenon. To add the necessary context to this chapter’s analysis a brief 
review of the (very large) body of growth literature was undertaken.  
 
5.1.2 Gibrat’s Law  
There is extensive literature on the topic of firm growth, which in many cases makes reference 
to Gibrat’s “Law [or Rule] [of Proportionate Effect]”, as proposed by Gibrat (1931). Given 
Gibrat’s continuing popularity in the debate of firm growth, with plenty of evidence produced in 
favour and against the key points made, the discussion of Gibrat’s work here is used to provide 
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a starting point for reviewing the complex topic of growth literature – and for the illustration of 
how many and often conflicting findings exist.   
“A suitable starting point for studies into industrial structure and dynamics is the firm 
size distribution, which is one of the oldest and most fundamental stylized facts about 
firm size and growth. In fact, it was while contemplating the empirical size distribution 
that Robert Gibrat (1931) proposed the well-known ‘Law of Proportionate Effect’ (also 
known as Gibrat’s law’), which has arguably been the most influential model of firm 
growth. Even today, the firm size distribution continues to receive a lot of attention from 
both empirical researchers and theoretical modellers.” 
Coad (2009, p. 14) 
 
Under the assumption of a fixed number of firms, and random growth rates by firms (under 
normal distribution) including independence from firm size and previous growth, Gibrat (1931) 
asserted that the distribution of firm sizes will assume lognormal and importantly an increasing 
variance over time. This conclusion was drawn on the basis of the underlying sample – 
industrial companies in France. Sutton (1997) provides more detail and a comprehensive 
discussion on Gibrat’s Law.  
The “huge” literature that followed is described by Anyadike and Hart (2014, p.4) as “[…] 
concerned with fitting increasingly exotic statistical distributions to the firm size distributions, 
and more recently to the distribution of firm growth rates”, with reference to Axtell (2006) and 
Bottazzi and Secchi (2003).  
Audretsch et al. (2004; in Petrunia, 2008) conclude that on the whole Gibrat’s Law and size 
distribution theories have little support. Out of 51 studies captured, 27 reject it, 16 find mixed 
results, depending on industrial sector and sample of firms chosen. Petrunia (2008) 
summarises the reasons for rejection as  
1) “Smaller firms grow at an expected rate that is greater than larger firms”, 
2) “Growth favours larger firms”, 
3) “Assumption of no persistence in firm growth over time fails to hold”; 
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with a number of example sources provided for the above.  
And whilst the commonly quoted results by Mansfield (1962) that see a negative relation 
between firm size and growth were explained as a result of sample bias by the author, plenty 
of other research since confirmed that this inverse relationship between firm size and growth 
rates was not linked to sample bias (Evans, 1987; Hall 1987; Dunne et al., 1989; all in Cabral, 
1995). The description of an inverse relationship would be in support of non-random growth 
patterns.   
In more detail, Coad (2009) offer a recent literature review and angle on Gibrat and size 
distribution work. Gibrat’s work should be considered as pioneering in the field, and laying the 
foundation for a still popular field of research. However, given the at best mixed evidence, it 
fails to provide a robust and generally valid explanation for firm growth. Importantly, for the 
analysis of the impact of business support it a remains more of theoretical than practical value. 
The assumption of a fixed firm count and therefore ignoring new market entrants, generally 
smaller firms at start-up benefitting from an inverse firm size and growth relationship, does not 
sit well with the analysis of a support scheme aimed at small firms. However, it does serve as 
a viable introduction to the complexities of the firm growth debate. It is still commonly referred 
to in recent research as one of the many dimensions that there are to growth, resulting in many 
opposing findings as to the triggers of that growth. Ijiri and Simon (1964; in Coad, 2007) went 
as far as comparing Gibrat’s law to that of Galileo: Approximately correct, but not taking into 
account numerous environmental factors such as air resistance et cetera. That means it 
provides but also remains a useful first approximation. In agreement with Coad (2007) this 
provides a workable concluding position on Gibrat’s Law. 
  
5.1.3 Extensions and alternative approaches to Gibrat 
Keeping in mind this research’s interest in soft business support and its impact, it is sensible 
to look at some of the extensions to Gibrat’s work suggested over time, and alternative 
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approaches. The reasoning behind this is that soft business support can be hoped to add to 
firms’ and owners’ skill basis, depending on programme specifics. Such advancement in a 
firm’s capabilities would have gone unaccounted for in Gibrat (1931). 
Relevant extensions to Gibrat’s model were suggested over time; the inclusion of individual 
firm characteristics (and size) affecting growth, or firm age and size by Ijiri and Simon (1977; 
in Parker, 2009). As an alternative approach, Parker (2009) presents (among others) 
Jovanovic’s (1982) model of industry selection, which assumes imperfect information by 
entrepreneurs about their capabilities. The model assigns a central role to luck (that is, 
randomness) of an entrepreneur, and also refers to the unknown abilities (before start-up) of 
the entrepreneur in determining (survival) and growth. This implies that the entrepreneur who 
stays in business for longer learns more about their true abilities than the entrepreneur whose 
firm failed to survive for long. Again, this presents an area where business support may make 
a difference, highlighting owners’ true abilities to them earlier. A further central distinction of 
the model is its assumption of continuous entry (and exit), compared to Gibrat’s Law.  
Other theories providing plausible explanations for firm growth (and providing a suitable link to 
the areas business support may address) include those that assign a central role to innovation 
to firm growth (and entry), as summarised in Parker (2009). Over time product maturity leads 
to zero economic profits and a terminal decline of market entrants (Klepper, 1996; Klepper and 
Simons, 2000). First movers are assumed to be those that grow fastest and then dominate the 
market, consequently leading to the formation of oligopolies.  
Other extensions exist. Segal and Spivak (1989) were concerned with the relatively higher 
dissolution costs of intangible nature, such as reputation, faced by businesses operating with 
little economic profit. These firms tend to be smaller ones which therefore have a higher 
incentive to reinvest more of their profits into business development. As such, they grow faster 
than larger firms who do not face the perceived risk of exit and the dissolution costs involved. 
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Notably, for large firms, Segal and Spivak provide support for Gibrat’s Law, in that large firms 
experience growth rates converging to a constant.  
Again, focussing on the growth differential between smaller and larger firms, a further potential 
explanation is offered by Cabral (1995). His proposition is that investments into organisational 
or technological capacity include a certain level of sunk element, irrecoverable upon exit. 
Similar to Segal and Spivak (1989) this sunk cost is thought to then explain the different 
behaviours between smaller and larger firms. Smaller entrants are at a higher risk of exit than 
their larger peers, which leads to a more gradual investment approach by small firms. Cabral 
(1995) thereby explains higher growth rates than for larger entrants who undertake more 
upfront investment.  
Other than Gibrat (1931) and the considerable research linking to and building on his work, 
another central contribution was made by Penrose (1959)64. Penrose differentiated between 
organic growth, for which entrepreneurial capabilities are key, and acquired growth, for which 
a firm’s financial strength and spare managerial resource are key. Penrose (1959) explains a 
firm’s ability to grow organically through its ability to identify opportunities for expansion and to 
reallocate existing resources within the firm in new ways, allowing exploitation of such 
opportunities. Sticking with this resource-based view, for an acquisition a firm would require 
the necessary financial strength and managerial slack, both related to firm size (Davidsson et 
al., 2006). As such, rather than by the desire to “develop new economic activities”, a firm may 
choose to grow through acquisition as a result of its available resources (Davidsson et al., 
2006), of which larger firms inadvertently have more of.  
This is an important distinction, as a firm that acquires another one does indeed grow, but at 
the expense of another company’s existence. Employment may even drop in sum due to 
efficiency gains, so that rather than growth of size, whether employment or turnover, 
                                               
64
 Gibrat (1931) and Penrose (1959) are singled out as the main growth theories, for example, in the 
extensive growth literature review by Coad (2009).  
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measuring productivity growth may provide the favourable results (for considerations about 
growth measurement see below – the key contribution of Penrose’s work to this research is 
this very distinction of how growth was achieved). Davidsson et al. (2006) present an overview 
of studies supporting this distinction between small and young firms and their organic 
‘entrepreneurial’ growth versus that of their larger and older peers that focus largely on 
acquisitioned growth. McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) provide a comprehensive summary of 
Penrose’s work, and illustrate how it remains one of the most referred to theories in the field. 
 
5.1.3 The (non-)desire of firms to grow 
Given the focus of much of the research introduced above and also by policy-makers alike on 
understanding why certain firms may grow and others not, it is important to note that, in fact, 
most entrepreneurs and firms have little ambition to become much larger enterprises (Roper 
and Hart, 2013; Wiklund et al., 2003), or, in fact, would even possess the potential to grow 
considerably (Roper and Hart, 2013).  
Based on figures of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) 1991-1999, only a third of 
entrepreneurs hire people at all, and no more than seven percent of self-employed individuals 
in the UK create at least ten jobs (Henley, 2005). For the UK, Cowling et al. (2004) found some 
seven to eight percent of self-employed single employee businesses hire someone else over 
a three to four year timespan. They suggest the existence of a barrier that needs to be 
overcome before the decision to hire additional staff would be contemplated.  And even though 
firms may be profitable, with sustained high profits over a number of years, in a Swedish 
sample 25 percent of firms chose not to grow employment (Bornhäll et al., 2014). Aldrich 
(1999) and Davidsson and Wiklund (2001; all in Jennings, Jennings and Greenwood, 2009) 
observe new small firms as ranging from “ ‘imitators’, who reproduce prevailing practices, to 
‘innovators’, who do things differently”. Most new entrants are imitators in mature sectors that 
exclusively serve local markets, and they will always be limited in their growth potential, as 
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stated for example by Parker (2009)65. Wiklund et al. (2003) name non-economic concerns as 
a more important factor than personal gain or loss considerations. They provide the example 
of “work atmosphere” – likely to be affected by growth it will be considered when deciding for 
or against further growth. Other factors named include independence from other stakeholder 
and survival probability.   
Small businesses as a group are still considered to add significantly to the economy (OECD, 
2013), and that they contribute more to job creation than do larger firms, with some sector 
specific exemptions for manufacturing and trade66 (Wit and Kok, 2014; with data from various 
EU member states). But, it is only a relatively small number of firms that satisfy the idea of 
small businesses as engines of job growth. In an attempt to identify the few high impact firms 
terms such as “high-growth firms” or “gazelles” sprung up. These are firms that grow 
considerably faster than the average firm. 
 
5.1.5 Growth and randomness  
On the basis of the inconclusive evidence identified and reviewed it is tempting to conclude 
that firm growth would be a process more determined by chance or, in fact, randomness than 
any other single hard factor. This would find some support by McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) 
and their key summary points made, less support in Davidsson (2015), both sources as 
introduced above. Coad et al. (2013) looked at this issue of growth and potential randomness 
in some detail, sparking a number of direct responses to their journal article. Their approach 
was somewhat novel, by arguing that firm growth was not triggered by certain firm or owner 
characteristics – their resource base. Instead, a firm’s resource base would be linked to their 
                                               
65
 A simple example may be independent restaurants and fast food outlets, often offering little product 
differentiation and high exit rates. Most owners will have little desire to grow beyond a single location.  
66
 It may be arguable to what extent such new employment adds to the total number of jobs. Possibly, 
it might merely replace other employment. Edmiston (2004; in Judd, 2006) and Fox and Murray (2004, 
in Judd, 2006) argue that much of the new job creation attributed to small firms results from considerable 
job losses at their large peers. 
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survival, seen as non-random67, which in turn would allow firms more chances for random 
growth events. The study is based on tracking a cohort of 6,247 firms for five years. Their data 
was captured as part of opening their bank account, for which they had to respond to a firm 
and owner characteristics survey. 2,184 firms survived the entire period and could be used for 
the growth path analysis. 
The results by Coad et al. (2013) “approximately” confirm the perceived random walk nature 
of firm growth. They call for building theories that consider growth as only one dimension of 
new business performance, and where the performance is primarily a game of chance. Central 
to this would be the recognition that a firm’s resources drive its chances to survive, whether 
available immediately from point of start-up or acquired over the course of trading as a 
business. As part of this firm growth is confirmed to be impacting survival.  
Coad et al. (2013) received a number of direct follow-ups and responses. Methodologically 
Derbyshire and Garnsey (2014) criticise the choice of measurement by Coad et al. (2013). 
Rather than sales they argue employment would be a more suitable and common measure. 
They also doubt the choice of growth categories that do not allow for firms that remain fairly 
similar in size with no real growth or decline. Derbyshire and Garnsey (2014) arrived at a 
sample size of 39,825 firms for the purpose of their study, using a database that relies on major 
business directory entries for firms’ inception dates. Based on their results they argue that 
rather than chance making it impossible to determine drivers for firm growth it would be much 
more a case of “deterministic chaos”68. They argue entrepreneurial skill and effort in matching 
internal firm resources to external opportunities would be central to firm growth. However, 
prediction of these is impossible due to ensuing deterministic chaos – and not due to chance 
and randomness. In agreement with Coad et al. (2013) they call for new methods and 
                                               
67
 With a view on Chapter 4 results, business support would then be seen as not having made a 
significant enough contribution to firms’ resource base to increase survival rates in any significant 
manner. 
68
 Derbyshire and Garnsey (2014, p.11) refer to May (1976) to explain, who showed that “even in a 
deterministic model in which all parameters are correctly and fully specified outcomes still appear 
random and prediction impossible. In complexity science this is known as deterministic chaos.” 
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theoretical logic to further understand the phenomenon of firm growth, but there was little to 
be gained from doing so under the assumption of randomness underpinning firm growth.  
In response to the others’ respective comments, Coad et al. (2015) and Derbyshire and 
Garnsey (2015) broadly reiterate and confirm their respective conclusions drawn, aside from 
exploring some of the methodological criticism. In the context of this research the message 
from both sets of authors’ arguments is clear: Just as earlier literature review as part of this 
chapter suggests, there are serious doubts around the research community’s current ability to 
explain firm growth drivers.  
 
5.1.6 Literature review: Discussion  
Firm growth presents an area of research that is widely investigated and discussed. And 
despite the many journal and research paper pages produced over a number of decades, 
major question marks remain. Various models to explain firm growth have been developed 
over time, but they appear to fit only very distinct scenarios, influenced by geography, sector 
and firm size considered. No common explanatory variables for growth have been identified. 
Results differ according to measure of growth chosen. There are calls for a new theoretical 
regime around investigating firm growth, based on perceived randomness and deterministic 
chaos arguments. 
What does this mean for studying the long-term impact of business support on firm growth? 
Policy-makers hope to understand if and how business support makes a positive contribution 
to firm development. Business support impact evaluations often rely on assessing performance 
effects such as growth, as discovered in Chapter Two. This was also the approach by the 
previous Business Link economic impact study undertaken on the same firms as herein 
(BERR, 2007).  
- 127 - 
 
A business support intervention will, if at all, impact growth as part of an array of factors inside 
and outside the firm. Growth presents a “multi-dimensional, heterogeneous, and complex 
phenomenon, as is each facet of it” (Leitch et al., 2010). The suggestion that luck or chance 
are also to be considered as brought up first by Jovanovic (1982) points to the complexity of 
the growth phenomenon. When considering that “decades of research […] failed to explain 
more than about 15% of the variation of firm performance” (Storey, 2011, Coad, 2009; both 
provided as reference for the quote from Derbyshire and Garnsey, 2014, p.8), one can relate 
to Coad et al. (2013) and Derbyshire and Garnsey (2014) calling for new approaches to 
investigate firm growth. Both sets of authors provide plausible arguments around the perceived 
failures of the current research regime in relation to firm growth.  
The absence of such new (and tested) methodological regime and with chance impossible to 
control for, any modelling of the impact of support on growth will need to include measures for 
firm and owner characteristics to account for their potential impact. Care needs to be taken not 
to treat growth as (implicitly) organic as by the majority of studies, but in line with Penrose 
(1959), to appreciate the different growth modes of firms. If the evaluation of business support 
presented herein would find jobs grew manifold for the assisted firms, but this was in fact driven 
by acquiring other firms, then this would provide a useless indicator for economic impact (as 
measured in jobs growth).  
It is a challenge to define defendable hypotheses around business support and its impact on 
the complex matter of firm growth, even when just considering the two sets of summary points 
around firm growth by McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) and by Davidsson (2015). By keeping the 
focus squarely on the purpose of this research – providing an understanding of whether and/or 
how long-term impact evaluation of business support matters – a number of research 
hypotheses can be defined.  
Chapter Two outlines how there is a perceived gap in the long-term impact of business support 
evaluation literature. McKelvie and Wiklund (2010) highlight the importance of time in firm 
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growth analysis, and measure used (see also Derbyshire and Garnsby, 2014, and Coad et al., 
2015 for a discussion on measurements). This chapter’s analysis, therefore, tests the following 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis H1 – The timing of an evaluation study may return different conclusions about the 
impact of a business support intervention for a single measured outcome such as employment 
growth. 
Hypothesis H2 – An evaluation of business support over different time spans and multiple 
measures (employees, turnover, productivity) will illustrate how the time lag of impact differs 
by measured outcome.  
Along these two central contributions, and given the richness of the data available, the 
heterogeneity of growth will also be explored. 
Hypothesis H3 – Not all firms benefit from assistance in the same way, and over time: The role 
of the impact of assistance varies along the outcome distribution.  
The summary points raised as part of “Growth as an Outcome” section will be reviewed as part 
of the methodology used in this chapter, and also in the discussion of results. It will be used to 
illustrate potential concerns in chosen analytical approach given the state of the growth 
literature, with the focus remaining on the contribution intended by this thesis.  
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5.2 Linked dataset: Firm growth by type of assistance 
 
Prior to developing the econometric approach to the analysis, this section compares the growth 
trends of firms, by type of assistance received. This is to identify any observable differences in 
growth between those firms in receipt of assistance, and those not.   
Figure 10 to Figure 13 show how IA, OA and NA groups develop their employment and 
turnover over the assessed period (base year 2004=100). Employment and turnover both grow 
in the first years post intervention, stagnating or even declining only in the latter years of 
analysis. Previous analysis of this cohort of supported firms was limited to investigating the 
impact between the first and second year post intervention, as indicated by the space between 
the two green lines in each graph corresponding to data years 2005 and 2006. The data used 
herein continues to be the longitudinal dataset as created and discussed in Chapter Three. 
That means of the original sample 1,045 firms were successfully matched and included for the 
analysis in this chapter. 
Figure 11, showing all firms’ employment (therefore including the employment figures of firms 
that exit before 2011, up to their year of exit), depicts how IAs have showed the highest growth 
prior to intervention; keeping in mind that they are on average smaller than the other groups, 
as shown in the sample descriptive statistics in Chapter Three. OAs and NAs grow by similar 
amounts in the period before the intervention.   
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Figure 10 – Employment growth index (all firms) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Interestingly, in the immediate time following the intervention, that is, between 2004 and 2005, 
OAs and NAs both grow a little more than IAs. However, in subsequent periods IAs outperform 
the growth of OAs by some margin. NAs achieve similar growth for the 2004-7 and 2004-8 
periods as the IAs, before declining towards OAs’ growth index level, matching it in 2011. This 
means that IAs show not only the most, but also most consistent growth over the period, with 
a relatively small decline from its peak 2008 and 2010 levels. OAs pull down the total average 
quite considerably, with employment remaining stable from 2007 onwards.  
Every firm that dies reduces the total figures by its employment (Figure 10) or turnover (Figure 
12) values. Figure 11 and Figure 13 adjust for this effect by using only the data of the firms 
having survived the entire period through to 2011. 
For employment, Figure 11 illustrates how the focus on the surviving firms only results in less 
stagnation or decline among the three groups of firms – that is, the somewhat flat trends in 
later years in Figure 11 were caused by firms ceasing and dropping out from the figures.  
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Figure 11 – Employment growth index (survivors only) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Taking that effect into account, employment figures are broadly in unison across the groups 
for the 2004-5 and 2004-6 periods, with NAs leading in 2005 and IAs in 2006. NAs then 
outperform both assisted groups in 2007 and 2008, before declining. OAs show least growth 
from 2007 onwards, with IAs growing their employment consistently all the way through to 
2010, outperforming the other two groups from 2009 onwards.  
Turnover growth shows less dramatic variations. For all firms (Figure 12) NAs experienced the 
largest growth in the pre-intervention period, but are then outperformed by IAs. OAs 
experience similar growth as NAs for the 2004-5 period (arguably for the 2004-6 period as 
well) and for the longer 2004-8 period. Interestingly, for the period 2004-7 IAs and OAs reach 
nearly identical growth levels, before IAs outperform OAs for the remaining periods. Overall, 
OAs remain closest to the overall average, IAs exceed it and NAs underperform by 
comparison. 
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Figure 12 – Turnover growth index (all firms) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Focussing on survivors only (Figure 13) the overall trends remain unchanged. However, 
immediately post intervention OAs display the lowest growth between 2004 and 2005, before 
rising to match IAs for the 2004-7 period. The fall in turnover for OAs and NAs between 2010 
and 2011 is also less pronounced when limiting the figures to survivors’ data.  
Figure 13 – Turnover growth index (survivors only) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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Figure 10 to Figure 13 illustrate well how IAs outperform NAs and OAs, suggesting how 
assistance appears to make a difference, that is, sufficient initial a priori evidence that justifies 
further analysis of the impact of support on growth. The graphs also indicate how obvious 
differences between the groups only arise two to three years post intervention. In fact, based 
purely on the short-term 2004-5 data, the story would be one of NAs outperforming IAs and 
OAs for employment growth – that is, assisted firms growing less than their non-assisted firms.  
As reviewed as part of Chapter Three, some of the firm characteristics differ between the 
groups of IA, OA and NA firms. Appendix C4 illustrates how these differences remain when 
considering survivors only, for example, as in Figure 11 and Figure 13. There are no significant 
differences between the linked longitudinal datasets with and without survivors. 
 It is quite possible that some of the differences in firm characteristics explain some of the 
observed variations in growth trends, and this will be accounted for in the following analysis. 
BSD data 2004-5: non-assisted firms grow their employment faster than assisted firms 
BSD data 2004-6: intensively assisted grow faster than their peers 
This presents a somewhat curious finding, opposing the findings as reported in BERR (2007) 
which ascribed a significant impact of assistance on employment growth. Of course, in BERR 
(2007) an approach based on self-reported performance data was employed, which was found 
to differ from the data reflected by the BSD – based on the self-reported data the same firms 
experienced far greater growth between 2004 and 2005 than when considering the official, 
BSD, data.  
The above is a finding – or better: observation – that provides support to the argument of 
avoiding evaluation that is limited by short-term data. Being able to consider a time profile of 
firm growth provides a considerably more meaningful picture with regards to the three groups’ 
development. This is also illustrated by the one-year time frame of the previous evaluations on 
the group of assisted firms: Any growth story discoverable as part of that one year period of 
data suffers from being unable to take into account the different growth patterns before and 
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after that short evaluation time frame. In that context, it would be interesting to see how the 
graphs would look based on multiple years of self-reported data to mirror the BSD data. Of 
course, as of yet it is unclear whether this catch-up of IAs and subsequent superior 
performance is due to the impact of assistance or down to other factors.   
Figure 14 illustrates a further benefit of working with multiple years of performance data.  
 
Figure 14 – Further benefits of having access to multiple years of performance data 
  
Number of firms experiencing high growth periods by type of assistance 
 
A further benefit of being able to draw on multiple years of performance data is the opportunity to 
identify firms with particularly consistent growth patterns.  
High growth firms (HGF) are a commonly referred to concept and are defined as firms that grow 
by at least 20% for three consecutive years (OECD, 2008). Table 13 provides a count of high 
growth (employment) periods by type of assistance. These periods of high growth may be 
overlapping, therefore high growth for the periods of 2004-2007 and 2005-2008 would count as 
two high growth periods. Overall, 14.3 percent of IAs experienced at least one period of high 
growth post intervention, compared to 9.9 percent for both OAs and NAs. This would represent a 
significant difference between IA and OA/NA at the ten percent level, however, not with narrower 
confidence limits at the five percent level.  
 
Table 13 – HGF periods (for any three year period 2004-2011, periods can overlap), based on employment 
 N 
Exact number of HGF periods 2004-11 Total  
(at least one HGF 
period)  1 2 3 4 5 
Intensively assisted (IA) 372 6.18% 4.57% 2.15% 0.27% 1.08% 14.25% 
Other assisted (OA) 292 3.08% 3.42% 2.74% 0.34% 0.34% 9.93% 
Non-assisted (NA) 273 5.13% 2.93% 1.83% 0.00% 0.00% 9.89% 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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5.3 Modelling the effect of Business Link support 
 
The overarching objective of this chapter’s empirical analysis is to illustrate the impact of the 
choice of timing on the econometric results which seek to measure impact controlling for 
selection. The previous descriptive analysis underpins the importance of taking into account 
the differences in firm characteristics between the assisted and non-assisted firms, with the 
possibility of selection error having been introduced to the sample.  
The econometric analysis will be able to account for these factors other than assistance, and 
is designed to address the hypotheses as defined in conclusion to this chapter’s literature 
review. The econometric analysis undertaken herein is split into individual sections for the 
different approaches employed. The methodologies applied will be introduced for each 
analytical step separately.  
Section 5.4 focusses on Heckman’s two-stage selection model, taking into account the 
probability of receiving support in the outcome regression. Section 5.5 investigates the growth 
distribution, that is, how evenly any impact of assistance is spread across different outcome 
levels, estimating a series of quantile regressions.  
All regression models will measure the outcomes in terms of firm performance as measured 
by employment, turnover and productivity, whereby strictly speaking employment and turnover 
represent growth measures, productivity as a function of the two is better described as 
performance measure. The use of different outcome measures is encouraged by previous 
research; growth for one measure does not necessarily mean growth among other measures 
(Murphy et al., 1996; Delmar et al., 2003). Examples of different results by impact measure 
include previous results on the BLO Survey dataset, for example, BERR (2007) and Drews 
and Hart (2015). Multiple outcome measures will also allow for a better understanding of the 
role of time lags, if any, and their variation by measure. It has previously been identified that 
turnover and employment growth behave differently, depending on the exact set of 
circumstances. Delmar et al. (2003) used a total of 19 different growth measures to define 
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seven types of firm growth patterns, concluding that only through the use of different measures 
different growth patterns will become recognisable. It should be kept in kind that these 
measures will not distinguish by internal versus external growth (see Penrose, 1959, discussed 
earlier in this chapter). However, as detailed before, few firms within the used sample had 
more than one site, pointing towards largely organic growth (if any). To understand the role of 
time, the same model specifications will be run multiple times, against varying outcome 
periods. For example, when creating the organisational capabilities to facilitate growth and the 
additional headcount that may result, employment effects may precede significant changes in 
sales. Analysis that would not allow for different time frames would not pick up on these 
different effects throughout time.  
The rationale for each modelling approach will be introduced in more detail before each step. 
The models in the following section will all include a number of firm and owner-manager 
characteristics. Market conditions, business strategy, characteristics of the owner-manager 
and firm are all emphasised as influencing firm performance for example Storey (1994), 
Barkham et al. (1996), Roper and Hewitt-Dundas (2001); in Roper and Hart, 2003; Parker, 
2009). 
For this chapter, only firms that survived the entire period 2004-11 are included in the linked 
longitudinal database, for comparability of the impact across the models. The focus of the 
analysis will be the impact of IA. Preliminary analysis undertaken showed no significant impact 
of OA, as was also found by BERR (2007) and which is in line with the observations from 
Figure 10 to Figure 13 above. The objective of this thesis remains to underline the importance 
and role of time in evaluation; focus on one support product (IA) is therefore not detrimental to 
results. The results are presented individually for each method in this chapter. The implications 
of the results with a view on the thesis’ central research questions around the timing of 
evaluation will be discussed subsequently in Chapter Six.  
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5.4 Impact of Business Link support – Separating the effects of 
assistance and selection 
 
First, this section reviews the growth analysis undertaken as part of BERR’s (2007) value for 
money analysis in this chapter, before mirroring their approach with the longitudinal dataset as 
compiled in Chapter Three. As noted before, BERR (2007) with their methodology and review 
of business support evaluations were rated highly in WWG (2014) and listed as one of the few 
robust evaluations of interest: Its model included the counterfactual and accounted for potential 
selection bias.  
In detail, the analysis by BERR (2007) was designed with the understanding that two main 
issues arise from the BLO Survey data: 
1) The first issue raised by the authors was in relation to the different firm characteristics 
between the IAs, OAs and NAs. The empirical analysis was designed to control for 
these differences, applying a multivariate approach and as such taking into account 
and allowing for these observed firm characteristics through an array of covariates.  
2) The second issue was the importance of accounting for selection. The selection effect 
had to be identified and included in the model to avoid estimation bias. As discussed 
at various points throughout this thesis, selection bias is of concern here in that a priori 
it is quite possible that those firms assisted through BL may have been different from 
those not assisted.  
Heckman’s two-stage procedure was chosen to account for this potential selection bias, that 
is, estimation of two linked statistical models. The approach is developed in some more detail 
in the following section.  
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5.4.1 Controlling for the effects of selection: Model 
 
Following the approach as developed by BERR (2007, p. 216) the objective of the analysis is 
to estimate the impact of BL assistance as captured by the BLO Survey data on firm 
performance for the period 2004-2011.  
Let firm growth be denominated by ∆ in a simple linear model: 
  εδβ ++=∆ zx      (1) 
The independent terms on the right-hand side are  
1) x, representing the vector of firm characteristics (as captured by the BLO Survey). 
These are mostly binary variables, but also include some continuous ones.   
2) z, the treatment (here assistance) term, a binary of value 1 if a firm has been 
assisted, 0 if not assisted.  
3) ε, the error term. 
The effect of assistance is provided by z’s coefficient δ, with its respective t-value to highlight 
the assistance’s (in)significance.  
As BERR (2007) point out, the treatment effect will only provide an unbiased estimate of the 
impact of assistance if no selection effects for the receipt of assistance are present. As such, 
the probability of receiving assistance needs to be randomly distributed between the IAs and 
NAs in the longitudinal dataset. As pointed out earlier, this random distribution appears unlikely 
a priori (even if BERR [2007] found the selection effects to be weak) and the model will need 
to include provision for dealing with this non-random probability of receiving assistance69. 
Failure to do so in the presence of selection effects would result in both assistance and 
selection effects being reflected in the treatment term’s coefficient, resulting in the described 
                                               
69
 IAs and NAs differ in their individual characteristics (Appendix C1), and this remains true for the 
matched sample in the analysis here, as seen in Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8. The observed 
differences between the groups increase the likelihood of the samples having not being randomly 
selected – that means that potentially a selection bias may be present. 
- 139 - 
 
bias. Selection effect in this context would involve Business Link operators choosing firms to 
assist that would on average perform either better or worse than non-assisted firms and as 
such would introduce an estimation bias in the modelling of the outcome variable. 
Guided by Greene (2003, p. 782) equation (1) is extended to form model (2), consisting of two 
equations (2.1 and 2.2). Firstly, to specifically provide for selection bias, a probability 
estimation of the likelihood of receiving assistance is required. z* denotes that probability, and 
is regressed on a number of relevant firm and management characteristics (w). 
  z*= γ’w     +     µ   (2.1) 
The primary interest remains to be the linear regression  
  εδβ ++=∆ zx ''   (2.2) 
Heckman’s two-stage estimation procedure is the standard approach for this model (Greene, 
1995; in BERR, 2007). Heckman’s (1979; in Wooldridge, 2010) approach suggests to treat the 
presence of selection bias as an omitted variable problem, that is, assuming that the variable 
capturing the selection effect has not been included. BERR (2007) chose the two-stage 
approach given their perceived “importance of a strongly multivariate approach which explicitly 
allows for differences in the characteristics of assisted [IAs70] and non-assisted [NAs] 
companies, their strategic orientations and the strengths of their owner-managers and 
managerial teams”. They also highlight their models’ clear identification of both assistance and 
selection effect (if any), whilst “explicitly allowing for the differences between the characteristics 
of assisted and non-assisted firms”.  
For that purpose, a probit model by maximum likelihood is estimated first, comparing the 
probability of receiving IA versus NA. A selection parameter, the inverted Mills ratio, can be 
                                               
70
 A reminder that OAs, as outlined in Section 5.3, are not included in the analysis undertaken within 
this chapter.  
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inferred from the probit results and then serves as the appropriate parameter in the regression 
2.2. Greene (2003) provides the details of this approach.  
The treatment equation therefore becomes 
  ελδβ +++=∆ szx ''   (2.3) 
where s is the inferred selection parameter from the first stage probit model, in place of “the 
omitted variable”. As laid out in BERR (2007), the vectors of appropriate characteristics 
included in the models, w in 2.1 and x in 2.3, should not be identical between the two equations. 
The characteristics data at hand from nearly a decade ago limits the variation of possible 
explanatories for use in the two equations – fortunately the firm characteristics captured were 
quite comprehensive. BERR (2007) drew on previous studies to inform their choice of firm 
characteristics for both equations, referring specifically to Roper and Hart (2005) and Storey 
(1994). The probit models focussed on what is described as “informational variables and 
objective and observable characteristics of firms – factors which may have provided the basis 
for administrative criteria for the targeting of assistance.” For the second stage models 
organisational factors and characteristics of the entrepreneur were added, as felt appropriate 
with reference to the small business literature.  
The value of mirroring the approach from a previous impact evaluation is as following71:   
1) It provides an accepted approach that was used previously to evaluate and inform 
government policy. It was as such accepted by the then Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and by a number of academics in the research 
area72. 
2) It allows exploring the what-if scenarios of replacing 2005 performance data as used 
for the original study by data of a later year, increasing the evaluation span. This is 
relevant for future studies needing to decide on how long after an intervention they 
                                               
71
 The shortcomings of this approach are explored post analysis in subsequent parts of this chapter. 
72
 Authors of BERR (2007) were Kevin Mole, Stephen Roper, Mark Hart and David Saal.  
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would need to collect their data if no secondary data was available for use (and the 
ability of running the analysis based on a number of annual periods, herein). 
3) It provides an initial understanding of the variation of impact over time, in essence 
allowing to build a time profile of impact.  
For this approach to be implemented the likelihood of firms receiving assistance is estimated 
first, through a probit model for IA, based on administrative data held in the specifically created 
longitudinal dataset. Estimation results are shown in Table 14.  
The likelihood of having received assistance was reduced for firms of older age, an effect 
remaining significant in both the full and restricted models for the >17 year old firms. The only 
other determinants of significant nature focus on how the contact to Business Link was initially 
established. A first contact with Business Link through receipt of a promotional direct mailing 
or a first contact through the Business Link website had the largest impact on increasing the 
likelihood of receiving assistance. The only first method of contact of no significant impact on 
the likelihood of receiving assistance was a referral ‘by others’ – a referral not by friends. 
Gender and ethnicity of directors, industry, size, legal form and the number of directors all had 
no significant impact on the probability of receiving assistance.  
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Table 14 – Probit model to estimate likelihood of receiving IA  
  
 Likelihood of IA 
   
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0993 
  (0.267) 
Employment 2004 (LLD) -0.00148 
  (0.00241) 
Firm age: 0<2 years -0.953* 
  (0.511) 
Firm age: 3<7 years -1.079** 
  (0.478) 
Firm age: 8<17 years -0.921* 
  (0.472) 
Firm age: >17 years -1.184** 
  (0.467) 
BL contact: Mailing 1.056*** 
  (0.203) 
BL contact: Website 1.064*** 
  (0.173) 
BL contact: Direct contact 0.502*** 
  (0.174) 
BL contact: Referred by other 0.202 
  (0.189) 
BL contact: Other referral (friend) 0.718** 
  (0.308) 
Number of directors 0.0634 
  (0.0469) 
% of female directors 0.00218 
  (0.00275) 
% of ethnic minority directors -0.00526 
  (0.00655) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.00828 
  (0.249) 
SIC: Construction -0.171 
  (0.312) 
SIC: Retail & Wholesale -0.376 
  (0.256) 
SIC: Education -0.323 
  (0.266) 
  
Constant x 
  x 
Pseudo R2  0.3624 
Observations 406 
  
   
  
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
The inverse mills ratio was calculated on the basis of this full probit model and included in the 
second step, the OLS models, to control for selection effects.  
The models were specified as semi-log models (see, for example, BERR, 2007; Reichstein 
and Dahl, 2004), correcting for the skewed nature of the growth rates, where most firms 
experience fairly modest changes in size, and a few displaying far more rapid growth.  
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5.4.2 Growth Models: Impact of assistance and selection 
  
Initially, a total of 84 estimations were run: full and restricted models, with and without selection 
term. The same models were run with the dependent variable measuring growth (for 
employment, turnover or productivity) for the seven periods of 2004 to 2005, 2004 to 2006, 
continuing up to 2004 to 2011.  A full and a variety of restricted models were run for each time 
period and each dependent variable. In addition, full and restricted models were run each with 
and without a selection term.  
The results will be reviewed in turn for each outcome measure, with the results of the full non-
selection models being presented in below tables. Plots to show the strength of the IA 
coefficients for both selection and non-selection models are also included, providing a profile 
of impact over time.  The summary tables provided here within the main body of the analysis 
are accompanied by the full model results for each estimation in Appendix E1. 
 
Employment  
Overall, for longer time periods the models perform better than in the short-term, using R² as 
a rough indicator for goodness of fit. However, considerable unexplained variation remains, 
with R² rarely exceeding 0.2. While the selection term is insignificant throughout, it does 
improve the fit of the full model notably in some instances. The impact of IA on employment 
growth is found to be positive for both selection and non-selection models, and regardless of 
the time period applied. The strength of the IA coefficient varies across time, however. In the 
full models IA only reaches (ten percent level) significance for the 2004-7 period.73 
  
                                               
73
 Restricted models, dropping the insignificant terms from the full models – with exception of the 
assistance term, without  selection term return ten percent level significance for the 2004-6, 2004-8 and 
2004-11 periods, and a stronger five percent level significance for the 2004-7, 2004-9 and 2004-10 
models. For the restricted employment models including the selection term no significant IA impact is 
identified. 
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Figure 15 – Plot of assistance coefficient (employment model) 
 
 
Table 15 – Impact of IA on employment, 2004-11 
  (where + for positive coefficient, - for negative coefficient) 
2004 to 2005 2006 2007 2008 
         
assistance ns(+) ns(+) + ns(+) 
          
other   --- size (empl) --- size (empl) --- size (empl) 
significant +++ multi-site ++ size² (empl) +++ size² (empl) +++ size² (empl) 
variables  ++ SIC: 
construct. -- firm 20+ yrs.   ++ multi-site 
  
  +++ multi-site ++ multi-site ++ nonexec dir. 
  
    
  
R² 0.082 0.121 0.133 0.138 
N 342 342 342 342 
  
   
2004 to 2009 2010 2011 
 
        
assistance ns(+) ns(+) ns(+)  
  
    
   
other --- size (empl) --- size (empl) --- size (empl)  
significant +++size² (empl) +++size² (empl) ++ firm 3<5 yrs.  
variables  ++ nonexec dir. ++ multi-site +++size² (empl)  
      
++ multi-site  
      
++ nonexec dir. 
 
     
R² 0.185 0.174 0.197  
N 341 341 347  
Where +++/++ & ---/-- indicate significance at 1%/5% and the sign of the coefficient. ns(+) and 
ns(-) represent insignificant coefficients, and their sign. 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
 
Other than the assistance term, there are a number of other significant effects on employment 
growth, as summarised in Table 15. Firm size in 2003, at the time of intervention, is a negative 
and significant predictor of employment growth in nearly all models. Squared firm size in turn 
0.142*
0.202*
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Employment model: IA coefficient
IA coefficient IA coeff. (selection model)
2004-5       2004-6      2004-7       2004-8        2004-9      2004-10     2004-11 
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is a positive significant predictor in most cases, suggesting a significant positive impact of size 
for the largest of firms. Firms with more than one firm site are growing their employment faster 
on average, again, regardless of outcome period measured. Being of older age reduces a 
firm’s growth perspectives for the shorter outcome periods, whilst 3<5 year old firms have a 
significantly higher growth rate for 2004-11. Other significant effects exist for having appointed 
non-executive directors, and for being in the construction sector, the latter factor being a 
predictor for the outcome period 2004-5. None of these characteristics can be addressed 
through business support, as could be, for example, sales strategy, exporting and putting into 
place a business plan.  
The original one year evaluation undertaken by BERR (2007) suggested a significant positive 
effect of assistance on employment growth, based on the firms’ self-reported data. This early 
effect is not confirmed here, and it is clear that the observation of any significant assistance 
effects would be limited to the respective assessment period chosen.  
 
Turnover 
For employment, there was a distinct trend by models to perform better for the longer outcome 
periods, using R² as a rough indicator for goodness of fit. The performance of the turnover 
models follows no such trend. Again, considerable unexplained variation remains. The 
inclusion of the selection term was insignificant throughout. The restricted models’ 
performance is weak, with many periods providing not a single significant explanatory variable 
other than assistance. The turnover results do not allow for straightforward interpretation. For 
the first three periods all models suggest a negative impact of IA on turnover, significantly so 
for the 2004-6 period.  For the full models without selection the sign for IA then turns positive 
for the 2004-8 and 2004-9 models when including the selection term the sign change is limited 
to the 2004-9 model – all without statistical significance. 
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Figure 16 – Plot of assistance coefficient (turnover model) 
    
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Table 16 – Impact of IA on turnover, 2004-11 
2004 to 2005 2006 2007 2008 
         
assistance ns(-) - - ns(-) ns(+) 
          
other ++ firm 3<5 yrs.       
significant ++ exporting       
variables  ++ maint. sales       
  
+++ new mkts.       
  
-- OM equity     
    
  
  
R² 0.116 0.079 0.081 0.111 
N 342 340 340 340 
  
    
    
2004 to 2009 2010 2011 
  
. 
      
 
assistance ns(+) ns(-) ns(-)  
  
      
 
other        
significant        
variables         
  
      
 
R² 0.117 0.135 0.105  
N 339 340 339 
 
Where +++/++ & ---/-- indicate significance at 1%/5% and the sign of the coefficient. ns(+) and 
ns(-) represent insignificant coefficients, and their sign. 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Compared to the employment models, fewer firm and owner characteristics are of significance 
across the estimated turnover models. For a number of models no significant effects at all were 
found. For all 2004-5 models – and only for those – the strategy of seeking new markets has 
a significant positive impact on turnover growth. The role of firm age is also evidenced for the 
-0.17**
-0.212*
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Turnover model: IA cofficient
IA coefficient IA coeff. (selection model)
2004-5       2004-6      2004-7       2004-8        2004-9      2004-10     2004-11 
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initial 2004-5 period. The original BERR (2007) results suggested an insignificant one year 
impact – this is confirmed here but qualified by a significant negative impact for 2004-6 period. 
 
Productivity (turnover per employee) 
Productivity growth here is defined and measured as the ratio of turnover growth over 
employment growth. The positive sign for the assistance coefficients in the employment 
models and the initially negative sign for the assistance terms in the turnover model both would 
point to an initially negative impact of assistance on productivity growth.  
This combination of IA’s positive impact on employment, whilst negative for turnover in the 
short-term, is confirmed by the models as negative impact of IA on productivity, found nearly 
unisono across the productivity models74. The IA coefficient is negative yet insignificant in the 
immediate short-term. For 2004-6 the full models indicate a negative impact of IA on 
productivity growth significant, both with and without inclusion of the insignificant selection 
term. The selection model also carries a significant negative assistance term for the 2004-7 
period. 
 
 
  
                                               
74
 With regards to the fit of the model specification, longer outcome periods the models perform worse 
than in the short-term. Considerable unexplained variation remains. While the selection term is 
insignificant throughout, it does improve the fit for most full models, but not unilaterally. The restricted 
models do not offer any additional coherent insights. 
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Figure 17 – Plot of assistance coefficient (productivity model) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Table 17 – Impact of IA on productivity, 2004-11 
2004 to 2005 2006 2007 2008 
         
assistance ns(-) - - - ns(-) ns(-) 
          
other ++ firm 3<5 yrs. ++ size (empl) ++ size (empl)   
significant ++ new mkts.   -- size² (empl)   
variables          
          
R² 0.105 0.087 0.064 0.064 
N 342 340 340 340 
         
2004 to 2009 2010 2011  
 
      
 
assistance ns(+) ns(-) ns(-)  
  
      
 
other +++ size (empl) ++ size (empl) ++ size (empl)  
significant 
-- size² (empl)   -- firm 5<10 yrs.  
variables  -- nonexec dir.      
  
  ++ multi-site    
R² 0.100 0.100    
N 340 340 0.092  
  
  
 339  
Where +++/++ & ---/-- indicate significance at 1%/5% and the sign of the coefficient. ns(+) and 
ns(-) represent insignificant coefficients, and their sign. 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Few firm and owner characteristics are of significance across the estimated productivity 
outcome models. Size is of significant positive impact on productivity growth for the 2004-6, 
2004-7 and 2004-9 to 2004-11 full models. For all 2004-5 models – and only for those – the 
strategy of seeking new markets has a significant positive impact on productivity growth; the 
-0.287***
-0.358** -0.386***
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
Productivity model: IA coefficient
IA coefficient IA coeff. (selection model)
2004-5       2004-6      2004-7       2004-8        2004-9      2004-10     2004-11 
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link to the turnover model results for 2004-6 is obvious, given productivity growth being a 
function of turnover over employment growth.  
From the results, it is evident that the role of assistance is limited compared to other far more 
common factors assessed across periods. Whilst firm size and age effect are independent of 
firm characteristics that business support may influence, at least in the very short-term 
business support aiming at firms exploring new markets may yield positive impact (or where 
assistance may trigger them to do so). In comparison to the BERR (2007) results, the 
insignificance for the one year period post intervention is confirmed, and as for the turnover 
result this is qualified by the results for the two year period of 2004-6, that suggest a significant 
negative impact of assistance on productivity. 
 
5.4.3 Lagged growth models 
 
The above growth models were also estimated including lagged growth terms. The addition of 
(the statistically significant) time lags broadly confirms the findings from the linear regression 
analysis above – the full estimation results are presented in Appendix E2. There are few 
significant determinants for firm growth across outcome periods. The models seeking to 
assess impact immediately following the intervention (BSD period 2004-5) find no significance 
for the assistance term. Then, two to three years beyond intervention, the significant effects 
seen in previous section are confirmed. These are positive for employment growth, negative 
in terms of productivity. Any analysis including subsequent years returns no significant impact 
of support on growth. However, when analysing the long-term, that is the periods 2004-10/11, 
the support coefficient again turns significantly negative in the productivity estimations.   
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5.4.4 The role of size and age confirmed 
 
Assistance is found to be only of significance for some evaluation time frames and measures. 
In turn, the roles of age and size are confirmed as more vital than that of assistance across the 
time periods chosen. In line with expectations on the role of age, the plots below show how the 
models suggest markedly stronger employment and turnover growth for the youngest of firms. 
Figure 18 – Plot of age category coefficients (employment model) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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Employment model: Age category coefficients
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Firm age: 10<20 years Firm age: >20 years
2004-5          2004-6          2004-7          2004-8          2004-9          2004-10       2004-11
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Figure 19 – Plot of age category coefficients (turnover model) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
Whilst age coefficients are significant for some of the employment and turnover models, size 
is significant for many of the employment and productivity models75. The results confirm an 
increasing negative impact of firm size on employment growth. And when considering 
productivity growth, it becomes clear that size is an important determinant of productivity 
growth. 
 
  
                                               
75
 No significant coefficients were estimated for age/productivity and size/turnover, and therefore no 
respective plots included here.  
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Figure 20 – Plot of size coefficients (employment model) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
 
Figure 21 – Plot of size coefficients (productivity model) 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
Two aspects are of note based on this confirmed role of age and size. Firstly, the strength of 
the size and age coefficients compared to that of the assistance coefficients in the previous 
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section underlines how the role of size and age are undoubted when it comes to firm growth, 
and across various outcome periods. By comparison, the results around the impact of firm 
assistance on firm growth are pretty thin, significant only for very narrowly defined time periods 
and outcome measures. Secondly, business support may be of influence on firm and owner 
characteristics such as growth strategy or propensity to export, and through that may have an 
impact on firm growth. However, the coefficients for those terms are only significant in for some 
of the models and periods estimated. In turn, size and age influence growth for most estimated 
scenarios. Assistance cannot directly influence those.  
 
5.4.5 Concluding remarks on regression results 
 
Overall, it is interesting to see how in the immediate short-term no significant impact of 
assistance can be identified for employment and turnover as outcomes. Instead, significant 
effects focussed around the two to three year post intervention period. This contrasts the BERR 
(2007) findings for employment, which suggested a significant impact of assistance on 
employment growth for the short period evaluated. The results here also add context to the 
meaningfulness of the non-significant impact found for turnover and productivity in their one 
year evaluation76. The positive employment impact compared to the negative sign the 
assistance coefficients take in the shorter term turnover and productivity models underlines 
well how assisted businesses tend to grow by employment expansion first, that is, setting up 
for firm growth first. Turnover (and as a result productivity) effects lag behind.  
The results are clearly not as robust as they preferably should be for reliable conclusions – 
most significant terms are so at the 10 percent level. However, given observable trends over 
                                               
76
 Drews and Hart (2015) in their feasibility study of investigating the long-term impact of business 
support found a continuous effect of assistance on employment growth for all periods 2004-6 through 
to 2004-11 (10 percent significance level), which is somewhat contrasting the findings herein. However, 
it was possible to use a considerably larger sample for this research, which resulted specifically in the 
inclusion of additional smaller firms, reducing average firm size for the sample investigated. Like for like 
comparisons with the exploratory results of the feasibility study are therefore, however, of little value. 
- 154 - 
 
time, they provide value in understanding how time affects conclusions drawn. Impact 
evaluations focussing on the short-term fail to capture this variation in the observed trends. In 
effect, the results show that depending on the time frame (and measure) chosen, very different 
conclusions about the impact of the scheme assessed could be drawn. If the results were 
taken at face value, a 2004-5 study based on this data would have concluded the assistance 
made no difference. A study constrained to the 2004-6 period could have become somewhat 
concerned with the impact of support being limited to turnover and productivity effects. A 2004-
7 employment outcome study would likely to have drawn a more satisfying conclusion, based 
on the identified positive employment effects. This variation of impact is in stark contrast to the 
impact of size and age on firm growth, which are, as expected, far more consistent in their role 
as growth determinants. 
 
5.5 Analysis: Impact of assistance along outcome percentiles 
 
Both the linear regression and lagged growth models estimate the average effect of assistance 
and the included firm and owner-manager characteristics on the (average) outcome. The 
observed growth rates are fairly low for most firms, but not for all – the growth distribution is 
not even. It is therefore worth exploring models allowing for a more flexible estimation approach 
than a simple focus on averages. One such approach is offered by quantile regression. 
 
5.5.1 Quantile regression model 
 
Quantile regression was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). As illustrated through 
an example by Koenker and Hallock (2001), the scenario for this analysis is that a firm will 
display growth at the xth quantile if it performs better than the proportion of x of the firm 
population. Accordingly, its performance is also worse than 1-x. As Koenker and Hallock (2001) 
discuss, the defined quantiles refer to the general case. Koenker and Bassett (1978) extended 
these ideas with their quantile regression models. These are not linear, but conditional quantile 
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functions, where the “quantiles of the conditional distribution of the response variables are 
expressed as functions of observed covariates” (Koenker and Hallock, 2001, p. 143).  
As introduced at the outset of this section, it is unlikely that growth is evenly distributed across 
the firm population, with linear regression and its reliance on averages possibly providing an 
incomplete picture (Mosteller and Tukey, 1977). Quantile regression performs better in such 
contexts than linear regression, as summarised by Coad and Rao (2006): 
1) As introduced above, quantile regressions provide estimations for the entire conditional 
distribution of the outcome variable. 
2) Quantile regression results are considered robust to outliers and tail heavy 
distributions.  
3) Linear regression assumes identically distributed error terms across the conditional 
distribution; this assumption is relaxed for quantile regression allowing for firm 
hetereogeneity and differerent slope parameters across the different quantiles. 
Coad and Rao (2006, p.6) describe the model as  
 
        with     Quant ( | )it it it it it ity u y x xθ θ θ θχ β β′ ′= + =
 (3) 
“where yit is the growth rate, x is a vector of regressors, β is the vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and u is a vector of residuals. Qµ(yit|xit) denotes the µth conditional quantile of yit 
given xit. 
 
As for the previous regressions, the same full set of firm and owner-manager characteristics 
will be included again. 
 
5.5.2 Results: Quantile regression 
Figure 22 to 24 plot the assistance coefficients for each estimated quantile. The full quantile 
regression results are to be found in Appendix E3. The pseudo R2 values as an indicator for 
measurement were generally very low, but they are not reported here due to the inherent 
problems of their suitability in the context of quantile regression. 
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Employment 
Notable is how for the 2004-5 outcome period the coefficients are of similar magnitude across 
all estimated percentiles. Taking a longer view, the 10th percentile assistance term then 
considerably strengthens for the 2004-6 and 2004-7 outcome period, turning significant, 
suggesting a positive impact of assistance on this percentile on the outcome distribution. For 
the longer periods beyond that no further significant assistance impact on employment growth 
could be identified77. 
Figure 22 – Quantile regression (employment models), plot of assistance coefficients 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
 
Turnover 
The results are more varied when considering the turnover model outcomes. Four support 
coefficients are significant, albeit at the ten percent level only. They are distributed across 
different outcome periods (2004-6, 2004-10 and 2004-11). For 2004-6 assistance is found to 
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 Selection models were also estimated. Only for two (of a total of 35 estimated) models did the 
selection term reach significance, suggesting an additional significant positive impact of assistance on 
the 90th percentile for the 2004-5 employment model.   
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be adversely affecting turnover growth for both the 75th and 90th percentile. The 2004-10 and 
2004-11 results return a negative impact of assistance on the median78.  
Figure 23 – Quantile regression (turnover models), plot of assistance coefficients 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
 
Productivity 
All significant support coefficients in the productivity models carry a negative sign. Again, 2004-
6 and 2004-7 see some significant coefficients, in this case for the 75th and 90th percentile. 
Outside that, the assistance coefficient is negative and significant for the 10th percentile for the 
shortest evaluation period 2004-5, and for the 2004-11 period for the 75th percentile.79 
Generally, it is notable how the coefficient strength for the 10th percentile generally remains 
the highest, and for the 90th percentile the lowest.  
 
  
                                               
78
 Inclusion of the selection term leads to only one instance of a significant selection coefficient across 
the estimated turnover models reported here. The assistance term for that model remains insignificant 
regardless.  
79
 Again, including the selection term makes no difference to the results reported herein. 
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Figure 24 – Quantile regression (productivity models), plot of assistance coefficients 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
 
 
5.5.3 Discussion: Quantile regression 
The quantile regression results suggest limited significance for the impact of business support 
for the majority of firms and their performance. Signs varies across the respective percentiles, 
time periods and outcome variables, but for the majority of results the assistance coefficient 
remains insignificant. Most significant results were returned for the shorter assessment 
periods. This underlines the results from the previous analysis in this chapter, where the impact 
of business support appears to be limited to a two to three year time frame post intervention. 
This impact is positive for employment, and negative for productivity ‘growth’. This significance 
is mainly for the extreme percentiles, not for the median.  
The full models as in Appendix E3 provide a number of significant coefficients other than 
assistance, especially for the 75th and 90th percentiles. For employment, previous size 
becomes an increasingly important (negative) determinant of growth for increasing lengths of 
outcome periods. The role of firm age is also confirmed again as being negative. For turnover, 
the role of firm age is equally confirmed. There are also a number of significant coefficients for 
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owner-manager age in the turnover models. The productivity models do not allow for singling 
out any group of variables for their pattern of significance.  
From these results it is clear that – depending on period – the impact of support is not spread 
evenly across the distribution of firms and outcome measures. At the same time, the results 
show that even where significant coefficients for the impact of support were found in the OLS 
models, this does need to translate into significant effects for any of the estimated percentiles 
for the same period and outcome measure. Given these variations across results, few general 
conclusions are possible. What the results quite clearly do suggest is how choice of timing 
would affect the conclusions drawn from any evaluation. Here, where support had any 
significant impact, this was most likely for a two to three year period from point of intervention.  
 
5.6 Discussion and conclusions 
 
5.6.1  Summary of Results 
A number of results hold true across the respective models applied. Firstly, there is no 
significant impact of assistance for the 2004-5 outcome period for any measure, the single 
exception being the extreme percentiles of one employment quantile regression model. For 
employment, depending on the model, significant effects start to appear for 2004-6, with the 
noted exception above, and most commonly for 2004-780. By comparison, the quantile 
regression models suggest limited impact, with significant impact of support for the 2004-5/6 
periods for some extreme percentiles. This impact generally carries a positive sign. 
For turnover, the effects estimated across the models appear less robust. Linear regression 
suggests a negative impact of support for the 2004-6 outcome period, for the other periods the 
support coefficients remain weak and change sign a number of times. This weakness of 
                                               
80
 The lagged growth models also confirm that the significant impact centres on the 2004/5-6/7 
periods, depending on the lags chosen. 
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coefficient is in line with the other characteristics controlled for, very few of which are significant 
at any point, rendering the inclusion of restricted models optional due to a lack of predictors. 
The inclusion of lagged growth adds no coherent insights to the role of support on turnover 
growth, the same applies to the quantile regression results.  
In line with the results of the employment and turnover growth models, linear regression results 
suggest a negative impact of support on productivity growth as the function of the two 
measures for 2004-6/7. Only firm size provides a second significant predictor for these periods. 
With the inclusion of different lags, the strong negative effect for the 2004/5-6/7 periods is 
confirmed81.  
An additional important conclusion from the results is that interquantile regression shows how 
a reliance on average effects is likely to oversimplify impact of support. Relying on two 
measurements in time, the interquantile regression models suggest effects at the extreme 
ends of the outcome population.  
 
5.6.2  Results by hypothesis 
 
Hypothesis H1 – Timing of evaluation will return different conclusions about impact of a 
business support intervention for a single measured outcome. 
The results strongly support the first hypothesis. Short-term evaluation, immediately after the 
intervention, would have suggested no significant impact of support on the outcomes 
measured based on the analysis undertaken here82. For a two to three year period, significant 
outcomes were identified, but these varied by the outcome measure chosen. For the analysis 
herein, any analysis purely considering long-term results would have been unlikely to identify 
                                               
81
 Unexpected is the suggestion by the lagged growth term results of a negative impact of support on 
productivity again for the 2004-10/11 periods. The quantile regression results show how this impact of 
support is focussed on the 10th, 75th and 90th percentiles, depending on period and lags chosen. 
82
 As illustrated, these insignificant short-term results differ from the one year evaluation findings of 
BERR (2007) for employment.  
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a significant impact of business support, with exception of the long-term productivity effects 
after six to seven years, depending on the model. Therefore, as reasonably expected, the 
choice of timing and measure both play a significant role for robust evaluation results.  
 
Hypothesis H2 – An evaluation of business support over different time spans and multiple 
measures will illustrate how the time lag of impact differs by measure.  
One assumption would be to find evidence, for example, for the impact of assistance on 
employment to precede the impact onto turnover, as capability for turnover growth first needs 
to be built with any additional staff taken on board. However, the evidence from this analysis 
is inconclusive. The impact of support on employment and productivity growth is apparent after 
two years, and remains largely insignificant for turnover growth. The time profile of the 
coefficients’ lends support to this hypothesis, however, with immediate and strengthening 
coefficients for assistance in the employment model, and initially negative but then 
strengthening and turning positive assistance coefficients for the turnover model.   
Hypothesis H3 – Not all firms benefit from assistance in the same way, and over time: The role 
of the impact of assistance varies along the outcome distribution. 
The few significant interquantile regression results confirm this varying impact of support, 
depending on chosen outcome percentile. Compared to the quantile regression results, more 
numerous significant effects were found in the simple regression models, that is, for the 
average outcomes.  
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5.6.3  Conclusion 
 
Time periods for impact will differ by the type of assistance. Here, it was sought to understand 
how the impact of a soft business support programme would develop. The results can only 
provide an indication of how impact developed for this and possibly comparable schemes. The 
central suggestion that must arise from the variety of models and results is not to limit 
evaluation to one measurement at the point of intervention and one some period later on, 
however well justified that period may be. Data availability and political expediency are very 
good explanations for an approach to evaluation focussing on two data points within a relatively 
short time period. But, in summary, the results strongly suggest that such approach will always 
be limited to providing a snapshot of the impact, and will fail to understand the relevant 
outcomes of previous and subsequent periods. The length of what may be deemed a sensible 
time period post intervention for evaluation purposes is constrained by the problem of impact 
attribution. Based on the results presented here, longitudinal data covering a five year period 
would have captured the main effects. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Discussion & Conclusions 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The core of this thesis was to provide a contribution to the evaluation and business support 
policy literature. What do we know about the impact of business support in the mid to longer 
term? Does it matter?  
This research is at the intersection of economics and politics. The interest of the UK 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills in the undertaking of this study stems from the 
awareness that political expediency led to many short-term evaluations, with long-term 
evidence more than scarce. The question is whether what is understood to be robust evidence 
actually provides that reliable understanding to a scheme’s impact, or whether political 
pressures mean that economic analysis is, in fact, incomplete. If so, what would be sensible 
time frame for evaluation? 
This thesis revisited the impact analysis undertaken as part of BERR (2007), rated as a highly 
robust contribution in later evidence reviews. BERR (2007) only had two measurements of firm 
performance data at hand, and these within two years of the intervention. On that basis, it was 
concluded that Business Link had a positive impact on employment, whilst none on turnover. 
This research looked at the same set of firms, but with performance data for up to seven years 
post intervention, seeking to understand the role of time in evaluation, and exploring the use 
of official firm-level data for this purpose.  
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Section 1.2 outlined the contributions intended: 
Two major contributions are made by this research in the field of the evaluation of business 
support policies:  
1) A critique of current evaluation practice and its timing, underpinned by 
2) the application of a longitudinal impact study of small business support in England, 
revisiting the BL evaluation undertaken in 2006 (BERR, 2007). 
The research is also of methodological value for follow-up and similar studies by setting out:  
3) The key component of data linking scheme beneficiary data from the support 
organisations customer relationship management system with business registration 
databases and official firm-level data records for evaluation purposes. 
 
 
6.2 Findings 
 
6.2.1  “A critique of current evaluation practice and its timing”  
 
Leading on from the policy justification arguments in Chapter One, Chapter Two illustrated the 
clear gap in the current literature and our understanding of how business support benefits firms 
beyond the short-term. For many evaluations one may wonder whether the desired/measured 
effects had sufficient time to be realised post intervention. A central concern is that authors 
offer no explanation as to why certain timings for evaluation were chosen. And, of course, it is 
inherently difficult, if not impossible, to do so, as it would require a case-by-case understanding 
of how long an intervention reasonably needs for it to develop its full potential in any set of 
given circumstances. This can only really be known post evaluation.  
The literature makes the case for policy-makers to clearly specify what their policy intends to 
achieve (e.g. Storey, 1998; Spicker, 2006). This involves providing objectives that an 
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intervention can be clearly assessed against. In a scenario, in which a clearly defined objective 
is provided, and evaluation considered as an assessment of outcomes against such set 
targets, it would arguably not be the task of the evaluator to discuss timing considerations.  
The trouble with that perspective is that it assumes a sensible time frame for the objectives to 
be achieved has been chosen. With next to no evidence on what suitable time frames would 
be for a desired impact to develop, it is likely to be the role of evaluators as part of the research 
community to articulate a view on sensible time frames. However, time frames are often 
formulated with a view to estimate “reliable” effects soon after, due to policy pressures. A 
government usually wishes to demonstrate results prior to the next election. Also, (tax) spend 
needs to be justified internally within government or any organisation, for that matter, putting 
the pressure onto policy-makers to provide evidence a scheme was worth the resources 
allocated to it. 
In consequence, policy-makers’ thinking is shaped by relatively short-term horizons. They are 
usually the same people that commission the evaluation research into their policies’ impact. 
This is likely the biggest problem that evaluators are facing, as there are a numerous warnings 
about the danger of considering only the relative short-term, for example in BERR (2007), 
Bridge and O’Neill (2013), Chrisman et al. (2005), Cook et al. (2008), EIM (2009), Lundström 
and Stevenson (2005), OECD (2007), Schwartz (2009) and Shapira (2001). Yet, this concern 
has not been addressed yet in practice.  
 
6.2.2 “Setting out the key component of data linking scheme beneficiary data from 
 the support organisations’ customer relationship management system with 
 business registration databases and official firm-level data records for 
 evaluation purposes” 
 
Chapter Three then developed the methodology proposed. Other than policy expediency 
issues leading to short-term evaluations, there is also the problem of capturing longitudinal 
data. Surveys require a considerable resource, making them rather costly. Long-term 
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cooperation is needed from all programme participants, be it recipients or delivery 
organisations, which is notoriously difficult for both parts, as is also illustrated by this research’s 
intended original use of Regional Development Agency data. Chapter Three explores the use 
of secondary performance data, as available from the UK Data Service, (but also from 
comparable agencies in other nations), as an alternative to engaging with scheme participants 
over many years for data collection purposes. This approach has its limitations, however. 
Linking the Business Link participants and their firm and owner characteristics as captured by 
a previous evaluation survey in 2005 with the official data records, namely the BSD, requires 
care and introduces its own set of challenges. Most notable is the high attrition from the original 
sample of 3,448 firms down to less than a third post linking and outlier removal. Reasons for 
this include the inability to identify the company registration number required as the unique 
and common identifier for firms. The firm list was recorded by the Business Link operators, 
and this difficulty of identification is due to either imprecise recording of firm names or not being 
a registered firm. The inclusion of only VAT registered and PAYE firms in the BSD leads to a 
further sample reduction. The BSD also requires some careful reflection, as it is not a ready-
to-use dataset, but requires annual linking and an in-depth look at its data structure. For the 
purpose of this thesis specifically the firm exit date required some detailed attention.  
Despite the caveats around the use of data linking, the sample characteristics changed 
significantly only for few firm and owner characteristics. One of the advantages of using official 
employee and turnover data is that self-reported performance data does not need to be relied 
upon, which appears to differ somewhat from the official records. Using larger samples or 
linking would require little additional effort as long as the company registration numbers would 
have been identified, allowing for analysis drawing on many more observations than common 
or, in fact, practicable with surveys. The use of larger samples could also allow linking with 
other available firm-level datasets, such as the Annual Respondents Database, or UK 
Innovation Survey, providing more outcome measures but also firm characteristics without the 
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need for primary data collection. In this case, the original sample was not of sufficient size for 
linking with other dataset available through the Secure Lab. 
The data linking exercise provided a dataset that can be used for far richer analysis, given its 
now longitudinal nature. The firms had not to be revisited for capturing this data, which is 
another major benefit. However, it also means being limited to firm characteristics from the 
original survey carried out, and what additional information and limited information is available 
from the datasets the survey data gets linked to.  
 
6.2.3 “Application of a longitudinal impact study of small business support in 
 England” 
 
The impact of assistance on survival and growth was explored. The key finding from the 
survival analysis was that firms in receipt of assistance had survival rates no different from 
those not assisted in the medium to long-term. The analysis suggested a short-term effect for 
the period immediately after the intervention having taken place, an effect observed most of 
the time regardless of age or size groups. Both, age and size are of considerable more 
influence on survival prospects than assistance. Survival rates of a random BSD sample were 
found to be overall lower than those of the assisted and non-assisted firms used for the 
analysis herein. Clearly, the random sample from BSD is not similar to the selected group of 
non-assisted firms used for analysis purposes. This flags the desirability of being able to draw 
on firm and owner characteristics. These are not available from the BSD, but they clearly are 
of importance to ensure firm groups of similar characteristics would be compared. The random 
sample here was unlikely to provide a suitable comparison group.  
Chapter Four’s results show how any survival analysis carried out for a two year period post 
intervention or beyond fails to support any effect of assistance on survival. Here, a one year 
evaluation would have provided a conclusion that, in fact, is only valid immediately post 
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intervention, and not suitable as a general summary of the impact of assistance on survival83. 
So, here the timing of evaluation makes a marked difference to the conclusions drawn.  
The analysis in Chapter Five is of an exploratory nature, and was divided by four different 
methodological approaches. The initial approach applied followed the highly rated 
methodology of the previous short-term Business Link evaluation by BERR (2007), involving 
linear regression, both with and without selection effects. Making use of the longitudinal data 
available, lagged growth models (taking into account previous growth experienced by the 
firms) were also estimated, and interquantile regressions undertaken to understand the effect 
size across the outcome population. Across the regressions, the significance of impact is 
apparent for the two to three year period post intervention. In the linear regressions, support 
is positive for employment, but negative for turnover and productivity. Including lags in the 
lagged growth models, there is some later positive effect on turnover for 2006-7. The lagged 
growth models for productivity provide some indication of a negative effect of support for 2004-
10 and 2004-11 periods. The few periods of significant impact remain similar for the generally 
weak interquantile regression results. Impact is limited to the extreme quantiles defined, and 
therefore is not distributed evenly across the outcome spectrum.  
It is certain that no definite answer on the period of impact can be given – and, of course, the 
results presented in this thesis are specific to the particular business support programme 
assessed. The results show that there is a lag of impact; with assistance coefficients mostly 
significant two to three years post intervention. With conventional regressions techniques that 
is the point in time after which – here in this analysis – significance of impact largely fades. 
The role of support is underlined by the fact that there are few consistent predictors of growth 
across models, that is, firm age, multiple sites, size, and possibly non-executive directorships. 
Assistance joins that list as a further predictor of the few significant ones for the two to three 
                                               
83
 This is a somewhat theoretical contribution; in practice survival analysis would be unusual to be 
carried out for a one year period only. The limited existing evidence (Fuentes and Dresdner, 2013; 
Girma et al., 2007; Jarmin, 1999; Wren and Storey, 2002) certainly looked at longer time frames. 
- 169 - 
 
year periods highlighted. This holds true across multiple modelling approaches. The central 
problem with increasing lengths for the outcome periods is the attribution aspect: Firms, 
whether previously assisted or not, may benefit from further support through the same or other 
programmes. The regression results are in that sense not surprising, with the effect of the 
measured soft support intervention fading after three years.  
What evidence does this provide then? The critique raised concerned current evaluation 
practice and the role of time in evaluation. It is clear that the timing of evaluation is absolute 
central to gaining a holistic understanding of support impact. A short evaluation period may 
miss effects becoming significant later. Evaluate “too” late, and previous significant effects may 
be missed. The research makes a case for the use of longitudinal data, undertaking evaluation 
at multiple points in time, and essentially creating time profiles of impact. It should be 
considered that a one-off evaluation based on two measurements will only be able to provide 
an understanding of average effects.  
Based on the evidence herein, it is clear that the ideal time frame for business support policy 
evaluation would be four to five years, capturing the periods of significant assistance effects 
and their subsequent fading. It is unlikely that one could sensibly undertake evaluation for a 
period stretching beyond that period, without an understanding of potential other assistance 
received or changing firm characteristics. 
 
6.3 Implications 
 
6.3.1 What is the value of taking a longer term approach to impact evaluation? 
Arguably, regardless of outcome, it will always be of value to allow for a taking into account a 
number of years of firm performance post intervention, ideally four to five years as found above. 
Even if no long-term effects are found, and a scheme appears only significant in the short-
term, the clear policy implication is that the scheme in question may well have provided a short-
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term boost to the support group of firms, but that the effect is fading in the mid- to long-term. 
The other way around, where long-term effects are shown by an evaluation, it is clear that a 
short-term evaluation could have underestimated the full economic impact of a scheme. 
Potentially, it would have estimated the impact as entirely insignificant, if the short-term 
evaluation’s cut-off comes before a scheme’s impact had sufficiently developed for a significant 
impact to develop. There is no doubt about the vital importance of timing in evaluation. 
 
6.3.2 The implications for practice 
The resulting challenges for business support evaluators are diverse: 
- Explain the choice of timing for evaluation 
The evidence of this study suggests that significant assistance effects appear 
mainly for the two to three year period, using conventional methods, depending on 
the measure used, which in this thesis is employment versus turnover. A period of 
five years of post intervention data would have captured the main effects here. If a 
number of similar studies existed, authors may refer back to studies of comparable 
schemes for their assumptions around timing of their evaluation. However, given 
the variation of impact observed by length of time, for robust evaluation the answer 
can only be to evaluate outcomes for a number time periods, as done herein. Of 
course, the longer the time period assessed, the more likely it is that other effects 
may distort the findings – the attribution problem. It is not unlikely that firms assisted 
in one way may also benefit of other assistance in parallel. Changes to firm 
characteristics are increasingly likely to distort findings over time. This will always 
limit the maximum sensible time horizon for analysis but the question is where to 
apply the cut-off? The time period included in evaluation needs to reflect the 
magnitude of the scheme’s impact – which of course can only be really known after 
evaluation.  
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- Explain the required time needed to funders and those requesting fast 
understanding of the scheme 
Whilst the first point around timing is of rather theoretical nature, it is also arguably 
detached from the practical requirements of the ‘real world’. The demand for 
support evaluations has a clear focus on rapid evidence; a five year evaluation 
would not fit within a single government term, including the time it takes to first 
design a support programme and to implement it. It would be naïve to ignore the 
push by policy-makers and funders for short-term analysis. However, as done with 
the BLO Survey data used for this thesis, such relatively short-term studies may be 
carried out initially to provide a first understanding of impact, and can then be 
subsequently extended longitudinally. That, of course, assumes that there would 
still be a market for findings on schemes being some five years old and possibly 
long abandoned. It also raises the question of the availability of funding for such 
evaluations with a potentially limited audience.  
 
- Highlight to the reader what the results actually tell 
Citations referring to “successful” schemes need to embed evidence into more 
context. Rather than suggesting, ‘Scheme XY was successful’, an addition that ‘A 
one-year impact assessment suggests Scheme’s XY effectiveness early on [and 
this evaluation is robust/not so robust given its methodological approach]’ would 
highlight that the results are only true for when measurement was taken. 
Particularly the grey literature, produced for policy-making purposes, often provides 
little context on findings. The awareness must be raised that most existing evidence 
cannot universally confirm (or reject) a scheme’s impact, it can only do so in the 
context of the timing of its applied measures. Of course, this also works in reverse, 
with users of evaluation results urged to be looking at the detailed context in which 
any particular scheme was deemed to be working or not.  
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- Device a strategy that provides the required, potentially longitudinal, data 
 This is mainly a question of resource and between the choice of primary and 
secondary methods for data acquisition. Rich longitudinal data on firms is hardly at 
all available through secondary sources, at least in the UK84. This thesis proposes 
one potential approach, where an extensive survey covering multiple firm 
characteristics gets linked to certain performance measures, reducing the need for 
resource-intensive primary data collection. Programme design could include 
automatic transmission of the inventory of assisted firms, allowing for that data to be 
stored and returned to later, even if the programme office has long been dissolved. 
However, comparable availability of official data as in this thesis may be limited by 
geography but also topic (see the linking of the BLO Survey to the UK Innovation 
Survey). Given data linking success rates (=attrition), the original sample needs to 
be of sufficient size.  
 
 
6.4 Limitations and extensions 
 
 Are models ever true, in the sense that full reality is represented exactly by a 
 model we can conceive and fit to the data[?], or are models merely 
 approximations?”     Burnham and Anderson, 2004 
A number of limitations were already explored as part of previous chapters.  
 
  
                                               
84
 Note that firm-level data is available in many nations, of varying depth. This availability of data allows 
the use of data–linking for business support evaluations in many countries other than the UK.  
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6.4.1 Attribution of impact 
One of the most pressing issues with long-term analysis of a single intervention is the problem 
of attribution. There are numerous soft and hard business support programmes available. How 
much of a measureable difference and for how long can a single intervention make? Firms 
once assisted are more likely to seek advice in the future (BERR, 2007), this is one of the 
central ideas of providing public business support, addressing the market failure of firms 
unaware of the value of advice. The MED (2009) is the only evaluation to the author’s 
knowledge using firm-level data with assistance data from various programmes. The inherent 
issues here are the many different bodies involved in support delivery. Few schemes are as 
big as Business Link in 2003, used for this thesis. Gathering data from hundreds if not 
thousands of support providers is not feasible, even when assuming there would be no data 
protection issues in doing so.  
Without an understanding of what other support may be of relevance for a firm’s performance, 
there is a natural limit to the length of what would constitute a sensible evaluation period. 
 
6.4.2 Firm characteristics 
Part of the purpose of this analysis was to demonstrate how a longitudinal study could be 
conducted with minimal resource implications by using officially captured micro data as 
available through the ONS’ Secure Lab service in the case of the UK. As a result of this 
approach, firm and owner characteristics were only available for the reference year, 2003, the 
year of the BLO Survey. It is likely that characteristics such as firm strategy, exporting, 
appointment of non-executive directors, and multi-site status, are subject to change over an 
eight year period. To determine growth factors, inclusion of evolving firm characteristics may 
be desirable – as argued by Coad (2009, p. 144).  
With reference to the attribution problem, it would have been interesting to understand whether 
firms had any further assistance (as discussed above). However, it is a question of striking a 
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balance. The big advantage of this study was no requirement for capturing any additional 
primary data, which will always require considerable resource. What may be worth 
investigating in this context is the use of other official datasets, which only have data for a 
sample of the firm population, unlike the BSD. For example, in the UK the Annual Business 
Survey (previously the Annual Respondents Database) allows insights into exporting status 
and tax paid (see Oulton, 1997, for more detail on the ARD). The UK Innovation Survey 
provides data on a firm’s innovation activities, the Employer Skills Survey on the workforce. 
However, as the matching rates to the UK Innovation Survey in Appendix C3 suggest, the 
sample size for matching would need to be unusually large. The Business Link population the 
sample for the BLO Survey was drawn from was in excess of 160 thousand firms, likely to 
present a sufficiently sized sample for such activity. 
 
6.4.3 Type of assistance 
This thesis differentiated between intensive and other, non-intensive, assistance. In Chapter 
Five, given the lack of other assistance’s impact, only intensive assistance was considered. 
The actual assistance as categorised as “intensive” in BERR (2007) was not homogenous, 
however. For example, if support resulted in getting access to new sources of finance, this 
would likely to have a more measureable impact on growth than advice on tax matters. 
Research by Mole et al. (2008) split the assistance into four types, depending on whether the 
Business Link provider chose a deeper or broader delivery approach. However, this could not 
be replicated in this thesis, given the post linking sample being too limited in size.  
In a broader sense, type of assistance will also matter for what could be regarded as a sensible 
time frame for evaluation. Schemes providing a relatively small intervention will not have a 
measurable impact for extended periods of time, whilst more complex interventions may have 
longer lasting effects. As mentioned above, the appropriate period of time for evaluation will 
only be known once evaluation has been carried out.  
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6.4.4 Concluding remarks on limitations 
There are other, wider limitations. The list of implications and suggestions provided as part of 
this Chapter is likely to be seen as rather theoretical in nature. Overcoming short-termism in 
politics is a far larger issue (see Stoker [2015] for a debate of this topic). Presenting results 
with a number of exclusions and limitations, such as saying that the “result is only true for the 
point of measurement” is unlikely when the policy-makers’ question was to provide a “Yes” or 
“No” with regards to a programmes’ positive impact.  
The question of measurement arises. For this thesis, it was clear that performance had to be 
measured in employment and turnover, with the addition of survival. BERR (2007) defined 
them as their measures of interest, that is, their objectives they wanted to see impact against. 
Practically, not much other data of interest would have been available from the BSD for the 
purpose of evaluation. It is important to keep in mind that good performance is not necessarily 
reflected by growth (Davidsson, 2015) or survival. Improved survival rates due to support 
(which little evidence was found for in this thesis) could mean that an inefficient firm’s life may 
have been artificially extended by support, potentially hindering new entrants with better 
prospects. In relation to growth, it is known that a large share of firms do not want to grow. 
They may perform well, nonetheless. Arguably, this concern is not one for evaluators, however.  
Policy objectives should be defined as part of the programme design (Storey, 1998; Spicker, 
2006), with the evaluation’s purpose to provide results against that defined purpose of a 
programme, also taking account of internal versus external growth if growth is of interest.  
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6.5 Thesis Conclusion 
 
This thesis raised the question of the long-term impact of business support, and the role of 
evaluation timing using micro data. The literature, for reasons of political expediency and data 
availability, pays little attention to the impact of evaluation timing on results, despite numerous 
references made to the desirability of undertaking longitudinal analysis for that purpose. The 
evidence arising from this research shows how the choice of timing is central to evaluation. It 
is recommended for evaluators to make greater use of longitudinal data for impact evaluation. 
Focus on just one measurement period will always remain no more than a snapshot, obscuring 
the richness of the profile of impact, and leading to incomplete conclusions on a programme’s 
impact. Based on this analysis, the recommendation would be to take into account four to five 
years of firm performance post intervention for soft business support evaluation.  
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Appendix C – Chapter Three 
Appendix C1 – BLO survey’s sampling frame 
 
During the 6 months from April through to September 2003 the Business Link delivery 
organisations (BLOs) recorded provision of assistance to 166,312 entities. The high count of 
interventions provides a good initial feel for the quality/intensity of the same.  
As one would expect, given the high number of support provisions recorded, the bulk of 
interventions were light-touch, with 89 percent (147,650) of interactions recorded as Other 
Assistance (OA). Only around 11 percent (18,662) of interventions were classed as instances 
of Intensive Assistance (IA).  Whilst the majority of the data is complete, there are no reported 
instances of OA in Norfolk, whilst the London IA data was unusable due to a lack of detail 
provided by the available data.  
Among the remaining 37 BLOs the share of IA vs. OA differed considerably. Each BLO could 
decide on their own delivery strategy, where some BLOs chose a more intensive approach 
whilst others offered more light-touch but wider available support (Mole et al., 2008). 
Leicestershire with 2.6 percent of IAs is at the extreme end of those with a focus on broad non-
intensive advice, Northamptonshire, Wessex and the West also had less than one IA for every 
20 OAs recorded. On the other end of the scale, more than half of all support in 
Northumberland was IA, with that share being 40 percent of IAs for Cheshire & Warrington and 
Hereford & Worcestershire.  
Table 18 provides an overview of the distribution of IAs and OAs across the 39 BLOs. Whilst 
the majority of the data is complete, there are no reported instances of OA in Norfolk, whilst 
the London IA data was unusable due to a lack of detail provided by the available data.  
Among the remaining 37 BLOs the share of IA vs. OA differed considerably. Each BLO could 
decide on their own delivery strategy, where some BLOs chose a more intensive approach 
whilst others offered more light-touch but wider available support (Mole et al., 2008). 
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Leicestershire with 2.6 percent of IAs is at the extreme end of those with a focus on broad non-
intensive advice, Northamptonshire, Wessex and the West also had less than one IA for every 
20 OAs recorded. On the other end of the scale, more than half of all support in 
Northumberland was IA, with that share being 40 percent of IAs for Cheshire & Warrington and 
Hereford & Worcestershire.  
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Table 18 – BLO sampling frame 
Type > IA OA IA% Total 
BLO  
        
B'ham & Solihull 1,063 8,706 10.9% 9,769 
Beds & Luton 83 932 8.2% 1,015 
Berkshire & Wiltshire 592 7,670 7.2% 8,262 
Black Country 581 4,931 10.5% 5,512 
Cambridge 161 2,893 5.3% 3,054 
Cheshire & Warrington 299 446 40.1% 745 
Coventry & Warwickshire 445 4,944 8.3% 5,389 
Cumbria 801 1,932 29.3% 2,733 
Derbyshire 754 3,248 18.8% 4,002 
Devon & Cornwall 1,010 7,099 12.5% 8,109 
Durham 279 1,160 19.4% 1,439 
East Lancashire 227 2,439 8.5% 2,666 
Gloucestershire 184 2,625 6.6% 2,809 
Gr. Merseyside 229 640 26.4% 869 
Hereford & Worcs 743 1,089 40.6% 1,832 
Hertfordshire 220 1,158 16.0% 1,378 
Kent 1,071 8,431 11.3% 9,502 
Lancashire 603 5,880 9.3% 6,483 
Leicestershire 79 2,608 2.9% 2,687 
Lincolnshire 131 2,159 5.7% 2,290 
London NA 1,580 NA 1,580 
MK Oxon Bucks 554 9,940 5.3% 10,494 
Manchester & Northern Manchester 820 2,048 28.6% 2,868 
Norfolk 770 NA NA 770 
Northamptonshire 85 2,289 3.6% 2,374 
Northumberland 938 867 52.0% 1,805 
Shropshire 601 1,589 27.4% 2,190 
Somerset 274 4,240 6.1% 4,514 
South Yorkshire 305 1,113 21.5% 1,418 
Staffordshire 548 5,611 8.9% 6,159 
Suffolk 1,134 2,226 33.8% 3,360 
Surrey 324 4,072 7.4% 4,396 
Sussex 388 5,212 6.9% 5,600 
Teeside 121 1,093 10.0% 1,214 
Tyne & Wear 180 2,879 5.9% 3,059 
Wessex 567 11,884 4.6% 12,451 
West 337 6,777 4.7% 7,114 
West Yorkshire 825 7,047 10.5% 7,872 
York & North Yorkshir 336 6,193 5.1% 6,529 
       
Total 18,662 147,650 11.2% 166,312 
Source: Business Link firm universe of assisted firms 
 
The BLOs covered areas of different size and economic activity, but yet it is of note that some 
BLOs provided far greater numbers of interventions than others. The magnitude of that 
difference is unlikely to be proportional to economic activity (e.g. the number of firms by BLO) 
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for cases such as Wessex. It is a reasonable assumption to make that every IA will have 
required the resource for multiple OAs85.  
Overall, out of the 166,000 firms recorded around 148,000–150,000 had employment, sector 
and/or age information86. For the 148,049 firms for which employment figures were captured, 
the minimum employment was 0, the maximum 42,000; average size was considerable 
smaller, 33.4 employees (Table 19).  
Table 19 – BLO sampling frame: Employment summary statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Employment 148,049 33.4 343.9 0 42000 
Source: Business Link firm universe of assisted firms 
 
42,000 is an unusually high employment number for a firm in receipt of Business Link support 
– usually aimed at SMEs. Overall, some 2,600 firms exceeded the official SME definition’s 
employment cut-off of 249 employees, some 540 had 1,000 staff or more (Table 20 87).  
 
The highly skewed firm size distribution is reflected well in this population of assisted firms. 
Nearly a quarter of firms had no more than one employee, whilst nearly half of firms did not 
exceed four employees. Another 30 percent of firms had between 5 to 19 employees, and a 
total of 90 percent of firms employing fewer than 50 employees. As a result, removing the 1.8 
percent of largest firms (>249 staff) reduces average firm size  to around 16 employees, less 
than half the 33.4 employee average when accounting for all firm employment figures 
captured. 
 
  
                                               
85
 The split of resources between the 39 BLOs is not known, but is likely to explain some of the 
variance in total support offering seen across BLOs.   
86
 The VAT reference and/or company house registration number were only recorded for 11,503 and 
2,945 firms, respectively. Linking to other datasets based on these two identifiers would not be 
possible, but require the use of matching algorithms for name and address.  
87
 Size band information was captured for around 2,500 more firms than exact employment count.  
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Table 20 – BLO sampling frame: Employment by size categories 
Employment Freq. Percent Cum. 
No employees 13,487 9.0% 9.0% 
1 employee 21,374 14.2% 23.2% 
2-4 empl. 35,930 23.9% 47.0% 
5-9 empl. 25,083 16.7% 63.7% 
10-19 empl. 20,774 13.8% 77.5% 
20-49 empl. 18,917 12.6% 90.0% 
50-99 empl. 7,470 5.0% 95.0% 
100-249 empl. 4,918 3.3% 98.3% 
250-999 empl. 2,051 1.4% 99.6% 
>1,000 empl. 544 0.4% 100.0% 
      
Total 150,548 100.0%   
Source: Business Link firm universe of assisted firms 
 
Table 21 provides a breakdown of firms by industry sector, for 148,154 firms from the total 
population assisted. Following by and large the total number of firms by sector, most 
interventions were recorded for SIC D (manufacturing), SIC G (wholesale) and SIC K (real 
estate), whilst SIC B (fishing), SIC C (mining) and SIC Q (extra-territorial organisation) had 
fewer than 60 interventions between them in total. The high number of firms supported in the 
real estate sector is an interesting side note, given the relative smallness of that sector of the 
economy (suggesting that some type of selection must have taken place for how the support 
was allocated: the sector split in the sampling frame of assisted firms does not mirror that of 
the actual economy).  
 
Ignoring the extra-territorial sector due to the low number of firms, SIC A (agriculture) firms 
enjoyed the highest proportion of IA (18.2 percent), followed by SIC N (health and social) and 
SIC D (manufacturing) with 15.8 percent and 15.2 percent, respectively. The lowest proportion 
of IA was for firms in SIC J (finance) and SIC H (hospitality), where less than one in ten 
interventions were IA rather than OA at 8.3 percent and 9.7 percent, respectively.  
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Table 21 – BLO sampling frame: Industry sector (SIC) breakdown 
SIC - Sector IA OA IA% Total 
% of 
Total 
A - Agriculture, Hunting 1,186 5,340 18.2% 6,526 4.4% 
B - Fishing 3 16 15.8% 19 0.0% 
C - Mining & Quarrying 3 27 10.0% 30 0.0% 
D - Manufacturing 4,416 24,708 15.2% 29,124 19.7% 
E - Electricity, Gas 29 213 12.0% 242 0.2% 
F - Construction 977 7,659 11.3% 8,636 5.8% 
G - Wholesale, Retail 2,214 19,897 10.0% 22,111 14.9% 
H - Hotels and Restaurants 735 6,827 9.7% 7,562 5.1% 
I - Transport, Storage 562 4,712 10.7% 5,274 3.6% 
F - Financial Intermed. 254 2,806 8.3% 3,060 2.1% 
K - Real Estate, Rent 4,032 35,166 10.3% 39,198 26.5% 
L - Public Adminst. 136 1,153 10.6% 1,289 0.9% 
M - Education 788 5,598 12.3% 6,386 4.3% 
N - Health and Social 1,307 6,948 15.8% 8,255 5.6% 
O - Other Social & P. 1,019 9,160 10.0% 10,179 6.9% 
P - Private Household 28 225 11.1% 253 0.2% 
Q - Extra-Territorial 2 8 20.0% 10 0.0% 
        
Total 17,691 130,463 11.9% 148,154 100.0% 
Source: Business Link firm universe of assisted firms 
 
Firm foundation date is also included in the available data, however, it was not captured in a 
coherent manner. For example, all Birmingham & Solihull assisted firms are showing as 1900 
or 1905 births, strongly suggesting that the data consistency has suffered over time (or, in fact, 
that the data was never recorded correctly). Similar issues were found for a number of other 
BLOs. For Table 22 all those instances where the firms’ foundation date appeared uncertain 
were removed (i.e. among others all of Birmingham & Solihull’s BLO assisted firms). 60 percent 
of the original firm population are included in the table, therefore still providing a good idea of 
the cohort’s firm age distribution.  
The distribution of total interventions is again influenced by the total number of firms, i.e. there 
are far more young firms than older ones. In this case this means that 12,699 firms were 
assisted when less than one year old, but only 4,783 four to five year old firms. Interestingly, 
the proportion of IA out of all interventions dropped with age, and whilst more than 13 percent 
of firms no older than two years enjoyed IA, less than 11 percent of firms 10 years and older 
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could do so88. For those firms in-between those age ranges, the share of IA was in the 11.1-
12.1 percent range.  
 
Table 22 – BLO sampling frame: Firm age categories 
Firm Age IA OA IA% Total 
Firm age: <1 year 1,663 11,036 13.1% 12,699 
Firm age: 1<2 
years 
1,251 8,192 13.2% 9,443 
Firm age: 2<3 
years 
836 6,323 11.7% 7,159 
Firm age: 3<4 
years 
682 5,479 11.1% 6,161 
Firm age: 4<5 
years 
531 4,252 11.1% 4,783 
Firm age: 5<10  2,192 15,958 12.1% 18,150 
Firm age: 10<20 
years 
2,300 19,728 10.4% 22,028 
Firm age: >20 
years 
2,392 19,706 10.8% 22,098 
       
Total 11,847 90,674   102,521 
Source: Business Link firm universe of assisted firms 
 
 
  
                                               
88
 This reduction in the share of IA vs. OA could have taken place for various reasons, including a bias 
of advisors towards younger firms for IA (possibly in the light of more visible results being achievable 
when a firm is younger and potentially smaller), or a more proactive approach by firms to seek out IA. 
- 197 - 
 
Appendix C2 - Technical considerations, using the Secure Lab 
 
 
Using the BSD and other datasets through the UK Data Service Secure Lab 
 
The use of the UK Data Service Secure Lab (SL) comes with a number of limitations. Access 
to the BSD, ARD and UK Innovation Survey (CIS) (as explored later) is facilitated by UK Data 
Service through their SL. The data accessible through the SL (and also the VML, the Virtual 
Microdata Laboratory) is micro data on UK firms, 
 “[…] data that are too detailed, sensitive or confidential to be made available 
 under a standard End User Licence of Special Licence. Our specialised staff 
 apply statistical control techniques to ensure the delivery of safe statistical 
 results. 
 Data accessed in this way cannot be downloaded. Once researchers are specially 
 trained, they analyse the data remotely from their institutional desktop or in our Safe 
 Centre. We provide access to statistical and office software to make remote analysis 
 and collaboration secure and convenient.”  
          (UKDS, 2015) 
Just like the BSD, all these datasets are based on micro-data collected through surveys or 
compiled from administrative data. The data is available through a virtual computer 
environment to researchers at UK academic institutions or the Economics and Social Research 
Council (ESRC) funded research centres. Access is only possible through a registered and in 
my case university based IP address. Data cannot be downloaded onto an individual’s 
computer but remains in the virtual environment where all analysis needs to be undertaken. 
Researchers are subject to a number of rules when using the SL. These rules have been 
designed by a European group of bodies making detailed micro data available (referring to 
themselves as National Statistical Institutes), the Network of Excellence in the European 
Statistical System in the field of Statistical Disclosure Control (ESSNet S D C).  The ESSNet 
S D C have defined the following four central criteria as part of their “Overall rule of thumb” 
(ESSNet S D C, unknown date): 
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 “1. 10 units: all tabular and similar output should have at least 10 units 
 (unweighted) underlying any cell or data point represented. […] 
 2. 10 degrees of freedom: all modelled output should have at least 10 degrees of 
 freedom and at least 10 units have been used to produce the model. […] 
3. Group Disclosure: In all tabular and similar output no cell can contain more than 
90% of the total number of units in its row or column to prevent group disclosure. […] 
 4. Dominance: In all tabular and similar data the largest contributor of a cell can not 
 [sic] exceed 50% of the cell total. […]” 
 
In essence, using data through the SL, no statistics for an individual firm or aggregate 
measures of less than 10 observations within can be disclosed. This is to avoid the possibility 
of an individual firm being identified from the statistics outside of the SL’s virtual environment. 
Naturally, this results in some limitations about what can be presented in this thesis. Scatter 
plots of various dimensions of the data were prepared at the outset of the analysis, useful to 
see the correlations but also to identify outliers. The scatter points represent individual firms, 
and these diagrams would allow recognising individual firms’ characteristics and as such 
provide an example of which kind of outputs could not be cleared by the SL. Following data 
linking, a number of outliers were removed, and again to mention their size would have been 
problematic. Furthermore, minimum and maximum values can usually not be disclosed, unless 
it is known to be at least 10 observations that share the same minimum and maximum values 
(more of a challenge for continuous rather than categorical variables, of course. For clearance, 
it is also required to remove all constant terms from the output tables. 
sk of unintentional disclosure. 
Table 23 from ESSNet S D C (unknown date) summarises the safe and unsafe output 
classifications used by the UK Data Service. Unsafe output requires the researcher applying 
for output clearance to demonstrate that the output complies with above rules. For safe output, 
the onus would be on the UK Data Service to explain why they would want to withhold the 
output in question.  Generally, descriptive outputs carry a far greater risk of unintentional 
disclosure. 
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Table 23 – Classification of output table by ESSNET S D C 
Type of Statistics Type of Output Classification 
Descriptive Statistics 
Frequency tables Unsafe 
Magnitude tables Unsafe 
Maxima, minima and percentiles (incl. median) Unsafe 
Mode Safe 
Means, indices, ratios, indicators Unsafe 
Concentration ratios Safe 
Higher moments of distributions (incl. variance, covariance, 
kurtosis, skewness) Safe 
Graphs: pictorial representations of actual data Unsafe 
Correlation and 
Regression Analysis 
Linear regression coefficients Safe 
Non-linear regression coefficients Safe 
Estimation residuals Unsafe 
Summary and test statistics from estimates Safe 
Correlation coefficients Safe 
Source: ESSNET S D C (unknown date, p. 8)  
 
Data linking: Data observations post linking 
 
The use of the BSD is not straightforward. This section considers how the BSD records 
whether a firm has died or not, as one of the data’s main peculiarities – especially when 
compiling multiple editions (years) of BSD data for the same firm.  
Definitions of firm death vary, and depend to a large extent on the type of data available to the 
researcher. Storey and Wynarczyk (1996; in Wren and Storey, 2002) define firm death as 
“where a change occurs in at least three attributes as follows: name, location, ownership and 
sector”. 
In the BSD it is important to note that any changes to location, name and sector do not affect 
the firm’s death date. Any acquisitions or break-ups also would not automatically result in the 
death of a firm, only if its unique reference number ‘entref’ ceases to be used (i.e. if becoming 
part of another entity, or more mundanely when ceasing trading due to bankruptcy or closure).   
Generally, the firm's death date would be populated by the year of the death of a firm, if 
applicable, in the BSD following the year of its death (i.e. a 2005 death would first be recorded 
in the 2006 BSD). If this system was applied continuously, it would then be sufficient to take 
the year of death of the latest BSD data attached to one’s longitudinal dataset, and have the 
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appropriate year of death for all firms included in the sample. As Table 24 demonstrates, that 
approach would fail (quite badly) to recognise a number of firms that appear to have previously 
been dead. 
Table 24 – Extract of firm death dates as recorded by the BSD for 2004-2011 (enterprise level)   
entref 
2004 
death 
2005 
death 
2006 
death 
2007 
death 
2008 
death 
2009 
death 
2010 
death 
2011 
death 
Random+0      2008 2008  
Random+1         
Random+2         
Random+3   2005   2008 2008 2010 
Random+4       2009 2009 
Random+5         
Random+6         
Random+7         
Random+8      2007   
Random+9         
Random+10     2007 2007 2007  
Random+11         
Random+12         
Random+13    2006 2006    
Source: own work  
 
Table 24 provides a sample of how, for the same firms (=entref), different dates of death may 
be recorded in different editions of the BSD. The oddities as depicted by the extract above 
include a number of firms that die but appear to come back to life, in the case of Random+3 a 
2005 death is recorded in BSD 2006, then no death date in subsequent years until BSD 2009, 
where the firm has a new death date of 2008. This remains unchanged for BSD 2010, before 
becoming a 2010 death date in BSD 2011.  
There are some explanations offered by the UKDS provide some a number of explanations for 
the described phenomena. For example, small firms may drop below the minimum turnover 
level where they would need to be registered for VAT. Such firms may opt out from VAT, and if 
they are not on PAYE in parallel, would be recorded as a firm death. If a firm subsequently 
reaches a turnover size requiring it to re-register for VAT, its death date would be removed from 
the IDBR and the following annual BSD snapshot appears without a death date for the grown 
firm. 
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Throughout the sample there are a high number of firms with a death date recorded in BSD 
2010, but not BSD 2011. Death dates are also removed after a period, causing the systematic 
inconsistency between BSD 2011 and previous versions. The BSD 2011 would only highlight 
firm 2009-2011 deaths. Any firm with an earlier death date in BSD 2010 would not have its 
death date listed in BSD 2011. 
Random+8 died in 2007 according to BSD 2009 only, appearing without a recorded death date 
in BSD 2008 (and in BSD 2010 and BSD 2011)89. 
With the intention to establish a single reliable death date for each firm, other indicators in the 
data had to be used to determine it. The Active indicator (to provide an insight as to whether a 
firm is active or not) as part of each annual BSD is of no help as it behaves mostly identical to 
the death dates – it appears most likely that the death dates are a function of the Active 
indicator, or vice versa. In actual fact, instances exist where Active is recorded as missing 
across a number of BSD years, with an Active status recorded in BSD 2010 and BSD 2011. 
Throughout, no death date was recorded for any of the BSD years for the particular firm in 
question. Active could potentially be useful as it gets recorded as missing in BSD 2011 for 
those observations where a firm had a pre-2009 death date (which as a rule would disappear 
in BSD 2011). However, this does not hold valid for any of the early BSD years, where firms 
may “return to live” with Active switching from Inactive to Live accordingly. 
Using a combination of employment and turnover records as well as the death dates as 
recorded, a single and definitive death date was determined for all firms. Turnover and 
employment records were reviewed, and where they remain unchanged for a number of years 
or were recorded as missing this was used as an indicator for firm inactivity – and as such 
death. This approach is similar to BIS (2011), where death was determined by a combination 
of using employee data and the active/inactive marker.  
                                               
89
 Example of a case where no sensible reason for the observed could be identified.  
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The underlying logic for using employment (and turnover) as the main indicators of whether a 
firm is alive or dead is that firms can remain in the IDBR with turnover and employment data 
depending on their type of death (merger vs. ceasing to trade) – firms will only be assigned a 
death date once the VAT and/or PAYE registrations are terminated. This “administrative death” 
can be some time following the actual death. 
Overall, where firms had a death date recorded and omitted or replaced by different dates in 
subsequent BSD editions, that initial death date often provided a good indicator of the death 
date determined later: In most instances the approach outlined often resulted in the same (that 
earliest recorded) death date. 
Turnover and employment values were then set as missing for the periods following the 
determined death date, to ensure they would not form part of the analysis. 
From the inspection of the data it is apparent that the BSD was not designed for the research 
purpose it is used for herein. The IDBR’s purpose is to provide a sampling frame for 
administrative purposes, and the BSD is merely the annual snapshot of that – and only 
reasonably recently made widely available for researchers. 
The example of death shows that by no means the BSD constitutes a ready to go dataset for 
research. It requires considerable attention and understanding prior to analysis, and for 
informed assumptions to be made. 
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Appendix C3 – Exploring the use of the UK Innovation Survey 
The relevance of small firms to the economy goes beyond the large number of jobs they 
provide. Economic progress, or growth, is linked to the innovative capabilities of an economy 
– innovation is a major driver of economic growth (Solow 1957; Romer 1987, 2000; in 
Antanssov, 2013). 
The Austrian economist Schumpeter named innovation as the “critical dimension of change” 
(Schumpeter, 1934). Those economies and firms that make innovation a continuum will 
prosper and survive. They therefore develop new products and services and new ways to 
produce and run things, replacing the old.  
A large body of literature underpins how innovation is at the core of economic growth. It often 
gets referred to in the context of the importance of small businesses. Chapter One of this study 
briefly refers to the link between small business and innovation. In that context, when 
undertaking long-term analysis, considering the effects of assistance on innovation provides 
an interesting and possible worthwhile angle to explore. Are assisted firms stronger 
innovators? Do they show different innovation behaviour, for example focus on process or 
product innovation to a different extent than their competitors? 
 
Fostering innovation was not at the core of Business Link, and accordingly this study focusses 
on the impact of the support on firm growth. Certainly, analyses of innovation exist, but again, 
any long-term analyses of the impact of (soft) business support are rare as the long-term 
evaluation literature review found (by, in fact, failing to find studies). In the absence of data on 
firms that were part of an innovation assistance scheme, the BLO Survey data is used to 
demonstrate the potential of the use of datasets other than the BSD for performance data, and 
also the limitations of that wider use of firm-level datasets available. 
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“The UK Innovation Survey (UKIS) provides the main source of information on business 
innovation in the UK”90. As the main survey on innovation, it is intended to inform research and 
policy makers about the innovation activities and their nature taking place. Its data is used in 
the Community Innovation Survey on a European level.  
 
Other than its purpose of measuring and understanding innovation, the UKIS is different to the 
BSD in that it does not capture all firms, as the BSD with the exception of the non-PAYE and 
non-VAT registered firms does. The UKIS’ sampling frame is around 16,000 UK firms (as 
provided by the Interdepartmental Business Register [IDBR], of which the BSD provides the 
annual snapshots). That difference is easily explained by the UKIS’ data collection being 
conducted through postal survey (whereas the IDBR simply draws on records provided for tax 
purposes by firms automatically, and by law). The UKIS also is not conducted annually, having 
moved from a four year to every two year survey in 2007. The data is captured at firm level but 
not across the same set of firms each year. It is therefore not possible to track individual firms’ 
innovation behaviour across a number of years usually. The analysis is, therefore, limited to 
considering individual time periods, with trend analysis only possible by defining groups of 
similar firms. The firm identifier is the same as in the BSD, entref, enabling the linking of the 
BSD and UKIS in a relatively straightforward manner.  
 
Table 25 shows the matching success across four waves of UKIS. UKIS 4 was conducted 
2004, UKIS 5 2006, UKIS 6 2008 and UKIS 7 2010, therefore corresponding with the time 
period since the 2003 BLO intervention assessed in this study. The longitudinal dataset (as 
created in Chapter Three) contains 425 firms intensively assisted (IAs), 321 other assisted 
(OAs), and 298 firms non-assisted firms, 1044 firms in total. The achieved matching rate to the 
                                               
90
 As described by the UK Data Service on its website, “UK Innovation Survey, 1994-2010: Secure 
Access”, http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/catalogue?sn=6699 accessed 21/04/2014. The remainder 
of the paragraph also builds on information from their website on the UKIS.  
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UKIS was low, around 3.5 to 4.5 percent, roughly in proportion of the 16,000 firms sampling 
frame used for the UKIS and the total firm population of the BSD.  
 
Table 25 – UKIS matching success across UKIS waves (longitudinal dataset) 
 IA OA NA Total 
UKIS (CIS) 4 11 19 13 43 
UKIS (CIS) 5 10 13 14 37 
UKIS (CIS) 6 11 21 <10 32-41 
UKIS (CIS) 7 16 14 16 46 
Source: BLO Survey and UK Innovation Surveys 4-7 
 
It is clear that too few firms are contained in the longitudinal dataset for data linking with the 
UKIS. Drawing robust conclusions about innovation behaviour of assisted firms and their 
control group is not possible. In fact, so little data was matched that when considering individual 
firms’ innovation behaviours as measured in the UKIS, the cell count would be below 10 
regularly, rendering the publication of such tables here impossible due to the disclosure 
protocol as highlighted in Chapter Three.  
With the tables unpublishable, at a high-level the following was seen (keeping in mind the low 
number of observations underpinning this): 
- In UKIS 4, both IAs and OAs were more than double as likely as NAs to be involved in 
innovation activities. 
- In UKIS 5 that effects fades, IAs and OAs remain stronger product and process 
innovators by some margin though, compared to NAs.  
- In UKIS 6, across the different innovation categories measures, IAs appear somewhat 
more likely to be innovating, but this effect is not marked. Less than a third of matched 
firms innovated at all. 
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- In UKIS 7 around half of the matched firms undertook some form of (captured) 
innovation, with that figure highest for OAs (by some margin), smallest for IAs.  
What value is there to these small figures? At best, they indicate somewhat of a trend of 
assisted firms having been more innovative. That would be a welcome outcome for economic 
growth, and an effect not necessarily measureable by employment or turnover growth at the 
innovating firm itself – something that this study’s main analysis has focussed on. 
Given the lack of statistical robustness of the small figures involved, the value of this UKIS 
exploration is that innovation outcomes are a feasible further dimension of measurement for 
economic impact assessment of business support, provided that a large enough firm universe 
of assisted firms was available for linking into the UKIS. As such, this appended section on 
innovation provides a call for future research to consider the use the UKIS for this purpose91. 
 
 
 
  
                                               
91
 In that context, a discussion of whether it is to be expected that assisted firms are more likely to have 
been innovators would be needed. It appears plausible that assisted firms are more likely to change, 
and more likely to be innovators? As such, the type of measured innovation becomes relevant. Rather 
than assisted firms innovating more than non-assisted one (confirming the expected), a surprising result 
might more likely to find no difference between those assisted and those that were not.  
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Appendix C4 – Summary table Longitudinal Data survivors only 
 
Table 26 – Comparison of firm characteristics: long. dataset vs. L.D. survivors only (for IA) 
IA Post matching: ELD Post matching: LD 
survivors   Test statistics 
  
Obs Mean S.D. 
 
Obs Mean S.D. 
   
LD<-LD 
(surv.) 
Variable 
          
t-/z-
value sig. 
Employment 2004 (BLO S) 416 25.844 36.840 
 
319 28.774 39.581 
  t 1.619   
Employment 2004 (BSD) 425 23.348 36.558 
 
328 26.174 39.471 
  t 1.590   
Employment 2005 (BLO S) 418 28.148 40.607 
 
321 31.458 43.792 
  t 1.662   
Employment 2005 (BSD) 425 23.955 36.157 
  
328 26.838 38.662 
  t 1.640   
Firm age: 2<3 years 423 0.097 0.296 
 
326 0.067 0.251 
  z 1.439   
Firm age: 3<4 years 423 0.071 0.257 
 
326 0.064 0.246 
  z 0.350   
Firm age: 4<5 years 423 0.095 0.293 
 
326 0.095 0.294 
  z 
-
0.025   
Firm age: 5<10 years 423 0.222 0.416 
 
326 0.227 0.420 
  z 
-
0.155   
Firm age: 10<20 years 423 0.243 0.430 
 
326 0.236 0.425 
  z 0.232   
Firm age: >20 years 423 0.272 0.445 
  
326 0.310 0.463 
  z 
-
1.137   
Formal business plan 418 0.706 0.456 
 
321 0.710 0.454 
  z 
-
0.134   
Multisite firm 425 0.193 0.395 
 
328 0.201 0.402 
  z 
-
0.283   
Esporting firm 424 0.377 0.485 
 
327 0.404 0.491 
  z 
-
0.733   
Legal form: Limited liability 425 0.904 0.296 
  
328 0.902 0.297 
  z 0.050   
Owner-Manager <25 years old 397 0.003 0.050 
 
307 xxx xxx 
  z    
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 397 0.076 0.265 
 
307 0.081 0.274 
  z 
-
0.288   
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 397 0.317 0.466 
 
307 0.329 0.471 
  z 
-
0.327   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 397 0.360 0.481 
 
307 0.349 0.477 
  z 0.321   
Owner-Manager >55  years old 397 0.244 0.430 
  
307 0.241 0.428 
  z 0.101   
OM is serial entrepreneur 395 0.400 0.491 
 
302 0.377 0.486 
  z 0.604   
% of female directors 414 24.406 30.588 
 
319 23.807 30.769 
  t 0.397   
% of ethnic minority directors 411 2.835 13.696 
  
318 2.652 12.916 
  t 0.270   
SIC1: Agriculture, Hunting & 
Fishing 425 0.033 0.179  328 0.037 0.188   z 
-
0.272   
SIC4: Manufacturing 425 0.273 0.446 
 
328 0.280 0.450 
  z 
-
0.230   
SIC6: Construction 425 0.104 0.305 
 
328 0.098 0.297 
  z 0.270   
SIC7: Retail & Wholesale 425 0.132 0.339 
 
328 0.152 0.360 
  z 
-
0.809   
SIC9: Financial Services 425 0.031 0.172 
 
328 0.034 0.180 
  z 
-
0.228   
SIC11: Education 425 0.285 0.452 
 
328 0.277 0.448 
  z 0.220   
SIC13: Other Services 425 0.040 0.196 
 
328 0.046 0.209 
  z 
-
0.387   
SIC14: Hotels & Catering 425 0.042 0.202   328 xxx xxx   z 
    
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
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Table 27 – Comparison of firm characteristics: long. dataset vs. L.D. survivors only (for OA) 
OA Post matching: ELD Post matching: LD 
survivors   Test statistics 
  
Obs Mean S.D. 
 
Obs Mean S.D. 
   
LD<-LD 
(surv.) 
Variable 
          
t-/z-
value sig. 
Employment 2004 (BLO S) 315 27.349 42.519 
 
246 30.882 46.861 
  t 1.470   
Employment 2004 (BSD) 321 23.620 38.835 
 
250 27.316 42.378 
  t 1.700 * 
Employment 2005 (BLO S) 316 28.348 43.510 
 
246 31.959 47.961 
  t 1.471   
Employment 2005 (BSD) 321 24.495 39.822 
  
250 28.228 43.367 
  t 1.674   
Firm age: 2<3 years 321 0.084 0.278 
 
250 0.072 0.259 
  z 0.533   
Firm age: 3<4 years 321 0.050 0.218 
 
250 0.048 0.214 
  z 0.101   
Firm age: 4<5 years 321 0.065 0.248 
 
250 0.052 0.222 
  z 0.672   
Firm age: 5<10 years 321 0.174 0.380 
 
250 0.152 0.360 
  z 0.718   
Firm age: 10<20 years 321 0.287 0.453 
 
250 0.304 0.461 
  z 
-
0.453   
Firm age: >20 years 321 0.340 0.474 
  
250 0.372 0.484 
  z 
-
0.804   
Formal business plan 316 0.620 0.486 
 
245 0.629 0.484 
  z 
-
0.202   
Multisite firm 321 0.190 0.393 
 
250 0.200 0.401 
  z 
-
0.299   
Esporting firm 321 0.280 0.450 
 
250 0.272 0.446 
  z 0.222   
Legal form: Limited liability 321 0.879 0.327 
  
250 0.880 0.326 
  z 
-
0.054   
Owner-Manager <25 years old 283 0.007 0.084 
 
220 xxx xxx 
  z    
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 283 0.106 0.308 
 
220 0.100 0.301 
  z 0.220   
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 283 0.300 0.459 
 
220 0.318 0.467 
  z 
-
0.430   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 283 0.314 0.465 
 
220 0.318 0.467 
  z 
-
0.088   
Owner-Manager >55  years old 283 0.272 0.446 
  
220 0.264 0.442 
  z 0.212   
OM is serial entrepreneur 296 0.409 0.492 
 
230 0.396 0.490 
  z 0.305   
% of female directors 310 22.690 28.428 
 
239 22.403 28.040 
  t 0.177   
% of ethnic minority directors 310 8.210 86.638 
  
239 8.279 97.650 
  t 0.014   
SIC1: Agriculture, Hunting & Fishing 321 0.044 0.205  250 0.048 0.214   z 
-
0.249   
SIC4: Manufacturing 321 0.259 0.439 
 
250 0.260 0.440 
  z 
-
0.039   
SIC6: Construction 321 0.109 0.312 
 
250 0.108 0.311 
  z 0.039   
SIC7: Retail & Wholesale 321 0.178 0.383 
 
250 0.172 0.378 
  z 0.174   
SIC9: Financial Services 321 0.016 0.124 
 
250 xxx xxx 
  z    
SIC11: Education 321 0.287 0.453 
 
250 0.288 0.454 
  z 
-
0.037   
SIC13: Other Services 321 0.031 0.174 
 
250 xxx xxx 
  z    
SIC14: Hotels & Catering 321 0.047 0.211   250 0.056 0.230   z -0.501   
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
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Table 28 – Comparison of firm characteristics: long. dataset vs. L.D. survivors only (for NA) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD 
  
NA Post matching: ELD Post matching: LD 
survivors   Test statistics 
  
Obs Mean S.D. 
 
Obs Mean S.D. 
   LD<-LD (surv.) 
Variable 
          
t-/z-
value sig. 
Employment 2004 (BLO S) 291 28.186 37.765 
 
225 31.631 42.808 
  t 1.551   
Employment 2004 (BSD) 298 27.560 40.759 
 
232 31.659 45.080 
  t 1.730 * 
Employment 2005 (BLO S) 291 28.893 38.991 
 
225 32.351 43.970 
  t 1.507   
Employment 2005 (BSD) 298 29.117 45.114 
  
232 34.052 51.064 
  t 1.881 * 
Firm age: 2<3 years 297 0.037 0.189 
 
231 xxx xxx 
  z    
Firm age: 3<4 years 297 0.037 0.189 
 
231 xxx xxx 
  z    
Firm age: 4<5 years 297 0.040 0.197 
 
231 xxx xxx 
  z    
Firm age: 5<10 years 297 0.165 0.372 
 
231 0.156 0.363 
  z 0.283   
Firm age: 10<20 years 297 0.242 0.429 
 
231 0.238 0.427 
  z 0.115   
Firm age: >20 years 297 0.481 0.501 
  
231 0.515 0.501 
  z -0.768   
Formal business plan 285 0.400 0.491 
 
219 0.416 0.494 
  z -0.352   
Multisite firm 297 0.185 0.389 
 
231 0.182 0.387 
  z 0.099   
Esporting firm 295 0.217 0.413 
 
230 0.230 0.422 
  z -0.368   
Legal form: Limited liability 298 0.862 0.345 
  
232 0.888 0.316 
  z -0.877   
Owner-Manager <25 years old 264 0.011 0.106 
 
204 xxx xxx 
  z    
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 264 0.091 0.288 
 
204 0.098 0.298 
  z -0.262   
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 264 0.299 0.459 
 
204 0.324 0.469 
  z -0.563   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 264 0.318 0.467 
 
204 0.343 0.476 
  z -0.570   
Owner-Manager >55  years old 264 0.280 0.450 
  
204 0.225 0.419 
  z 1.347   
OM is serial entrepreneur 270 0.300 0.459 
 
208 0.260 0.439 
  z 0.972   
% of female directors 288 22.922 29.662 
 
223 22.503 29.036 
  t 0.239   
% of ethnic minority directors 287 2.933 15.963 
  
222 2.890 15.558 
  t 0.045   
SIC1: Agriculture, Hunting & Fishing 298 0.040 0.197  232 0.047 0.213   z -0.401   
SIC4: Manufacturing 298 0.252 0.435 
 
232 0.254 0.436 
  z -0.069   
SIC6: Construction 298 0.124 0.330 
 
232 0.112 0.316 
  z 0.427   
SIC7: Retail & Wholesale 298 0.238 0.427 
 
232 0.250 0.434 
  z -0.313   
SIC9: Financial Services 298 0.027 0.162 
 
232 xxx xxx 
  z    
SIC11: Education 298 0.154 0.362 
 
232 0.155 0.363 
  z -0.026   
SIC13: Other Services 298 0.057 0.232 
 
232 0.065 0.246 
  z -0.365   
SIC14: Hotels & Catering 298 0.040 0.197   232 xxx xxx   z 
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Appendix D – Chapter Four 
 
Appendix D1 – Log-rank and Wilcoxon tests 
 
Log-rank and Wilcoxon tests can be used to confirm the insignificant differences between the 
assisted and non-assisted groups in survival terms (and ignoring size and age herein). The 
log-rank test provides a straightforward statistical comparison of group survival rates (both 
methodologically and in terms of interpretation). Non-parametrical in nature, it was first 
developed in the field of medical science by Mantel (1966; in Walker 2010). It takes the form 
of 
  Χ2 (Log rank) = 


+	



     (2) 
where O1 and O2 are the observed occurrence of the event (deaths), and E1 and E2 denote the 
expected number of events for the two groups. The null hypothesis Ho is that no difference 
exists between the survival rates of the compared two groups. The two groups initially 
compared were the IA and NA groups (Table 29). IAs appeared to be more distinctively 
different from the NAs than the OAs in the Kaplan-Meier graphs.  
Interpretation of the results is straightforward. For the purpose of the log-rank test Χ2 is 
assumed to have an approximate Χ2 (chi2) distribution (Staub and Gekenidis, 2011). Table 29 
provides the statistical results of the log-rank tests, with the p-values reported. 
Three log-rank tests were undertaken. The first one tests for the equality of the survivor 
function across the entire 2004-2011 period. The p-values suggest anything but a significant 
difference between IAs’ and NAs’ survival chances seven years post intervention. A Kaplan-
Meier graph would have suggested a superior survival of IAs over NAs in the early years post 
intervention. To test for the statistical significance of that observation, two further time periods 
were considered in separate tests, 2004-6 and 2004-7. Compared to the 2004-11 results the 
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p-values reduce considerably, serving as an indicator of a stronger impact of assistance soon 
after the assessed intervention.   
Nonetheless, the group differences remain statistically insignificant, and the null hypothesis is 
accepted for all tests run. As no statistically significant differences were found between the IAs 
and NAs in the log-rank test, the OA versus NA test results are omitted here, given the visually 
even less distinct nature of OA performance compared to IA effects on survival in the hazard 
graphs.   
Kaplan-Meier graphs showed non-proportionality of the three assistance groups across the 
years (graphs not reproduced here). In such circumstances it is not always advisable to rely 
on the log-rank test as applied above (Ziegler et al., 2007). The Wilcoxon test is regarded as 
an appropriate alternative for situations of non-proportionality (Ziegler et al, 2007) and was 
applied here to ensure the robustness of the log-rank test results.  The generalised Wilcoxon 
test attaches more weight to the earlier stages of survival, and potentially a higher statistical 
power for non-proportionality situations.  
Table 31 summarises the p-values for the Wilcoxon test for the same scenarios as tested in 
Table 30 by log-rank test (the results are shown again for easy comparison). The results differ 
only slightly between the two tests, confirming insignificance of assistance on survival 
suggested by the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates.  
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Table 29 – Log-rank test [“Event” = Death of firm] 
    
2004-2011       
 Events Events  
 observed expected  
    
Intensively assisted firms   97 95.94  
Other assisted firms 71 71.52  
Non-assisted firms  67 67.54  
    
    
Total 235 235  
    
 chi2(2) = 0.02  
 Pr>chi2 = 0.9897  
    
Check for 2004-7 ONLY    
 Events Events  
 observed expected   
    
Intensively assisted firms 31 37.02  
Other assisted firms 32 27.35  
Non-assisted firms 27 25.63  
    
Total 90 90  
    
 chi2(2) = 1.91  
 Pr>chi2 = 0.3855  
    
Check for 2004-6 ONLY    
 Events Events  
 observed expected   
    
Intensively assisted firms 18 25.04  
Other assisted firms 24 18.6  
Non-assisted firms 19 17.36  
    
Total 61 61  
    
 chi2(2) = 3.83  
 Pr>chi2 = 0.1472  
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Table 30 – Log-rank test results compared to Wilcoxon test results (full results below)  
  LD 04-11 LD 04-07 LD 04-06 
Log-rank test Chi2(2) 0.02 1.91 3.83 
 Pr>chi2 0.9897 0.3855 0.1472 
Wilcoxon Chi2(2) 0.01 2.03 3.89 
 Pr>chi2 0.9953 0.3622 0.143 
 
As some of the graphs and the statistical tests suggest, the assisted groups appear to fare 
better in the immediate period after the intervention. However, no statistical significance is 
attached to those observations.  In conclusion, there does not appear to be any evidence that 
would point towards any impact of assistance on firm survival. That result remains unchanged 
regardless of the evaluation timing chosen.  
 
Table 31 – Log-rank test results compared to Wilcoxon test results (full results)  
Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions   Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions  
       
Events Events Sum of  Events Events Sum of 
type                             observed expected ranks  type                             observed expected ranks 
       
Intensively assisted firms (X1         97 95.94 507  Intensively assisted firms (X1         92 92.37 -634 
Non-assisted firms (Y)                    67 67.54 -598  Non-assisted firms (Y)                    67 62.69 3860 
Other assisted firms (X2)               71 71.52 91  Other assisted firms (X2)                66 69.95 -3226 
       
Total                                               235 235 0  Total                                               225 225 0 
       
chi2(2) = 0.01   chi2(2) = 0.56  
Pr>chi2 = 0.9953   Pr>chi2 = 0.7577  
       
              
Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions   Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions  
       
Events Events Sum of  Events Events Sum of 
type                             observed expected ranks  type                             observed expected ranks 
       
Intensively assisted firms (X1         31 37.02 -6340  Intensively assisted firms (X1         36 35.86 -140 
Non-assisted firms (Y)                    27 25.63 1470  Non-assisted firms (Y)                    27 24.17 2791 
Other assisted firms (X2)                32 27.35 4870  Other assisted firms (X2)                24 26.97 -2651 
       
Total                                                90 90 0  Total                                                87 87 0 
       
chi2(2) = 2.03   chi2(2) = 0.71  
Pr>chi2 = 0.3622   Pr>chi2 = 0.7011  
       
              
Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions   Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions  
       
Events Events Sum of  Events Events Sum of 
type                             observed expected ranks  type                             observed expected ranks 
       
Intensively assisted firms (X1         18 25.04 -7342  Intensively assisted firms (X1         22 25.94 -3760 
Non-assisted firms (Y)                    19 17.36 1739  Non-assisted firms (Y)                    22 17.54 4241 
Other assisted firms (X2)                24 18.6 5603  Other assisted firms (X2)                19 19.52 -481 
       
Total                                                61 61 0  Total                                                63 63 0 
       
chi2(2) = 3.89   chi2(2) = 1.88  
Pr>chi2 = 0.143   Pr>chi2 = 0.3911  
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Appendix E – Chapter Five 
Appendix E1 – Linear regression models, full outputs 
1.1 – Impact of IA 2004-05 on employment (two part model, longitudinal dataset, only 2004-
11 survivors) 
  M S5.1 M S5.2 M S5.3 M S5.4 
VARIABLES empl0405 empl0405 empl0405 empl0405 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00272* -0.000977   
 (0.00151) (0.00133)   
Employment 2004 squared 1.09e-05 4.66e-06   
 (7.61e-06) (7.12e-06)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.00676 -0.0664   
 (0.105) (0.0905)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0486 -0.0650   
 (0.100) (0.0875)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0750 -0.136   
 (0.102) (0.0887)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.0895 -0.198**  -0.100*** 
 (0.101) (0.0884)  (0.0349) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0137 -0.0257   
 (0.0720) (0.0637)   
Multi-site firm 0.159*** 0.120** 0.0580 0.0690 
 (0.0593) (0.0522) (0.0392) (0.0422) 
Exporting firm -0.00554 0.00842   
 (0.0507) (0.0439)   
Firm in competitive environ.  0.00442 -0.0152   
 (0.0482) (0.0429)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0205 -0.0400   
 (0.0535) (0.0469)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0488 -0.00741   
 (0.109) (0.0885)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0365 -0.0206   
 (0.103) (0.0844)   
Strategy: New markets -0.0325 -0.0507   
 (0.121) (0.103)   
Strategy: New products -0.0224 -0.0355   
 (0.168) (0.134)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.0497 0.00353   
 (0.0480) (0.0422)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.0481 -0.00162   
 (0.0559) (0.0507)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm 0.0117 -0.0247   
 (0.0583) (0.0531)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old -0.164    
 (0.395)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old -0.116 0.0266   
 (0.391) (0.0780)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old -0.142 -0.0330   
 (0.390) (0.0775)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.217 -0.0438   
 (0.391) (0.0809)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm -0.0138 0.0386   
 (0.0463) (0.0393)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.0562 0.0636   
 (0.0674) (0.0620)   
SIC: Construction 0.170** 0.0895 0.130**  
 (0.0803) (0.0694) (0.0508)  
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0427 0.0260   
 (0.0681) (0.0617)   
SIC: Education 0.0500 0.00601   
 (0.0672) (0.0584)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.00462 0.0262 0.0451 0.0503 
 (0.0468) (0.0533) (0.0314) (0.0457) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0349  0.0347 
  (0.0503)  (0.0388) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 342 272 559 406 
R-squared 0.082 0.096 0.018 0.027 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
- 215 - 
 
1.2 – Impact of IA 2004-6 on employment (two part model, L.D., survivors 2004-11 only) 
  M S5.5 M S5.6 M S5.7 M S5.8 
VARIABLES empl0406 empl0406 empl0406 empl0406 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00770*** -0.00578** -0.00399** -0.00212*** 
 (0.00257) (0.00273) (0.00171) (0.000778) 
Employment 2004 squared 3.13e-05** 2.54e-05* 1.14e-05  
 (1.30e-05) (1.47e-05) (9.20e-06)  
Firm age: 3<5 years -0.0739 -0.145   
 (0.179) (0.186)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.258 -0.266   
 (0.171) (0.180)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.263 -0.327*   
 (0.173) (0.183)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.339** -0.431** -0.0882 -0.100 
 (0.171) (0.182) (0.0560) (0.0664) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0445 -0.00110   
 (0.122) (0.131)   
Multi-site firm 0.272*** 0.263** 0.169** 0.185** 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.0676) (0.0795) 
Exporting firm -0.00980 0.00451   
 (0.0862) (0.0905)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0492 -0.0529   
 (0.0821) (0.0884)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0172 -0.0580   
 (0.0911) (0.0967)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.105 0.0930   
 (0.185) (0.182)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0194 0.00132   
 (0.176) (0.174)   
Strategy: New markets 0.0382 0.0841   
 (0.205) (0.213)   
Strategy: New products -0.0449 0.0204   
 (0.286) (0.275)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.0452 -0.0431   
 (0.0816) (0.0869)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.125 0.106   
 (0.0951) (0.104)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0730 -0.116   
 (0.0992) (0.109)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old -0.251    
 (0.672)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old -0.154 0.196   
 (0.666) (0.161)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old -0.291 0.00304   
 (0.664) (0.160)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.198 0.178   
 (0.665) (0.167)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0558 0.121   
 (0.0789) (0.0810)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.158 0.104   
 (0.115) (0.128)   
SIC: Construction 0.198 0.155   
 (0.137) (0.143)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0190 -0.0425   
 (0.116) (0.127)   
SIC: Education -0.0344 -0.125   
 (0.114) (0.120)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.117 0.146 0.103* 0.130 
 (0.0797) (0.110) (0.0530) (0.0853) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.00179  0.0251 
  (0.104)  (0.0726) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 342 272 556 556 
R-squared 0.121 0.155 0.047 0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.3 – Impact of IA 2004-7 on employment (two part model, L.D., survivors 2004-11 only) 
  M S5.9 M S5.10 M S5.11 M S5.12 
VARIABLES empl0407 empl0407 empl0407 empl0407 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00888*** -0.00826*** -0.00574*** -0.00385* 
 (0.00275) (0.00291) (0.00181) (0.00220) 
Employment 2004 squared 4.07e-05*** 4.19e-05*** 2.25e-05** 1.29e-05 
 (1.39e-05) (1.56e-05) (9.92e-06) (1.24e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.00889 -0.0834   
 (0.192) (0.198)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.196 -0.205   
 (0.183) (0.192)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.244 -0.342*   
 (0.185) (0.194)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.309* -0.407**  -0.0922 
 (0.184) (0.194)  (0.0743) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0815 -0.00491   
 (0.131) (0.140)   
Multi-site firm 0.276** 0.316*** 0.201*** 0.261*** 
 (0.108) (0.114) (0.0733) (0.0885) 
Exporting firm 0.0256 0.0260   
 (0.0925) (0.0963)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0269 -0.0333   
 (0.0880) (0.0941)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0729 -0.115   
 (0.0977) (0.103)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.116 0.105   
 (0.198) (0.194)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0877 0.0951   
 (0.188) (0.185)   
Strategy: New markets 0.0510 0.0585   
 (0.220) (0.226)   
Strategy: New products -0.103 -0.0250   
 (0.307) (0.293)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.104 0.0199   
 (0.0876) (0.0925)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.170* 0.158   
 (0.102) (0.111)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0521 -0.0966   
 (0.106) (0.116)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old -0.152    
 (0.720)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old -0.160 -0.0293   
 (0.714) (0.171)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old -0.296 -0.190   
 (0.712) (0.170)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.137 0.0468   
 (0.713) (0.178)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0880 0.147*   
 (0.0846) (0.0862)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.146 0.151   
 (0.123) (0.136)   
SIC: Construction 0.188 0.184   
 (0.146) (0.152)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.00855 -0.0314   
 (0.124) (0.135)   
SIC: Education -0.0630 -0.120   
 (0.123) (0.128)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.142* 0.202* 0.147** 0.141 
 (0.0855) (0.117) (0.0570) (0.0940) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0800  0.0447 
  (0.110)  (0.0800) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 342 272 559 406 
R-squared 0.133 0.170 0.043 0.042 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.4 – Impact of IA 2004-8 on employment (two part model, L.D., survivors 2004-11 only) 
  M S5.13 M S5.14 M S5.15 M S5.16 
VARIABLES empl0408 empl0408 empl0408 empl0408 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00918*** -0.00828** -0.00763*** -0.00604** 
 (0.00296) (0.00325) (0.00197) (0.00234) 
Employment 2004 squared 4.23e-05*** 4.22e-05** 3.01e-05*** 2.24e-05* 
 (1.49e-05) (1.74e-05) (1.08e-05) (1.33e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.129 0.0939   
 (0.206) (0.222)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.193 -0.145   
 (0.197) (0.214)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.221 -0.238   
 (0.199) (0.217)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.355* -0.406*   
 (0.197) (0.216)   
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0856 -0.0194   
 (0.141) (0.156)   
Multi-site firm 0.261** 0.308** 0.232*** 0.303*** 
 (0.116) (0.128) (0.0800) (0.0962) 
Exporting firm 0.0251 0.0170   
 (0.0993) (0.108)   
Firm in competitive environ.  0.00665 0.0178   
 (0.0945) (0.105)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0568 -0.121   
 (0.105) (0.115)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0854 0.0730   
 (0.213) (0.217)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0950 0.0855   
 (0.202) (0.207)   
Strategy: New markets 0.0758 0.0713   
 (0.237) (0.253)   
Strategy: New products -0.112 -0.0201   
 (0.329) (0.327)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.0885 -0.0258   
 (0.0940) (0.103)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.222** 0.233* 0.195**  
 (0.109) (0.124) (0.0814)  
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0773 -0.157   
 (0.114) (0.130)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old -0.101    
 (0.773)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old -0.216 -0.177   
 (0.766) (0.191)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old -0.334 -0.308   
 (0.764) (0.190)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.136 -0.0323   
 (0.766) (0.198)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0746 0.145   
 (0.0908) (0.0962)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.138 0.163   
 (0.132) (0.152)   
SIC: Construction 0.184 0.213   
 (0.157) (0.170)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0402 0.0560   
 (0.133) (0.151)   
SIC: Education -0.0285 -0.0503   
 (0.132) (0.143)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.104 0.156 0.119* 0.0568 
 (0.0918) (0.131) (0.0616) (0.103) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0547  -0.0239 
  (0.123)  (0.0862) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 342 272 550 406 
R-squared 0.138 0.158 0.056 0.043 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.5 – Impact of IA 2004-9 on employment (two part model, L.D., survivors 2004-11 only) 
  M S5.17 M S5.18 M S5.19 M S5.20 
VARIABLES empl0409 empl0409 empl0409 empl0409 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.0121*** -0.0116*** -0.00822*** -0.00624** 
 (0.00310) (0.00351) (0.00206) (0.00269) 
Employment 2004 squared 5.42e-05*** 5.56e-05*** 3.21e-05*** 1.96e-05 
 (1.56e-05) (1.89e-05) (1.14e-05) (1.56e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.310 0.372   
 (0.215) (0.240)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.129 -0.0205   
 (0.205) (0.232)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.135 -0.0616   
 (0.208) (0.235)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.263 -0.227   
 (0.206) (0.234)   
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0228 0.101   
 (0.147) (0.169)   
Multi-site firm 0.215* 0.270*   
 (0.121) (0.138)   
Exporting firm -0.0226 -0.0749   
 (0.104) (0.116)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0188 -0.000422   
 (0.0989) (0.114)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.00465 -0.0829   
 (0.110) (0.124)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0854 -0.141   
 (0.222) (0.235)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0149 -0.0633   
 (0.211) (0.224)   
Strategy: New markets -0.0319 -0.0379   
 (0.247) (0.273)   
Strategy: New products -0.213 -0.161   
 (0.344) (0.354)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.126 0.0113   
 (0.0987) (0.112)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.265** 0.288** 0.228*** 0.261** 
 (0.115) (0.134) (0.0873) (0.117) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0559 -0.138   
 (0.119) (0.141)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old -0.0993    
 (0.807)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old -0.385 -0.293   
 (0.800) (0.207)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old -0.545 -0.495**  -0.0758 
 (0.798) (0.206)  (0.0880) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.323 -0.198   
 (0.800) (0.214)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.129 0.165   
 (0.0949) (0.104)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.107 0.119   
 (0.138) (0.164)   
SIC: Construction 0.124 0.134   
 (0.164) (0.184)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0137 0.0414   
 (0.139) (0.164)   
SIC: Education -0.146 -0.147   
 (0.137) (0.155)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.136 0.113 0.168** 0.000405 
 (0.0962) (0.141) (0.0662) (0.120) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0497  -0.160 
  (0.133)  (0.103) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 341 272 550 374 
R-squared 0.185 0.196 0.057 0.048 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.6 – Impact of IA 2004-10 on employment (two part model, L.D., survivors 2004-11 only) 
  M S5.21 M S5.22 M S5.23 M S5.24 
VARIABLES empl0410 empl0410 empl0410 empl0410 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.0110*** -0.0105*** -0.00900*** -0.00785*** 
 (0.00321) (0.00365) (0.00216) (0.00287) 
Employment 2004 squared 4.90e-05*** 4.93e-05** 3.50e-05*** 2.52e-05 
 (1.61e-05) (1.96e-05) (1.18e-05) (1.65e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.417* 0.461*   
 (0.223) (0.249)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0262 0.117   
 (0.213) (0.241)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0733 0.0101   
 (0.215) (0.244)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.165 -0.137   
 (0.213) (0.244)   
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0546 0.0293   
 (0.152) (0.176)   
Multi-site firm 0.288** 0.331** 0.286*** 0.278** 
 (0.126) (0.144) (0.0873) (0.121) 
Exporting firm -0.0130 -0.0783   
 (0.108) (0.121)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0202 -0.0237   
 (0.102) (0.118)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0808 -0.173   
 (0.114) (0.129)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0717 -0.136   
 (0.230) (0.244)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0499 -0.111   
 (0.219) (0.233)   
Strategy: New markets -0.0492 -0.0279   
 (0.256) (0.284)   
Strategy: New products -0.216 -0.151   
 (0.356) (0.368)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.157 0.0384   
 (0.102) (0.116)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.232* 0.284**  0.216* 
 (0.119) (0.140)  (0.124) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm 0.112 0.0511   
 (0.123) (0.146)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.149    
 (0.836)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old -0.156 -0.462**  -0.0362 
 (0.829) (0.215)  (0.112) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old -0.312 -0.674***  -0.0647 
 (0.826) (0.214)  (0.108) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.135 -0.401*   
 (0.828) (0.223)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.127 0.169   
 (0.0982) (0.108)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.0793 0.106   
 (0.143) (0.171)   
SIC: Construction 0.133 0.182   
 (0.170) (0.191)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0191 0.0325   
 (0.144) (0.170)   
SIC: Education -0.167 -0.127   
 (0.142) (0.161)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0947 0.0746 0.167** 0.0126 
 (0.0996) (0.147) (0.0679) (0.126) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0432  -0.127 
  (0.139)  (0.108) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 341 272 558 374 
R-squared 0.174 0.200 0.061 0.059 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.7 – Impact of IA 2004-11 on employment (two part model, L.D., survivors 2004-11 only) 
  M S5.25 M S5.26 M S5.27 M S5.28 
VARIABLES empl0411 empl0411 empl0411 empl0411 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.0123*** -0.0126*** -0.00989*** -0.00821*** 
 (0.00327) (0.00370) (0.00236) (0.00299) 
Employment 2004 squared 5.46e-05*** 5.78e-05*** 3.49e-05*** 2.67e-05 
 (1.65e-05) (1.99e-05) (1.28e-05) (1.71e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.492** 0.555** 0.394*** 0.347*** 
 (0.227) (0.253) (0.111) (0.130) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.0802 0.223   
 (0.217) (0.244)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0474 0.0637   
 (0.220) (0.248)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.128 -0.0652   
 (0.218) (0.247)   
Legal form: Limited liability -0.113 0.0364   
 (0.156) (0.178)   
Multi-site firm 0.308** 0.372** 0.296*** 0.300** 
 (0.128) (0.146) (0.0956) (0.125) 
Exporting firm -0.0580 -0.136   
 (0.110) (0.123)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0297 -0.000572   
 (0.104) (0.120)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0967 -0.201   
 (0.116) (0.131)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0989 -0.147   
 (0.235) (0.247)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0567 -0.135   
 (0.223) (0.236)   
Strategy: New markets -0.0691 -0.0482   
 (0.261) (0.288)   
Strategy: New products -0.222 -0.148   
 (0.363) (0.373)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.158 0.0566   
 (0.104) (0.118)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.246** 0.294** 0.245** 0.241* 
 (0.121) (0.142) (0.0960) (0.128) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm 0.0353 -0.0664   
 (0.126) (0.148)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old -0.661    
 (0.853)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old -0.945 -0.461**  -0.116 
 (0.845) (0.218)  (0.116) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old -1.096 -0.646***  -0.112 
 (0.843) (0.217)  (0.112) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.921 -0.364   
 (0.845) (0.226)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.132 0.183*   
 (0.100) (0.110)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.144 0.145   
 (0.146) (0.173)   
SIC: Construction 0.0733 0.113   
 (0.173) (0.194)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0349 0.00712   
 (0.147) (0.172)   
SIC: Education -0.156 -0.120   
 (0.145) (0.163)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.118 0.112 0.133* 0.0189 
 (0.102) (0.149) (0.0735) (0.130) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0173  -0.0733 
  (0.141)  (0.112) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 341 272 546 374 
R-squared 0.181 0.211 0.103 0.084 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.8 – Impact of IA 2004-5 on turnover (two-stage model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.29 M S5.30 M S5.31 M S5.32 
VARIABLES turn0405 turn0405 turn0405 turn0405 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00224 -0.00247   
 (0.00199) (0.00231)   
Employment 2004 squared 1.19e-05 1.35e-05   
 (1.01e-05) (1.24e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.338** 0.0154 0.176**  
 (0.139) (0.158) (0.0755)  
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.219* -0.102   
 (0.133) (0.152)   
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.0917 -0.210   
 (0.134) (0.155)   
Firm age: >20 years 0.0858 -0.215   
 (0.133) (0.154)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0910 0.0864   
 (0.0951) (0.111)   
Multi-site firm 0.0736 0.0471   
 (0.0784) (0.0909)   
Exporting firm 0.133** 0.132* 0.0175  
 (0.0670) (0.0765) (0.0547)  
Firm in competitive environ.  0.00807 0.0151   
 (0.0638) (0.0748)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0445 -0.0664   
 (0.0707) (0.0818)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.289** 0.282* 0.0902  
 (0.144) (0.154) (0.0583)  
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.202 0.198   
 (0.136) (0.147)   
Strategy: New markets 0.445*** 0.462** 0.280*** 0.345*** 
 (0.160) (0.180) (0.0958) (0.105) 
Strategy: New products 0.168 0.127   
 (0.222) (0.233)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.00298 0.0164   
 (0.0634) (0.0735)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0950 -0.0314   
 (0.0739) (0.0883)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.165** -0.163* -0.0514  
 (0.0770) (0.0925) (0.0667)  
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old -0.0524    
 (0.522)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.141 0.0424   
 (0.517) (0.136)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.0862 -0.0193   
 (0.515) (0.135)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.158 0.0703   
 (0.517) (0.141)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0732 0.0412   
 (0.0612) (0.0685)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.0937 -0.130   
 (0.0891) (0.108)   
SIC: Construction -0.0743 -0.107   
 (0.106) (0.121)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.00196 -0.111   
 (0.0900) (0.108)   
SIC: Education -0.0412 -0.0571   
 (0.0888) (0.102)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0861 -0.0536 -0.0420 -0.0482 
 (0.0619) (0.0930) (0.0522) (0.0790) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0644  -0.0366 
  (0.0877)  (0.0656) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 342 272 500 394 
R-squared 0.116 0.110 0.031 0.028 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.9 – Impact of IA 2004-6 on turnover (two-stage model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.33 M S5.34 M S5.35 M S5.36 
VARIABLES turn0406 turn0406 turn0406 turn0406 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.000280 -0.000626   
 (0.00271) (0.00306)   
Employment 2004 squared 1.65e-06 7.81e-06   
 (1.36e-05) (1.64e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.177 -0.185   
 (0.187) (0.207)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.147 -0.501**   
 (0.178) (0.200)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.155 -0.495**   
 (0.181) (0.202)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.244 -0.561***  -0.107 
 (0.179) (0.202)  (0.0714) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0319 0.0524   
 (0.129) (0.148)   
Multi-site firm 0.195* 0.155   
 (0.106) (0.119)   
Exporting firm 0.0607 0.0208   
 (0.0903) (0.100)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0296 -0.0859   
 (0.0861) (0.0983)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.119 -0.132   
 (0.0953) (0.107)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0961 0.0489   
 (0.193) (0.202)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0637 0.0503   
 (0.184) (0.193)   
Strategy: New markets 0.104 0.0164   
 (0.215) (0.236)   
Strategy: New products -0.0256 -0.102   
 (0.299) (0.305)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.0656 0.0356   
 (0.0859) (0.0964)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0757 0.0461   
 (0.0995) (0.116)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0382 -0.0938   
 (0.104) (0.121)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.193    
 (0.701)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.317 -0.133   
 (0.695) (0.178)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.315 -0.151   
 (0.693) (0.177)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.323 -0.126   
 (0.695) (0.185)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.128 0.0791   
 (0.0824) (0.0896)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.0348 -0.0625   
 (0.120) (0.142)   
SIC: Construction -0.0431 -0.0387   
 (0.143) (0.158)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0437 -0.0284   
 (0.121) (0.142)   
SIC: Education -0.128 -0.130   
 (0.120) (0.133)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.170** -0.212* 0.0394 -0.106 
 (0.0837) (0.123) (0.0605) (0.0956) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0576  -0.108 
  (0.117)  (0.0810) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 558 405 
R-squared 0.079 0.108 0.001 0.012 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.10 – Impact of IA 2004-7 on turnover (two-stage model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.37 M S5.38 M S5.39 M S5.40 
VARIABLES turn0407 turn0407 turn0407 turn0407 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.000315 -0.00166   
 (0.00312) (0.00324)   
Employment 2004 squared 5.06e-07 1.16e-05   
 (1.57e-05) (1.74e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.413* 0.0282   
 (0.215) (0.219)   
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.0843 -0.328   
 (0.206) (0.212)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0210 -0.400*   
 (0.208) (0.214)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.0884 -0.473**  -0.137* 
 (0.206) (0.214)  (0.0804) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0916 0.106   
 (0.149) (0.157)   
Multi-site firm 0.215* 0.241*   
 (0.122) (0.126)   
Exporting firm 0.0417 -0.0396   
 (0.104) (0.106)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0335 -0.129   
 (0.0992) (0.104)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.135 -0.124   
 (0.110) (0.113)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0602 -0.0967   
 (0.223) (0.214)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0772 -0.108   
 (0.212) (0.204)   
Strategy: New markets -0.0864 -0.173   
 (0.247) (0.250)   
Strategy: New products -0.395 -0.531   
 (0.344) (0.323)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.104 0.0280   
 (0.0990) (0.102)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.00514 0.0725   
 (0.115) (0.123)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0440 -0.162   
 (0.120) (0.129)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.210    
 (0.808)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.245 -0.0682   
 (0.801) (0.189)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.255 -0.148   
 (0.799) (0.188)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.273 -0.0959   
 (0.800) (0.196)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.166* 0.156   
 (0.0949) (0.0950)   
SIC: Manufacturing 0.00578 0.0218   
 (0.139) (0.150)   
SIC: Construction -0.0344 -0.0400   
 (0.164) (0.168)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0855 -0.00601   
 (0.140) (0.150)   
SIC: Education -0.0870 -0.0806   
 (0.138) (0.141)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0256 -0.176 0.159** -0.0788 
 (0.0965) (0.131) (0.0698) (0.108) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0711  -0.121 
  (0.124)  (0.0912) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 558 405 
R-squared 0.081 0.134 0.009 0.014 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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1.11– Impact of IA 2004-8 on turnover (two-stage model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.41 M S5.42 M S5.43 M S5.44 
VARIABLES turn0408 turn0408 turn0408 turn0408 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00355 -0.00472   
 (0.00345) (0.00360)   
Employment 2004 squared 2.36e-05 3.47e-05*   
 (1.74e-05) (1.93e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.316 0.0886   
 (0.238) (0.244)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.215 -0.473**  -0.329** 
 (0.227) (0.236)  (0.144) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.321 -0.529**  -0.365** 
 (0.230) (0.238)  (0.143) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.321 -0.585**  -0.409*** 
 (0.228) (0.238)  (0.134) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0991 0.114   
 (0.165) (0.175)   
Multi-site firm 0.0739 0.149   
 (0.134) (0.140)   
Exporting firm 0.0516 -0.0719   
 (0.115) (0.118)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0450 -0.0873   
 (0.110) (0.116)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.100 -0.196   
 (0.121) (0.126)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.00830 -0.0117   
 (0.246) (0.238)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0158 0.0168   
 (0.234) (0.228)   
Strategy: New markets 0.101 0.0548   
 (0.273) (0.278)   
Strategy: New products -0.393 -0.410   
 (0.380) (0.360)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.102 -0.0260   
 (0.109) (0.114)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0340 0.0544   
 (0.127) (0.136)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.234* -0.316**  -0.152 
 (0.132) (0.143)  (0.130) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.424    
 (0.893)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.306 -0.262   
 (0.885) (0.210)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.243 -0.415**  0.00958 
 (0.882) (0.209)  (0.0983) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.258 -0.335   
 (0.884) (0.218)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.116 0.124   
 (0.105) (0.106)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.0547 0.0820   
 (0.153) (0.167)   
SIC: Construction -0.00586 0.147   
 (0.182) (0.187)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0135 -0.0343   
 (0.154) (0.167)   
SIC: Education -0.0859 0.0152   
 (0.152) (0.157)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0288 -0.0605 0.228*** -0.0365 
 (0.107) (0.146) (0.0783) (0.134) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0212  -0.147 
  (0.138)  (0.118) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 558 361 
R-squared 0.111 0.186 0.015 0.043 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.12 – Impact of IA 2004-9 on turnover (two-stage model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.45 M S5.46 M S5.47 M S5.48 
VARIABLES turn0409 turn0409 turn0409 turn0409 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00276 -0.00413   
 (0.00360) (0.00380)   
Employment 2004 squared 1.81e-05 3.27e-05   
 (1.81e-05) (2.04e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.445* 0.361   
 (0.252) (0.262)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0138 -0.165   
 (0.241) (0.254)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.160 -0.285   
 (0.244) (0.256)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.191 -0.431*   
 (0.242) (0.256)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0397 0.0343   
 (0.172) (0.184)   
Multi-site firm 0.0197 0.152   
 (0.140) (0.148)   
Exporting firm 0.0377 -0.0673   
 (0.120) (0.124)   
Firm in competitive environ.  0.00768 -0.0554   
 (0.115) (0.122)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0829 -0.163   
 (0.127) (0.133)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0189 -0.128   
 (0.257) (0.251)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0388 -0.0261   
 (0.244) (0.239)   
Strategy: New markets 0.238 0.111   
 (0.285) (0.292)   
Strategy: New products -0.292 -0.347   
 (0.397) (0.379)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.116 -0.0217   
 (0.114) (0.120)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0161 -0.00390   
 (0.132) (0.144)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.142 -0.284*   
 (0.139) (0.153)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.476    
 (0.932)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.202 -0.383*   
 (0.924) (0.221)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.0904 -0.571***  -0.0420 
 (0.921) (0.220)  (0.0999) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.223 -0.356   
 (0.923) (0.229)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.154 0.194*   
 (0.110) (0.112)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.0811 0.0879   
 (0.160) (0.176)   
SIC: Construction 0.0504 0.210   
 (0.190) (0.197)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0156 0.0177   
 (0.161) (0.176)   
SIC: Education -0.231 -0.115   
 (0.159) (0.166)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.129 0.0508 0.295*** -0.0145 
 (0.112) (0.154) (0.0840) (0.137) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0455  -0.191 
  (0.146)  (0.118) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 339 270 557 374 
R-squared 0.117 0.183 0.022 0.012 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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1.13 – Impact of IA 2004-10 on turnover (two-stage model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.49 M S5.50 M S5.51 M S5.52 
VARIABLES turn0410 turn0410 turn0410 turn0410 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00197 -0.00447   
 (0.00375) (0.00391)   
Employment 2004 squared 1.27e-05 3.27e-05   
 (1.89e-05) (2.09e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.199 0.117   
 (0.259) (0.264)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.320 -0.473*   
 (0.247) (0.255)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.435* -0.548**  -0.223 
 (0.250) (0.259)  (0.136) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.437* -0.611**  -0.260** 
 (0.248) (0.258)  (0.122) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0627 -0.00305   
 (0.179) (0.190)   
Multi-site firm -0.0150 0.0887   
 (0.146) (0.152)   
Exporting firm 0.0989 0.0194   
 (0.125) (0.128)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0675 -0.158   
 (0.119) (0.126)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.164 -0.248*   
 (0.132) (0.137)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.132 -0.130   
 (0.267) (0.258)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0490 -0.119   
 (0.254) (0.247)   
Strategy: New markets 0.0766 -0.00757   
 (0.297) (0.301)   
Strategy: New products -0.690* -0.689*   
 (0.413) (0.390)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.210* 0.0830   
 (0.119) (0.123)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0331 0.00687   
 (0.138) (0.148)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.150 -0.301*   
 (0.144) (0.155)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.734    
 (0.971)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.595 -0.293   
 (0.962) (0.228)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.463 -0.496**  0.0207 
 (0.959) (0.226)  (0.109) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.463 -0.388   
 (0.961) (0.236)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.226** 0.245** 0.111 0.0127 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.0973) (0.109) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.189 -0.124   
 (0.167) (0.181)   
SIC: Construction -0.146 0.0413   
 (0.198) (0.203)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.283* -0.265   
 (0.168) (0.181)   
SIC: Education -0.271 -0.142   
 (0.166) (0.171)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0449 -0.174 0.188** -0.122 
 (0.116) (0.158) (0.0932) (0.148) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0676  -0.0957 
  (0.150)  (0.130) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 508 362 
R-squared 0.135 0.209 0.012 0.019 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.14 – Impact of IA 2004-11 on turnover (two-stage model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.53 M S5.54 M S5.55 M S5.56 
VARIABLES turn0411 turn0411 turn0411 turn0411 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) -0.00233 -0.00507   
 (0.00429) (0.00475)   
Employment 2004 squared 1.71e-05 3.75e-05   
 (2.16e-05) (2.55e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.128 0.152   
 (0.296) (0.321)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.423 -0.521*   
 (0.283) (0.311)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.508* -0.553*   
 (0.287) (0.315)   
Firm age: >20 years -0.519* -0.654**  -0.202* 
 (0.284) (0.314)  (0.123) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0311 -0.0757   
 (0.205) (0.231)   
Multi-site firm 0.0183 0.159   
 (0.167) (0.185)   
Exporting firm 0.0131 -0.111   
 (0.143) (0.156)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0199 -0.148   
 (0.137) (0.154)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.154 -0.197   
 (0.152) (0.168)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0737 -0.0868   
 (0.306) (0.314)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.121 -0.167   
 (0.291) (0.300)   
Strategy: New markets 0.132 0.0142   
 (0.342) (0.369)   
Strategy: New products -0.656 -0.655   
 (0.473) (0.474)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.185 0.0654   
 (0.137) (0.151)   
Firm has non-executive directors 0.103 0.170   
 (0.158) (0.180)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.177 -0.357*   
 (0.164) (0.189)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.888    
 (1.111)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.619 -0.440   
 (1.101) (0.277)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.436 -0.687**  -0.0385 
 (1.098) (0.275)  (0.120) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.424 -0.544*   
 (1.100) (0.287)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.175 0.196   
 (0.131) (0.140)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.120 0.0168   
 (0.191) (0.221)   
SIC: Construction -0.221 0.0306   
 (0.226) (0.246)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.121 -0.0763   
 (0.193) (0.221)   
SIC: Education -0.154 0.00488   
 (0.189) (0.207)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0334 -0.194 0.276*** -0.145 
 (0.133) (0.192) (0.0984) (0.164) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0777  -0.126 
  (0.183)  (0.142) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 339 270 557 374 
R-squared 0.105 0.164 0.014 0.011 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.15 – Impact of IA 2004-5 on productivity (two part model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.57 M S5.58 M S5.59 M S5.60 
VARIABLES prod0405 prod0405 prod0405 prod0405 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.000473 -0.00150   
 (0.00237) (0.00252)   
Employment 2004 squared 1.05e-06 8.88e-06   
 (1.19e-05) (1.36e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.331** 0.0818 0.0441  
 (0.165) (0.172) (0.0810)  
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.268* -0.0372   
 (0.157) (0.166)   
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.167 -0.0738   
 (0.159) (0.169)   
Firm age: >20 years 0.175 -0.0165   
 (0.158) (0.168)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0773 0.112   
 (0.113) (0.121)   
Multi-site firm -0.0853 -0.0728   
 (0.0930) (0.0993)   
Exporting firm 0.138* 0.124   
 (0.0795) (0.0836)   
Firm in competitive environ.  0.00365 0.0303   
 (0.0757) (0.0817)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0241 -0.0264   
 (0.0839) (0.0893)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.240 0.290*   
 (0.170) (0.169)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.165 0.218   
 (0.162) (0.161)   
Strategy: New markets 0.477** 0.513*** 0.388*** 0.384*** 
 (0.189) (0.196) (0.102) (0.108) 
Strategy: New products 0.191 0.163   
 (0.263) (0.254)   
Firm has formal business plan -0.0468 0.0129   
 (0.0752) (0.0802)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.143 -0.0297   
 (0.0877) (0.0965)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.177* -0.138   
 (0.0914) (0.101)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.112    
 (0.619)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.257 0.0157   
 (0.613) (0.148)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.228 0.0137   
 (0.612) (0.148)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.375 0.114   
 (0.613) (0.154)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0870 0.00252   
 (0.0727) (0.0748)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.150 -0.194   
 (0.106) (0.118)   
SIC: Construction -0.244* -0.197   
 (0.126) (0.132)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0447 -0.137   
 (0.107) (0.117)   
SIC: Education -0.0911 -0.0631   
 (0.105) (0.111)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0907 -0.0799 -0.0733 -0.0950 
 (0.0735) (0.102) (0.0545) (0.0815) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0294  -0.0468 
  (0.0958)  (0.0676) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 342 272 536 394 
R-squared 0.105 0.083 0.029 0.034 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.16 – Impact of IA 2004-6 on productivity (two part model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.61 M S5.62 M S5.63 M S5.64 
VARIABLES prod0406 prod0406 prod0406 prod0406 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.00800** 0.00516 0.000795  
 (0.00333) (0.00348) (0.000824)  
Employment 2004 squared -2.97e-05* -1.76e-05   
 (1.67e-05) (1.87e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.251 -0.0401   
 (0.229) (0.236)   
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.111 -0.235   
 (0.219) (0.228)   
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.108 -0.168   
 (0.222) (0.231)   
Firm age: >20 years 0.0954 -0.130   
 (0.220) (0.230)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0748 0.0530   
 (0.159) (0.169)   
Multi-site firm -0.0773 -0.108   
 (0.130) (0.136)   
Exporting firm 0.0707 0.0164   
 (0.111) (0.114)   
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0192 -0.0332   
 (0.106) (0.112)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.102 -0.0743   
 (0.117) (0.122)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.00931 -0.0440   
 (0.237) (0.230)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0450 0.0492   
 (0.225) (0.220)   
Strategy: New markets 0.0661 -0.0676   
 (0.263) (0.269)   
Strategy: New products 0.0197 -0.122   
 (0.366) (0.348)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.0203 0.0786   
 (0.105) (0.110)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.201 -0.0601   
 (0.122) (0.132)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm 0.0354 0.0218   
 (0.127) (0.138)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.445    
 (0.861)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.472 -0.329   
 (0.853) (0.203)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.607 -0.154   
 (0.851) (0.202)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.521 -0.305   
 (0.853) (0.211)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0715 -0.0422   
 (0.101) (0.102)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.193 -0.167   
 (0.148) (0.162)   
SIC: Construction -0.242 -0.194   
 (0.175) (0.181)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0620 0.0139   
 (0.149) (0.161)   
SIC: Education -0.0948 -0.00591   
 (0.147) (0.152)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.287*** -0.358** -0.0926 -0.226** 
 (0.103) (0.141) (0.0702) (0.107) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0590  -0.107 
  (0.134)  (0.0896) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 558 405 
R-squared 0.087 0.098 0.005 0.011 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.17 – Impact of IA 2004-7 on productivity (two part model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.65 M S5.66 M S5.67 M S5.68 
VARIABLES prod0407 prod0407 prod0407 prod0407 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.00867** 0.00643* 0.00257  
 (0.00364) (0.00366) (0.00232)  
Employment 2004 squared -4.04e-05** -2.95e-05 -1.31e-05  
 (1.83e-05) (1.96e-05) (1.29e-05)  
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.407 0.115   
 (0.251) (0.247)   
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.285 -0.118   
 (0.239) (0.239)   
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.223 -0.0587   
 (0.242) (0.242)   
Firm age: >20 years 0.214 -0.0598   
 (0.240) (0.242)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.180 0.123   
 (0.173) (0.178)   
Multi-site firm -0.0578 -0.0732   
 (0.142) (0.143)   
Exporting firm 0.00845 -0.0671   
 (0.121) (0.120)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0104 -0.0916   
 (0.115) (0.118)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0562 -0.0109   
 (0.128) (0.128)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.181 -0.203   
 (0.259) (0.242)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.175 -0.208   
 (0.246) (0.231)   
Strategy: New markets -0.141 -0.236   
 (0.288) (0.282)   
Strategy: New products -0.292 -0.513   
 (0.400) (0.365)   
Firm has formal business plan -0.00823 0.0111   
 (0.115) (0.115)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.158 -0.0836   
 (0.133) (0.138)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm 0.00354 -0.0694   
 (0.139) (0.145)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.353    
 (0.941)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.393 -0.0404   
 (0.932) (0.213)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.536 0.0456   
 (0.929) (0.212)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.404 -0.138   
 (0.931) (0.221)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0819 0.00945   
 (0.110) (0.107)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.145 -0.125   
 (0.161) (0.170)   
SIC: Construction -0.222 -0.221   
 (0.191) (0.190)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.100 0.0317   
 (0.163) (0.170)   
SIC: Education -0.0209 0.0430   
 (0.160) (0.160)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.161 -0.386*** 0.00212 -0.217** 
 (0.112) (0.148) (0.0749) (0.110) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.161  -0.151 
  (0.140)  (0.0916) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 558 405 
R-squared 0.064 0.084 0.002 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
  
- 231 - 
 
1.18 – Impact of IA 2004-8 on productivity (two part model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.69 M S5.70 M S5.71 M S5.72 
VARIABLES prod0408 prod0408 prod0408 prod0408 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.00573 0.00342   
 (0.00362) (0.00377)   
Employment 2004 squared -1.89e-05 -6.80e-06   
 (1.82e-05) (2.02e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.190 -0.00237   
 (0.249) (0.255)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0173 -0.324   
 (0.238) (0.247)   
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0998 -0.291   
 (0.241) (0.250)   
Firm age: >20 years 0.0272 -0.174   
 (0.239) (0.249)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.191 0.143   
 (0.172) (0.183)   
Multi-site firm -0.184 -0.158   
 (0.141) (0.147)   
Exporting firm 0.0191 -0.0900   
 (0.121) (0.124)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0556 -0.102   
 (0.115) (0.121)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0374 -0.0760   
 (0.127) (0.132)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0823 -0.0852   
 (0.258) (0.249)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0894 -0.0726   
 (0.245) (0.238)   
Strategy: New markets 0.0214 -0.0201   
 (0.286) (0.291)   
Strategy: New products -0.280 -0.396   
 (0.398) (0.377)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.00514 0.00210   
 (0.115) (0.119)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.249* -0.177   
 (0.133) (0.143)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.161 -0.162   
 (0.138) (0.150)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.517    
 (0.936)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.510 -0.0866   
 (0.928) (0.220)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.562 -0.104   
 (0.925) (0.219)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.388 -0.299   
 (0.927) (0.228)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0454 -0.0201   
 (0.110) (0.111)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.198 -0.0775   
 (0.161) (0.175)   
SIC: Construction -0.188 -0.0638   
 (0.191) (0.196)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0479 -0.0853   
 (0.162) (0.175)   
SIC: Education -0.0545 0.0685   
 (0.160) (0.165)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0682 -0.223 0.0776 -0.0523 
 (0.112) (0.152) (0.0765) (0.118) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0837  -0.101 
  (0.145)  (0.0981) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 558 405 
R-squared 0.064 0.092 0.002 0.003 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.19 – Impact of IA 2004-9 on productivity (two part model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.73 M S5.74 M S5.75 M S5.76 
VARIABLES prod0409 prod0409 prod0409 prod0409 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.00929*** 0.00753** 0.00386* 0.00259*** 
 (0.00326) (0.00349) (0.00228) (0.000957) 
Employment 2004 squared -3.56e-05** -2.32e-05 -1.39e-05  
 (1.64e-05) (1.87e-05) (1.26e-05)  
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.199 0.0734   
 (0.228) (0.240)   
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.183 -0.0545   
 (0.218) (0.233)   
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.0350 -0.145   
 (0.221) (0.235)   
Firm age: >20 years 0.137 -0.117   
 (0.219) (0.235)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0755 -0.0529   
 (0.155) (0.169)   
Multi-site firm -0.192 -0.121   
 (0.127) (0.136)   
Exporting firm 0.0620 0.00911   
 (0.108) (0.114)   
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0400 -0.0350   
 (0.103) (0.112)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0807 -0.0809   
 (0.114) (0.122)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0531 -0.0112   
 (0.232) (0.231)   
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0502 0.0311   
 (0.220) (0.220)   
Strategy: New markets 0.264 0.135   
 (0.258) (0.269)   
Strategy: New products -0.0717 -0.185   
 (0.358) (0.348)   
Firm has formal business plan -0.00233 -0.0264   
 (0.103) (0.110)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.278** -0.286** -0.194** -0.290*** 
 (0.119) (0.132) (0.0961) (0.104) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0623 -0.108   
 (0.126) (0.141)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.571    
 (0.842)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.572 -0.0924   
 (0.834) (0.203)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.614 -0.0874   
 (0.832) (0.202)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.535 -0.155   
 (0.833) (0.211)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0134 0.0136   
 (0.0992) (0.103)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.182 -0.0227   
 (0.144) (0.162)   
SIC: Construction -0.0698 0.0830   
 (0.171) (0.181)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0331 -0.0123   
 (0.146) (0.162)   
SIC: Education -0.0980 0.0167   
 (0.144) (0.153)   
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.00497 -0.0549 0.0823 -0.0267 
 (0.101) (0.141) (0.0730) (0.109) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0756  -0.0584 
  (0.134)  (0.0909) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 339 270 548 402 
R-squared 0.082 0.083 0.015 0.034 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.20 – Impact of IA 2004-10 on productivity (two part model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.77 M S5.78 M S5.79 M S5.80 
VARIABLES prod0410 prod0410 prod0410 prod0410 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.00870** 0.00565 0.00141  
 (0.00371) (0.00386) (0.000956)  
Employment 2004 squared -3.49e-05* -1.48e-05   
 (1.87e-05) (2.07e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years -0.217 -0.336   
 (0.256) (0.261)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.291 -0.580**  -0.0488 
 (0.244) (0.252)  (0.113) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.367 -0.558**  -0.0354 
 (0.247) (0.256)  (0.102) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.269 -0.462*   
 (0.245) (0.255)   
Legal form: Limited liability 0.135 -0.00777   
 (0.177) (0.188)   
Multi-site firm -0.298** -0.239 -0.145  
 (0.144) (0.150) (0.101)  
Exporting firm 0.112 0.0948   
 (0.124) (0.127)   
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0414 -0.126   
 (0.118) (0.124)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0848 -0.0784   
 (0.130) (0.135)   
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0580 0.00532   
 (0.264) (0.255)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.00328 -0.0185   
 (0.251) (0.244)   
Strategy: New markets 0.124 0.0111   
 (0.294) (0.298)   
Strategy: New products -0.478 -0.553   
 (0.409) (0.385)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.0590 0.0506   
 (0.118) (0.122)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.264* -0.274*   
 (0.136) (0.146)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.267* -0.360**  -0.280** 
 (0.142) (0.153)  (0.120) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.573    
 (0.960)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.736 0.166   
 (0.951) (0.225)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.767 0.185   
 (0.948) (0.224)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.591 0.0231   
 (0.950) (0.234)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.101 0.0775   
 (0.113) (0.113)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.260 -0.221   
 (0.165) (0.179)   
SIC: Construction -0.273 -0.133   
 (0.195) (0.200)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.257 -0.284   
 (0.166) (0.179)   
SIC: Education -0.0960 -0.00719   
 (0.164) (0.169)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.145 -0.266* 0.0355 -0.131 
 (0.115) (0.156) (0.0797) (0.123) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0906  -0.0632 
  (0.148)  (0.105) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 340 271 557 385 
R-squared 0.100 0.147 0.007 0.018 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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1.21 – Impact of IA 2004-11 on productivity (two part model, L.D., 2004-11 survivors only) 
  M S5.81 M S5.82 M S5.83 M S5.84 
VARIABLES prod0411 prod0411 prod0411 prod0411 
          
Employment 2004 (LD) 0.00967** 0.00735* 0.000660  
 (0.00391) (0.00421) (0.00103)  
Employment 2004 squared -3.66e-05* -1.97e-05   
 (1.97e-05) (2.26e-05)   
Firm age: 3<5 years -0.367 -0.399   
 (0.269) (0.284)   
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.508** -0.743*** -0.0357 -0.154 
 (0.257) (0.275) (0.109) (0.147) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.493* -0.647**  -0.103 
 (0.261) (0.279)  (0.146) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.394 -0.584**  -0.0587 
 (0.258) (0.278)  (0.136) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0931 -0.0946   
 (0.186) (0.204)   
Multi-site firm -0.275* -0.196   
 (0.152) (0.164)   
Exporting firm 0.0594 0.00758   
 (0.131) (0.138)   
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0362 -0.113   
 (0.125) (0.137)   
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0847 -0.0271   
 (0.139) (0.149)   
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0209 0.0575   
 (0.279) (0.278)   
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0759 -0.0432   
 (0.265) (0.266)   
Strategy: New markets 0.149 -0.00285   
 (0.312) (0.327)   
Strategy: New products -0.461 -0.537   
 (0.431) (0.420)   
Firm has formal business plan 0.0487 0.0347   
 (0.124) (0.134)   
Firm has non-executive directors -0.140 -0.123   
 (0.143) (0.159)   
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.219 -0.301*   
 (0.150) (0.167)   
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 1.536    
 (1.011)    
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 1.547 0.0147   
 (1.002) (0.245)   
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 1.513 -0.0514   
 (0.999) (0.244)   
Owner-Manager >55 years old 1.339 -0.171   
 (1.001) (0.254)   
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0554 0.0290   
 (0.119) (0.124)   
SIC: Manufacturing -0.242 -0.0971   
 (0.174) (0.196)   
SIC: Construction -0.289 -0.0753   
 (0.206) (0.218)   
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0976 -0.0933   
 (0.175) (0.195)   
SIC: Education 0.00747 0.136   
 (0.172) (0.184)   
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.169 -0.321* 0.0659 -0.169 
 (0.121) (0.170) (0.0882) (0.133) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0963  -0.0630 
  (0.162)  (0.113) 
Constant^ xx xx xx xx 
 xx xx xx xx 
     
Observations 339 270 554 404 
R-squared 0.092 0.132 0.002 0.007 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Appendix E2a – Growth Models: Extension to include lagged growth 
 
In most cases evaluators have access to no more than two years of data for their studies, 
which does not allow for much more in terms of modelling than introduced in the previous 
section. When multiple years of data are available, however, the value of replicating the same 
model numerous times for ever increasing time periods is potentially too little for achieving 
robust results. Data availability for a number of years, as is the case here, allows for expanding 
the analytical approach in a number of ways. This section does so by the use of lagged growth 
models, in essence an extension of the previous linear regression models by including lagged 
growth terms. Section 5.6 will then explore the use of quantile regressions to take better 
account of the heterogeneity of the firms analysed. 
 
Accounting for previous growth 
In Section 5.4 the model did not take into account previous periods’ firm growth, with the intent 
of using a comparable approach to BERR (2007). That essentially assumed that only the two 
performance data points used for each period modelled were available, and indicated how that 
choice of time period in between may impact the conclusions drawn.  
However, in actual case the longitudinal dataset allows for inclusion of more than two years of 
performance data. It is commonly acknowledged that growth in one period may impact the 
same in following periods. Delmar and Wiklund (2008), for example, show how the willingness 
to grow in the past directly influences future growth intentions. Importantly, they note how it is 
not just the willingness, but actual success of growing, that predicts firms’ motivations to grow 
in the subsequent time periods. A firm displaying higher growth in one year would then be 
more likely to do so also in subsequent periods, if it is paired with a willingness to grow. 
At the same time, experiencing a period of growth may also put strain on the resources of a 
firm. This is especially likely where firms have grown through acquisition, requiring both finance 
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and effort for full integration of the previously separate organisation. Such scenario would 
essentially render immediate further growth less likely, as a direct result of previous growth.  
Assessing the impact of assistance on growth, autocorrelation between the measured outcome 
and previous “outcomes” is not unlikely. In time series analysis, dynamic regressions – making 
use of lagged dependent variables – are commonly used. Their use allows to take into account 
how the “current values of the dependent variable are a function of its prior values” (Beck and 
Katz, 2011; Shurnway and Stoffer, 1995; both in Wilkins, 2014). 
The previous treatment equation including the selection parameter  
  ελδβ +++=∆ szx ''    (2.3) 
therefore becomes 
  ελδβ ++++∆=∆
−
szxktt ''   (2.4) 
where t represents the current time period, and t-k one (or more) previous time periods. 
 
Results: Inclusion of lagged growth 
Table 32, Table 33 and Tables 34 provide summaries of the results for the expanded 
regression models estimated. No restricted models are reported due to similar problems as 
observed in the previous section – a lack of predictors and poor fit92.  
Overall, the selection models again perform better in nearly all instances, but the differences 
are not as stark as for the previous section’s linear models. Significance of previous growth is 
confirmed by the significance of many lagged terms across the different outcome measures 
                                               
92
 Appendix E2 contains the full models for 
 
Table 32, Table 33 and 
 
Table 34. Models with more lags were also estimated, but their results added no further insights. 
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and periods. Firm size also remains to have a significant impact in many models, particularly 
those for a longer time period. As a multisite business, employment growth will be significantly 
higher for many models, and also a number of turnover models. For turnover, the effect of firm 
age, namely higher growth for the youngest firms, plays a role.  
The impact of support then varies in significance by outcome measure and period. For 
employment, depending on exact lags and outcome period chosen, the impact of assistance 
is strongest (ten percent level significance or higher) in the relative short-term, but not 
immediately for 2004-5. The (positive) impact of assistance centres on the periods 2004-6 or 
2005-6 for the non-selection models, and up to 2007 for the selection models. 
The role of support is less clear, less robust, for the turnover models. The results differ 
remarkably by the choice of lags included. The sign of the IA coefficient changes depending 
on the model specified, and no conclusion on a significant role of support on turnover growth 
becomes evident.  
The results are easier to describe for the productivity models. Again, no immediate impact of 
support on the outcome (2004-5) is observed, but a strong negative effect for the periods of 
2004/5-6. For the selection model this is also evident for the periods of 2004/5-7. The selection 
effect is relatively strong for these models, significant at ten percent level. Remarkably, the 
2004-10/11 models suggest the return of this negative impact of assistance on productivity. 
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Table 32 – Employment: Summary of IA impact coefficients when including lagged growth 
    Full model   Full model with selection term 
Lag 
included 
for 
Employment 
Growth 
period 
IA Coef.  R² N IA Coef.  
Selection 
coeff. R² N 
2003-4 2004-5 ns(+) 0.085 323 ns(+)  0.103 256 
2004-5 2005-6 + 0.137 323 +  0.148 256 
2005-6 2006-7 ns(+) 0.092 323 ns(+) + 0.143 256 
    
           
2003-5 2005-6 + 0.098 342 ++  0.116 272 
2003-6 2006-7 ns(+) 0.073 342 ns(+) + 0.121 272 
 
Some further significant effects are present in above models, but not coherently across models. The 
full results are reported in Appendix E2b. 
 
2002-4 2004-5 ns(+) 0.091 302 ns(+)  0.096 240 
2003-4 2004-5 ns(+) 0.085 323 ns(+)  0.103 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-6 ns(+) 0.106 302 ++  0.168 240 
2003-4 2004-6 ns(+) 0.158 323 ++  0.177 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-7 ns(+) 0.157 302 ++ + 0.184 240 
2003-4 2004-7 ns(+) 0.158 323 ++ + 0.189 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-8 ns(+) 0.155 302 ns(+)  0.164 240 
2003-4 2004-8 ns(+) 0.156 323 ns(+)  0.174 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-9 ns(+) 0.18 301 ns(+)  0.19 240 
2003-4 2004-9 ns(+) 0.199 322 ns(+)  0.206 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-10 ns(+) 0.184 301 ns(+)  0.207 240 
2003-4 2004-10 ns(+) 0.198 322 ns(+)  0.215 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-11 ns(+) 0.193 301 ns(+)  0.228 240 
2003-4 2004-11 ns(+) 0.21 322 ns(+)   0.232 256 
 
The full results are in Appendix E2b. The following further significant effects are present for the lower 
part of this table: The included lags have a negative impact on growth for the non-selection models, 
for the 2004-6 to 2004-8 (2002-4 lag) or 2004-9 (2003-4 lag) models. Firm size does not matter in 
2004-5, but during the other periods it has a negative impact on employment growth, whilst squared 
employment as firm size indicator has a positive impact also for all models beyond 2004-5. Multisite 
has an increasing positive impact on growth over time, throughout all specified employment models.  
 
Where +++/++/+ & ---/--/- indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% and the sign of the coefficient. ns(+) 
and ns(-) represent insignificant coefficients, and their sign.  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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Table 33 - Turnover: Summary of IA impact coefficients when including lagged growth 
    Full model   Full model with selection term 
Lag 
included 
for 
Turnover 
Growth 
period 
IA 
Coef.  R² N 
IA 
Coef.  
Selection 
coeff. R² N 
2003-4 2004-5 ns(-) 0.358 323 ns(-)  0.425 256 
2004-5 2005-6 ns(-) 0.127 321 ns(-)  0.176 255 
2005-6 2006-7 ++ 0.072 321 ns(+)  0.099 255 
    
           
2003-5 2005-6 ns(-) 0.103 340 ns(-)  0.157 271 
2003-6 2006-7 ++ 0.083 340 ns(+)  0.102 271 
 
Some further significant effects are present in above models, but not coherently across models. 
The full results are reported in Appendix E2b. 
  
  
2002-4 2004-5 ns(-) 0.282 302 ns(+)  0.301 240 
2003-4 2004-5 ns(-) 0.358 323 ns(-)  0.425 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-6 - 0.151 300 ns(-)  0.163 239 
2003-4 2004-6 - 0.124 321 ns(-)  0.166 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-7 ns(-) 0.133 300 ns(-)  0.164 239 
2003-4 2004-7 ns(-) 0.12 321 ns(-)  0.184 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-8 ns(-) 0.169 300 ns(-)  0.232 239 
2003-4 2004-8 ns(-) 0.165 321 ns(-)  0.253 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-9 ns(-) 0.144 299 ns(+)  0.214 238 
2003-4 2004-9 ns(+) 0.138 320 ns(+)  0.227 254 
    
           
2002-4 2004-10 ns(-) 0.16 300 ns(-)  0.219 239 
2003-4 2004-10 ns(-) 0.152 321 ns(-)  0.234 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-11 ns(-) 0.12 299 ns(-)  0.171 238 
2003-4 2004-11 ns(-) 0.118 320 ns(-)   0.185 254 
 
The full results are in Appendix E2b. The following further significant effects are present for the 
lower part of this table: The included lags have a negative impact on growth for the non-selection 
models, for the 2004-5 to 2004-10 (2002-4 lag) or 2004-11 (2003-4 lag) models. Multisite has its 
significantly positive periods between 2004-6 and 2004-9, depending on the exact model. Growth 
rates are also significantly higher for the youngest category of firms with a 2003-4 lag, mainly in the 
non-selection models 2004-5 to 2004-10. The choice of strategy impacts short-term (2004-5) growth 
positively. Other effects, significant in some models, exist for most variables, but no consistent 
patterns can be established.   
 
Where +++/++/+ & ---/--/- indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% and the sign of the coefficient. ns(+) 
and ns(-) represent insignificant coefficients, and their sign.  
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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Table 34 - Productivity: Summary of IA impact coefficients when including lagged growth 
    Full model   Full model with selection term 
Lag 
included 
for 
Productivity 
Growth 
period 
IA 
Coef.  R² N 
IA 
Coef.  
Selection 
coeff. R² N 
2003-4 2004-5 ns(-) 0.327 323 ns(-)  0.36 256 
2004-5 2005-6 - - 0.115 300 - - -  0.195 271 
2005-6 2006-7 ns(+) 0.085 300 ns(-)  0.125 271 
    
           
2003-5 2005-6 - - 0.12 340 - - -  0.162 239 
2003-6 2006-7 ns(+) 0.062 340 ns(-)  0.135 239 
 
Some further significant effects are present in above models, but not coherently across 
models. The full results are reported in Appendix E2b. 
  
 
2002-4 2004-5 ns(-) 0.315 302 ns(+)  0.356 240 
2003-4 2004-5 ns(-) 0.327 323 ns(-)  0.36 256 
    
           
2002-4 2004-6 - - 0.205 300 - - -  0.196 239 
2003-4 2004-6 - - - 0.142 321 - - -  0.146 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-7 ns(-) 0.194 300 - - - - 0.206 239 
2003-4 2004-7 ns(-) 0.129 321 - - - - 0.148 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-8 ns(-) 0.268 300 ns(-)  0.286 239 
2003-4 2004-8 ns(-) 0.186 321 -  0.201 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-9 ns(-) 0.276 299 ns(-)  0.285 238 
2003-4 2004-9 ns(-) 0.17 320 ns(-)  0.166 254 
    
           
2002-4 2004-10 - 0.259 300 -  0.261 239 
2003-4 2004-10 ns(-) 0.199 321 - -  0.242 255 
    
           
2002-4 2004-11 - - 0.252 299 - -  0.256 238 
2003-4 2004-11 - 0.197 320 - -   0.231 254 
 
The following further significant effects are present for the lower part of this table: The included 
lags have a negative impact on productivity growth for all models. Firm size does not matter 
in 2004-5, and with varying significance then, with increasing coefficient strength for the longer 
outcome periods. A new markets strategy significantly improves productivity 2004-5. , whilst 
construction and manufacturing (the latter for selection model only) sectors reduce 
productivity 2004-5. Maintain sales as a strategy has a positive significant impact on 
productivity growth in the 2004-5 with 2003-4 lag models.  
 
Where +++/++/+ & ---/--/- indicate significance at 1%/5%/10% and the sign of the coefficient. 
ns(+) and ns(-) represent insignificant coefficients, and their sign. The full results are in 
Appendix E2b. 
 
Source: BLO Survey and BSD  
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Concluding remarks: Inclusion of lagged growth 
 
The significant addition of time lags to the estimations broadly confirms the findings from the 
linear regression analysis. There are few significant determinants for firm growth across 
outcome periods. The models seeking to assess impact immediately following the intervention 
(BSD period 2004-5) find no significance for the assistance term. Then, two to three years 
beyond intervention, significant effects can be found. These are positive for employment 
growth, negative in terms of productivity. Any analysis including subsequent years returns no 
significant impact of support on growth. However, when analysing the long-term, that is the 
periods 2004-10/11, the support coefficient again turns significantly negative in the productivity 
estimations.   
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Appendix E2b – Lagged growth, full outputs 
 
Employment 2.1, lagged growth, lag 2002-4 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  empl0405 empl0405 empl0406 empl0406 empl0407 empl0407 empl0408 empl0408 
                  
Lag: Employment growth 2002-3         
          
Lag: Employment growth 2002-4 -0.0285 -0.0199 -0.199** -0.0921 -0.253*** -0.161* -0.259*** -0.171 
  (0.0530) (0.0449) (0.0859) (0.0898) (0.0925) (0.0958) (0.0988) (0.107) 
Lag: Employment growth 2003-4         
          
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00274* -0.000844 -0.00721*** -0.00572** -0.00829*** -0.00783*** -0.00840*** -0.00747** 
  (0.00162) (0.00139) (0.00263) (0.00278) (0.00283) (0.00296) (0.00302) (0.00331) 
Employment 2004 squared 1.10e-05 3.46e-06 2.94e-05** 2.34e-05 3.90e-05*** 3.84e-05** 3.98e-05** 3.69e-05** 
  (8.28e-06) (7.40e-06) (1.34e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.44e-05) (1.58e-05) (1.54e-05) (1.76e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.0184 -0.0250 -0.278 -0.326 -0.124 -0.174 0.0140 -0.0186 
  (0.215) (0.164) (0.348) (0.329) (0.374) (0.351) (0.400) (0.391) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.00976 0.00264 -0.507 -0.484 -0.357 -0.312 -0.327 -0.274 
  (0.210) (0.161) (0.341) (0.321) (0.367) (0.343) (0.392) (0.382) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0380 -0.0733 -0.484 -0.507 -0.394 -0.429 -0.362 -0.371 
  (0.210) (0.162) (0.341) (0.324) (0.367) (0.345) (0.392) (0.385) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.0549 -0.137 -0.580* -0.631* -0.488 -0.521 -0.505 -0.536 
  (0.211) (0.162) (0.341) (0.324) (0.367) (0.346) (0.393) (0.386) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.00109 -0.0313 -0.0778 0.0125 -0.176 -0.0661 -0.185 -0.0883 
  (0.0834) (0.0716) (0.135) (0.143) (0.145) (0.153) (0.155) (0.171) 
Multi-site firm 0.172*** 0.133** 0.324*** 0.329*** 0.326*** 0.386*** 0.320*** 0.376*** 
  (0.0643) (0.0555) (0.104) (0.111) (0.112) (0.119) (0.120) (0.132) 
Exporting firm -0.0127 0.00799 0.0224 0.0246 0.0624 0.0684 0.0471 0.0443 
  (0.0567) (0.0477) (0.0919) (0.0955) (0.0989) (0.102) (0.106) (0.114) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0196 0.00494 -0.0395 -0.0204 -0.00245 0.00555 0.0346 0.0658 
  (0.0539) (0.0470) (0.0874) (0.0940) (0.0941) (0.100) (0.101) (0.112) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0385 -0.0628 -0.0122 -0.0467 -0.0905 -0.121 -0.0673 -0.111 
  (0.0591) (0.0501) (0.0957) (0.100) (0.103) (0.107) (0.110) (0.119) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0802 0.0238 0.100 0.111 0.169 0.192 0.145 0.168 
  (0.136) (0.109) (0.220) (0.218) (0.236) (0.232) (0.253) (0.259) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0805 0.0195 0.0216 0.0173 0.156 0.184 0.183 0.213 
  (0.129) (0.104) (0.210) (0.208) (0.226) (0.222) (0.241) (0.247) 
Strategy: New markets -0.0262 -0.0506 -0.104 -0.0843 0.0137 0.0180 0.0203 0.0225 
  (0.148) (0.125) (0.240) (0.250) (0.258) (0.267) (0.276) (0.297) 
Strategy: New products 0.0416 0.0520 0.0257 0.154 0.0669 0.214 0.0632 0.220 
  (0.204) (0.159) (0.331) (0.317) (0.357) (0.338) (0.381) (0.377) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.0739 0.0180 0.0594 -0.0362 0.126 0.0258 0.110 -0.0242 
  (0.0539) (0.0463) (0.0873) (0.0926) (0.0939) (0.0988) (0.100) (0.110) 
Firm has non-executive directors 0.0634 0.00295 0.111 0.0647 0.198* 0.133 0.221* 0.192 
  (0.0605) (0.0530) (0.0980) (0.106) (0.106) (0.113) (0.113) (0.126) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm 0.0187 -0.0207 -0.0706 -0.118 -0.0649 -0.111 -0.0678 -0.131 
  (0.0632) (0.0565) (0.102) (0.113) (0.110) (0.121) (0.118) (0.135) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old -0.144 0.0770 -0.217 -0.117 -0.0803 0.0306 -0.0736 0.0532 
  (0.414) (0.0909) (0.670) (0.182) (0.721) (0.194) (0.771) (0.216) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old -0.150 0.0616 -0.107 0.0525 -0.139 -0.0508 -0.170 -0.101 
  (0.409) (0.0561) (0.663) (0.112) (0.714) (0.120) (0.763) (0.134) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old -0.171 0.00505 -0.218 -0.121 -0.223 -0.172 -0.249 -0.215* 
  (0.408) (0.0542) (0.661) (0.108) (0.711) (0.116) (0.760) (0.129) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.248  -0.195  -0.140  -0.128  
  (0.409)  (0.662)  (0.713)  (0.762)  
Owner-Manager had previous firm -0.0168 0.0452 0.0337 0.120 0.0541 0.131 0.0278 0.101 
  (0.0521) (0.0431) (0.0844) (0.0861) (0.0909) (0.0919) (0.0971) (0.103) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.0583 0.0705 0.136 0.0943 0.141 0.149 0.154 0.172 
  (0.0749) (0.0663) (0.121) (0.133) (0.131) (0.141) (0.140) (0.158) 
SIC: Construction 0.196** 0.102 0.187 0.0994 0.217 0.171 0.221 0.202 
  (0.0878) (0.0738) (0.142) (0.148) (0.153) (0.157) (0.164) (0.176) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0294 0.00981 -0.0912 -0.170 -0.0561 -0.129 -0.00640 -0.0514 
  (0.0751) (0.0666) (0.122) (0.133) (0.131) (0.142) (0.140) (0.158) 
SIC: Education 0.0439 -0.00485 -0.0704 -0.167 -0.0709 -0.144 -0.0186 -0.0614 
  (0.0752) (0.0631) (0.122) (0.126) (0.131) (0.135) (0.140) (0.150) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.00257 0.0424 0.106 0.254** 0.105 0.271** 0.0658 0.211 
  (0.0516) (0.0582) (0.0836) (0.116) (0.0899) (0.124) (0.0961) (0.139) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0535  0.114  0.189*  0.143 
   (0.0520)  (0.104)  (0.111)  (0.124) 
Constant^  x x x x x x x x 
  x x x x x x x x 
          
Observations 302 240 302 240 302 240 302 240 
R-squared  0.091 0.098 0.146 0.168 0.157 0.184 0.155 0.164 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Employment 2.2, lagged growth, lag 2002-4 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  empl0409 empl0409 empl0410 empl0410 empl0411 empl0411 
              
Lag: Employment growth 2002-3       
 
       
Lag: Employment growth 2002-4 -0.136 -0.0463 -0.0464 0.0215 0.0251 0.0738 
 
 (0.103) (0.116) (0.106) (0.118) (0.107) (0.119) 
Lag: Employment growth 2003-4       
 
       
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.0117*** -0.0113*** -0.0113*** -0.0105*** -0.0125*** -0.0128*** 
 
 (0.00316) (0.00358) (0.00322) (0.00364) (0.00327) (0.00367) 
Employment 2004 squared 5.27e-05*** 5.25e-05*** 5.02e-05*** 4.75e-05** 5.50e-05*** 5.61e-05*** 
 
 (1.61e-05) (1.91e-05) (1.64e-05) (1.94e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.95e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.844** 0.899** 0.834* 0.883** 0.950** 1.025** 
 
 (0.417) (0.424) (0.426) (0.431) (0.432) (0.434) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.377 0.461 0.399 0.492 0.544 0.656 
 
 (0.408) (0.414) (0.417) (0.421) (0.423) (0.424) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.383 0.451 0.369 0.436 0.485 0.581 
 
 (0.408) (0.418) (0.417) (0.425) (0.423) (0.427) 
Firm age: >20 years 0.256 0.304 0.283 0.310 0.406 0.464 
 
 (0.409) (0.418) (0.418) (0.425) (0.424) (0.428) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.117 0.0656 -0.163 -0.0251 -0.154 0.0132 
 
 (0.162) (0.185) (0.165) (0.188) (0.168) (0.189) 
Multi-site firm 0.301** 0.375*** 0.409*** 0.492*** 0.432*** 0.553*** 
 
 (0.125) (0.143) (0.128) (0.146) (0.129) (0.147) 
Exporting firm -0.0396 -0.101 -0.0360 -0.0878 -0.0892 -0.147 
 
 (0.110) (0.123) (0.113) (0.125) (0.114) (0.126) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.00582 0.0400 0.00149 0.00394 0.0141 0.0318 
 
 (0.105) (0.121) (0.107) (0.123) (0.109) (0.124) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0311 -0.0845 -0.125 -0.181 -0.142 -0.195 
 
 (0.115) (0.129) (0.117) (0.131) (0.119) (0.132) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0494 0.0446 0.108 0.120 0.182 0.226 
 
 (0.263) (0.281) (0.269) (0.285) (0.273) (0.287) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.125 0.131 0.132 0.147 0.193 0.217 
 
 (0.251) (0.268) (0.257) (0.272) (0.260) (0.274) 
Strategy: New markets -0.0904 -0.0829 -0.154 -0.122 -0.103 -0.0712 
 
 (0.288) (0.322) (0.294) (0.328) (0.298) (0.330) 
Strategy: New products 0.0416 0.172 -0.00754 0.156 0.0681 0.259 
 
 (0.397) (0.409) (0.405) (0.416) (0.411) (0.419) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.103 -0.0395 0.156 0.000539 0.165 0.0209 
 
 (0.105) (0.119) (0.107) (0.121) (0.109) (0.122) 
Firm has non-executive directors 0.248** 0.243* 0.213* 0.230* 0.240* 0.243* 
 
 (0.118) (0.137) (0.120) (0.139) (0.122) (0.140) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0754 -0.157 0.0743 0.00554 -0.0117 -0.128 
 
 (0.123) (0.146) (0.125) (0.148) (0.127) (0.149) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old -0.159 0.118 0.0778 0.236 -0.777 0.152 
 
 (0.803) (0.235) (0.820) (0.239) (0.832) (0.240) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old -0.336 -0.0307 -0.144 -0.0311 -0.984 -0.0887 
 
 (0.794) (0.145) (0.811) (0.147) (0.823) (0.148) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old -0.454 -0.231* -0.258 -0.242* -1.076 -0.263* 
 
 (0.792) (0.140) (0.808) (0.142) (0.820) (0.143) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.317  -0.133  -0.935  
 
 (0.794)  (0.810)  (0.822)  
Owner-Manager had previous firm 0.110 0.147 0.127 0.166 0.121 0.175 
 
 (0.101) (0.111) (0.103) (0.113) (0.105) (0.114) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.148 0.130 0.149 0.139 0.189 0.159 
 
 (0.146) (0.171) (0.149) (0.174) (0.151) (0.175) 
SIC: Construction 0.143 0.0948 0.162 0.153 0.0930 0.0696 
 
 (0.170) (0.190) (0.174) (0.194) (0.177) (0.195) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0310 -0.0365 -0.0532 -0.0662 -0.0668 -0.0992 
 
 (0.146) (0.172) (0.149) (0.175) (0.151) (0.176) 
SIC: Education -0.108 -0.128 -0.111 -0.0994 -0.110 -0.113 
 
 (0.146) (0.163) (0.149) (0.166) (0.151) (0.167) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.119 0.190 0.0823 0.165 0.132 0.237 
 
 (0.100) (0.150) (0.103) (0.153) (0.104) (0.154) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0295  0.0535  0.102 
 
  (0.134)  (0.136)  (0.137) 
Constant^  x x x x x x 
 
 x x x x x x 
 
       
Observations 301 240 301 240 301 240 
R-squared  0.180 0.190 0.184 0.207 0.193 0.228 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Employment 2.3, lagged growth, lag 2003-4 
  (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
  empl0405 empl0405 empl0406 empl0406 empl0407 empl0407 empl0408 empl0408 
                  
Lag: Employment growth 2002-3         
          
Lag: Employment growth 2002-4         
          
Lag: Employment growth 2003-4 0.0507 0.0633 -0.291*** -0.141 -0.315*** -0.193 -0.282** -0.160 
  (0.0651) (0.0561) (0.105) (0.111) (0.113) (0.118) (0.121) (0.131) 
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00289* -0.00111 -0.00685*** -0.00533** -0.00810*** -0.00787*** -0.00832*** -0.00764** 
  (0.00155) (0.00135) (0.00250) (0.00268) (0.00270) (0.00284) (0.00289) (0.00316) 
Employment 2004 squared 1.13e-05 4.92e-06 2.71e-05** 2.21e-05 3.68e-05*** 3.91e-05** 3.79e-05*** 3.80e-05** 
  (7.82e-06) (7.26e-06) (1.26e-05) (1.43e-05) (1.36e-05) (1.53e-05) (1.45e-05) (1.70e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.0379 -0.00754 -0.00865 -0.0941 0.193 0.0576 0.273 0.179 
  (0.124) (0.108) (0.200) (0.213) (0.216) (0.227) (0.231) (0.252) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0178 -0.00739 -0.276 -0.292 -0.0833 -0.130 -0.105 -0.114 
  (0.119) (0.104) (0.192) (0.205) (0.207) (0.218) (0.222) (0.242) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0447 -0.0750 -0.227 -0.283 -0.0979 -0.211 -0.114 -0.169 
  (0.119) (0.104) (0.191) (0.205) (0.206) (0.218) (0.221) (0.242) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.0557 -0.137 -0.309 -0.408** -0.167 -0.297 -0.237 -0.338 
  (0.118) (0.103) (0.190) (0.203) (0.204) (0.216) (0.219) (0.240) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.00290 -0.0308 -0.0551 0.00127 -0.128 -0.0626 -0.142 -0.0849 
  (0.0796) (0.0701) (0.128) (0.139) (0.138) (0.147) (0.148) (0.164) 
Multi-site firm 0.160*** 0.122** 0.311*** 0.325*** 0.322*** 0.388*** 0.316*** 0.390*** 
  (0.0615) (0.0536) (0.0990) (0.106) (0.107) (0.113) (0.114) (0.125) 
Exporting firm -0.00651 0.0118 -0.0246 -0.0146 0.0133 0.0165 -0.0201 -0.0214 
  (0.0534) (0.0454) (0.0859) (0.0898) (0.0926) (0.0955) (0.0991) (0.106) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0103 -0.00734 -0.0237 -0.0138 0.00298 0.00724 0.0580 0.0843 
  (0.0513) (0.0453) (0.0826) (0.0896) (0.0890) (0.0952) (0.0952) (0.106) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0314 -0.0579 -0.0236 -0.0680 -0.0912 -0.134 -0.0878 -0.150 
  (0.0569) (0.0491) (0.0916) (0.0971) (0.0988) (0.103) (0.106) (0.115) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0473 -0.0145 0.0818 0.0987 0.0892 0.104 0.0297 0.0390 
  (0.119) (0.0960) (0.192) (0.190) (0.207) (0.202) (0.222) (0.224) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0364 -0.0293 0.0143 0.0184 0.0796 0.113 0.0762 0.0979 
  (0.113) (0.0912) (0.182) (0.180) (0.196) (0.192) (0.210) (0.213) 
Strategy: New markets -0.0309 -0.0499 -0.104 -0.0934 -0.0620 -0.0771 -0.0754 -0.110 
  (0.133) (0.113) (0.214) (0.224) (0.231) (0.238) (0.247) (0.265) 
Strategy: New products -0.0128 -0.0241 -0.00581 0.0966 -0.0681 0.0451 -0.0968 0.0192 
  (0.183) (0.143) (0.295) (0.283) (0.318) (0.301) (0.340) (0.335) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.0524 0.00134 0.0344 -0.0576 0.0878 -0.000999 0.0621 -0.0640 
  (0.0505) (0.0440) (0.0813) (0.0870) (0.0876) (0.0924) (0.0938) (0.103) 
Firm has non-executive directors 0.0484 -0.00172 0.127 0.0964 0.174* 0.138 0.213** 0.202* 
  (0.0576) (0.0520) (0.0927) (0.103) (0.0999) (0.109) (0.107) (0.122) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm 0.00932 -0.0332 -0.0640 -0.125 -0.0492 -0.105 -0.0584 -0.137 
  (0.0603) (0.0547) (0.0971) (0.108) (0.105) (0.115) (0.112) (0.128) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old -0.147  -0.262  -0.169  -0.124  
  (0.404)  (0.651)  (0.702)  (0.751)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old -0.120 0.0105 -0.117 0.185 -0.120 -0.00957 -0.189 -0.161 
  (0.401) (0.0835) (0.645) (0.165) (0.695) (0.176) (0.744) (0.195) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old -0.146 -0.0489 -0.248 -0.00129 -0.244 -0.165 -0.286 -0.282 
  (0.399) (0.0826) (0.643) (0.163) (0.693) (0.174) (0.742) (0.193) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.222 -0.0590 -0.212 0.122 -0.144 0.0124 -0.152 -0.0706 
  (0.400) (0.0868) (0.645) (0.172) (0.695) (0.182) (0.743) (0.203) 
Owner-Manager had previous firm -0.0164 0.0423 0.0190 0.106 0.0492 0.122 0.0221 0.100 
  (0.0488) (0.0411) (0.0786) (0.0812) (0.0847) (0.0863) (0.0907) (0.0960) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.0672 0.0709 0.162 0.127 0.168 0.182 0.202 0.236 
  (0.0719) (0.0646) (0.116) (0.128) (0.125) (0.136) (0.134) (0.151) 
SIC: Construction 0.178** 0.0916 0.229* 0.165 0.236 0.210 0.255 0.263 
  (0.0840) (0.0721) (0.135) (0.143) (0.146) (0.151) (0.156) (0.169) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0373 0.0186 -0.0437 -0.118 -0.0146 -0.0970 0.0416 -0.00796 
  (0.0720) (0.0647) (0.116) (0.128) (0.125) (0.136) (0.134) (0.151) 
SIC: Education 0.0458 -0.000137 -0.0456 -0.129 -0.0539 -0.116 0.0168 -0.0102 
  (0.0710) (0.0610) (0.114) (0.121) (0.123) (0.128) (0.132) (0.143) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.00238 0.0346 0.112 0.234** 0.123 0.274** 0.0778 0.214 
  (0.0491) (0.0565) (0.0790) (0.112) (0.0852) (0.119) (0.0912) (0.132) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0456  0.103  0.187*  0.151 
   (0.0509)  (0.101)  (0.107)  (0.119) 
Constant^  x x x x x x x x 
  x x x x x x x x 
          
Observations 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 
R-squared  0.085 0.103 0.158 0.177 0.158 0.189 0.156 0.174 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Employment Part 2.4, lagged growth, lag 2003-4 
  (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
  empl0409 empl0409 empl0410 empl0410 empl0411 empl0411 
              
Lag: Employment growth 2002-3       
 
       
Lag: Employment growth 2002-4       
 
       
Lag: Employment growth 2003-4 -0.258** -0.124 -0.217* -0.114 -0.248* -0.156 
 
 (0.126) (0.142) (0.130) (0.147) (0.133) (0.150) 
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.0113*** -0.0110*** -0.0104*** -0.00973*** -0.0116*** -0.0118*** 
 
 (0.00301) (0.00343) (0.00311) (0.00356) (0.00318) (0.00363) 
Employment 2004 squared 4.95e-05*** 5.11e-05*** 4.53e-05*** 4.46e-05** 5.11e-05*** 5.32e-05*** 
 
 (1.51e-05) (1.84e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.91e-05) (1.60e-05) (1.95e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.503** 0.492* 0.690*** 0.667** 0.826*** 0.814*** 
 
 (0.240) (0.274) (0.248) (0.284) (0.253) (0.290) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.00396 0.0251 0.185 0.218 0.324 0.362 
 
 (0.230) (0.263) (0.239) (0.273) (0.243) (0.278) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.0319 0.0385 0.160 0.168 0.246 0.261 
 
 (0.229) (0.262) (0.237) (0.272) (0.242) (0.278) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.0834 -0.127 0.0809 0.0199 0.171 0.124 
 
 (0.227) (0.261) (0.235) (0.270) (0.240) (0.276) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0901 0.0429 -0.130 -0.0516 -0.115 -0.00764 
 
 (0.154) (0.178) (0.159) (0.184) (0.162) (0.188) 
Multi-site firm 0.280** 0.365*** 0.350*** 0.432*** 0.372*** 0.475*** 
 
 (0.119) (0.136) (0.123) (0.141) (0.125) (0.144) 
Exporting firm -0.0797 -0.119 -0.0661 -0.100 -0.103 -0.149 
 
 (0.103) (0.115) (0.107) (0.119) (0.109) (0.122) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0460 0.0631 0.0482 0.0367 0.0404 0.0424 
 
 (0.0992) (0.115) (0.103) (0.119) (0.105) (0.122) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0713 -0.127 -0.157 -0.219* -0.177 -0.237* 
 
 (0.110) (0.125) (0.114) (0.129) (0.116) (0.132) 
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.165 -0.188 -0.132 -0.155 -0.158 -0.168 
 
 (0.230) (0.243) (0.239) (0.253) (0.243) (0.258) 
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0623 -0.0720 -0.0780 -0.0933 -0.0993 -0.126 
 
 (0.218) (0.231) (0.226) (0.240) (0.231) (0.245) 
Strategy: New markets -0.268 -0.304 -0.278 -0.269 -0.313 -0.318 
 
 (0.257) (0.287) (0.266) (0.298) (0.271) (0.304) 
Strategy: New products -0.204 -0.124 -0.214 -0.114 -0.213 -0.108 
 
 (0.353) (0.363) (0.365) (0.377) (0.373) (0.384) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.102 -0.0348 0.131 -0.0166 0.137 -0.00192 
 
 (0.0980) (0.112) (0.101) (0.116) (0.103) (0.118) 
Firm has non-executive directors 0.261** 0.266** 0.224* 0.257* 0.240** 0.261* 
 
 (0.111) (0.132) (0.115) (0.137) (0.118) (0.139) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0448 -0.131 0.116 0.0542 0.0320 -0.0655 
 
 (0.116) (0.139) (0.121) (0.144) (0.123) (0.147) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old -0.103  0.186  -0.646  
 
 (0.780)  (0.807)  (0.824)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old -0.365 -0.275 -0.138 -0.410* -0.949 -0.387* 
 
 (0.773) (0.212) (0.800) (0.220) (0.817) (0.224) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old -0.493 -0.464** -0.273 -0.624*** -1.072 -0.582*** 
 
 (0.770) (0.210) (0.797) (0.217) (0.814) (0.222) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.341 -0.229 -0.157 -0.405* -0.948 -0.339 
 
 (0.772) (0.220) (0.799) (0.228) (0.816) (0.233) 
Owner-Manager had previous firm 0.0886 0.126 0.110 0.142 0.128 0.168 
 
 (0.0943) (0.104) (0.0976) (0.108) (0.0995) (0.110) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.194 0.197 0.184 0.191 0.217 0.215 
 
 (0.139) (0.164) (0.144) (0.170) (0.147) (0.173) 
SIC: Construction 0.206 0.180 0.216 0.228 0.145 0.146 
 
 (0.162) (0.183) (0.168) (0.190) (0.171) (0.193) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.000580 -0.0158 -0.00589 -0.0212 -0.0212 -0.0494 
 
 (0.139) (0.164) (0.144) (0.170) (0.147) (0.174) 
SIC: Education -0.103 -0.121 -0.115 -0.106 -0.114 -0.114 
 
 (0.137) (0.155) (0.142) (0.160) (0.145) (0.164) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.109 0.171 0.0686 0.126 0.113 0.191 
 
 (0.0951) (0.143) (0.0985) (0.149) (0.100) (0.152) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0470  0.0578  0.0955 
 
  (0.129)  (0.134)  (0.137) 
Constant^  x x x x x x 
 
 x x x x x x 
 
       
Observations 322 256 322 256 322 256 
R-squared  0.199 0.206 0.198 0.215 0.210 0.232 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Turnover 2.5, lagged growth, lag 2002-4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 turn0405 turn0405 turn0406 turn0406 turn0407 turn0407 turn0408 turn0408 
                 
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-3         
         
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-4 -0.237*** -0.256*** -0.175*** -0.164*** -0.192*** -0.160*** -0.211*** -0.201*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0385) (0.0489) (0.0539) (0.0562) (0.0564) (0.0591) (0.0589) 
Lag: Turnover growth 2003-4         
         
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00224 -0.00149 -0.000112 -0.000126 0.000656 -8.85e-05 -0.00265 -0.00282 
 (0.00172) (0.00214) (0.00253) (0.00301) (0.00291) (0.00315) (0.00306) (0.00329) 
Employment 2004 squared 1.38e-05 9.74e-06 6.08e-06 6.41e-06 -1.51e-06 5.72e-06 2.27e-05 2.72e-05 
 (8.83e-06) (1.14e-05) (1.29e-05) (1.60e-05) (1.48e-05) (1.68e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.75e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years -0.0910 -0.110 -0.0886 -0.0983 0.0882 0.109 0.0213 0.0544 
 (0.240) (0.265) (0.349) (0.370) (0.401) (0.388) (0.422) (0.405) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.250 -0.262 -0.452 -0.474 -0.261 -0.293 -0.466 -0.479 
 (0.232) (0.257) (0.338) (0.359) (0.389) (0.376) (0.409) (0.392) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.423* -0.436* -0.494 -0.492 -0.421 -0.386 -0.635 -0.565 
 (0.230) (0.256) (0.335) (0.357) (0.385) (0.374) (0.405) (0.390) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.457** -0.476* -0.612* -0.580 -0.496 -0.463 -0.668* -0.647* 
 (0.230) (0.255) (0.335) (0.357) (0.385) (0.373) (0.404) (0.390) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0548 0.0519 -0.0164 0.0226 -0.0103 0.0685 -0.00480 0.0899 
 (0.0893) (0.111) (0.131) (0.158) (0.151) (0.165) (0.159) (0.173) 
Multi-site firm 0.109 0.115 0.227** 0.228* 0.268** 0.325** 0.166 0.264** 
 (0.0697) (0.0866) (0.102) (0.121) (0.117) (0.127) (0.123) (0.133) 
Exporting firm 0.139** 0.171** 0.0835 0.0778 0.0561 -0.0187 0.0271 -0.0686 
 (0.0602) (0.0732) (0.0878) (0.102) (0.101) (0.107) (0.106) (0.112) 
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.00859 -0.0107 -0.0608 -0.128 -0.115 -0.161 -0.113 -0.108 
 (0.0577) (0.0726) (0.0843) (0.102) (0.0969) (0.107) (0.102) (0.111) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0227 -0.0201 -0.114 -0.120 -0.0813 -0.0775 -0.0814 -0.151 
 (0.0633) (0.0775) (0.0923) (0.108) (0.106) (0.113) (0.111) (0.118) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.240* 0.220 0.145 0.122 0.0780 0.0197 0.226 0.211 
 (0.145) (0.168) (0.211) (0.235) (0.242) (0.246) (0.255) (0.256) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.228 0.223 0.183 0.189 0.125 0.112 0.277 0.354 
 (0.139) (0.161) (0.202) (0.225) (0.232) (0.235) (0.244) (0.246) 
Strategy: New markets 0.457*** 0.457** 0.269 0.192 0.147 0.0731 0.366 0.390 
 (0.158) (0.193) (0.230) (0.270) (0.265) (0.282) (0.278) (0.295) 
Strategy: New products 0.0385 0.0641 0.126 0.179 -0.109 -0.0868 0.175 0.346 
 (0.219) (0.246) (0.319) (0.343) (0.366) (0.359) (0.385) (0.375) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.0327 0.0189 0.0383 -0.0269 0.0438 -0.0517 0.0689 -0.0955 
 (0.0575) (0.0714) (0.0844) (0.100) (0.0969) (0.105) (0.102) (0.110) 
Firm has non-executive directors -0.00964 -0.0130 -0.000210 0.0309 0.0426 0.0605 0.00438 0.0468 
 (0.0648) (0.0823) (0.0945) (0.115) (0.109) (0.120) (0.114) (0.126) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0956 -0.0936 0.0143 -0.0612 0.0328 -0.111 -0.200* -0.276** 
 (0.0679) (0.0880) (0.0989) (0.123) (0.114) (0.129) (0.119) (0.135) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 0.0705 0.0278 0.348 0.180 0.443 0.123 0.595 0.302 
 (0.442) (0.139) (0.643) (0.195) (0.738) (0.204) (0.776) (0.213) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 0.0554 -0.0140 0.245 0.0206 0.288 0.0658 0.326 0.105 
 (0.438) (0.0868) (0.637) (0.122) (0.731) (0.128) (0.769) (0.133) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old -0.0158 -0.0899 0.232 -0.0107 0.308 -0.0139 0.306 -0.0545 
 (0.436) (0.0837) (0.635) (0.117) (0.729) (0.122) (0.766) (0.128) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.0754  0.246  0.304  0.301  
 (0.437)  (0.636)  (0.730)  (0.768)  
Owner-Manager had previous firm 0.0775 0.0846 0.146* 0.133 0.170* 0.156 0.113 0.0895 
 (0.0558) (0.0666) (0.0813) (0.0932) (0.0933) (0.0975) (0.0981) (0.102) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.145* -0.219** -0.120 -0.187 -0.0480 -0.0958 -0.0474 -0.0383 
 (0.0798) (0.102) (0.117) (0.143) (0.134) (0.150) (0.141) (0.156) 
SIC: Construction -0.0921 -0.139 -0.0772 -0.0859 0.00554 -0.0242 0.0597 0.149 
 (0.0938) (0.114) (0.137) (0.160) (0.157) (0.167) (0.165) (0.174) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0519 -0.165 -0.0401 -0.105 0.0660 -0.0236 0.0398 -0.0372 
 (0.0802) (0.103) (0.117) (0.144) (0.134) (0.151) (0.141) (0.158) 
SIC: Education -0.0879 -0.148 -0.139 -0.175 -0.0171 -0.0532 -0.0428 -0.0446 
 (0.0807) (0.0980) (0.118) (0.137) (0.135) (0.144) (0.142) (0.150) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0882 0.000378 -0.153* -0.148 -0.0798 -0.148 -0.0591 -0.0299 
 (0.0549) (0.0896) (0.0804) (0.126) (0.0923) (0.132) (0.0971) (0.138) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.109  -0.0196  -0.0331  0.0405 
  (0.0804)  (0.113)  (0.118)  (0.123) 
Constant x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x 
         
Observations 302 240 300 239 300 239 300 239 
R-squared 0.282 0.301 0.151 0.163 0.133 0.164 0.169 0.232 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Turnover 2.6, lagged growth models, lag 2002-4 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 turn0409 turn0409 turn0410 turn0410 turn0411 turn0411 
             
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-3       
       
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-4 -0.172** -0.160** -0.131** -0.125* -0.122 -0.109 
 (0.0682) (0.0687) (0.0656) (0.0654) (0.0773) (0.0823) 
Lag: Turnover growth 2003-4       
       
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00157 -0.00134 -0.00124 -0.00226 -0.000980 -0.00210 
 (0.00326) (0.00353) (0.00340) (0.00366) (0.00400) (0.00460) 
Employment 2004 squared 1.77e-05 2.08e-05 1.39e-05 2.23e-05 1.60e-05 2.38e-05 
 (1.67e-05) (1.88e-05) (1.73e-05) (1.95e-05) (2.04e-05) (2.45e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.656 0.792* -0.167 -0.00724 -0.0993 0.103 
 (0.487) (0.467) (0.469) (0.449) (0.552) (0.565) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.147 0.180 -0.652 -0.608 -0.663 -0.628 
 (0.478) (0.458) (0.454) (0.435) (0.535) (0.547) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0138 0.0831 -0.754* -0.623 -0.710 -0.573 
 (0.477) (0.458) (0.450) (0.434) (0.530) (0.546) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.0643 -0.0451 -0.794* -0.685 -0.747 -0.658 
 (0.477) (0.458) (0.449) (0.433) (0.529) (0.544) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0895 0.0402 -0.0412 0.00834 -0.102 -0.0110 
 (0.169) (0.185) (0.176) (0.192) (0.208) (0.241) 
Multi-site firm 0.126 0.262* 0.105 0.223 0.149 0.310* 
 (0.131) (0.142) (0.136) (0.147) (0.161) (0.186) 
Exporting firm 0.0157 -0.0794 0.0525 -0.0171 -0.0373 -0.162 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.118) (0.124) (0.139) (0.157) 
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0542 -0.0438 -0.110 -0.118 -0.0695 -0.108 
 (0.109) (0.120) (0.113) (0.124) (0.134) (0.157) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.0620 -0.132 -0.154 -0.222* -0.142 -0.175 
 (0.119) (0.127) (0.124) (0.131) (0.148) (0.167) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.381 0.232 0.125 0.111 0.232 0.199 
 (0.272) (0.275) (0.283) (0.285) (0.333) (0.358) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.490* 0.459* 0.282 0.260 0.244 0.255 
 (0.260) (0.263) (0.271) (0.273) (0.319) (0.343) 
Strategy: New markets 0.609** 0.497 0.261 0.202 0.348 0.245 
 (0.297) (0.316) (0.309) (0.327) (0.367) (0.416) 
Strategy: New products 0.261 0.314 -0.0341 0.0681 0.0439 0.135 
 (0.411) (0.402) (0.428) (0.417) (0.504) (0.524) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.0538 -0.124 0.169 0.00493 0.134 -0.0189 
 (0.109) (0.117) (0.113) (0.122) (0.134) (0.154) 
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.0130 -0.00204 -0.0279 -0.0134 0.0962 0.141 
 (0.122) (0.134) (0.127) (0.139) (0.149) (0.175) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in 
firm 
-0.167 -0.278* -0.146 -0.278* -0.177 -0.336* 
 (0.128) (0.146) (0.133) (0.149) (0.156) (0.188) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 
0.611  0.844 0.343 1.017 0.535* 
 (0.828)  (0.862) (0.237) (1.016) (0.298) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 
0.278 -0.261 0.631 0.183 0.709 0.211 
 (0.820) (0.218) (0.854) (0.148) (1.006) (0.186) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 
0.225 -0.470** 0.538 -0.0499 0.558 -0.0855 
 (0.818) (0.218) (0.851) (0.142) (1.003) (0.179) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.297 -0.297 0.468  0.471  
 (0.819) (0.228) (0.853)  (1.005)  
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 
0.175* 0.167 0.227** 0.190* 0.169 0.130 
 (0.105) (0.110) (0.109) (0.113) (0.129) (0.143) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.0657 -0.00904 -0.165 -0.216 -0.0911 -0.0511 
 (0.150) (0.168) (0.156) (0.174) (0.185) (0.220) 
SIC: Construction 0.115 0.220 -0.0660 0.0697 -0.136 0.0774 
 (0.176) (0.187) (0.183) (0.194) (0.216) (0.243) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0676 0.0241 -0.284* -0.300* -0.0762 -0.0627 
 (0.151) (0.169) (0.157) (0.175) (0.185) (0.221) 
SIC: Education -0.0756 -0.0309 -0.157 -0.0994 -0.0152 0.0943 
 (0.152) (0.161) (0.158) (0.167) (0.186) (0.210) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.00247 0.0112 -0.148 -0.175 -0.159 -0.206 
 (0.104) (0.148) (0.108) (0.153) (0.127) (0.192) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0518  0.0774  0.102 
  (0.132)  (0.137)  (0.173) 
Constant x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x 
       
Observations 299 238 300 239 299 238 
R-squared 0.144 0.214 0.160 0.219 0.120 0.171 
Standard errors in       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Turnover 2.7, lagged growth models, lag 2003-4 
 (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
 turn0405 turn0405 turn0406 turn0406 turn0407 turn0407 turn0408 turn0408 
                 
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-3         
 
        
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-4         
 
        
Lag: Turnover growth 2003-4 -0.488*** -0.523*** -0.279*** -0.287*** -0.312*** -0.309*** -0.392*** -0.385*** 
 (0.0459) (0.0471) (0.0701) (0.0734) (0.0796) (0.0761) (0.0847) (0.0821) 
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00175 -0.00143 0.000507 -6.10e-05 0.000392 -0.000716 -0.00264 -0.00334 
 (0.00174) (0.00190) (0.00268) (0.00300) (0.00304) (0.00311) (0.00323) (0.00335) 
Employment 2004 squared 9.68e-06 7.44e-06 1.67e-07 3.57e-06 -2.99e-06 6.03e-06 1.91e-05 2.76e-05 
 (8.75e-06) (1.02e-05) (1.34e-05) (1.60e-05) (1.53e-05) (1.66e-05) (1.62e-05) (1.80e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.657*** 0.245 0.426** -0.0492 0.678*** 0.185 0.883*** 0.450* 
 (0.141) (0.154) (0.215) (0.240) (0.245) (0.249) (0.260) (0.268) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.435*** 0.0499 0.0780 -0.393* 0.323 -0.202 0.280 -0.186 
 (0.134) (0.146) (0.204) (0.228) (0.232) (0.236) (0.247) (0.255) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.311** -0.0486 0.0649 -0.359 0.188 -0.274 0.150 -0.244 
 (0.134) (0.146) (0.204) (0.228) (0.232) (0.237) (0.247) (0.256) 
Firm age: >20 years 0.264** -0.110 -0.0482 -0.464** 0.111 -0.360 0.128 -0.321 
 (0.132) (0.145) (0.202) (0.226) (0.229) (0.235) (0.244) (0.253) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0980 0.0501 -0.00178 -0.00416 0.0184 0.0507 0.0541 0.0897 
 (0.0890) (0.0985) (0.137) (0.157) (0.156) (0.163) (0.166) (0.176) 
Multi-site firm 0.131* 0.0938 0.244** 0.219* 0.273** 0.316** 0.168 0.251* 
 (0.0690) (0.0754) (0.105) (0.118) (0.120) (0.122) (0.127) (0.132) 
Exporting firm 0.141** 0.127** 0.0623 0.0147 0.0239 -0.0678 0.00417 -0.0931 
 (0.0597) (0.0638) (0.0912) (0.0995) (0.104) (0.103) (0.110) (0.111) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0553 0.0897 0.0183 -0.0124 0.0217 -0.0320 0.0196 -0.0132 
 (0.0575) (0.0637) (0.0880) (0.0999) (0.100) (0.104) (0.106) (0.112) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.100 -0.124* -0.193** -0.220** -0.195* -0.193* -0.213* -0.269** 
 (0.0638) (0.0691) (0.0974) (0.108) (0.111) (0.112) (0.118) (0.121) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.304** 0.278** 0.0724 0.0412 -0.139 -0.175 -0.0744 -0.0967 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.203) (0.210) (0.231) (0.218) (0.245) (0.235) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.259** 0.253** 0.0795 0.0878 -0.0876 -0.110 -0.00932 0.0187 
 (0.126) (0.128) (0.193) (0.200) (0.219) (0.207) (0.233) (0.224) 
Strategy: New markets 0.396*** 0.392** -0.00729 -0.131 -0.236 -0.368 -0.0812 -0.166 
 (0.149) (0.159) (0.227) (0.248) (0.258) (0.257) (0.274) (0.278) 
Strategy: New products 0.336 0.311 0.101 0.0674 -0.134 -0.241 -0.105 -0.114 
 (0.205) (0.202) (0.313) (0.315) (0.355) (0.326) (0.378) (0.352) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.0491 0.0638 0.0756 0.0531 0.0972 0.0316 0.105 -0.0469 
 (0.0567) (0.0619) (0.0871) (0.0970) (0.0990) (0.101) (0.105) (0.109) 
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0444 0.0377 -0.0408 0.0913 0.0314 0.0937 0.00786 0.0760 
 (0.0645) (0.0730) (0.0985) (0.114) (0.112) (0.118) (0.119) (0.128) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.116* -0.113 -0.0189 -0.0833 -0.00276 -0.124 -0.204 -0.271** 
 (0.0676) (0.0769) (0.103) (0.120) (0.117) (0.125) (0.125) (0.135) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old -0.0220  0.233 0.279 0.202 0.224 0.375 0.362* 
 (0.452)  (0.689) (0.192) (0.783) (0.199) (0.833) (0.215) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 0.0902 -0.135 0.265 -0.0116 0.215 0.0471 0.275 0.0996 
 (0.448) (0.118) (0.683) (0.119) (0.777) (0.124) (0.826) (0.134) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 0.0203 -0.191 0.284 0.0205 0.251 0.0272 0.254 -0.00763 
 (0.447) (0.117) (0.681) (0.116) (0.774) (0.120) (0.823) (0.130) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.0716 -0.142 0.268  0.218  0.213  
 (0.448) (0.123) (0.683)  (0.776)  (0.825)  
Owner-Manager had previous firm 0.0589 0.0344 0.126 0.0848 0.138 0.144 0.0954 0.0999 
 (0.0546) (0.0577) (0.0833) (0.0900) (0.0947) (0.0933) (0.101) (0.101) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.105 -0.111 -0.0351 -0.0371 0.0395 0.0718 0.0577 0.146 
 (0.0803) (0.0907) (0.123) (0.142) (0.140) (0.147) (0.149) (0.159) 
SIC: Construction -0.101 -0.120 -0.0419 -0.0129 -0.00137 0.0157 0.0797 0.205 
 (0.0938) (0.101) (0.143) (0.158) (0.163) (0.164) (0.173) (0.177) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0577 -0.144 -0.0169 -0.0846 0.0562 -0.0287 0.0281 -0.0430 
 (0.0805) (0.0908) (0.123) (0.142) (0.140) (0.148) (0.149) (0.159) 
SIC: Education -0.151* -0.183** -0.207* -0.218 -0.150 -0.141 -0.0992 -0.0555 
 (0.0802) (0.0864) (0.122) (0.135) (0.139) (0.140) (0.148) (0.151) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0630 -0.0139 -0.161* -0.170 -0.0451 -0.140 -0.00125 -0.0208 
 (0.0550) (0.0794) (0.0843) (0.125) (0.0958) (0.129) (0.102) (0.140) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0532  -0.0256  -0.0287  0.0176 
 
 (0.0715)  (0.112)  (0.116)  (0.126) 
Constant x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x 
 
        
Observations 323 256 321 255 321 255 321 255 
R-squared 0.358 0.425 0.124 0.166 0.120 0.184 0.165 0.253 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Turnover 2.8, lagged growth models, lag 2003-4 
 (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
 turn0409 turn0409 turn0410 turn0410 turn0411 turn0411 
             
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-3       
       
Lag: Turnover growth 2002-4       
       
Lag: Turnover growth 2003-4 -0.316*** -0.330*** -0.286*** -0.240*** -0.301*** -0.250** 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.0937) (0.0909) (0.108) (0.112) 
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00177 -0.00266 -0.000930 -0.00293 -0.000859 -0.00303 
 (0.00339) (0.00351) (0.00358) (0.00371) (0.00413) (0.00458) 
Employment 2004 squared 1.24e-05 2.45e-05 6.73e-06 2.43e-05 9.06e-06 2.63e-05 
 (1.70e-05) (1.88e-05) (1.80e-05) (1.99e-05) (2.07e-05) (2.45e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.893*** 0.619** 0.639** 0.341 0.615* 0.450 
 (0.275) (0.285) (0.288) (0.297) (0.332) (0.367) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.353 -0.0178 0.0636 -0.326 -0.0265 -0.333 
 (0.264) (0.274) (0.273) (0.282) (0.315) (0.349) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.224 -0.0781 -0.0393 -0.349 -0.0932 -0.321 
 (0.263) (0.273) (0.273) (0.283) (0.315) (0.350) 
Firm age: >20 years 0.183 -0.235 -0.0452 -0.403 -0.0896 -0.384 
 (0.261) (0.272) (0.269) (0.281) (0.311) (0.346) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.00522 0.0266 0.0215 -0.0160 -0.0377 -0.0272 
 (0.174) (0.184) (0.183) (0.194) (0.212) (0.240) 
Multi-site firm 0.120 0.276** 0.0748 0.183 0.136 0.299* 
 (0.133) (0.138) (0.141) (0.146) (0.163) (0.181) 
Exporting firm -0.0371 -0.119 0.0226 -0.0271 -0.0720 -0.171 
 (0.115) (0.117) (0.122) (0.123) (0.141) (0.153) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.101 0.0524 0.0308 -0.0490 0.0941 -0.0130 
 (0.112) (0.117) (0.118) (0.124) (0.137) (0.155) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.195 -0.241* -0.277** -0.321** -0.287* -0.292* 
 (0.123) (0.126) (0.130) (0.133) (0.152) (0.167) 
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.108 -0.221 -0.247 -0.264 -0.189 -0.217 
 (0.258) (0.246) (0.272) (0.260) (0.313) (0.321) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0126 -0.0335 -0.0805 -0.153 -0.161 -0.199 
 (0.244) (0.234) (0.258) (0.247) (0.297) (0.305) 
Strategy: New markets -0.00705 -0.199 -0.174 -0.312 -0.210 -0.430 
 (0.287) (0.290) (0.303) (0.307) (0.353) (0.384) 
Strategy: New products -0.0260 -0.0861 -0.481 -0.530 -0.456 -0.509 
 (0.396) (0.369) (0.418) (0.390) (0.483) (0.482) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.125 -0.0388 0.225* 0.0631 0.211 0.0611 
 (0.110) (0.114) (0.117) (0.120) (0.135) (0.149) 
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.0145 0.00802 -0.00508 0.0239 0.130 0.174 
 (0.125) (0.133) (0.132) (0.141) (0.152) (0.174) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in 
firm 
-0.143 -0.286** -0.129 -0.270* -0.148 -0.320* 
 (0.132) (0.143) (0.138) (0.149) (0.159) (0.184) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 
0.443  0.722 0.453* 0.880  
 (0.873)  (0.922) (0.238) (1.063)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 
0.154 -0.408* 0.532 0.139 0.587 -0.462 
 (0.866) (0.216) (0.914) (0.148) (1.054) (0.282) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 
0.102 -0.538** 0.456 -0.00569 0.449 -0.671** 
 (0.862) (0.214) (0.910) (0.144) (1.050) (0.280) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.149 -0.429* 0.372  0.356 -0.614** 
 (0.865) (0.226) (0.913)  (1.052) (0.294) 
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 
0.136 0.176* 0.211* 0.217* 0.160 0.181 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.111) (0.111) (0.129) (0.138) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.0647 0.183 -0.0436 -0.0485 0.0509 0.143 
 (0.156) (0.166) (0.164) (0.176) (0.190) (0.218) 
SIC: Construction 0.167 0.294 -0.0194 0.136 -0.0857 0.139 
 (0.181) (0.185) (0.191) (0.195) (0.221) (0.241) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0542 -9.56e-05 -0.252 -0.280 -0.0783 -0.0821 
 (0.156) (0.167) (0.164) (0.176) (0.190) (0.219) 
SIC: Education -0.182 -0.117 -0.219 -0.142 -0.104 0.0225 
 (0.155) (0.158) (0.164) (0.168) (0.189) (0.207) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0588 0.0405 -0.104 -0.204 -0.103 -0.206 
 (0.107) (0.146) (0.113) (0.154) (0.130) (0.191) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0834  0.0601  0.0994 
  (0.131)  (0.139)  (0.172) 
Constant x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x 
       
Observations 320 254 321 255 320 254 
R-squared 0.138 0.227 0.152 0.234 0.118 0.185 
Standard errors in       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Productivity 2.9, lagged growth models, lag 2002-4 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 prod0405 prod0405 prod0406 prod0406 prod0407 prod0407 prod0408 prod0408 
 
                
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-3         
         
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-4 -0.335*** -0.341*** -0.324*** -0.264*** -0.381*** -0.303*** -0.457*** -0.415*** 
 (0.0392) (0.0395) (0.0577) (0.0598) (0.0641) (0.0622) (0.0591) (0.0590) 
Lag: Productivity growth 2003-4         
         
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.000416 -0.00154 0.00696** 0.00541 0.00897*** 0.00775** 0.00564* 0.00463 
 (0.00207) (0.00220) (0.00306) (0.00336) (0.00340) (0.00350) (0.00314) (0.00332) 
Employment 2004 squared 6.54e-06 1.01e-05 -2.22e-05 -1.62e-05 -3.96e-05** -3.26e-05* -1.54e-05 -9.65e-06 
 (1.06e-05) (1.17e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.79e-05) (1.74e-05) (1.86e-05) (1.60e-05) (1.77e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.119 0.104 0.510 0.437 0.627 0.579 0.546 0.516 
 (0.288) (0.274) (0.422) (0.415) (0.469) (0.432) (0.433) (0.410) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0464 -0.108 0.325 0.185 0.449 0.271 0.318 0.171 
 (0.279) (0.265) (0.409) (0.402) (0.455) (0.418) (0.419) (0.397) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.169 -0.175 0.247 0.194 0.299 0.277 0.155 0.163 
 (0.278) (0.266) (0.408) (0.403) (0.453) (0.419) (0.418) (0.397) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.167 -0.125 0.227 0.240 0.311 0.304 0.260 0.261 
 (0.278) (0.266) (0.408) (0.403) (0.454) (0.419) (0.418) (0.398) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0315 0.0692 0.0358 -0.00307 0.147 0.130 0.152 0.163 
 (0.107) (0.114) (0.159) (0.177) (0.177) (0.184) (0.163) (0.175) 
Multi-site firm -0.0385 0.00383 -0.0521 -0.0731 0.00243 -0.0159 -0.0770 -0.0470 
 (0.0833) (0.0894) (0.122) (0.136) (0.136) (0.141) (0.125) (0.134) 
Exporting firm 0.112 0.123 0.0461 0.0326 -0.0301 -0.103 -0.0529 -0.141 
 (0.0723) (0.0757) (0.106) (0.115) (0.118) (0.119) (0.109) (0.113) 
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0294 -0.00475 -0.0258 -0.102 -0.122 -0.158 -0.159 -0.163 
 (0.0692) (0.0749) (0.102) (0.114) (0.113) (0.119) (0.104) (0.112) 
Firm faces price elastic demand 0.0211 0.0463 -0.0877 -0.0637 0.0342 0.0579 0.0159 -0.0184 
 (0.0758) (0.0800) (0.111) (0.121) (0.124) (0.126) (0.114) (0.120) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.201 0.234 0.0748 0.0329 -0.0623 -0.150 0.123 0.0791 
 (0.174) (0.173) (0.255) (0.263) (0.283) (0.273) (0.262) (0.259) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.167 0.226 0.208 0.203 0.0182 -0.0270 0.159 0.209 
 (0.166) (0.166) (0.244) (0.252) (0.271) (0.262) (0.250) (0.248) 
Strategy: New markets 0.499*** 0.529*** 0.369 0.279 0.122 0.0447 0.335 0.357 
 (0.190) (0.199) (0.278) (0.302) (0.309) (0.314) (0.285) (0.298) 
Strategy: New products -0.101 -0.0714 0.00511 -0.0443 -0.288 -0.392 -0.0405 -0.0102 
 (0.263) (0.254) (0.386) (0.385) (0.429) (0.400) (0.396) (0.380) 
Firm has formal business plan -0.0597 -0.0174 -0.0249 -0.000338 -0.0938 -0.0812 -0.0564 -0.0813 
 (0.0689) (0.0738) (0.102) (0.112) (0.113) (0.117) (0.105) (0.111) 
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0647 -0.00960 -0.0951 -0.0203 -0.127 -0.0493 -0.182 -0.112 
 (0.0777) (0.0848) (0.114) (0.129) (0.127) (0.134) (0.117) (0.127) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0927 -0.0517 0.116 0.0824 0.131 0.0337 -0.0877 -0.0930 
 (0.0814) (0.0908) (0.120) (0.138) (0.133) (0.143) (0.123) (0.136) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years old 0.136 -0.120 0.532 0.276 0.477 0.0891 0.603 0.237 
 (0.530) (0.143) (0.777) (0.218) (0.864) (0.226) (0.797) (0.215) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years old 0.184 -0.0613 0.334 -0.0184 0.392 0.128 0.453 0.228* 
 (0.525) (0.0897) (0.769) (0.137) (0.855) (0.142) (0.789) (0.135) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years old 0.122 -0.0878 0.412 0.112 0.464 0.155 0.473 0.158 
 (0.523) (0.0864) (0.767) (0.131) (0.852) (0.136) (0.786) (0.129) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.309  0.418  0.406  0.382  
 (0.524)  (0.768)  (0.854)  (0.788)  
Owner-Manager had previous firm 0.101 0.0533 0.124 0.0252 0.136 0.0415 0.110 0.0134 
 (0.0669) (0.0688) (0.0981) (0.104) (0.109) (0.109) (0.101) (0.103) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.170* -0.253** -0.256* -0.272* -0.198 -0.244 -0.207 -0.207 
 (0.0955) (0.105) (0.141) (0.160) (0.156) (0.166) (0.144) (0.158) 
SIC: Construction -0.309*** -0.265** -0.270 -0.197 -0.215 -0.200 -0.169 -0.0652 
 (0.112) (0.118) (0.165) (0.179) (0.183) (0.186) (0.169) (0.176) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.0558 -0.149 0.0640 0.0783 0.143 0.122 0.0746 0.0380 
 (0.0962) (0.106) (0.141) (0.162) (0.157) (0.168) (0.145) (0.159) 
SIC: Education -0.162* -0.176* -0.104 -0.0394 0.0150 0.0546 -0.0768 -0.0417 
 (0.0968) (0.101) (0.142) (0.154) (0.158) (0.160) (0.146) (0.152) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0645 0.00517 -0.249** -0.373*** -0.166 -0.396*** -0.100 -0.197 
  (0.0659) (0.0928) (0.0973) (0.142) (0.108) (0.147) (0.0997) (0.140) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0585  -0.128  -0.220*  -0.0956 
  (0.0830)  (0.126)  (0.132)  (0.125) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x 
         
Observations 302 240 300 239 300 239 300 239 
R-squared 0.315 0.356 0.205 0.198 0.194 0.206 0.268 0.286 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         
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Productivity 2.10, lagged growth models, lag 2002-4 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 prod0409 prod0409 prod0410 prod0410 prod0411 prod0411 
 
            
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-3       
       
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-4 -0.423*** -0.401*** -0.402*** -0.322*** -0.388*** -0.336*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0591) (0.0642) (0.0659) (0.0668) (0.0715) 
Lag: Productivity growth 2003-4       
       
Employment 2004 (ELD) 0.00936*** 0.00945*** 0.00895*** 0.00744** 0.0103*** 0.00983** 
 (0.00288) (0.00315) (0.00340) (0.00370) (0.00354) (0.00402) 
Employment 2004 squared 
-3.08e-
05** -2.96e-05* -3.10e-05* -2.14e-05 
-3.35e-
05* -2.89e-05 
 (1.47e-05) (1.68e-05) (1.74e-05) 
(1.97e-
05) 
(1.81e-
05) 
(2.14e-
05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.365 0.420 -0.403 -0.465 -0.459 -0.434 
 (0.430) (0.420) (0.470) (0.458) (0.489) (0.496) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.239 0.168 -0.542 -0.741* -0.707 -0.876* 
 (0.422) (0.411) (0.455) (0.443) (0.473) (0.480) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.0518 0.0677 -0.632 -0.706 -0.712 -0.758 
 (0.421) (0.411) (0.454) (0.444) (0.472) (0.482) 
Firm age: >20 years 0.144 0.119 -0.563 -0.605 -0.631 -0.672 
 (0.421) (0.412) (0.454) (0.444) (0.472) (0.482) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.00377 -0.0322 0.0979 0.0419 0.0191 -0.0259 
 (0.149) (0.166) (0.177) (0.195) (0.184) (0.211) 
Multi-site firm -0.0959 -0.0374 -0.217 -0.205 -0.193 -0.161 
 (0.115) (0.127) (0.136) (0.150) (0.142) (0.163) 
Exporting firm 0.0191 -0.0218 0.0436 0.0282 -0.00915 -0.0731 
 (0.0997) (0.107) (0.118) (0.126) (0.123) (0.137) 
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0614 -0.0647 -0.112 -0.100 -0.0693 -0.101 
 (0.0959) (0.107) (0.113) (0.126) (0.119) (0.138) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.00990 -0.0256 -0.00742 -0.0250 0.00162 0.0207 
 (0.105) (0.113) (0.124) (0.134) (0.131) (0.147) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.392 0.237 0.0867 0.0405 0.120 0.0283 
 (0.240) (0.246) (0.284) (0.290) (0.295) (0.314) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.434* 0.400* 0.224 0.168 0.114 0.103 
 (0.229) (0.235) (0.271) (0.277) (0.282) (0.301) 
Strategy: New markets 0.698*** 0.574** 0.417 0.323 0.421 0.278 
 (0.261) (0.282) (0.310) (0.333) (0.325) (0.365) 
Strategy: New products 0.0437 -0.0279 -0.224 -0.239 -0.245 -0.311 
 (0.362) (0.360) (0.429) (0.424) (0.447) (0.460) 
Firm has formal business plan -0.0559 -0.0968 0.00474 -0.00398 -0.0330 -0.0407 
 (0.0957) (0.105) (0.113) (0.124) (0.119) (0.135) 
Firm has non-executive directors -0.207* -0.209* -0.212* -0.215 -0.114 -0.0718 
 (0.107) (0.120) (0.127) (0.142) (0.132) (0.154) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0449 -0.0629 -0.170 -0.243 -0.116 -0.159 
 (0.113) (0.131) (0.133) (0.152) (0.138) (0.165) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.681  0.658 0.0529 1.674*  
 (0.729)  (0.864) (0.240) (0.899)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.564 -0.0507 0.717 0.225 1.633* -0.00612 
 (0.722) (0.194) (0.856) (0.151) (0.890) (0.248) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.601 -0.0809 0.710 0.192 1.540* -0.151 
 (0.719) (0.194) (0.853) (0.144) (0.888) (0.248) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.567 -0.138 0.550  1.356 -0.322 
 (0.721) (0.204) (0.855)  (0.889) (0.260) 
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0871 0.0498 0.124 0.0514 0.0777 -0.00482 
 (0.0924) (0.0981) (0.109) (0.115) (0.114) (0.125) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.193 -0.117 -0.283* -0.322* -0.230 -0.159 
 (0.132) (0.150) (0.157) (0.176) (0.163) (0.192) 
SIC: Construction -0.0368 0.109 -0.240 -0.0963 -0.244 -0.00907 
 (0.155) (0.167) (0.184) (0.197) (0.191) (0.213) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.135 0.0993 -0.187 -0.191 0.0264 0.0694 
 (0.133) (0.151) (0.157) (0.178) (0.164) (0.194) 
SIC: Education -0.0194 0.0321 -0.102 -0.0495 0.0345 0.148 
 (0.134) (0.144) (0.158) (0.170) (0.165) (0.184) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.100 -0.124 -0.205* -0.296* -0.268** -0.385** 
  (0.0916) (0.133) (0.108) (0.156) (0.113) (0.169) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0251  0.0205  0.00971 
  (0.118)  (0.139)  (0.152) 
Constant^ x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x 
       
Observations 299 238 300 239 299 238 
R-squared 0.276 0.285 0.259 0.261 0.252 0.256 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Productivity 2.11, lagged growth models, lag 2003-4 
 
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
 prod0405 prod0405 prod0406 prod0406 prod0407 prod0407 prod0408 prod0408 
 
                
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-3         
         
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-4         
         
Lag: Productivity growth 2003-4 -0.493*** -0.463*** -0.276*** -0.220*** -0.372*** -0.303*** -0.503*** -0.436*** 
 (0.0498) (0.0470) (0.0755) (0.0733) (0.0830) (0.0767) (0.0795) (0.0766) 
Employment 2004 (ELD) 0.000303 -0.00106 0.00737** 0.00493 0.00855** 0.00670* 0.00556 0.00377 
 (0.00210) (0.00215) (0.00321) (0.00338) (0.00353) (0.00354) (0.00338) (0.00353) 
Employment 2004 squared 5.75e-07 4.20e-06 
-2.69e-
05* -1.71e-05 
-3.98e-
05** 
-3.13e-
05* -1.84e-05 -8.92e-06 
 
(1.06e-
05) 
(1.15e-
05) 
(1.61e-
05) 
(1.81e-
05) 
(1.77e-
05) 
(1.89e-
05) 
(1.70e-
05) 
(1.89e-
05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.520*** 0.0973 0.436* -0.0144 0.517* 0.105 0.643** 0.248 
 (0.169) (0.171) (0.255) (0.268) (0.280) (0.280) (0.269) (0.280) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.367** -0.0699 0.357 -0.142 0.424 -0.0900 0.394 -0.100 
 (0.161) (0.164) (0.244) (0.256) (0.268) (0.268) (0.257) (0.268) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.296* -0.0732 0.293 -0.117 0.303 -0.0839 0.280 -0.0943 
 (0.161) (0.164) (0.243) (0.256) (0.268) (0.268) (0.257) (0.268) 
Firm age: >20 years 0.263* -0.0556 0.261 -0.0851 0.283 -0.0699 0.366 0.0102 
 (0.159) (0.163) (0.241) (0.255) (0.265) (0.267) (0.254) (0.266) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0592 0.0946 0.0573 0.00857 0.159 0.140 0.199 0.201 
 (0.108) (0.111) (0.165) (0.177) (0.181) (0.185) (0.173) (0.185) 
Multi-site firm -0.0397 -0.0514 -0.0665 -0.113 -0.0384 -0.0718 -0.135 -0.138 
 (0.0832) (0.0851) (0.126) (0.133) (0.139) (0.139) (0.133) (0.139) 
Exporting firm 0.132* 0.104 0.0861 0.0271 
-
0.000270 -0.0883 0.00823 -0.0796 
 (0.0721) (0.0721) (0.109) (0.112) (0.120) (0.118) (0.115) (0.118) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0585 0.114 0.0411 0.000539 0.0202 -0.0278 -0.0292 -0.0731 
 (0.0695) (0.0721) (0.106) (0.113) (0.116) (0.118) (0.111) (0.118) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.0792 -0.0757 -0.168 -0.150 -0.102 -0.0631 -0.130 -0.131 
 (0.0771) (0.0781) (0.117) (0.122) (0.128) (0.127) (0.123) (0.127) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.330** 0.372** -0.0119 -0.0399 -0.228 -0.261 -0.0835 -0.0981 
 (0.161) (0.152) (0.244) (0.237) (0.268) (0.248) (0.257) (0.248) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.252* 0.310** 0.0622 0.0692 -0.174 -0.222 -0.0804 -0.0656 
 (0.153) (0.145) (0.231) (0.226) (0.255) (0.236) (0.244) (0.236) 
Strategy: New markets 0.476*** 0.521*** 0.0955 -0.0159 -0.182 -0.280 -0.00685 -0.0358 
 (0.180) (0.179) (0.272) (0.280) (0.299) (0.293) (0.286) (0.292) 
Strategy: New products 0.350 0.320 0.106 -0.0514 -0.0437 -0.294 0.0300 -0.125 
 (0.248) (0.228) (0.375) (0.356) (0.412) (0.372) (0.395) (0.372) 
Firm has formal business plan -0.0112 0.0512 0.0403 0.107 0.00542 0.0379 0.0405 0.0250 
 (0.0684) (0.0699) (0.104) (0.110) (0.115) (0.115) (0.110) (0.114) 
Firm has non-executive directors -0.0725 0.0653 -0.167 -0.00718 -0.126 -0.0367 -0.177 -0.102 
 (0.0780) (0.0827) (0.118) (0.129) (0.130) (0.135) (0.125) (0.135) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.151* -0.114 0.0443 0.0278 0.0441 -0.0310 -0.150 -0.149 
 (0.0815) (0.0867) (0.123) (0.136) (0.136) (0.142) (0.130) (0.142) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.111 0.0630 0.493 0.374* 0.359 0.227 0.485 0.303 
 (0.546) (0.139) (0.826) (0.217) (0.909) (0.227) (0.871) (0.227) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.195 -0.0724 0.380 -0.0863 0.310 0.0573 0.427 0.183 
 (0.542) (0.0859) (0.820) (0.135) (0.901) (0.141) (0.864) (0.141) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.168 -0.0404 0.529 0.142 0.464 0.207 0.501 0.218 
 (0.540) (0.0841) (0.816) (0.131) (0.898) (0.137) (0.860) (0.137) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.292  0.479  0.339  0.332  
 (0.541)  (0.818)  (0.900)  (0.863)  
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0740 -0.00778 0.107 -0.0207 0.0935 0.0236 0.0774 0.00169 
 (0.0660) (0.0652) (0.0999) (0.102) (0.110) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.136 -0.177* -0.198 -0.162 -0.132 -0.0991 -0.139 -0.0750 
 (0.0970) (0.103) (0.147) (0.161) (0.162) (0.168) (0.155) (0.168) 
SIC: Construction -0.321*** -0.265** -0.269 -0.181 -0.243 -0.198 -0.195 -0.0811 
 (0.114) (0.114) (0.172) (0.179) (0.189) (0.187) (0.181) (0.187) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale -0.115 -0.181* 0.0292 0.0348 0.0738 0.0754 -0.0198 -0.0336 
 (0.0974) (0.103) (0.148) (0.161) (0.162) (0.168) (0.156) (0.168) 
SIC: Education -0.208** -0.188* -0.159 -0.0719 -0.106 -0.0184 -0.141 -0.0596 
 (0.0968) (0.0977) (0.147) (0.153) (0.161) (0.160) (0.155) (0.160) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0642 -0.0570 -0.272*** -0.412*** -0.156 -0.426*** -0.0638 -0.246* 
  (0.0664) (0.0897) (0.101) (0.141) (0.111) (0.147) (0.107) (0.147) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0127  -0.132  -0.230*  -0.159 
  (0.0809)  (0.127)  (0.133)  (0.133) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x 
         
Observations 323 256 321 255 321 255 321 255 
R-squared 0.327 0.360 0.142 0.146 0.129 0.148 0.186 0.201 
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1        
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Productivity 2.12, lagged growth models, lag 2003-4 
 
(23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
 prod0409 prod0409 prod0410 prod0410 prod0411 prod0411 
 
            
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-3       
       
Lag: Productivity growth 2002-4       
       
Lag: Productivity growth 2003-4 -0.403*** -0.363*** -0.485*** -0.413*** -0.523*** -0.448*** 
 (0.0817) (0.0818) (0.0836) (0.0803) (0.0865) (0.0868) 
Employment 2004 (ELD) 0.00922*** 0.00790** 0.00890** 0.00623* 0.0103*** 0.00844** 
 (0.00313) (0.00337) (0.00355) (0.00370) (0.00368) (0.00401) 
Employment 2004 squared 
-3.59e-
05** -2.57e-05 
-3.67e-
05** -1.89e-05 
-4.10e-
05** -2.70e-05 
 (1.57e-05) 
(1.81e-
05) 
(1.78e-
05) 
(1.98e-
05) 
(1.85e-
05) 
(2.15e-
05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.472* 0.203 0.0243 -0.270 -0.125 -0.295 
 (0.253) (0.273) (0.282) (0.293) (0.292) (0.317) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.413* 0.0327 -0.0941 -0.522* -0.322 -0.670** 
 (0.244) (0.264) (0.270) (0.280) (0.279) (0.303) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.257 -0.0463 -0.161 -0.490* -0.311 -0.563* 
 (0.243) (0.263) (0.270) (0.281) (0.279) (0.304) 
Firm age: >20 years 0.333 -0.0188 -0.0917 -0.383 -0.221 -0.462 
 (0.241) (0.262) (0.267) (0.279) (0.276) (0.302) 
Legal form: Limited liability 0.0961 0.0194 0.161 0.0764 0.0775 0.0122 
 (0.161) (0.177) (0.182) (0.194) (0.189) (0.210) 
Multi-site firm -0.146 -0.0890 -0.250* -0.234 -0.200 -0.147 
 (0.123) (0.133) (0.140) (0.146) (0.145) (0.158) 
Exporting firm 0.0394 -0.00416 0.0811 0.0635 0.0126 -0.0425 
 (0.107) (0.112) (0.121) (0.123) (0.126) (0.134) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0777 0.0256 0.0124 -0.0416 0.105 0.0126 
 (0.103) (0.113) (0.117) (0.124) (0.122) (0.136) 
Firm faces price elastic demand -0.138 -0.125 -0.143 -0.124 -0.160 -0.103 
 (0.114) (0.121) (0.129) (0.133) (0.136) (0.146) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0670 -0.0196 -0.0797 -0.0764 -0.00315 -0.0212 
 (0.238) (0.237) (0.270) (0.259) (0.279) (0.281) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0838 0.0465 0.0212 -0.0435 -0.0413 -0.0555 
 (0.226) (0.225) (0.256) (0.247) (0.265) (0.268) 
Strategy: New markets 0.255 0.114 0.0977 -0.0479 0.0442 -0.174 
 (0.265) (0.279) (0.301) (0.306) (0.314) (0.335) 
Strategy: New products 0.207 0.0414 -0.207 -0.378 -0.197 -0.372 
 (0.366) (0.354) (0.415) (0.389) (0.430) (0.422) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.0376 0.00613 0.118 0.104 0.113 0.102 
 (0.102) (0.109) (0.116) (0.120) (0.120) (0.131) 
Firm has non-executive directors -0.231** -0.236* -0.200 -0.193 -0.0765 -0.0471 
 (0.115) (0.129) (0.131) (0.141) (0.136) (0.153) 
(Owner-)Manager: equity in firm -0.0836 -0.138 -0.241* -0.333** -0.174 -0.262 
 (0.122) (0.137) (0.137) (0.148) (0.142) (0.161) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years 
old 0.540  0.526 0.0972 1.522  
 (0.807)  (0.915) (0.237) (0.947)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 
old 0.488 -0.143 0.619 0.141 1.481 -0.143 
 (0.800) (0.208) (0.908) (0.148) (0.939) (0.246) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years 
old 0.563 -0.0767 0.684 0.235 1.465 -0.143 
 (0.797) (0.205) (0.904) (0.144) (0.936) (0.244) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.461 -0.198 0.474  1.246 -0.340 
 (0.799) (0.217) (0.906)  (0.938) (0.257) 
Owner-Manager had previous 
firm 0.0402 0.0380 0.101 0.0781 0.0413 0.0266 
 (0.0979) (0.102) (0.111) (0.111) (0.115) (0.121) 
SIC: Manufacturing -0.112 0.00785 -0.205 -0.212 -0.131 -0.0261 
 (0.144) (0.160) (0.163) (0.176) (0.169) (0.191) 
SIC: Construction -0.0466 0.0996 -0.255 -0.116 -0.250 -0.0284 
 (0.168) (0.178) (0.190) (0.195) (0.197) (0.211) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0510 0.0258 -0.260 -0.249 -0.0883 -0.0409 
 (0.144) (0.160) (0.163) (0.176) (0.170) (0.191) 
SIC: Education -0.104 -0.0178 -0.143 -0.0746 -0.0369 0.0949 
 (0.143) (0.152) (0.163) (0.167) (0.168) (0.181) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.0413 -0.133 -0.166 -0.346** -0.218* -0.409** 
  (0.0990) (0.141) (0.112) (0.154) (0.116) (0.167) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.00400  -0.0400  -0.0245 
  (0.127)  (0.139)  (0.151) 
Constant^ x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x 
       
Observations 320 254 321 255 320 254 
R-squared 0.170 0.166 0.199 0.242 0.197 0.231 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Appendix E3 – Quantile Regression models, full outputs
- 255 - 
 
 
 
Employment 3.1 - 2004-5, quantiles, no lags (full models with and without selection [s]); quantiles 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 
FULL 
OLS 
FULL 
OLS S 
Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 
S 
Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75
S 
Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)     (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
empl04
05 
empl040
5 
empl04
05 
empl04
05 
empl04
05 
empl04
05 
  
empl04
05 
empl04
05 
empl04
05 
empl04
05 
                         
Employment 2004 (ELD) -
0.0027
-
0.00095
0.0004
88 
-
0.0002
-
0.0003
-7.18e-
06 
could could -
0.0006
-
0.0009
-
0.0029
-
0.0004 ( . 15
1) 
( . 132
) 
(0.002
51) 
(0. 1
10) 
( . 2
61) 
(0. 002
88) 
not  not  ( . 8
08) 
(0. 1
04) 
(0. 02
27) 
(0. 1
30) Employment 2004 
squared 
1.09e-
05 
4.52e-06 -2.03e-
06 
2.91e-
06 
2.4 e-
07 
-3.64e-
06** 
be  be  4.10e-
06 
5.82e-
06 
1.01e-
05 
4.89e-
07  (7.61e-
06) 
(7.12e-
06) 
(9.84e-
06) 
(5.21e-
06) 
(1.75e-
06) 
(1.44e-
06) 
compu
ted 
compu
ted 
(4. 8e-
06) 
(6.50e-
06) 
(8.77e-
06) 
(6.23e-
06) Firm age: 3<5 years 0. 067
6 
-0.0684 -
0.0687 
-
0.0936 
0. 003
94 
-
0.00026
  -0.183* -0.257* 0. 489 -0.168 
 (0.105) (0.0905) (0.196) (0.117) (0.0118
) 
(0. 94
9) 
  
(0.0936
) 
(0.143) (0.192) (0.164) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0486 -0.0667 0.0295 -
0.0074
0.0003
87 
0.00028
8 
  -0.133 -0.158 -
0.379**
-
0.424**  (0.100) (0.0875) (0.084
4) 
(0. 5
5) 
(0.0114
) 
(0.0102
) 
  
(0.0939
) 
(0.147) (0.144) (0.181)
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0750 -0.137 0.0069
4 
-
0.0375 
0.0003
18 
-
0.00057
  
-
0.203** 
-0.252* -
0.418**
-
0.571** (0.102) (0.0885) (0.090
6) 
(0.051
8) 
(0.0116
) 
(0. 95
3) 
  
(0.0829
) 
(0.137) (0. 24) (0.149) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.0895 -0.200** -
0.0784 
-
0.0883 
-
0.0008
-
0.00121 
  
-
0.207** 
-0.262* -
0.395**
-
0.603** (0.101) (0.0884) (0.103) (0.058
7) 
( . 119
) 
(0. 00
) 
  
(0.0843
) 
(0.133) (0.146) (0.153) 
Legal form: Limited 
liability 
0.0137 -0.0277 -
0.0481 
-
0.0227 
0.0005
22 
0.00034
3 
  0.0227 -
0.0339 
0.0169 0.0318 
 (0.0720
) 
(0.0638) (0.033
7) 
(0.032
9) 
(0.0072
2) 
(0.0057
5) 
  
(0.0290
) 
(0.0 6
5) 
(0.086
2) 
(0.052
9) Multi-site firm 0.159**
* 
0.121** 0.0635 0.0429 0.0015
1 
0.00064
8 
  
0.0092
7 
0.0297 0.0892 0.0932 
 (0.0593
) 
(0.0521) (0.043
7) 
(0.045
2) 
(0.0072
2) 
(0.0048
1) 
  
(0.0333
) 
(0.034
7) 
(0.102) (0.071
6) Exporting firm -
0.0055
0.00886 0.0030
4 
-
0.0306 
0.0004
14 
-4.49e-
05 
  
-
0.0090
-
0.0069
0.0368 0.0235 
 ( . 507
) 
(0.0438) (0.056
2) 
(0.034
7) 
(0.0056
6) 
(0. 044
5) 
  
( . 229
) 
(0. 27
3) 
(0.057
8) 
(0.051
9) Firm in competitive 
environ.  
0.0044
2 
-0.0145 -
0.0190 
-
0.0012
-
0.0002
-
0.00023
  -0.0185 0.0086
7 
-
0.0105 
-
0.0818  (0.0482
) 
(0.0429) (0.044
4) 
(0. 41
2) 
( . 51
3) 
(0. 37
6) 
  
(0.0284
) 
(0.029
7) 
(0.059
6) 
(0.055
9) Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.0205 -0.0403 0.0048
9 
-
0.0365 
0.0006
22 
0.00085
7 
  -0.0235 -
0.0211 
-
0.0640 
-
0.0427  (0.0535
) 
(0.0469) (0.053
6) 
(0.049
3) 
(0.0057
8) 
(0.0044
6) 
  
(0.0253
) 
(0.03
7) 
(0.061
9) 
(0.049
0) Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0488 -0.00515 -
0.0383 
-
0.0627 
-3.79e-
05 
-
0.00068
  
0.0056
9 
-
0.0025
0.155 0.0959 
 (0.109) (0.0886) (0.049
8) 
(0.063
3) 
(0. 101
) 
(0. 76
6) 
  
(0.0565
) 
(0. 42
0) 
(0.105) (0.067
7) Strategy: Penetrate 
market 
0.0365 -0.0175 -
0.0487 
-
0.0710 
0.0003
71 
-
0.00044
  0.0136 0.0326 0.0907 0.105* 
 (0.103) (0.0846) (0.04
6) 
(0.053
4) 
(0.0097
9) 
(0. 75
0) 
  
(0.0542
) 
(0.038
0) 
(0.080
7) 
(0.060
6) Strategy: New markets -0.0325 -0.0462 -
0.0925 
-0.103 -
0.0009
-
0.00144 
  0.0152 0.0586 0.137 0.0754 
 (0.121) (0.104) (0.069
0) 
(0.083
0) 
( . 131
) 
(0. 0
) 
  
(0.0699
) 
(0.077
8) 
(0.100) (0.075
8) Strategy: New products -0.0224 -0.0312 -0.108 -
0.0940 
-0.0314 -0.0389   -0.0270 0.0305 -
0.0100 
0.0300 
 (0.168) (0.134) (0.167) (0.067
2) 
(0.0521
) 
(0.0363
) 
  (0.139) (0.078
8) 
(0.120) (0.086
8) Firm has formal 
business plan 
0.0497 0.00350 0.0311 -
0.0069
0.0001
43 
0.00016
3 
  0.0438 0.0085
5 
0.0922 0.0493 
 (0.0480
) 
(0.0421) (0.061
0) 
(0. 33
8) 
(0.0049
7) 
(0.0036
1) 
  
(0.0284
) 
(0.025
8) 
(0.063
6) 
(0.043
4) Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.0481 -0.00354 -
0.0410 
-
0.0456 
0.0017
5 
-
0.00076
  0.0262 -
0.0154 
0.142 0.0381 
 (0.0559
) 
(0.0508) (0.06
5) 
(0.069
3) 
(0.0070
4) 
(0. 50
2) 
  
(0.0480
) 
(0.027
4) 
(0.117) (0.066
3) (Owner-)Manager: 
equity in firm 
0.0117 -0.0234 0.0836 0.0032
7 
-
0.0025
-
0.00201 
  -0.0531 -
0.0497 
-
0.0246 
0.0458 
 (0.0583
) 
(0.0531) (0.146) (0.055
0) 
( . 9
9) 
(0. 080
9) 
  
(0.0574
) 
(0.045
3) 
(0.082
3) 
(0.069
8) Owner-Manager 25<35 
years old 
-0.164  -0.159 -0.292* -0.0519 -
0.00040
  -0.0184 0.0251 0.171 -
0.0080 (0.395)  (0.170) (0.176) (0.0387
) 
(0. 72
8) 
  
(0.0710
) 
(0.077
9) 
(0.291) (0. 75
2) Owner-Manager 35<45 
years old 
-0.116 0.0260 -0.132 -
0.0426 
-0.0521 -
0.00077
  
0.0095
0 
0.0084
7 
0.143 0.116* 
 (0.391) (0.0780) (0.206) (0.030
2) 
(0.0380
) 
(0. 41
8) 
  
(0.0645
) 
(0.030
4) 
(0.259) (0.067
5) Owner-Manager 45<55 
years old 
-0.142 -0.0350 -0.148 -
0.0695
-0.0516 -
0.00046
  -0.0222 -
0.0152 
0.0733 -
0.0231  (0.390) (0.0776) (0.178) (0.034
7) 
(0.0376
) 
(0. 0
7) 
  
(0.0616
) 
(0.023
2) 
(0.251) (0.044
8) Owner-Manager had 
previous firm 
-0.0138 0.0380 -
0.0096
0.0018
8 
-
0.0007
0.00014
7 
  
0.0085
0 
0.0244 -
0.0933
-
0.0018 (0.0463
) 
(0.0391) (0. 44
4) 
(0.040
1) 
( . 4
9) 
(0.0031
6) 
  
(0.0252
) 
(0.030
5) 
(0.051
5) 
(0. 3
1) SIC: Manufacturing 0.0562 0.0650 0.193 0. 86 0.0203*
* 
0.00252   -0.0312 -
0.0191 
-
0.0873 
-
0.0041 (0.0674
) 
(0.0620) (0.148) (0.135) (0.0097
4) 
(0.0065
0) 
  
(0.0372
) 
(0.055
5) 
(0.098
1) 
(0. 99
0) SIC: Construction 0.170** 0.0897 0.169 0.158 0.0207* 0.0 217   0.136 0.0191 0.329 0.147 
 (0.0803
) 
(0.0693) (0.185) (0.157) (0.0107
) 
(0.0070
8) 
  (0.200) (0.147) (0.670) (0.123) 
SICH: Retail & 
Wholesale 
0.0427 0.0248 0.191 0.197 0.0207*
* 
0.00253   -0.0169 -
0.0692 
-
0.0631 
-
0.0684  (0.0681
) 
(0.0617) (0.131) (0.122) (0.0089
3) 
(0.0065
5) 
  
(0.0410
) 
(0.057
1) 
(0.099
2) 
(0.097
7) SIC: Education 0.0500 0.00692 0.162 0.137 0.0202*
* 
0.00203   -0.0478 -
0.0684 
0.0501 0.0945 
 (0.0672
) 
(0.0584) (0.125) (0.128) (0.0090
5) 
(0.0059
9) 
  
(0.0409
) 
(0.051
3) 
(0.113) (0.112) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0046
2 
0.0318 0.0204 -
0.0723
-
0.0001
-
0.00091
    -0.0174 0.0491 -
0.0679 
0.0858
**  (0.0468
) 
(0.0538) (0.031
5) 
(0.034
4) 
( . 5
1) 
(0. 47
2) 
    
(0.0228
) 
(0.040
1) 
(0.065
6) 
(0.038
9) Selection Effect (inverse 
mills) 
 0.0409  -
0.0714 
 
-
0.00079
   0.0497  0.136** 
  (0.0483)  (0.051
3) 
 
(0. 50
2) 
   
(0.045
4) 
 
(0.065
6) Constant^ x x x x x x   x x x x 
 x x x x x x   x x x x 
             
Observations 342 272 342 272 342 272   342 272 342 272 
R-squared 0.082 0.097                     
Standard errors in             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Employment 3.2 - 2004-6, quantiles, no lags (full models with and without selection (s); quantiles 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 FULL FULL S Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 
S 
Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75
S 
Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
empl04
06 
                         
Employment 2004 (ELD) -
0.00770
-
0.0057
-
0.0011
-
0.0055
-
0.0028
-
0.0008
-
0.0001
-
0.0009
-
0.0031
-
0.0031
-
0.0118*
-
0.0046 (0. 025
7) 
( . 2
3) 
(0. 02
34) 
(0. 06
00) 
( . 13
4) 
(0. 2
03) 
( . 9
39) 
(0. 1
22) 
( . 12
3) 
(0. 0
72) 
(0.0040
6) 
(0. 03
22) Employment 2004 
squared 
3.13e-
05** 
2.50e-
05* 
1.43e-
06 
2.73e-
05 
1.30e-
05** 
2.1 e-
07 
1.0 e-
06 
4.74e-
06 
1.47e-
05** 
2.18e-
05* 
5.40e-
05*** 
2.10e-
05  (1.30e-
05) 
(1.47e-
05) 
(1.21e-
05) 
(2.3 e-
05) 
(5.41e-
06) 
(1.1 e-
05) 
(4.13e-
06) 
(5.44e-
06) 
(6.97e-
06) 
(1.30e-
05) 
(1.89e-
05) 
(1.54e-
05) Firm age: 3<5 years -0.0739 -0.158 -
0.254** 
-0.171 -0.0534 -0.119 -
0.286** 
-0.246 -0.310 -0.231 -0.0444 -0.291 
 (0.179) (0.186) (0.114) (0.116) (0.0895
) 
(0.109) (0.112) (0.151) (0.215) (0.180) (0.493) (0.370) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.258 -0.284 -
0.326**
-
0.279** 
-0.0823 -
0.0881 
-
0.286**
-0.246 -
0.452** 
-0.284 -0.522** -0.388 
 (0.171) (0.180) (0.117) (0.133) (0.0825
) 
(0.0 5
6) 
(0.110) (0.150) (0.210) (0.180) (0.212) (0.261) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.263 -0.342* -
0.320**
-0.195* -0.0852 -0.138 -
0.288**
-
0.292** 
-
0.557**
-
0.464**
-
0.568*** 
-
0.587**  (0.173) (0.182) (0.110) (0.106) (0.0864
) 
(0.095
3) 
(0.108) (0.147) (0.209) (0.170) (0.210) (0.257)
Firm age: >20 years -0.339** -
0.454** 
-
0.349**
-
0.283** 
-0.126 -0.208* -
0.288**
-
0.294** 
-
0.557**
-
0.452**
-
0.608*** 
-
0.784** (0.171) (0.182) (0.0 9
0) 
(0.124) (0.0849
) 
(0.112) (0.105) (0.1 5) (0.204) (0.168) (0.191) (0.267) 
Legal form: Limited 
liability 
-0.0445 -0.0133 -
0.193** 
-
0.227** 
-0.0713 -0.125 0.0002
14 
-
0.0140 
-0.0212 0.0853 0.134 0.0968 
 (0.122) (0.131) (0.086
8) 
(0.104) (0.0459
) 
(0.077
3) 
(0.0347
) 
(0.0 8
1) 
(0.0996
) 
(0.083
7) 
(0.131) (0.146) 
Multi-site firm 0.272*** 0.283**
* 
0.160* 0.209** 0.0476 0.0805 0.0022
8 
0.0359 0.123 0.153 0.399** 0.468 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.085
6) 
(0.104) (0.0387
) 
(0.061
8) 
(0.0346
) 
(0.048
8) 
(0.0767
) 
(0.113) (0.184) (0.321) 
Exporting firm -
0.00980 
0.0149 -
0.0445 
0.0204 0.0150 0.0053
5 
0.0001
19 
-
0.0005
0.0334 0.0128 0.0437 0.111 
 (0. 862
) 
(0.0902
) 
(0.066
4) 
(0.082
7) 
(0.0322
) 
(0.043
4) 
(0.0286
) 
(0. 33
5) 
(0.0505
) 
(0.057
7) 
(0.0921
) 
(0.096
9) Firm in competitive 
environ.  
-0.0492 -0.0479 0.0211 0.0842 0.0143 0.0208 0.0005
03 
0.0030
0 
-0.0245 -
0.0388 
-0.0252 -
0.0043 (0.0821
) 
(0.0883
) 
(0.055
8) 
(0.071
7) 
(0.0344
) 
(0.053
1) 
(0. 287
) 
(0. 41
3) 
(0.0515
) 
(0.067
6) 
(0.123) (0.112) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.0172 -0.0551 -
0.0206 
-0.216* -0.0108 -
0.0367 
-
0.0001
-
0.0125 
-
0.0100
0.0151 -0.0616 -
0.0959  (0.0911
) 
(0.0964
) 
(0.083
2) 
(0.119) (0.0422
) 
(0.052
2) 
( . 3 0
) 
(0.037
0) 
( . 56
) 
(0.059
6) 
(0.105) (0.091
7) Strategy: Maintain sales 0.105 0.115 -
0.0489 
0.137 0.0371 0.0755 -
0.0013
-
0.0227 
-0.0751 -
0.0893 
0.141 0.126 
 (0.185) (0.182) (0.132) (0.127) (0.0499
) 
(0.080
6) 
( . 679
) 
(0.108) (0.102) (0.114) (0.183) (0.221) 
Strategy: Penetrate 
market 
0.0194 0.0288 -
0.0719 
0.0258 0.0116 0.0136 -
0.0006
-
0.0212 
-0.121 -0.121 -0.0212 0.0452 
 (0.176) (0.174) (0.129) (0.082
2) 
(0.0460
) 
(0.079
6) 
( . 659
) 
(0.105) (0.0920
) 
(0.081
6) 
(0.166) (0.169) 
Strategy: New markets 0.0382 0.111 -0.257 -0.125 0.0144 0.0269 -
0.0011
-
0.0479 
-0.119 -0.117 -0.101 -
0.0924  (0.205) (0.213) (0.323) (0.208) (0.0659
) 
(0.101) ( . 785
) 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.107) (0.228) (0.164)
Strategy: New products -0.0449 0.0637 -
0.0142 
0.181 0.0767 0.171 0.115 0.0335 -0.210* -0.240* -0.324 -
0.0411  (0.286) (0.275) (0.178) (0.145) (0.164) (0.127) (0.107) (0.143) (0.112) (0.127) (0.212) (0.231)
Firm has formal 
business plan 
0.0452 -0.0364 -
0.256**
-0.158* -0.0203 -
0.0737 
-6.56e-
05 
-
0.0025
0.0807
* 
0.0171 0.169* -
0.0284  (0.0816
) 
(0.0866
) 
(0.0 8
2) 
(0.088
1) 
(0.0331
) 
(0.050
1) 
(0. 245
) 
(0. 32
8) 
(0.0450
) 
(0.061
3) 
(0.0952
) 
(0.105)
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.125 0.0874 0.182** 0. 39 0.0266 0.0669 0.0013
7 
0.0297 0.0374 0.0117 0.00429 0.150 
 (0.0951
) 
(0.105) (0.071
0) 
(0.090
3) 
(0.0375
) 
(0.059
7) 
(0.0326
) 
(0.041
7) 
(0.0630
) 
(0.071
2) 
(0.115) (0.115) 
(Owner-)Manager: 
equity in firm 
-0.0730 -0.113 -
0.225** 
-
0.0842 
-
0.0976
-
0.148**
-
0.0044
-
0.0441 
-0.0332 -
0.0075
-0.0733 0.0356 
 (0.0992
) 
(0.109) (0.094
4) 
(0.098
0) 
( . 411
) 
(0.048
2) 
( . 413
) 
(0.05
0) 
(0.0624
) 
(0. 63
9) 
(0.107) (0.104) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 
years old 
-0.251  -0.315 -0.876 -0.0717 0.0251 0.0963 -
0.0312 
0.151 -
0.0652 
0.314 -0.329* 
 (0.672)  (0.368) (0.570) (0.181) (0.101) (0.102) (0.064
8) 
(0.130) (0.100) (0.465) (0.194) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 
years old 
-0.154 0.186 -0.378 -
0.0353 
-0.0993 -
0.0291 
0.0963 0.0149 0.264** 0.193** 0.286 0.0609 
 (0.666) (0.160) (0.354) (0.099
8) 
(0.172) (0.050
6) 
(0.0940
) 
(0.041
4) 
(0.120) (0.085
9) 
(0.429) (0.212) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 
years old 
-0.291 -0.0120 -0.457 -
0.0811 
-0.112 -
0.0845 
0.0942 -
0.0290 
0.0294 -
0.0798 
0.0471 -0.257 
 (0.664) (0.160) (0.361) (0.079
0) 
(0.171) (0.052
8) 
(0.0925
) 
(0.034
4) 
(0.107) (0.04
9) 
(0.432) (0.165) 
Owner-Manager had 
previous firm 
0.0558 0.127 0.0358 0.0387 0.0218 0.0635 0.0007
34 
0.0285 0.0823 0.0790 -0.0538 0.0381 
 (0.0789
) 
(0.0806
) 
(0.062
8) 
(0.086
8) 
(0.0314
) 
(0.041
3) 
(0.0258
) 
(0.030
2) 
(0.0563
) 
(0.056
3) 
(0.0976
) 
(0.097
4) SIC: Manufacturing 0.158 0.118 0.377**
* 
0.530**
* 
0.163** 0.273** 0.0004
56 
0.0183 -0.0776 -0.229* -0.0855 -0.674 
 (0.115) (0.128) (0.102) (0.195) (0.0684
) 
(0.138) (0.0480
) 
(0.069
6) 
(0.100) (0.134) (0.177) (0.751) 
SIC: Construction 0.198 0.159 0.419**
* 
0.366* 0.121 0.285* 0.0005
86 
0.0159 -0.0213 -0.200 0.454 -0.146 
 (0.137) (0.143) (0.122) (0.213) (0.0818
) 
(0.158) (0.0589
) 
(0.074
4) 
(0.133) (0.153) (0.320) (0.839) 
SICH: Retail & 
Wholesale 
-0.0190 -0.0587 0.218** 0.298* 0.105 0.169 -
0.0011
-
0.0181 
-0.141 -
0.272** 
-0.264 -0.741 
 (0.116) (0.127) (0.109) (0.167) (0.0654
) 
(0.130) ( . 459
) 
(0.068
8) 
(0.103) (0.1 7) (0.201) (0.727) 
SIC: Education -0.0344 -0.116 0.255** 0.330* 0.129** 0.214 -
0.0008
-
0.0132 
-0.157* -
0.278** 
-0.303 -0.867 
 (0.114) (0.120) (0.106) (0.184) (0.0649
) 
(0.140) ( . 492
) 
(0.070
4) 
(0.0903
) 
(0.127) (0.188) (0.781) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.117 0.211* 0.273**
* 
0.720* 0.0171 0.0419 -
0.0006
-
0.0187 
-0.0388 0.0035
0 
-
0.00818 
0.0171 
 (0.0797
) 
(0.111) (0.098
0) 
(0.377) (0.0347
) 
(0.072
4) 
( . 24
) 
(0.035
1) 
(0.0597
) 
(0. 60
7) 
(0. 797
) 
(0.104) 
Selection Effect (inverse 
mills) 
 0.0972  0.172  -
0.0191 
 
-
0.0121 
 
-
0.0172 
 0.0532 
  (0.0993
) 
 (0.162)  (0.046
4) 
 
(0.0 8
8) 
 
(0.059
3) 
 (0.123) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
             
Observations 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 
R-squared 0.121 0.158                     
Standard errors in             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Employment 3.3 - 2004-7, quantiles, no lags (full models with and without selection (s); quantiles 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 FULL FULL S Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 
S 
Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75
S 
Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) 
 
empl04
07 
empl04
07 
empl0
407 
empl0
407 
empl0
407 
empl0
407 
empl0
407 
empl0
407 
empl04
07 
empl0
407 
empl04
07 
empl04
07 
                         
Employment 2004 
(ELD) 
-
0.00888
-
0.00822
-
0.0051
-
0.0092
-
0.0014
-
0.0012
-
0.0008
-
0.0013
-
0.00631
-
0.0088
-
0.0226*
-
0.0182* (0. 027
5) 
(0. 0 8
9) 
(0. 04
62) 
(0. 06
09) 
(0. 02
38) 
(0. 0
24) 
(0. 1
57) 
(0. 01
94) 
(0. 019
2) 
(0. 05
81) 
(0.0041
5) 
(0.0040
4) Employment 2004 
squared 
4.07e-
05*** 
4.12e-
05*** 
2.2 e-
05 
5.30e-
05* 
7.03e-
06 
8.31e-
06 
4. 4e-
06 
6.57e-
06 
2.49e-
05*** 
4.90e-
05 
0.00012
4*** 
0.00011
5***  (1.39e-
05) 
(1. 5e-
05) 
(2.40e-
05) 
(2.86e-
05) 
(1. 3e-
05) 
(1.18e-
05) 
(7.38e-
06) 
(8.79e-
06) 
(9.48e-
06) 
(5.41e-
05) 
(2.34e-
05) 
(2.58e-
05) Firm age: 3<5 years 0.00889 -0.101 -
0.0121 
0.192 -
0.0274 
0. 630 0. 473 -
0.0035
-0.236 -0.332 -0.0296 -0.400 
 (0.192) (0.198) (0.236) (0.255) (0.106) (0.144) (0.210) (0.248) (0.258) (0.328) (0.490) (0.282) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.196 -0.227 -
0.0878 
0.112 -
0.0979 
0.0443 -0.107 -0.136 -0.195 -0.398 -0.318 -0.449 
 (0.183) (0.191) (0.214) (0.178) (0.105) (0.112) (0.183) (0.233) (0.275) (0.332) (0.195) (0.272) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.244 -0.358* -
0.0876 
0.137 -0.134 -0.170 -0.133 -0.176 -0.439* -
0.625*
-0.453* -0.580** 
 (0.185) (0.193) (0.232) (0.190) (0.117) (0.112) (0.187) (0.241) (0.258) (0.312) (0.267) (0.261) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.309* -0.435** -0.235 -
0.0540 
-0.197* -0.186* -0.236 -0.271 -0.475* -
0.679*
-0.330 -0.694** 
 (0.184) (0.193) (0.200) (0.189) (0.103) (0.107) (0.179) (0.226) (0.266) (0.338) (0.282) (0.293) 
Legal form: Limited 
liability 
-0.0815 -0.0218 -
0.360*
-
0.272*
-0.148 -0.121 -
0.0844 
-
0.0423 
-0.0793 0.0387 0.0850 0.341** 
 (0.131) (0.139) (0.129) (0.132) (0.095
8) 
(0.106) (0.071
0) 
(0.097
3) 
(0.0864
) 
(0.147) (0.292) (0.149) 
Multi-site firm 0.276** 0.340**
* 
0.104 0.213 0.0877 0.160*
* 
0.133*
* 
0.205*
* 
0.233** 0.305*
** 
0.441* 0.471* 
 (0.108) (0.114) (0.152) (0.142) (0.079
4) 
(0.080
0) 
(0.064
0) 
(0.094
2) 
(0.0954
) 
(0.114) (0.226) (0.265) 
Exporting firm 0.0256 0.0375 0.0206 -
0.0698 
0.0635 0.0753 0.0853 0.0373 0.150 0.0680 -0.0793 0.136 
 (0.0925
) 
(0.0957
) 
(0.103) (0.106) (0.051
4) 
(0.066
6) 
(0.062
8) 
(0.065
0) 
(0.0942
) 
(0.107) (0.161) (0.130) 
Firm in competitive 
environ.  
-0.0269 -0.0267 -
0.0882 
-0.143 -
0.0014
-
0.0384 
-
0.0278 
-
0.0063
-0.0443 0.0269 0.0501 -
0.00457  (0.0880
) 
(0.0936
) 
(0.079
7) 
(0.101) (0. 56
1) 
(0.071
4) 
(0.059
3) 
(0. 4
2) 
(0.0842
) 
(0.086
7) 
(0.154) (0.137) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.0729 -0.113 -0.139 -0.206 -
0.0141 
0.0556 -
0.0222 
-
0.0373 
-0.0571 -0.213* -0.245 -0.205 
 (0.0977
) 
(0.102) (0.165) (0.213) (0.062
8) 
(0.082
2) 
(0.056
3) 
(0.065
4) 
(0.0919
) 
(0.127) (0.155) (0.145) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.116 0.133 -0.153 -0.140 0.144 0.0833 0.0822 0.155 0.0999 0.140 -0.0653 0.265 
 (0.198) (0.193) (0.232) (0.259) (0.157) (0.114) (0.105) (0.118) (0.222) (0.194) (0.530) (0.184) 
Strategy: Penetrate 
market 
0.0877 0.130 0.0033
1 
-
0.0001
0.103 0.0858 0.0244 0.0874 0.0966 0.117 0.00565 0.248 
 (0.188) (0.185) (0. 85) (0.250) (0.140) (0.099
6) 
(0.103) (0.107) (0.223) (0.179) (0.552) (0.151) 
Strategy: New markets 0.0510 0.0963 -0.146 -
0.0717 
0.107 -
0.0680 
0.0334 -
0.0214 
-0.0857 -
0.0442 
-0.0557 -0.0404 
 (0.220) (0.226) (0.267) (0.320) (0.160) (0.188) (0.139) (0.143) (0.239) (0.248) (0.768) (0.302) 
Strategy: New products -0.103 0.0282 -
0.0226 
0.0321 0.0748 0.0909 -
0.0407 
-
0.0275 
-0.222 -0.162 -0.906* -0.268 
 (0.307) (0.292) (0.323) (0.338) (0.162) (0.148) (0.143) (0.143) (0.258) (0.231) (0.547) (0.182) 
Firm has formal 
business plan 
0.104 0.0266 -
0.0522 
-0.229* 0.0326 -
0.0270 
0.0504 0.0481 0.250**
* 
0.273*
* 
0.512*** 0.376*** 
 (0.0876
) 
(0.0918
) 
(0.106) (0.133) (0.059
4) 
(0.068
0) 
(0.063
0) 
(0.063
8) 
(0.0775
) 
(0.113) (0.156) (0.124) 
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.170* 0.135 0.323*
** 
0.312*
* 
0.0297 0.0951 0.0321 0.0461 0.0441 0.0205 0.246 0.00065
7  (0.102) (0.111) (0.123) (0.137) (0.060
4) 
(0.077
4) 
(0.057
9) 
(0.076
3) 
(0.0926
) 
(0.118) (0.311) (0.166) 
(Owner-)Manager: 
equity in firm 
-0.0521 -0.0910 -0.239* -
0.374*
-
0.0788 
-
0.0803 
-
0.0171 
-
0.0204 
-0.0116 -
0.0632 
-0.0560 0.0266 
 (0.106) (0.116) (0.129) (0.173) (0.064
9) 
(0.08
6) 
(0.062
9) 
(0.085
1) 
(0.113) (0.125) (0.145) (0.140) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 
years old 
-0.152  -0.569 -0.213 -
0.0140 
-0.106 0.177 0.0627 0.121 -
0.0997 
0.159 -0.257 
 (0.720)  (0.584) (0.314) (0.168) (0.138) (0.183) (0.118) (0.160) (0.167) (0.670) (0.269) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 
years old 
-0.160 -0.0408 -0.760 -0.202* -
0.0416 
-
0.156*
0.149 -
0.0408 
0.245 0.0468 0.144 -0.0962 
 (0.714) (0.170) (0.583) (0.111) (0.158) (0.078
0) 
(0.182) (0.073
4) 
(0.189) (0.147) (0.630) (0.244) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 
years old 
-0.296 -0.210 -0.844 -
0.377*
-
0.0657 
-
0.179*
0.106 -
0.134*
0.0127 -0.181 -0.0118 -0.359 
 (0.712) (0.169) (0.580) (0.110) (0.137) (0.067
9) 
(0.189) (0.062
9) 
(0.163) (0.134) (0.601) (0.219) 
Owner-Manager had 
previous firm 
0.0880 0.151* 0.187*
* 
0.298*
** 
0.0444 0.110* 0.0672 0.0838 0.0827 0.118 0.136 0.157 
 (0.0846
) 
(0.0854
) 
(0.082
6) 
(0.111) (0.062
2) 
(0.064
3) 
(0.053
9) 
(0.071
7) 
(0.0743
) 
(0.079
4) 
(0.162) (0.135) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.146 0.168 0.381*
** 
0.359*
** 
0.108 0.206* 0.0004
35 
0.0803 -0.0688 0.0653 0.0225 -0.236 
 (0.123) (0.135) (0.124) (0.136) (0.090
4) 
(0.114) (0.087
5) 
(0.111) (0.118) (0.178) (0.205) (0.307) 
SIC: Construction 0.188 0.188 0.212 0.239 0.114 0.300* 0.0830 0.182 0.248 0.171 -0.0112 -0.102 
 (0.146) (0.151) (0.221) (0.258) (0.119) (0.167) (0.147) (0.190) (0.213) (0.204) (0.387) (0.380) 
SICH: Retail & 
Wholesale 
-
0.00855 
-0.0505 0.275*
* 
0.250* 0.113 0.180 -
0.0050
0.0308 -0.156 -0.177 -
0.497*** 
-0.602* 
 (0.124) (0.135) (0.134) (0.130) (0.086
5) 
(0.113) (0. 74
2) 
(0.108) (0.0976
) 
(0.162) (0.186) (0.315) 
SIC: Education -0.0630 -0.109 0.0155 0.0447 0.0189 0.0029
3 
-
0.0154 
0.0556 -0.148 -0.220 -0.476** -0.515* 
 (0.123) (0.127) (0.154) (0.157) (0.099
8) 
(0.125) (0.086
8) 
(0.104) (0.115) (0.159) (0.235) (0.307) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.142* 0.280** 0.205* 0.268 0.0375 0.190* 0.0118 0.0701 -
0.00704 
0.0593 0.0172 0.00618 
 (0.0855
) 
(0.117) (0.107) (0.200) (0.055
7) 
(0.104) (0.049
0) 
(0.091
8) 
(0. 69
) 
(0.096
5) 
(0.159) (0.154) 
Selection Effect 
(inverse mills) 
 0.190*  0.143  0.0769  0.0237  0.0970  0.198* 
  (0.105)  (0.153)  (0.073
6) 
 
(0.077
8) 
 
(0.081
3) 
 (0.111) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
             
Observations 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 
R-squared 0.133 0.179                     
Standard errors in             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Employment 3.4 - 2004-8, quantiles, no lags (full models with and without selection (s); quantiles 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 FULL FULL 
S 
Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 
S 
Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75
S 
Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) 
 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
empl04
08 
                         
Employment 2004 
(ELD) 
-
0.00918
-
0.0082
-
0.0078
-
0.0085
-
0.0035
-
0.0014
-
0.0024
-
0.0046
-
0.00706
-
0.0067
-
0.0228*
-
0.0219* (0. 029
6) 
(0. 03
23) 
(0. 05
55) 
(0. 06
18) 
(0. 03
06) 
(0. 02
77) 
(0. 02
20) 
(0. 02
92) 
(0. 02
4) 
(0. 0
37) 
(0.0052
4) 
(0.0070
5) Employment 2004 
squared 
4.23e-
05*** 
4.15e-
05** 
3.91e-
05 
4.97e-
05* 
1.75e-
05 
6.56e-
06 
9.86e-
06 
1. 5e-
05 
2.91e-
05** 
3.44e-
05 
0.00013
6*** 
0.00013
3***  (1.49e-
05) 
(1.74e-
05) 
(2.66e-
05) 
(2.76e-
05) 
(1.31e-
05) 
(1.34e-
05) 
(9.5 e-
06) 
(1.2 e-
05) 
(1.36e-
05) 
(6.72e-
05) 
(2.91e-
05) 
(3.95e-
05) Firm age: 3<5 years 0.129 0. 767 0.149 0.230 0. 356 0. 981 0.162 0.207 0.136 -0.145 0.273 0. 458 
 (0.206) (0.221) (0.195) (0.227) (0.147) (0.146) (0.210) (0.147) (0.334) (0.549) (0.679) (0.660) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.193 -0.167 -0.255 -0.136 -
0.0906 
-0.164 0.0733 0.108 -0.0956 -0.193 -0.180 -0.0920 
 (0.197) (0.213) (0.206) (0.252) (0.160) (0.176) (0.168) (0.150) (0.267) (0.572) (0.225) (0.349) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.221 -0.255 -0.198 -0.100 -
0.0735 
-0.112 -
0.0451 
0.0296 -0.175 -0.375 -0.398* -0.480 
 (0.199) (0.216) (0.180) (0.254) (0.150) (0.157) (0.171) (0.159) (0.294) (0.555) (0.232) (0.406) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.355* -
0.434** 
-
0.399** 
-0.265 -0.242 -
0.346** 
-0.180 -0.173 -0.333 -0.540 -0.377 -0.317 
 (0.197) (0.216) (0.171) (0.219) (0.147) (0.136) (0.164) (0.146) (0.272) (0.565) (0.265) (0.437) 
Legal form: Limited 
liability 
-0.0856 -
0.0358 
-
0.313** 
-
0.400** 
-0.101 -
0.0157 
-
0.0578 
-
0.0388 
-0.104 0.0678 -0.109 0.267 
 (0.141) (0.156) (0. 27) (0.172) (0.126) (0.134) (0.104) (0.146) (0.181) (0.175) (0.284) (0.193) 
Multi-site firm 0.261** 0.333**
* 
0.154 0.215 0.0717 0.237** 0.124 0.232* 0.232 0.394* 0.297 0.513* 
 (0.116) (0.127) (0.125) (0.171) (0.101) (0.103) (0.092
3) 
(0.135) (0.155) (0.211) (0.261) (0.288) 
Exporting firm 0.0251 0.0291 0.0340 0.0531 0.0718 0.0443 0.0526 0.0253 0.187 0.0877 0.00161 0.0579 
 (0.0993
) 
(0.107) (0.087
4) 
(0.147) (0.070
9) 
(0.092
0) 
(0.074
0) 
(0.080
7) 
(0.114) (0.157) (0.146) (0.246) 
Firm in competitive 
environ.  
0.00665 0.0244 0.0376 -
0.0354 
0.0142 0.0062
3 
0.0069
8 
0.0115 -0.0589 -
0.0252 
0.00547 0.00690 
 (0.0945
) 
(0.105) (0.090
5) 
(0.116) (0.088
7) 
(0.098
8) 
(0.079
2) 
(0.100) (0.108) (0.174) (0.157) (0.176) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.0568 -0.118 -
0.0992 
-0.281 0.0218 -
0.0914 
0.0019
7 
-
0.0270 
-0.0729 -
0.0667 
-0.0749 -0.116 
 (0.105) (0.114) (0.126) (0.180) (0.084
5) 
(0.116) (0.076
2) 
(0.089
2) 
(0.105) (0.146) (0.172) (0.195) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0854 0.101 -
0.0899 
-
0.0516 
0.0206 -
0.0428 
-
0.0120 
0.0266 0.152 0.297 -0.0185 0.332 
 (0.213) (0.216) (0.224) (0.274) (0.142) (0.224) (0.148) (0.175) (0.223) (0.206) (0.522) (0.278) 
Strategy: Penetrate 
market 
0.0950 0.120 0.0464 0.121 0.0766 0.0486 0.0106 0.0338 0.182 0.299 0.0189 0.446 
 (0.202) (0.206) (0.181) (0.212) (0.127) (0.195) (0.132) (0.164) (0.193) (0.184) (0.559) (0.290) 
Strategy: New markets 0.0758 0.108 -
0.0864 
-
0.0983 
0.0661 -0.264 -
0.0285 
-
0.0026
-0.0335 0.103 -0.0752 0.490 
 (0.237) (0.253) (0.207) (0.271) (0.167) (0.303) (0.153) (0.208) (0.221) (0.250) (0.476) (1.098) 
Strategy: New products -0.112 0.0339 -0.198 -
0.0173 
-
0.0116 
-0.112 -
0.0622 
0.0097
0 
-0.0719 0.316 -0.555 -0.108 
 (0.329) (0.326) (0.450) (0.433) (0.225) (0.241) (0.272) (0.238) (0.393) (0.306) (0.570) (0.461) 
Firm has formal 
business plan 
0.0885 -
0.0184 
-0.145 -
0.273** 
-
0.0335 
-
0.0912 
0.0970 0.0127 0.229** 0.120 0.374** 0.0809 
 (0.0940
) 
(0.103) (0.092
4) 
(0.1 5) (0.081
7) 
(0.096
7) 
(0.074
2) 
(0.079
3) 
(0.108) (0.150) (0.150) (0.257) 
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.222** 0.209* 0.316** 0.320** 0.0944 0.204 0.0468 0.109 0.0278 -
0.0820 
0.220 0.0257 
 (0.109) (0.124) (0.125) (0.137) (0.075
8) 
(0.129) (0.101) (0.110) (0.135) (0.139) (0.208) (0.215) 
(Owner-)Manager: 
equity in firm 
-0.0773 -0.152 -
0.328** 
-
0.417** 
-0.140 -0.196* -
0.0779 
-
0.212** 
0.0371 -
0.0337 
-0.103 -0.102 
 (0.114) (0.130) (0.152) (0. 82) (0.093
6) 
(0.110) (0.091
5) 
(0. 00) (0.180) (0.154) (0.142) (0.283) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 
years old 
-0.101  -0.656 -0.273 -
0.0427 
-
0.0357 
0.0409 0.121 0.328 0.204 0.390 0.162 
 (0.773)  (0.669) (0.336) (0.394) (0.225) (0.253) (0.318) (0.429) (0.486) (0.683) (0.392) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 
years old 
-0.216 -0.189 -0.729 -0.220 -0.197 -0.166* -
0.0495 
-0.110 0.252 -
0.0606 
0.228 0.142 
 (0.766) (0.190) (0.652) (0.142) (0.388) (0.096
3) 
(0.249) (0.088
4) 
(0.383) (0.195) (0.631) (0.247) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 
years old 
-0.334 -0.328* -0.884 -
0.392**
-0.236 -0.217* -0.134 -
0.184** 
0.0740 -0.269 0.0979 -0.0257 
 (0.764) (0.189) (0.642) (0.1 8) (0.387) (0.116) (0.262) (0.084
0) 
(0.368) (0.200) (0.611) (0.358) 
Owner-Manager had 
previous firm 
0.0746 0.150 0.227** 0.251* 0.0572 0.0573 0.0558 0.0692 0.0630 0.131 -0.0544 0.218 
 (0.0908
) 
(0.095
5) 
(0.093
6) 
(0.147) (0.082
1) 
(0.091
6) 
(0.070
3) 
(0.093
2) 
(0.125) (0.144) (0.164) (0.167) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.138 0.180 0.537**
* 
0.454* 0. 51 0.227 -
0.0794 
0.0818 -0.0456 0.0021
9 
-0.212 -0.377 
 (0.132) (0.151) (0.187) (0.239) (0.155) (0.173) (0.100) (0.166) (0.164) (0.193) (0.213) (0.479) 
SIC: Construction 0.184 0.217 0.277 0.424 0.164 0.267 0.0632 0.232 0.201 0.199 -0.153 -0.0986 
 (0.157) (0.169) (0.296) (0.265) (0.191) (0.212) (0.173) (0.215) (0.217) (0.188) (0.350) (0.494) 
SICH: Retail & 
Wholesale 
0.0402 0.0364 0.430** 0.304 0.138 0.176 -
0.0853 
0.0483 -0.0826 -0.116 -0.498** -0.703** 
 (0.133) (0.151) (0.178) (0.221) (0.141) (0.166) (0.09
6) 
(0.181) (0.139) (0.197) (0.231) (0.316) 
SIC: Education -0.0285 -
0.0394 
0.0460 0.0807 0.0070
2 
0.0360 -
0.0979 
0.0220 -0.101 -
0.0482 
-0.219 -0.368 
 (0.132) (0.142) (0.218) (0.233) (0.183) (0.185) (0.102) (0.165) (0.201) (0.177) (0.323) (0.347) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.104 0.236* 0.0454 0.186 0.0312 -
0.0015
0.0225 0.0612 0.0351 0.175 -0.0283 0.192 
 (0.0918
) 
(0.131) (0.110) (0.238) (0.071
8) 
(0. 98
3) 
(0.064
0) 
(0.108) (0.0904
) 
(0.154) (0.196) (0.388) 
Selection Effect (inverse 
mills) 
 0.168  0.139  -
0.0439 
 
-
0.0101 
 0.221  0.114 
  (0.118)  (0.163)  (0.104)  (0.095
6) 
 (0.162)  (0.287) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
             
Observations 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 342 272 
R-squared 0.138 0.164                     
Standard errors in             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Employment 3.5 - 2004-9, quantiles, no lags (full models with and without selection (s); quantiles 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 FULL FULL S Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 
S 
Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75
S 
Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) 
 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
empl04
09 
                         
Employment 2004 
(ELD) 
-
0.0121*
-
0.0116*
-
0.0081
-
0.0052
-
0.0034
-
0.0059
-
0.0037
-
0.0061
-
0.0077
-
0.0136 
-
0.0231*
-
0.0272* (0.0031
0) 
(0.0035
1) 
(0. 04
05) 
(0. 09
88) 
(0. 03
52) 
(0. 04
27) 
(0. 02
63) 
(0. 02
86) 
(0. 03
00) 
(0.010
6) 
(0.0057
2) 
(0.0051
8) Employment 2004 
squared 
5.42e-
05*** 
5.52e-
05*** 
3.84e-
05* 
3.32e-
05 
1.75e-
05 
2.85e-
05 
1.20e-
05 
2.45e-
05* 
3.17e-
05** 
7.95e-
05 
0.00012
0*** 
0.00014
7***  (1. 6e-
05) 
(1.89e-
05) 
(2.17e-
05) 
(8.31e-
05) 
(1.44e-
05) 
(1.92e-
05) 
(1.19e-
05) 
(1.36e-
05) 
(1. 3e-
05) 
(9. 8e-
05) 
(3.15e-
05) 
(3.43e-
05) Firm age: 3<5 years 0.310 0.359 0.277 0.568 0.166 0.297 0.252 0.149 0.278 0.311 0.648 0.369 
 (0.215) (0.240) (0.182) (0.345) (0.191) (0.189) (0.195) (0.252) (0.330) (0.412) (0.541) (0.335) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.129 -0.0408 -0.210 0.0335 -0.158 -
0.0767 
0.0487 0.0037
1 
-
0.0418 
0.0627 0.0297 0.208 
 (0.205) (0.232) (0.229) (0.321) (0.228) (0.218) (0.196) (0.242) (0.228) (0.295) (0.362) (0.302) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.135 -0.0799 -0.130 0.0318 -0.199 -
0.0513 
-
0.0450 
-0.122 -0.190 -0.210 -0.164 -0.0220 
 (0.208) (0.235) (0.190) (0.353) (0.205) (0.201) (0.171) (0.229) (0.240) (0.293) (0.383) (0.352) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.263 -0.255 -0.350* -0.130 -0.344* -0.303 -0.162 -0.258 -0.247 -0.238 -0.0164 0.128 
 (0.206) (0.234) (0.179) (0.331) (0.193) (0.197) (0.191) (0.246) (0.241) (0.345) (0.408) (0.335) 
Legal form: Limited 
liability 
-0.0228 0.0885 -0.237* -
0.0582 
-
0.0746 
0.0625 0.109 0.207 -0.153 0.192 0.268 0.452* 
 (0.147) (0.169) (0.138) (0.181) (0.112) (0.162) (0.133) (0.151) (0.242) (0.311) (0.228) (0.265) 
Multi-site firm 0.215* 0.294** 0.174 0.0101 0.110 0.267 0.275** 0.323** 0.140 0.306* 0.188 0.313 
 (0.121) (0.138) (0.174) (0.228) (0.123) (0.167) (0.127) (0.159) (0.133) (0.161) (0.230) (0.272) 
Exporting firm -0.0226 -0.0620 -
0.0244 
0.0652 0.0671 -
0.0715 
0.0004
08 
-
0.0702 
0.0335 -
0.0808 
-0.151 -0.0856 
 (0.104) (0.116) (0.104) (0.178) (0.086
4) 
(0.110) (0.081
1) 
(0.097
6) 
(0.116) (0.136) (0.135) (0.239) 
Firm in competitive 
environ.  
-0.0188 0.00504 0.0556 -0.116 0.0443 0.0549 0.0177 -
0.0169 
-
0.0993 
-
0.0382 
0.160 0.139 
 (0.0989
) 
(0.114) (0.109) (0.143) (0.108) (0.127) (0.093
9) 
(0.109) (0.144) (0.164) (0.151) (0.182) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-
0.00465 
-0.0786 -
0.0610 
-0.255 0.102 -
0.0462 
0.0287 0.0308 0.0746 0.0390 -0.0155 0.0188 
 (0.110) (0.124) (0.126) (0.186) (0.105) (0.155) (0.086
7) 
(0.110) (0.146) (0.158) (0.232) (0.229) 
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0854 -0.116 -
0.0685 
-0.339 -0.276 -0.115 -
0.0725 
-
0.0098
-0.151 -0.152 0.0339 0.0143 
 (0.222) (0.235) (0.699) (0.276) (0.185) (0.272) (0.182) (0.198) (0.279) (0.298) (0.228) (0.235) 
Strategy: Penetrate 
market 
-0.0149 -0.0321 0.120 0.0396 -0.125 -
0.0281 
-0.112 -
0.0004
-
0.0660 
-
0.0079
0.358 0.125 
 (0.211) (0.224) (0.656) (0.233) (0.152) (0.217) (0.171) (0.187) (0.286) (0.241) (0.232) (0.193) 
Strategy: New markets -0.0319 -
0.00903 
-
0.0703 
-
0.0503 
-0.371* -0.240 -0.331 -0.242 -0.133 -0.193 0.501 0.634 
 (0.247) (0.274) (0.676) (0.286) (0.218) (0.319) (0.205) (0.239) (0.373) (0.375) (0.395) (0.574) 
Strategy: New products -0.213 -0.111 0.107 0.344 -0.342 -
0.0489 
-0.389 -0.316 -0.352 -0.407 -0.317 -0.539 
 (0.344) (0.354) (0.656) (0.375) (0.229) (0.284) (0.242) (0.302) (0.385) (0.359) (0.366) (0.402) 
Firm has formal 
business plan 
0.126 0.0201 -
0.0088
-0.165 0.0550 -
0.0412 
0.223**
* 
0.0910 0.287** 0.206 0.306* 0.194 
 (0.0987
) 
(0.112) (0.120) (0.137) (0.098
1) 
(0.109) (0.074
9) 
(0.099
0) 
(0.135) (0.132) (0.185) (0.249) 
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.265** 0.267** 0.436**
* 
0.356* 0. 30 0.263* 0.0926 0.240* 0.0691 -
0.0025
0.190 0.114 
 (0.115) (0.135) (0.152) (0.214) (0.105) (0.138) (0.095
4) 
(0.131) (0.129) (0.150) (0.223) (0.241) 
(Owner-)Manager: 
equity in firm 
-0.0559 -0.137 -0.137 -0.297 -
0.0330 
-0.138 0.0334 -0.105 -0.120 -
0.0713 
0.183 0.0190 
 (0.119) (0.141) (0.160) (0.232) (0.117) (0.177) (0.119) (0.118) (0.147) (0.161) (0.139) (0.173) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 
years old 
-0.0993  -0.628 -0.648 -0.105 -
0.0131 
0.0994 0.306 0.369 0.260 0.263 0.465 
 (0.807)  (0.753) (1.264) (0.468) (0.297) (0.321) (0.254) (0.477) (0.312) (0.451) (0.416) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 
years old 
-0.385 -0.305 -0.969 -
0.341** 
-0.303 -0.221 -
0.0218 
0.0746 0.0686 0.0104 -0.0744 0.118 
 (0.800) (0.207) (0.727) (0.157) (0.473) (0.143) (0.246) (0.105) (0.465) (0.192) (0.347) (0.236) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 
years old 
-0.545 -0.511** -1.063 -
0.723**
-0.413 -
0.296** 
-0.244 -
0.221** 
-
0.0869 
-0.103 -0.144 0.0819 
 (0.798) (0.206) (0.718) (0.180) (0.457) (0.121) (0.246) (0.100) (0.437) (0.219) (0.296) (0.264) 
Owner-Manager had 
previous firm 
0.129 0.174* 0.0543 -
0.0813 
0.122 0.0206 0.0689 0.129 0.131 0.234* 0.0869 0.248 
 (0.0949
) 
(0.104) (0.124) (0.186) (0.106) (0.136) (0.089
2) 
(0.097
2) 
(0.130) (0.141) (0.165) (0.191) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.107 0.134 0.487** 0.210 0.136 0.283 -
0.0617 
-
0.0614 
-0.164 -0.132 -0.317 -0.365 
 (0.138) (0.164) (0.228) (0.285) (0.169) (0.253) (0.113) (0.161) (0.164) (0.261) (0.257) (0.298) 
SIC: Construction 0.124 0.138 0.224 0.378 0.0691 0.226 0.0046
6 
-
0.0056
0.0315 -
0.0177 
-0.347 -0.228 
 (0.164) (0.184) (0.266) (0.274) (0.245) (0.306) (0.128) (0.189) (0.261) (0.335) (0.286) (0.426) 
SICH: Retail & 
Wholesale 
-0.0137 0.0221 0.407* 0.273 0.0610 0.256 -
0.0859 
-0.147 -0.165 -0.241 -
0.771*** 
-0.749** 
 (0.139) (0.164) (0.239) (0.219) (0.154) (0.232) (0.117) (0.160) (0.168) (0.276) (0.234) (0.361) 
SIC: Education -0.146 -0.137 -
0.0418 
0.0029
5 
-0.237 -
0.0626 
-0.102 -0.195 -
0.0767 
-0.172 -
0.752*** 
-0.573 
 (0.137) (0.155) (0.255) (0.264) (0.176) (0.253) (0.136) (0.152) (0.195) (0.303) (0.258) (0.460) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.136 0.189 0.107 -0.122 -
0.0006
0.0360 0.0453 0.0699 -
0.0005
0.0713 0.297 0.138 
 (0.0962
) 
(0.143) (0.115) (0.190) (0.108) (0.145) (0.073
1) 
(0.116) (0.124) (0.139) (0.193) (0.319) 
Selection Effect (inverse 
mills) 
 0.0657  -0.209  -0.100  -
0.0470 
 0.0358  -0.105 
  (0.128)  (0.166)  (0.148)  (0.099
7) 
 (0.158)  (0.200) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
             
Observations 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 
R-squared 0.185 0.196                     
Standard errors in             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Employment 3.6 - 2004-10, quantiles, no lags (full models with and without selection (s); quantiles 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 FULL FULL 
S 
Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 
S 
Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75
S 
Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) 
 
empl04
10 
empl04
10 
empl0
410 
empl0
410 
empl0
410 
empl0
410 
empl04
10 
empl04
10 
empl04
10 
empl0
410 
empl04
10 
empl04
10 
                         
Employment 2004 
(ELD) 
-
0.0110*
-
0.0105
-
0.0036
-
0.0023
-
0.0037
-
0.0063
-
0.0080
-
0.0107*
-
0.00967
-
0.0179
-
0.0209*
-
0.0224* (0.0032
1) 
(0.0 3
65) 
(0. 05
22) 
(0. 04
86) 
(0. 03
30) 
(0. 05
55) 
(0. 03
10) 
(0.0030
6) 
(0. 035
3) 
(0.00
74) 
(0.0059
0) 
(0.0084
3) Employment 2004 
squared 
4.90e-
05*** 
4.89e-
05** 
6.69e-
06 
5.57e-
06 
1.54e-
05 
2.9 e-
05 
3. 2e-
05* 
4.41e-
05*** 
4. 7e-
05** 
0.0001
12 
0.0 011
2*** 
0.00012
5***  (1.61e-
05) 
(1.96e-
05) 
(3.40e-
05) 
(2.82e-
05) 
(1.58e-
05) 
(2.96e-
05) 
(1.70e-
05) 
(1.37e-
05) 
(1.70e-
05) 
(8.2 e-
05) 
(3.21e-
05) 
(4.20e-
05) Firm age: 3<5 years 0.417* 0.446* 0.541* 0.923 0.229 0.332 0.345* 0.445** 0.369 0.243 0.336 0.255 
 (0.223) (0.250) (0.325) (0.928) (0.178) (0.242) (0.195) (0.185) (0.368) (0.376) (0.552) (0.422) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.0262 0.0956 -
0.0733 
0.329 -
0.0940 
0.119 0.204 0.299* 0.0289 -
0.0330 
-0.252 0.0491 
 (0.213) (0.241) (0.388) (0.899) (0.215) (0.263) (0.187) (0.174) (0.317) (0.339) (0.333) (0.269) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0733 -
0.0086
-
0.0833 
0.214 -0.136 0.0672 0.0471 0.179 -0.0305 -0.158 -0.433 -0.101 
 (0.215) (0.244) (0.400) (0.880) (0.215) (0.271) (0.166) (0.171) (0.327) (0.341) (0.388) (0.416) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.165 -0.165 -0.181 0.0473 -0.328 -0.193 -
0.0414 
-0.0210 -0.143 -0.173 -0.210 -0.0186 
 (0.213) (0.244) (0.328) (0.782) (0.200) (0.266) (0.194) (0.186) (0.321) (0.377) (0.361) (0.375) 
Legal form: Limited 
liability 
-0.0546 0.0159 -0.379* -0.302 -
0.0983 
-
0.0206 
0.101 0.183 -0.110 0.101 0.0270 0.312 
 (0.152) (0.176) (0.202) (0.202) (0.123) (0.166) (0.129) (0.138) (0.341) (0.315) (0.458) (0.561) 
Multi-site firm 0.288** 0.356** 0.260 0.257 0.254 0.248 0.279** 0.438**
* 
0.256* 0.338 0.201 0.530 
 (0.126) (0.144) (0.248) (0.262) (0.158) (0.173) (0.136) (0.164) (0.142) (0.218) (0.238) (0.453) 
Exporting firm -0.0130 -
0.0651 
0.0248 0.0690 0.0101 -
0.0859 
-
0.0071
-0.0849 0.0306 -
0.0401 
-0.216 0.0441 
 (0.108) (0.121) (0.154) (0.268) (0.114) (0.132) (0. 98
2) 
(0.114) (0.105) (0.152) (0.162) (0.333) 
Firm in competitive 
environ.  
-0.0202 -
0.0180 
0.113 0.0006
81 
0.115 -0.103 -
0.0610 
-0.0929 -0.0541 -
0.0103 
-0.103 0.151 
 (0.102) (0.118) (0.173) (0.187) (0.134) (0.127) (0.087
6) 
(0.0958
) 
(0.129) (0.149) (0.189) (0.245) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.0808 -0.169 -0.177 -0.337 -
0.0024
-
0.0653 
0.0051
6 
-0.0372 -0.0789 -
0.0519 
-0.195 -0.261 
 (0.114) (0.129) (0.212) (0.213) (0.112) (0.201) (0.093
1) 
(0.101) (0.118) (0.151) (0.179) (0.269) 
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0717 -0.110 -0.113 -0.198 -0.239 -0.255 -
0.0669 
-0.196 0.0184 -
0.0664 
-0.209 0.170 
 (0.230) (0.244) (0.367) (0.419) (0.219) (0.327) (0.169) (0.177) (0.227) (0.231) (0.221) (0.312) 
Strategy: Penetrate 
market 
-0.0499 -
0.0781 
-
0.0760 
-0.112 -0.220 -0.182 -0.106 -0.281* 0.00732 -
0.0372 
0.0772 0.334* 
 (0.219) (0.233) (0.301) (0.334) (0.205) (0.278) (0.149) (0.162) (0.214) (0.197) (0.228) (0.198) 
Strategy: New markets -0.0492 0.0024
7 
-0.120 -0.393 -
0.527*
-0.433 -0.226 -0.393 -0.209 0.216 0.617 0.743 
 (0.256) (0.285) (0.327) (0.406) (0.240) (0.291) (0.226) (0.243) (0.278) (0.795) (0.611) (0.743) 
Strategy: New products -0.216 -
0.0989 
0.0342 0.242 -0.299 -
0.0942 
-0.352 -0.393* -0.278 -0.390 0.00028
8 
-0.0561 
 (0.356) (0.368) (0.378) (0.441) (0.249) (0.337) (0.234) (0.205) (0.450) (0.414) (0.420) (0.614) 
Firm has formal 
business plan 
0.157 0.0474 -
0.0675 
-0.193 0.118 0.0222 0.262**
* 
0.122 0.317**
* 
0.269*
* 
0.267 0.149 
 (0.102) (0.116) (0.145) (0.328) (0.102) (0.109) (0.091
1) 
(0.106) (0.108) (0.135) (0.162) (0.409) 
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.232* 0.262* 0.323* 0.389 0.208* 0.332*
* 
0. 30 0.199* 0.0944 0.0856 0.136 0.0148 
 (0.119) (0.140) (0.193) (0.238) (0.124) (0.153) (0.097
1) 
(0.114) (0.125) (0.147) (0.252) (0.193) 
(Owner-)Manager: 
equity in firm 
0.112 0.0528 -
0.0508 
-0.215 0.191 0.126 0. 63 0.0261 0.128 0.0414 0.202 0.184 
 (0.123) (0.146) (0.194) (0.285) (0.150) (0.278) (0.109) (0.133) (0.140) (0.134) (0.151) (0.246) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 
years old 
0.149  -0.271 0.301 -
0.0205 
0.345 0.108 0.351** 0.318 0.555 0.801 0.764 
 (0.836)  (0.708) (0.543) (0.514) (0.268) (0.299) (0.171) (0.303) (0.455) (0.872) (0.583) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 
years old 
-0.156 -
0.474** 
-0.762 -0.146 -0.346 -0.176 -
0.0359 
0.0792 0.251 0.0981 0.446 0.230 
 (0.829) (0.215) (0.694) (0.260) (0.520) (0.144) (0.295) (0.102) (0.330) (0.195) (0.870) (0.216) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 
years old 
-0.312 -
0.692**
-0.915 -0.559* -0.422 -
0.251*
-0.241 -0.149 0.0537 -
0.0517 
0.293 0.0948 
 (0.826) (0.214) (0.706) (0.296) (0.508) (0.119) (0.293) (0.105) (0.271) (0.217) (0.841) (0.306) 
Owner-Manager had 
previous firm 
0.127 0.177 0.170 0.289 0.0366 0.0034
6 
0.112 0.202* 0.156 0.205 0.401** 0.561* 
 (0.0982
) 
(0.108) (0.154) (0.237) (0.122) (0.128) (0.104) (0.120) (0.137) (0.135) (0.189) (0.310) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.0793 0.122 0.442 0.481 0.114 0.287 0.0070
4 
0.0387 -0.0635 -0.184 -0.395 -0.475 
 (0.143) (0.171) (0.276) (0.327) (0.171) (0.259) (0.152) (0.175) (0.166) (0.225) (0.326) (0.682) 
SIC: Construction 0.133 0.186 0.411 0.507 0.0256 0.428 0.101 0.136 0.0912 -0.167 -0.580 -0.232 
 (0.170) (0.191) (0.267) (0.361) (0.204) (0.313) (0.157) (0.176) (0.192) (0.255) (0.384) (0.670) 
SICH: Retail & 
Wholesale 
-0.0191 0.0126 0.420* 0.490 0.0703 0.286 -
0.0114 
-0.0310 -0.154 -0.381 -
1.053*** 
-0.919 
 (0.144) (0.170) (0.239) (0.329) (0.147) (0.237) (0.127) (0.170) (0.152) (0.260) (0.289) (0.696) 
SIC: Education -0.167 -0.116 -
0.0579 
0.114 -0.200 0.0344 -0.104 -0.148 -0.0995 -0.245 -
0.936*** 
-0.715 
 (0.142) (0.161) (0.308) (0.437) (0.154) (0.270) (0.152) (0.181) (0.202) (0.262) (0. 05) (0.706) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0947 0.153 0.189 0.104 0.0441 -
0.0072
0.0637 0.0334 0.0364 0.0723 0.194 0.0809 
 (0.0996
) 
(0.148) (0.130) (0.288) (0.109) (0.155) (0.097
8) 
(0.137) (0.106) (0.131) (0.141) (0.317) 
Selection Effect 
(inverse mills) 
 0.0755  0.0125  -
0.0640 
 -0.0653  0.0474  -0.0121 
  (0.133)  (0.197)  (0.123)  (0.0976
) 
 (0.145)  (0.342) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
             
Observations 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 
R-squared 0.174 0.200                     
Standard errors in             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Employment 3.7 - 2004-11, quantiles, no lags (full models with and without selection (s); quantiles 0.1, 
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 FULL FULL S Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 
S 
Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75S Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) 
 
empl04
11 
empl04
11 
empl0
411 
empl0
411 
empl0
411 
empl0
411 
empl04
11 
empl04
11 
empl04
11 
empl04
11 
empl04
11 
empl04
11 
                         
Employment 2004 
(ELD) 
-
0.0123*
-
0.0126*
-
0.0081
-
0.0097
-
0.0054
-
0.0070
-
0.0095
-
0.0106*
-
0.0133*
-
0.0196*
-
0.0216*
-
0.0290* (0.0032
7) 
(0.0037
0) 
(0. 04
09) 
(0. 05
25) 
(0. 03
26) 
(0. 03
70) 
( . 33
6) 
(0.0033
1) 
(0.0040
3) 
(0.0071
8) 
(0.0071
8) 
(0.0072
3) Employment 2004 
squared 
5.46e-
05*** 
5.74e-
05*** 
2.88e-
05 
3.79e-
05 
2. 4e-
05* 
3.42e-
05 
3. 5e-
05** 
4. 1e-
05*** 
5.69e-
05*** 
0.00011
8*** 
0.00010
6*** 
0.00014
8***  (1.65e-
05) 
(1.99e-
05) 
(2.40e-
05) 
(3. 9e-
05) 
(1.35e-
05) 
(2.48e-
05) 
(1.49e-
05) 
(1. 6e-
05) 
(1.97e-
05) 
(3.75e-
05) 
(3.65e-
05) 
(3.69e-
05) Firm age: 3<5 years 0.492** 0.541** 0.491*
* 
0.699 0.379*
* 
0.4 5* 0.401** 0.341 0.728** 0.397 0.400 0.426 
 (0.227) (0.253) (0.194) (0.543) (0.173) (0.235) (0.201) (0.227) (0.282) (0.578) (0.530) (0.367) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.0802 0.202 -0.133 0.248 0.190 0.296 0.239 0.298 0.352 0.0870 -0.251 0.316 
 (0.217) (0.244) (0.245) (0.615) (0.189) (0.248) (0.184) (0.207) (0.256) (0.577) (0.400) (0.299) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0474 0.0459 -0.157 0.0988 -
0.0305 
0.0848 0.0476 0.0737 0.118 0.00418 -0.304 0.223 
 (0.220) (0.247) (0.214) (0.533) (0.189) (0.261) (0.176) (0.199) (0.245) (0.570) (0.452) (0.365) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.128 -0.0927 -0.256 -
0.0736 
-0.174 -0.130 -0.0586 -0.0490 0.0792 -0.0356 -0.193 0.257 
 (0.218) (0.247) (0.181) (0.525) (0.182) (0.242) (0.179) (0.208) (0.242) (0.580) (0.470) (0.394) 
Legal form: Limited 
liability 
-0.113 0.0225 -
0.493*
-0.334 -
0.247* 
-0.121 0.0310 0.0375 0.0420 0.348 0.0662 0.577** 
 (0.156) (0.178) (0.158) (0.206) (0.126) (0.146) (0.129) (0.146) (0.208) (0.228) (0.426) (0.247) 
Multi-site firm 0.308** 0.396**
* 
0.388*
* 
0.375* 0.315*
* 
0.288* 0.378**
* 
0.456**
* 
0.349** 0.428* 0.506 0.665*** 
 (0.128) (0.145) (0.159) (0.216) (0.130) (0.165) (0.141) (0.141) (0.144) (0.225) (0.355) (0.194) 
Exporting firm -0.0580 -0.123 -
0.0137 
0.0553 -
0.0158 
-0.118 -0.0712 -0.113 0.0601 -0.114 -0.185 -0.226 
 (0.110) (0.122) (0.137) (0.201) (0.099
6) 
(0.111) (0.112) (0.121) (0.146) (0.192) (0.217) (0.227) 
Firm in competitive 
environ.  
-0.0297 0.0052
0 
0.0768 0.0416 0.0234 -
0.0576 
-0.0236 -0.0395 -0.0281 0.0854 -0.117 0.265 
 (0.104) (0.120) (0.115) (0.175) (0.117) (0.116) (0.0927
) 
(0.0989
) 
(0.133) (0.161) (0.248) (0.258) 
Firm faces price elastic 
demand 
-0.0967 -0.198 -0.154 -0.235 -
0.0294 
-0.121 -0.0852 -0.124 -
0.0071
-0.114 -0.283 -0.492** 
 (0.116) (0.131) (0.120) (0.175) (0.108) (0.145) (0.104) (0.122) (0.120) (0.186) (0.179) (0.219) 
Strategy: Maintain 
sales 
-0.0989 -0.120 -0.246 -0.129 -
0.0170 
-0.211 -0.166 -0.102 -0.0471 -0.0899 -0.0446 -0.234 
 (0.235) (0.247) (0.284) (0.445) (0.189) (0.298) (0.213) (0.229) (0.238) (0.306) (0.308) (0.261) 
Strategy: Penetrate 
market 
-0.0567 -0.103 -0.152 -
0.0193 
-
0.0099
-0.138 -0.236 -0.200 -0.0389 -0.116 0.125 -0.106 
 (0.223) (0.236) (0.244) (0.388) (0.173) (0.291) (0.205) (0.237) (0.240) (0.305) (0.258) (0.186) 
Strategy: New markets -0.0691 -0.0170 -0.410 -0.160 -0.208 -0.380 -0.242 -0.202 -0.332 -0.0678 0.599 0.371 
 (0.261) (0.289) (0.303) (0.427) (0.228) (0.311) (0.258) (0.322) (0.325) (0.528) (0.660) (0.635) 
Strategy: New products -0.222 -0.0972 -
0.0858 
0.170 0.0608 -
0.0268 
-0.285 -0.0866 -0.563* -0.566 -0.324 -0.522 
 (0.363) (0.373) (0.239) (0.735) (0.211) (0.326) (0.247) (0.293) (0.317) (0.460) (0.363) (0.546) 
Firm has formal 
business plan 
0.158 0.0649 0.0212 -
0.0799 
0.135 0.0100 0.168* 0.0940 0.348**
* 
0.344* 0.208 0.357 
 (0.104) (0.117) (0.130) (0.240) (0.092
1) 
(0.106) (0.100) (0.112) (0.125) (0.178) (0.232) (0.219) 
Firm has non-executive 
directors 
0.246** 0.272* 0.444*
** 
0.492*
* 
0.257*
* 
0.319*
* 
0.181 0.227** 0.0481 0.103 0.211 0.0360 
 (0.121) (0.142) (0.137) (0.216) (0.116) (0.126) (0.111) (0.113) (0.164) (0.187) (0.226) (0.209) 
(Owner-)Manager: 
equity in firm 
0.0353 -0.0639 -
0.0592 
-0.217 0.148 0.0842 0.0108 -0.105 0.128 -0.0585 0.195 -0.172 
 (0.126) (0.148) (0.136) (0.266) (0.136) (0.169) (0.133) (0.150) (0.156) (0.229) (0.202) (0.211) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 
years old 
-0.661  -1.174* 0.274 -0.767 0.357* -0.644* 0.443** -
0.633** 
0.456 -
0.00289 
0.440 
 (0.853)  (0.711) (0.345) (0.492) (0.187) (0.346) (0.206) (0. 13) (0.369) (0.47 ) (0.374) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 
years old 
-0.945 -
0.473** 
-
1.694*
-0.272 -
1.069*
-0.168 -
0.870** 
0.0781 -
0.599** 
0.0473 -0.306 -0.0735 
 (0.845) (0.218) (0.718) (0.175) (0.510) (0.125) (0.345) (0.117) (0.303) (0.212) (0.409) (0.214) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 
years old 
-1.096 -
0.663**
-
1.847*
-
0.505*
-
1.110*
-
0.175* 
-
1.048**
-0.124 -
0.774**
-0.164 -0.412 -0.174 
 (0.843) (0.217) (0.712) (0.178) (0.498) (0.105) (0.338) (0.110) (0.285) (0.231) (0.428) (0.205) 
Owner-Manager had 
previous firm 
0.132 0.190* 0.138 0.277 0.0854 0.0137 0.0928 0.0934 0.120 0.189 0.343 0.687*** 
 (0.100) (0.109) (0.114) (0.227) (0.111) (0.102) (0.0948
) 
(0.0962
) 
(0.111) (0.155) (0.224) (0.236) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.144 0.161 0.475*
* 
0.613 0.238 0.255 0.120 0.0989 -0.158 -0.163 -0.363 -0.0612 
 (0.146) (0.173) (0.199) (0.448) (0.154) (0.176) (0.181) (0.186) (0.226) (0.280) (0.332) (0.235) 
SIC: Construction 0.0733 0.117 0.352* 0.481 0.108 0.258 0.0586 0.147 -0.337 -0.163 -0.566 -0.136 
 (0.173) (0.194) (0.198) (0.487) (0.210) (0.199) (0.180) (0.181) (0.285) (0.335) (0.371) (0.313) 
SICH: Retail & 
Wholesale 
-0.0349 -0.0122 0.323* 0.475 0.168 0.214 -0.0467 -0.0571 -0.342 -0.412 -
1.062*** 
-0.634** 
 (0.147) (0.172) (0.186) (0.375) (0.132) (0.162) (0.163) (0.182) (0.258) (0.344) (0.273) (0.275) 
SIC: Education -0.156 -0.110 -0.143 0.0082
2 
-0.127 -
0.0745 
-0.0374 -0.0154 -0.248 -0.220 -0.746** -0.661 
 (0.145) (0.163) (0.247) (0.461) (0.147) (0.188) (0.176) (0.192) (0.276) (0.370) (0.335) (0.409) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.118 0.189 0.140 0.205 -
0.0062
-
0.0111 
0.0758 0.140 0.0364 0.137 0.315 0.208 
 (0.102) (0.150) (0.114) (0.329) (0. 99
5) 
(0.129) (0.0991
) 
(0.114) (0.119) (0.149) (0.216) (0.384) 
Selection Effect 
(inverse mills) 
 0.0970  0.0712  -
0.0610 
 0.0473  0.0229  -0.119 
  (0.135)  (0.244)  (0.103)  (0.0989
) 
 (0.142)  (0.261) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x x x 
             
Observations 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 341 272 
R-squared 0.181 0.213                     
Standard errors in             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Employment 3.8 - 2004-5, quantiles, with 2003-4 lag (full models with and without selection (s); 
quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 S Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75S Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)     (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040   empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040
                     
Lag: Employment growth 0.0171 0.0446 -2.38e-05 -0.0139   0.0788 0.0714 0.0583 0.237** 
 (0.0379) (0.0603) (0.0156) (0.0230)   (0.105) (0.0583) (0.0496) (0.118) 
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Employment 2004 (ELD) 0.00126 0.00056 1.10e-05 - could could -0.00104 -0.00136 -0.00232 -
 (0.00091 (0.00106 (0.00030 (0.00064 not  not  (0.00083 (0.00105 (0.00170 (0.00096
Employment 2004 squared -5.23e-06 -1.49e- -1.27e-06 -1.43e-06 be  be  5.09e-06 7.20e-06 8.21e-06 -9.95e-07 
 (3.54e- (4.75e- (1.93e- (8.52e- compute compute (3.91e- (7.01e- (8.46e- (4.58e-
Firm age: 3<5 years -0.0373 -0.137 2.59e-05 0.0143   -0.0770 -0.174 0.326 0.371** 
 (0.112) (0.167) (0.0187) (0.0182)   (0.377) (0.124) (0.209) (0.173) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.0365 -0.0300 4.22e-05 0.0159   -0.0835 -0.104 -0.112 -0.0347 
 (0.0823) (0.0817) (0.0179) (0.0175)   (0.150) (0.0991) (0.151) (0.133) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0101 -0.0176 3.07e-05 0.0119   -0.150 -0.178** -0.132 -0.173 
 (0.0812) (0.0655) (0.0177) (0.0171)   (0.132) (0.0862) (0.122) (0.110) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.0573 -0.0558 1.68e-05 0.00904   -0.151 -0.202** -0.149 -0.224** 
 (0.0851) (0.0739) (0.0186) (0.0163)   (0.133) (0.0841) (0.130) (0.111) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0498 -0.00341 1.21e-05 0.00126   -0.0431 -0.0547 0.00467 -0.0393 
 (0.0381) (0.0498) (0.0132) (0.0102)   (0.0636) (0.0531) (0.0859) (0.0534) 
Multi-site firm 0.0779** 0.0177 2.45e-05 0.00374   0.0214 0.0299 0.0758 0.0542 
 (0.0362) (0.0441) (0.00939) (0.00937)   (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0901) (0.0495) 
Exporting firm 0.0173 -0.0358 -5.72e-06 0.000226   0.00188 -0.0195 0.0378 0.0146 
 (0.0285) (0.0346) (0.00779) (0.00687)   (0.0278) (0.0297) (0.0461) (0.0385) 
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.0180 0.00998 -4.79e-06 0.000149   0.00285 0.0170 -7.73e- -0.0310 
 (0.0316) (0.0386) (0.00717) (0.00734)   (0.0353) (0.0330) (0.0530) (0.0430) 
Firm faces price elastic -0.0224 -0.0527 -9.67e-06 0.00250   -0.0198 -0.0515 -0.0721 -0.0188 
 (0.0309) (0.0341) (0.00724) (0.00711)   (0.0422) (0.0382) (0.0571) (0.0347) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.00293 -0.0628 -1.30e-05 -0.00510   0.0254 -0.00696 0.102 0.0671 
 (0.0505) (0.0593) (0.0127) (0.0120)   (0.0693) (0.0606) (0.118) (0.0869) 
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0199 -0.0648 -7.62e-06 -0.00127   0.0141 0.00085 0.0499 0.0976 
 (0.0469) (0.0510) (0.0117) (0.0102)   (0.0548) (0.0594) (0.111) (0.0639) 
Strategy: New markets -0.118 -0.103 -4.69e-05 -0.00818   0.0301 0.0975 0.0939 0.102 
 (0.0808) (0.0955) (0.0182) (0.0175)   (0.125) (0.102) (0.115) (0.0908) 
Strategy: New products -0.0896 -0.152* -0.0403 -0.0383   0.0142 0.0601 -0.0706 0.0122 
 (0.0850) (0.0869) (0.0703) (0.0527)   (0.139) (0.106) (0.144) (0.102) 
Firm has formal business plan 0.0105 -0.00783 -2.99e-07 0.00159   0.0560 0.0335 0.0893 0.0153 
 (0.0320) (0.0332) (0.00664) (0.00584)   (0.0404) (0.0384) (0.0549) (0.0381) 
Firm has non-executive -0.0420 -0.0516 8.23e-06 -0.00562   0.0128 -0.0188 0.137 0.106 
 (0.0603) (0.0465) (0.00921) (0.00916)   (0.0392) (0.0277) (0.123) (0.0758) (Owner-)Manager: equity in 0.105 -0.0125 - -0.00461   -0.0345 -0.0535 -0.0568 -0.0743 
 (0.0647) (0.0385) (0.0117) (0.0129)   (0.0457) (0.0377) (0.0919) (0.0713) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years -0.0976  -0.0320    0.0272  0.147  
 (0.189)  (0.0449)    (0.112)  (0.292)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years 0.000223 0.239** -0.0320 -   0.0229 -0.0224 0.133 0.0761 
 (0.177) (0.117) (0.0441) (0.0140)   (0.0643) (0.116) (0.264) (0.112) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years -0.0454 0.143 -0.0320 -   -0.0167 -0.0348 0.0553 -0.0238 
 (0.175) (0.130) (0.0437) (0.0146)   (0.0544) (0.127) (0.258) (0.0715) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old 0.0197 0.261** -0.0320 0.00156   -0.0301 -0.0409 -0.00203 -0.00211 
 (0.176) (0.123) (0.0437) (0.0143)   (0.0541) (0.119) (0.259) (0.0640) 
Owner-Manager had previous 0.00419 -0.00980 -9.40e-06 0.000458   -0.0196 0.0368 -0.0883* 0.00820 
 (0.0304) (0.0405) (0.00651) (0.00628)   (0.0349) (0.0340) (0.0506) (0.0348) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.272*** 0.218* 0.0378 0.0308   -0.0318 0.00226 -0.104 -0.0129 
 (0.0727) (0.120) (0.0634) (0.0599)   (0.0858) (0.0498) (0.114) (0.0830) 
SIC: Construction 0.251*** 0.200 0.0378 0.0328   0.156 0.0375 0.221 0.147 
 (0.0852) (0.139) (0.0628) (0.0650)   (0.147) (0.120) (0.230) (0.125) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.246*** 0.223** 0.0378 0.0308   -0.0534 -0.0652 -0.0842 -0.0940 
 (0.0720) (0.113) (0.0644) (0.0592)   (0.0847) (0.0591) (0.110) (0.0728) 
SIC: Education 0.218*** 0.169 0.0378 0.0279   -0.0573 -0.0416 0.0567 0.0134 
 (0.0757) (0.119) (0.0617) (0.0579)   (0.0987) (0.0465) (0.138) (0.0757) 
Assistance Effect (IA) -0.00564 -0.00328 -2.69e-06 -0.00346     -0.0149 0.0440 -0.0723 0.113*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0412) (0.00688) (0.00712)     (0.0304) (0.0420) (0.0549) (0.0398) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  -0.0331  -0.00228    0.0719  0.131*** 
  (0.0404)  (0.00733)    (0.0537)  (0.0408) 
Constant^ x x x x   x x x x 
 x x x x   x x x x 
           
Observations 323 256 323 256     323 256 323 256 
Standard errors in           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Employment 3.9 - 2004-6, quantiles, with 2003-4 lag (full models with and without selection (s); 
quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 S Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75S Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl0406 empl040 empl040 empl040
                     
Lag: Employment growth -0.00723 0.0724 -0.00814 0.0245 0.0110 -0.00336 -0.100 0.00563 -0.475*** -0.446*** 
 (0.110) (0.171) (0.126) (0.103) (0.0916) (0.0886) (0.146) (0.199) (0.163) (0.131) 
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Employment 2004 (ELD) - -0.00605 -0.00218 - - -0.00116 - -0.00391 -0.0103** -0.00399 
 (0.00296 (0.00493 (0.00136 (0.00205 (0.00111 (0.00122 (0.00129) (0.00244 (0.00402 (0.00419
Employment 2004 squared -2.62e- 3.25e-05 1.03e- -2.15e- 4.60e-06 5.72e-06 1.53e-05* 2.34e- 4.59e- 1.80e-05 
 (1.79e- (2.05e- (5.46e- (1.15e- (5.16e- (5.51e- (7.86e- (1.36e- (1.90e- (2.53e-
Firm age: 3<5 years -0.234 0.112 -0.0272 -0.114 -0.254** -0.223** -0.315* -0.324 -0.176 -0.151 
 (0.147) (0.289) (0.124) (0.110) (0.111) (0.113) (0.162) (0.291) (0.471) (0.388) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.375** -0.0962 -0.0676 -0.137 -0.260** -0.245** -0.383*** -0.377 -0.568 -0.482 
 (0.157) (0.300) (0.109) (0.0893) (0.105) (0.1000) (0.135) (0.251) (0.345) (0.318) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.360*** -0.0404 -0.0701 -0.172* -0.274*** -0.272*** -0.492*** -0.496** -0.775** -0.521* 
 (0.138) (0.273) (0.112) (0.0893) (0.105) (0.0992) (0.128) (0.251) (0.340) (0.314) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.358*** -0.103 -0.128 -0.234*** -0.276*** -0.283*** -0.482*** -0.506** -0.746** -0.597** 
 (0.125) (0.262) (0.107) (0.0858) (0.104) (0.0962) (0.133) (0.242) (0.340) (0.298) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.200* -0.219* -0.0911 -0.0688 -0.00838 -0.0198 0.00530 0.0753 -0.178 0.0919 
 (0.103) (0.112) (0.0585) (0.0865) (0.0518) (0.0607) (0.120) (0.131) (0.281) (0.235) 
Multi-site firm 0.170** 0.245* 0.0630 0.0878 0.0230 0.0353 0.109 0.162 0.343* 0.356 
 (0.0857) (0.133) (0.0390) (0.0615) (0.0386) (0.0498) (0.0832) (0.150) (0.181) (0.270) 
Exporting firm -0.0360 -0.00665 0.0196 0.00254 -0.00365 0.00445 0.00265 -0.0408 0.0597 -0.0465 
 (0.0797) (0.0839) (0.0336) (0.0502) (0.0303) (0.0345) (0.0564) (0.0912) (0.0903) (0.124) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0299 0.0369 0.0117 0.0189 0.00091 -0.00464 -0.0335 -0.00254 -0.132 0.0809 
 (0.0677) (0.0966) (0.0388) (0.0569) (0.0335) (0.0404) (0.0573) (0.0816) (0.139) (0.155) 
Firm faces price elastic -0.0320 -0.240 -0.0251 -0.0257 -0.00981 -0.0101 -0.0149 -0.0478 0.0348 -0.211 
 (0.0891) (0.174) (0.0428) (0.0597) (0.0325) (0.0370) (0.0658) (0.0714) (0.105) (0.144) 
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0563 0.0180 0.0483 0.0494 -0.00718 -0.0163 -0.130 -0.0708 -0.00270 0.0406 
 (0.127) (0.142) (0.0822) (0.0924) (0.103) (0.137) (0.124) (0.127) (0.226) (0.244) 
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0830 -0.114 0.0330 -0.00346 -0.00292 -0.0146 -0.163 -0.0927 -0.126 -0.0484 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.0740) (0.0838) (0.0986) (0.135) (0.107) (0.102) (0.259) (0.236) 
Strategy: New markets -0.319 -0.181 0.0185 0.0269 -0.0181 -0.0509 -0.233* -0.172 -0.277 -0.189 
 (0.379) (0.252) (0.0883) (0.102) (0.114) (0.146) (0.122) (0.131) (0.329) (0.277) 
Strategy: New products -0.0194 0.0813 0.122 0.212 0.105 0.0580 -0.207* -0.158 -0.0360 0.366 
 (0.310) (0.146) (0.165) (0.135) (0.155) (0.172) (0.118) (0.150) (0.443) (0.708) 
Firm has formal business plan -0.254*** -0.190** -0.0240 -0.117* 0.00198 -0.00781 0.0678 0.0266 0.236** 0.0476 
 (0.0760) (0.0950) (0.0352) (0.0615) (0.0287) (0.0324) (0.0571) (0.0704) (0.112) (0.138) 
Firm has non-executive 0.157* 0.0967 0.0181 0.0612 0.0150 0.0322 0.0603 0.0434 0.000545 -0.0318 
 (0.0838) (0.123) (0.0383) (0.0693) (0.0414) (0.0440) (0.0647) (0.0815) (0.101) (0.138) (Owner-)Manager: equity in -0.199** -0.141 - -0.144** -0.0494 -0.0460 -0.0101 -0.0567 0.0385 0.0169 
 (0.0885) (0.126) (0.0455) (0.0602) (0.0466) (0.0605) (0.0646) (0.0821) (0.108) (0.136) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years -0.274  -0.0602  0.0618  0.191  0.238  
 (0.421)  (0.107)  (0.120)  (0.150)  (0.578)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years -0.316 0.733 -0.0585 -0.0283 0.0686 0.0235 0.259** 0.122 0.386 0.477* 
 (0.398) (0.553) (0.0991) (0.104) (0.108) (0.0834) (0.128) (0.202) (0.561) (0.250) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years -0.413 0.651 -0.0887 -0.0992 0.0450 -0.0152 0.0304 -0.105 0.207 -
 (0.414) (0.575) (0.0959) (0.109) (0.105) (0.0681) (0.116) (0.152) (0.544) (0.228) 
Owner-Manager >55 years old -0.314 0.724 -0.0416 0.0223 0.0609 0.0188 0.0445 -0.00353 0.0874 0.149 
 (0.407) (0.597) (0.0978) (0.102) (0.105) (0.0665) (0.112) (0.153) (0.561) (0.233) 
Owner-Manager had previous 0.0141 0.106 0.0435 0.0469 0.00941 0.0236 0.0482 0.0782 -0.0830 0.0399 
 (0.0641) (0.100) (0.0348) (0.0454) (0.0313) (0.0336) (0.0533) (0.0731) (0.126) (0.128) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.398*** 0.604*** 0.211** 0.253** 0.00631 -0.00550 -0.0903 -0.176 -0.221 -0.541* 
 (0.123) (0.214) (0.105) (0.124) (0.0553) (0.0837) (0.127) (0.203) (0.161) (0.326) 
SIC: Construction 0.469*** 0.465*** 0.142 0.315** 0.00344 0.00169 -0.0350 -0.159 0.554* 0.0579 
 (0.131) (0.178) (0.129) (0.150) (0.0691) (0.0866) (0.151) (0.239) (0.292) (0.527) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.236* 0.331* 0.141 0.165 -0.0144 -0.0467 -0.177 -0.272 -0.370** -0.777** 
 (0.134) (0.186) (0.102) (0.119) (0.0519) (0.0854) (0.132) (0.192) (0.180) (0.327) 
SIC: Education 0.298*** 0.298* 0.156 0.184 -0.0179 -0.0413 -0.207 -0.263 -0.457** -0.786** 
 (0.103) (0.167) (0.1000) (0.134) (0.0560) (0.0865) (0.132) (0.186) (0.186) (0.314) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.275** 0.733* 0.0138 0.0923 -0.00387 -0.00698 -0.0244 0.0236 0.0303 -0.0111 
 (0.111) (0.407) (0.0364) (0.103) (0.0329) (0.0390) (0.0599) (0.0654) (0.106) (0.157) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.153  -0.0304  -0.0108  -0.0101  -0.0204 
  (0.163)  (0.0528)  (0.0341)  (0.0709)  (0.165) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x 
           
Observations 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 
Standard errors in           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Employment 3.10 - 2004-7, quantiles, with 2003-4 lag (full models with and without selection (s); 
quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 S Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75S Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl0407 empl0407 
                     
Lag: Employment growth 0.137 0.0552 0.136 0.0424 0.0136 0.131 -0.288 -0.103 -0.687 -0.510*** 
 (0.285) (0.112) (0.168) (0.142) (0.143) (0.245) (0.204) (0.198) (0.516) (0.157) 
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00532 -0.00730 -0.00173 - -0.00131 -0.00206 - -0.0101 -0.0165*** -
 (0.00816 (0.00695 (0.00240 (0.00222 (0.00172 (0.00184 (0.00229 (0.00707 (0.00478) (0.00392) 
Employment 2004 squared 2.51e-05 3.80e-05 8.30e-06 4.62e-06 5.19e-06 9.00e-06 2.06e- 6.18e-05 0.000105* 9.48e-
 (3.88e- (4.89e- (1.03e- (1.03e- (7.72e- (8.15e- (1.17e- (6.14e- (2.75e-05) (2.04e-
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.202 0.272 -0.105 0.0675 0.198 0.0657 0.137 -0.319 -0.298 -0.207 
 (0.218) (0.213) (0.174) (0.221) (0.156) (0.269) (0.260) (0.690) (0.520) (0.266) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.00140 0.245 -0.149 0.0690 0.0538 -0.0314 0.0345 -0.325 -0.401 -0.466** 
 (0.216) (0.172) (0.109) (0.134) (0.108) (0.235) (0.249) (0.698) (0.451) (0.217) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.0296 0.208 -0.191* -0.0744 0.0498 -0.0789 -0.175 -0.619 -0.699 -0.479 
 (0.219) (0.188) (0.113) (0.161) (0.113) (0.239) (0.237) (0.693) (0.452) (0.304) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.129 0.0554 -0.246** -0.136 -0.0274 -0.167 -0.204 -0.600 -0.533 -0.621** 
 (0.225) (0.186) (0.102) (0.142) (0.105) (0.231) (0.229) (0.704) (0.462) (0.280) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.265 -0.312*** -0.178 -0.203 -0.143 -0.0760 -0.0977 0.0451 -0.00169 0.101 
 (0.250) (0.111) (0.129) (0.143) (0.0911) (0.102) (0.0909) (0.174) (0.190) (0.165) 
Multi-site firm 0.243* 0.301** 0.133 0.206** 0.160** 0.229** 0.228* 0.355*** 0.301* 0.582*** 
 (0.142) (0.120) (0.0809) (0.0828) (0.0668) (0.109) (0.119) (0.130) (0.171) (0.202) 
Exporting firm -0.00164 -0.0329 0.0855 0.0732 0.0817 0.0386 0.0535 0.0167 -0.0378 -0.0597 
 (0.112) (0.0854) (0.0543) (0.0687) (0.0557) (0.0702) (0.0888) (0.0928) (0.130) (0.105) 
Firm in competitive environ.  -0.00118 -0.157* 0.0127 -0.0344 -0.0102 0.0252 -0.113 0.0267 -0.194 -0.00921 
 (0.0925) (0.0907) (0.0692) (0.0765) (0.0579) (0.0626) (0.0923) (0.0949) (0.151) (0.120) 
Firm faces price elastic -0.206 -0.167 -0.0707 -0.0252 -0.0738 -0.0553 -0.00810 -0.0885 0.0961 -0.0382 
 (0.137) (0.143) (0.0859) (0.104) (0.0622) (0.0671) (0.103) (0.0921) (0.198) (0.164) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0770 -0.132 0.226 0.0957 0.182 0.204 -0.0539 0.0722 -0.0910 0.288 
 (0.265) (0.150) (0.171) (0.136) (0.124) (0.130) (0.223) (0.306) (0.290) (0.254) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.139 0.0373 0.166 0.0720 0.110 0.134 -0.0422 0.0605 -0.0580 0.291 
 (0.209) (0.124) (0.152) (0.110) (0.112) (0.114) (0.221) (0.279) (0.290) (0.264) 
Strategy: New markets 0.0424 -0.135 0.208 -0.0803 0.0946 0.0293 -0.230 -0.176 -0.366 -0.131 
 (0.283) (0.183) (0.156) (0.239) (0.129) (0.145) (0.227) (0.335) (0.292) (0.241) 
Strategy: New products 0.243 0.146 0.150 0.0485 0.0775 0.0856 -0.303 -0.181 -0.241 0.211 
 (0.290) (0.306) (0.241) (0.155) (0.159) (0.161) (0.248) (0.337) (0.895) (0.340) 
Firm has formal business plan -0.192 -0.309*** 0.0214 -7.38e- 0.0536 0.0305 0.192* 0.215* 0.349*** 0.199 
 (0.132) (0.114) (0.0625) (0.0693) (0.0563) (0.0616) (0.0981) (0.119) (0.109) (0.130) 
Firm has non-executive 0.386** 0.348** 0.0704 0.0791 0.0235 0.0345 0.0921 0.0786 0.0844 0.0268 
 (0.168) (0.156) (0.0681) (0.0819) (0.0618) (0.0706) (0.101) (0.124) (0.205) (0.135) (Owner-)Manager: equity in -0.208 -0.326** -0.0980 -0.0680 -0.00463 -0.0899 0.0214 -0.0501 0.0155 0.0565 
 (0.176) (0.130) (0.0691) (0.0864) (0.0609) (0.0952) (0.119) (0.139) (0.124) (0.146) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years -0.536  -0.00181  0.190  0.0790  0.405  
 (0.679)  (0.277)  (0.186)  (0.352)  (0.654)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years -0.521 0.124 0.0195 0.0105 0.183 -0.0786 0.336 0.154 0.699 0.309* 
 (0.614) (0.455) (0.286) (0.209) (0.181) (0.133) (0.349) (0.146) (0.666) (0.178) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years -0.607 0.0249 -0.0733 -0.0483 0.0986 -0.184 0.0655 -0.0199 0.413 -0.0878 
 (0.624) (0.481) (0.274) (0.199) (0.185) (0.129) (0.343) (0.163) (0.638) (0.153) 
Owner-Manager >55 years -0.342 0.336 0.0242 0.0987 0.185 -0.0114 0.0967 0.0643 0.474 0.302 
 (0.603) (0.443) (0.274) (0.211) (0.182) (0.120) (0.351) (0.151) (0.719) (0.331) 
Owner-Manager had previous 0.162 0.351*** 0.0900 0.144* 0.0665 0.0682 0.0287 0.123 0.0400 0.0797 
 (0.113) (0.103) (0.0852) (0.0848) (0.0590) (0.0736) (0.0756) (0.0884) (0.148) (0.132) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.519 0.381*** 0.190 0.304** -0.00185 0.0535 -0.0732 0.00524 -0.0761 -0.214 
 (0.340) (0.134) (0.137) (0.136) (0.0938) (0.126) (0.135) (0.177) (0.177) (0.239) 
SIC: Construction 0.262 0.258 0.128 0.368* 0.0997 0.126 0.191 0.110 0.363 -0.0413 
 (0.417) (0.218) (0.172) (0.188) (0.168) (0.172) (0.233) (0.243) (0.433) (0.299) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.374 0.204 0.135 0.224 -0.0455 -0.0253 -0.152 -0.221 -0.437** -0.613*** 
 (0.326) (0.135) (0.129) (0.145) (0.0872) (0.115) (0.128) (0.169) (0.184) (0.211) 
SIC: Education 0.146 0.00272 0.0243 0.123 -0.0688 -0.0151 -0.220 -0.247 -0.270 -0.639** 
 (0.324) (0.145) (0.163) (0.170) (0.0890) (0.130) (0.156) (0.182) (0.229) (0.249) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.114 0.212 0.0251 0.165 0.0279 0.107 0.0474 0.0655 -0.0427 0.118 
 (0.0823) (0.150) (0.0664) (0.127) (0.0523) (0.0875) (0.0856) (0.109) (0.104) (0.165) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0573  0.0715  0.0283  0.0650  0.160 
  (0.148)  (0.0849)  (0.0757)  (0.0975)  (0.165) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x 
           
Observations 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 
Standard errors in           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
 
  
- 265 - 
 
 
Employment 3.11 - 2004-8, quantiles, with 2003-4 lag (full models with and without selection (s); 
quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 S Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75S Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) 
 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl040 empl0408 empl0408 
                     
Lag: Employment growth 0.111 0.0994 -0.0164 -0.0478 0.0361 0.0213 -0.286 -0.204 -0.695 -0.550*** 
 (0.137) (0.143) (0.294) (0.199) (0.284) (0.181) (0.252) (0.296) (0.630) (0.133) 
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Employment 2004 (ELD) - -0.0104* -0.00319 -0.00232 -0.00297 -0.00444 - -0.0119 -0.0223*** -0.0181*** 
 (0.00484 (0.00616 (0.00317 (0.00301 (0.00285 (0.00273 (0.00303 (0.00843 (0.00492) (0.00327) 
Employment 2004 squared 5.26e- 5.74e- 1.47e-05 1.26e-05 1.16e-05 1.81e-05 2.26e- 7.27e-05 0.000136* 0.000119*
 (2.10e- (3.14e- (1.30e- (1.59e- (1.19e- (1.22e- (1.35e- (7.49e- (3.17e-05) (1.87e-05) 
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.188 0.468** 0.0766 0.0663 0.104 0.189 0.276 0.0942 0.387 0.364 
 (0.144) (0.232) (0.159) (0.195) (0.208) (0.174) (0.302) (0.392) (0.633) (0.495) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.257 0.170 -0.107 -0.101 0.0807 0.144 -0.00620 -0.127 -0.0144 0.0928 
 (0.163) (0.237) (0.158) (0.156) (0.194) (0.154) (0.278) (0.391) (0.524) (0.437) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.157 0.0742 -0.0539 -0.0864 -0.0655 0.0266 -0.225 -0.373 -0.154 -0.149 
 (0.137) (0.245) (0.124) (0.160) (0.174) (0.150) (0.244) (0.366) (0.546) (0.479) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.336*** 0.00288 -0.262** -0.357** -0.211 -0.138 -0.302 -0.387 -0.188 -0.360 
 (0.128) (0.244) (0.124) (0.154) (0.183) (0.152) (0.268) (0.413) (0.542) (0.453) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.163 -0.0771 -0.113 -0.138 -0.0966 -0.0579 -0.229 0.117 0.0135 0.456** 
 (0.174) (0.304) (0.171) (0.149) (0.149) (0.175) (0.152) (0.208) (0.292) (0.192) 
Multi-site firm 0.280** 0.301* 0.106 0.343*** 0.156 0.232* 0.323** 0.392** 0.533** 0.646*** 
 (0.123) (0.159) (0.113) (0.119) (0.0960) (0.125) (0.133) (0.173) (0.251) (0.208) 
Exporting firm 0.0608 -0.0141 0.0618 0.0484 0.0349 0.00170 0.0145 -0.0775 0.0545 -0.0649 
 (0.0848) (0.120) (0.0828) (0.105) (0.0726) (0.0782) (0.109) (0.139) (0.136) (0.117) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0663 -0.0102 0.0135 0.0542 0.0176 0.0408 -0.0239 0.0728 -0.101 -0.0783 
 (0.0787) (0.105) (0.0965) (0.114) (0.0821) (0.100) (0.123) (0.125) (0.210) (0.173) 
Firm faces price elastic -0.194* -0.311 -0.0269 -0.171 -0.0523 -0.0406 -0.0493 -0.127 0.0975 -0.0255 
 (0.117) (0.230) (0.0932) (0.138) (0.0881) (0.0912) (0.104) (0.132) (0.323) (0.159) 
Strategy: Maintain sales -0.0166 -0.0445 -0.00503 -0.0359 0.0301 0.0427 -0.0588 -0.0789 0.268 0.0869 
 (0.172) (0.351) (0.199) (0.208) (0.197) (0.207) (0.229) (0.246) (0.245) (0.205) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.0479 0.0753 0.0379 0.0919 0.0628 0.0482 -0.0306 0.117 0.419* 0.347* 
 (0.152) (0.349) (0.183) (0.160) (0.185) (0.198) (0.200) (0.189) (0.226) (0.182) 
Strategy: New markets 0.0543 -0.0542 0.0128 -0.279 0.00912 0.0175 -0.258 -0.229 0.134 -0.0690 
 (0.170) (0.374) (0.211) (0.306) (0.193) (0.244) (0.221) (0.225) (0.295) (0.256) 
Strategy: New products -0.0353 0.0869 -0.0762 -0.0304 0.0691 0.00185 -0.323 -0.367 0.115 -0.0152 
 (0.250) (0.466) (0.360) (0.204) (0.340) (0.329) (0.301) (0.347) (0.334) (0.228) 
Firm has formal business plan -0.165 -0.343** -0.0385 -0.0835 0.0836 0.0230 0.215** 0.135 0.0962 -0.144 
 (0.102) (0.163) (0.0846) (0.115) (0.0905) (0.0807) (0.108) (0.147) (0.188) (0.189) 
Firm has non-executive 0.331*** 0.374** 0.102 0.252** 0.0303 0.114 0.0529 -0.00282 0.00300 -0.0807 
 (0.0896) (0.158) (0.0956) (0.127) (0.105) (0.103) (0.109) (0.124) (0.170) (0.158) (Owner-)Manager: equity in -0.256 -0.524*** -0.171* -0.137 -0.0951 -0.180 -0.00559 -0.0148 0.120 0.205 
 (0.158) (0.179) (0.103) (0.126) (0.109) (0.112) (0.164) (0.158) (0.187) (0.158) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years -0.693*  -0.0905  0.0619  0.202  0.339  
 (0.397)  (0.417)  (0.249)  (0.420)  (0.714)  
Owner-Manager 35<45 years -0.589* 0.182 -0.168 -0.221 -0.0393 -0.252 0.214 -0.182 0.479 0.121 
 (0.300) (0.411) (0.397) (0.302) (0.244) (0.309) (0.424) (0.312) (0.676) (0.228) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years -0.813*** -0.0802 -0.239 -0.235 -0.116 -0.333 0.0347 -0.365 0.275 -0.0512 
 (0.274) (0.381) (0.411) (0.271) (0.256) (0.307) (0.413) (0.311) (0.649) (0.220) 
Owner-Manager >55 years -0.396 0.384 -0.0654 0.0299 0.0133 -0.136 0.0596 -0.273 0.254 0.121 
 (0.252) (0.368) (0.400) (0.293) (0.234) (0.317) (0.418) (0.292) (0.688) (0.246) 
Owner-Manager had previous 0.173* 0.354** 0.0649 -0.0432 0.0122 0.0431 0.0775 0.0462 -0.0826 -0.0349 
 (0.0945) (0.148) (0.0838) (0.0995) (0.0739) (0.0963) (0.0979) (0.124) (0.142) (0.130) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.666*** 0.642** 0.208 0.346 0.00838 0.116 0.0303 0.166 -0.418 -0.340** 
 (0.204) (0.261) (0.191) (0.211) (0.103) (0.186) (0.148) (0.230) (0.287) (0.170) 
SIC: Construction 0.496** 0.528* 0.160 0.420* 0.111 0.262 0.315 0.275 -0.130 -0.0875 
 (0.222) (0.287) (0.243) (0.248) (0.160) (0.223) (0.373) (0.284) (0.381) (0.271) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.535*** 0.389 0.149 0.194 -0.0457 0.0205 -0.0478 -0.0570 -0.444* -0.409** 
 (0.180) (0.237) (0.173) (0.193) (0.128) (0.178) (0.149) (0.248) (0.260) (0.168) 
SIC: Education 0.222 0.225 0.0804 0.135 -0.0471 0.0522 -0.139 -0.153 -0.331 -0.220 
 (0.184) (0.260) (0.207) (0.215) (0.110) (0.179) (0.186) (0.227) (0.266) (0.199) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0146 0.199 -0.00786 0.0281 0.0122 0.0644 0.0392 -0.0951 0.0587 0.0837 
 (0.0753) (0.355) (0.0739) (0.110) (0.0812) (0.117) (0.0959) (0.177) (0.161) (0.199) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.108  -0.0158  -0.0236  0.0300  -0.0250 
  (0.234)  (0.0907)  (0.0956)  (0.152)  (0.164) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x 
           
Observations 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 
Standard errors in           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Employment 3.12 – 2005-6, quantiles, with 2003-5 lag (full models with and without selection (s); 
quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 S Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75S Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) 
 empl050 empl050 empl050 empl050 empl0506 empl050 empl050 empl050 empl050 empl050
                     
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth -0.0696 -0.0380 -0.00157 -0.0202 1.09e-05 0.000151 0.00886 0.0328 -0.163 -0.327 
 (0.0835) (0.0723) (0.00532) (0.0247) (0.000544 (0.00831) (0.0206) (0.0541) (0.333) (0.317) 
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Employment 2004 (ELD) -0.00149 0.00029 - - -1.66e-05 -5.59e-05 0.000157 0.000246 -0.00253 0.00137 
 (0.00226 (0.00234 (0.00043 (0.00058 (2.64e- (0.00028 (0.00048 (0.00081 (0.00248 (0.00197
Employment 2004 squared 8.82e-06 2.75e-06 2.98e- 4.52e- 3.89e- 1.38e-06 -4.04e-07 5.94e-07 1.17e-05 -6.31e-
 (9.37e- (1.00e- (1.71e- (2.73e- (1.31e- (1.35e- (2.66e- (4.83e- (1.03e- (9.47e-
Firm age: 3<5 years -0.245 -0.0386 -0.00118 -0.0167 -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.241 -0.208** 0.109 0.155 
 (0.149) (0.227) (0.0146) (0.0331) (0.00651) (0.0551) (0.205) (0.0820) (2.333) (0.468) 
Firm age: 5<10 years -0.271 -0.119 -0.00674 -0.0312 -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.297 -0.234*** -0.595 -0.329 
 (0.360) (0.224) (0.0147) (0.0361) (0.00641) (0.0540) (0.205) (0.0719) (0.655) (0.228) 
Firm age: 10<20 years -0.161* -0.106 -0.00519 -0.0303 -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.337* -0.251*** -0.645 -0.282 
 (0.0829) (0.220) (0.0141) (0.0305) (0.00641) (0.0549) (0.199) (0.0692) (0.673) (0.242) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.199** -0.218 -0.00591 -0.0509 -0.223*** -0.223*** -0.338* -0.248*** -0.650 -0.440* 
 (0.0930) (0.226) (0.0136) (0.0397) (0.00637) (0.0542) (0.199) (0.0661) (0.674) (0.235) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.170 -0.153* -0.00572 -0.0328 -2.66e-07 4.57e-05 0.0364 0.0208 -0.117 -0.0854 
 (0.104) (0.0809) (0.0102) (0.0372) (0.000760 (0.00756) (0.0296) (0.0396) (0.171) (0.134) 
Multi-site firm 0.00144 -0.0434 0.00525 0.0223 5.55e-05 0.000310 0.117* 0.0609 0.161 0.110 
 (0.0720) (0.0944) (0.00769) (0.0219) (0.000732 (0.00756) (0.0702) (0.0625) (0.188) (0.108) 
Exporting firm -0.0650 -0.0825 0.00192 0.00932 -8.20e-06 -9.22e-05 0.00110 0.00325 0.0219 -0.0544 
 (0.0650) (0.0666) (0.00604) (0.0186) (0.000497 (0.00619) (0.0234) (0.0266) (0.0741) (0.0777) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.0535 0.0883 0.00188 -0.00199 -8.01e-06 -1.65e-05 0.000785 0.0160 -0.0440 0.0491 
 (0.0771) (0.0610) (0.00518) (0.0162) (0.000480 (0.00570) (0.0217) (0.0283) (0.120) (0.104) 
Firm faces price elastic -0.0324 -0.0733 -0.00535 -0.0153 4.55e-06 - -0.00136 -0.0165 0.0991 0.00718 
 (0.0724) (0.0823) (0.00663) (0.0193) (0.000511 (0.00536) (0.0240) (0.0308) (0.0950) (0.127) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.0214 -0.0822 -0.00188 -0.0137 - - -0.00140 0.00331 0.101 -0.0110 
 (0.122) (0.0959) (0.0162) (0.0403) (0.00638) (0.0154) (0.0433) (0.0443) (0.147) (0.137) 
Strategy: Penetrate market -0.0384 -0.115 -0.00332 -0.0181 - - 0.00139 - 0.0185 0.00395 
 (0.104) (0.0830) (0.0151) (0.0347) (0.00633) (0.0143) (0.0366) (0.0416) (0.103) (0.125) 
Strategy: New markets -0.221 -0.167 -0.00224 -0.0259 - - -0.00348 0.00145 -0.0302 0.0902 
 (0.293) (0.139) (0.0170) (0.0411) (0.00638) (0.0154) (0.0370) (0.0514) (0.110) (0.205) 
Strategy: New products 0.0547 0.0939 0.00423 0.0482 0.0833*** 0.111** 0.158** 0.118 -0.0218 0.281 
 (0.200) (0.123) (0.0548) (0.0905) (0.00855) (0.0500) (0.0663) (0.158) (0.185) (0.649) 
Firm has formal business plan -0.101 -0.196*** -0.00404 -0.0338 -2.54e-05 -1.37e-05 -0.00523 -0.00528 -0.0451 -0.0621 
 (0.0897) (0.0663) (0.00485) (0.0280) (0.000423 (0.00448) (0.0178) (0.0210) (0.0677) (0.0759) 
Firm has non-executive 0.0789 0.139* 0.00621 0.0322 4.86e-05 0.000164 0.00734 0.0129 0.00131 0.0641 
 (0.0795) (0.0721) (0.00634) (0.0217) (0.000542 (0.00587) (0.0174) (0.0239) (0.127) (0.119) (Owner-)Manager: equity in -0.168** -0.148** -0.00567 -0.0213 -2.19e-05 - -0.00896 -0.0331 0.00571 0.171 
 (0.0804) (0.0656) (0.00783) (0.0239) (0.000793 (0.00940) (0.0379) (0.0586) (0.0946) (0.129) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years -0.198 -1.083*** 0.0744** -0.00434 0.118*** - 0.135* 0.00274 0.277 -0.141 
 (0.285) (0.269) (0.0318) (0.0298) (0.00231) (0.00870) (0.0787) (0.0601) (0.394) (0.179) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years -0.119 -0.111* 0.0807*** -0.0104 0.118*** 3.22e-05 0.184** 0.0923 0.465 0.272** 
 (0.260) (0.0659) (0.0267) (0.0174) (0.00220) (0.00545) (0.0900) (0.0880) (0.452) (0.106) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years -0.189 -0.229*** 0.0772*** -0.0249 0.118*** - 0.129 -0.0163 0.260 -0.0695 
 (0.261) (0.0716) (0.0264) (0.0203) (0.00226) (0.00475) (0.0796) (0.0203) (0.415) (0.0780) 
Owner-Manager had previous 0.0819 -0.00838 0.00225 0.0153 -7.60e-06 -7.89e-07 -0.00154 -0.00400 -0.0280 -0.0823 
 (0.0608) (0.0704) (0.00497) (0.0172) (0.000457 (0.00462) (0.0199) (0.0264) (0.0705) (0.0636) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.206* 0.424* 0.0105 0.0504 4.49e-05 0.000197 0.00426 -0.00108 -0.290 -0.550 
 (0.114) (0.230) (0.00967) (0.0455) (0.000594 (0.00777) (0.0238) (0.0487) (0.328) (0.484) 
SIC: Construction 0.0950 0.370* 0.00643 0.0659 5.76e-05 0.000331 0.00302 0.0169 -0.0168 -0.146 
 (0.207) (0.203) (0.0114) (0.0549) (0.000729 (0.00791) (0.0302) (0.0589) (0.359) (0.427) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.0362 0.0819 0.00306 0.0208 1.60e-05 8.91e-05 -0.00166 -0.0208 -0.370 -0.580 
 (0.176) (0.246) (0.00859) (0.0356) (0.000570 (0.00721) (0.0254) (0.0412) (0.329) (0.485) 
SIC: Education 0.0878 0.292 0.00448 0.0214 2.21e-05 4.16e-05 0.00167 -0.00962 -0.420 -0.635 
 (0.124) (0.226) (0.00963) (0.0421) (0.000656 (0.00755) (0.0247) (0.0390) (0.383) (0.544) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0741 0.382** 0.000422 -0.00576 -4.74e-06 - -1.84e-05 -0.0123 0.0670 -0.142 
 (0.0685) (0.184) (0.00573) (0.0187) (0.000542 (0.00628) (0.0187) (0.0316) (0.0666) (0.134) 
Selection Effect (inverse mills)  0.0978  -0.00405  3.95e-05  -0.00273  -0.135 
  (0.0965)  (0.0143)  (0.00444)  (0.0237)  (0.108) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x 
           
Observations 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 
Standard errors in           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Employment 3.13 – 2006-7, quantiles, with 2003-6 lag (full models with and without selection [s]; 
quantiles 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 
 Q0.1 Q0.1 S Q0.25 Q0.25 S Q0.5 Q0.5 S Q0.75 Q0.75S Q0.9 Q0.9S 
 (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) 
 empl0607 empl060 empl060 empl060 empl060 empl060 empl060 empl060 empl0607 empl0607 
                     
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Lag: Employment growth 0.0381 -0.0259 - -0.00112 9.24e-06 -6.19e- -0.0178 -0.0589 -0.124*** -0.119* 
 (0.0297) (0.0485) (0.0107) (0.0141) (0.00693 (0.00920 (0.0248) (0.0454) (0.0410) (0.0697) 
Lag: Employment growth           
           
Employment 2004 (ELD) 0.00321** 0.00328* 1.47e-05 - -4.97e- -7.30e- -0.00133 - - -
 (0.00101) (0.00142 (0.00050 (0.00061 (0.00034 (0.00047 (0.00090 (0.00158 (0.00179) (0.00191) 
Employment 2004 squared -1.02e- -1.12e- 1.18e-06 2.39e-06 8.28e-07 9.30e-07 5.12e-06 1.20e-05 6.82e- 7.17e-
 (4.21e- (5.80e- (2.15e- (2.72e- (1.48e- (2.32e- (4.01e- (8.68e- (1.26e- (1.48e-
Firm age: 3<5 years 0.136 -0.0196 0.210* 0.204 0.000569 0.000712 0.144* 0.183* 0.115 0.141 
 (0.139) (0.161) (0.123) (0.139) (0.0203) (0.0291) (0.0859) (0.109) (0.0980) (0.114) 
Firm age: 5<10 years 0.183 0.0936 0.199 0.198 0.000344 0.000741 0.0767 0.0766 0.0957 0.148 
 (0.148) (0.0981) (0.121) (0.134) (0.0155) (0.0221) (0.0578) (0.0852) (0.107) (0.109) 
Firm age: 10<20 years 0.0148 -0.117 0.181 0.179 0.000489 0.000493 0.0138 0.0243 0.0273 0.0783 
 (0.108) (0.0887) (0.122) (0.138) (0.0163) (0.0223) (0.0459) (0.0766) (0.0961) (0.0990) 
Firm age: >20 years -0.0835 -0.160** 0.170 0.172 0.000367 0.000256 0.0340 0.0256 0.111 0.132 
 (0.131) (0.0756) (0.124) (0.140) (0.0177) (0.0250) (0.0488) (0.0759) (0.104) (0.116) 
Legal form: Limited liability -0.0788 -0.0566 -0.0300 -0.0160 - - -0.215*** -0.130 -0.142** -0.128 
 (0.0957) (0.177) (0.0253) (0.0349) (0.0196) (0.0265) (0.0808) (0.111) (0.0708) (0.125) 
Multi-site firm 0.0445 0.0782 0.00403 0.0148 0.000228 0.000504 0.0705** 0.0849 0.0984 0.108 
 (0.0707) (0.0736) (0.0195) (0.0263) (0.0138) (0.0200) (0.0348) (0.0733) (0.0684) (0.0774) 
Exporting firm 0.131* 0.117* 0.0103 0.00718 6.80e-05 -8.20e- 0.00575 -0.0208 0.0463 0.0334 
 (0.0722) (0.0640) (0.0146) (0.0190) (0.00901 (0.0125) (0.0350) (0.0531) (0.0632) (0.0844) 
Firm in competitive environ.  0.108 0.105* 0.00566 0.00648 0.000155 0.000539 -0.0235 -0.0193 -0.00636 -0.00589 
 (0.0878) (0.0593) (0.0163) (0.0198) (0.00943 (0.0134) (0.0334) (0.0460) (0.0675) (0.0848) 
Firm faces price elastic 0.0225 -0.0633 -0.00584 0.00452 - -9.61e- -0.00176 -0.00508 -0.134** -0.129* 
 (0.0592) (0.0671) (0.0150) (0.0183) (0.00907 (0.0134) (0.0281) (0.0364) (0.0536) (0.0734) 
Strategy: Maintain sales 0.427** 0.209 0.0550 0.0684 -5.40e- -9.27e- -0.00678 -0.0552 -0.00515 0.109 
 (0.204) (0.425) (0.0448) (0.0656) (0.0310) (0.0458) (0.0902) (0.0823) (0.0845) (0.126) 
Strategy: Penetrate market 0.445** 0.287 0.0555 0.0763 5.44e-05 0.000134 0.0221 0.00780 0.149** 0.217* 
 (0.216) (0.427) (0.0431) (0.0645) (0.0299) (0.0446) (0.0881) (0.0763) (0.0721) (0.125) 
Strategy: New markets 0.518** 0.256 0.0504 0.0684 -8.98e- - -0.00709 -0.0865 0.156 0.221 
 (0.204) (0.424) (0.0483) (0.0699) (0.0323) (0.0463) (0.0907) (0.0886) (0.161) (0.162) 
Strategy: New products 0.344 -0.0388 -0.116 -0.113 - - -0.127 -0.137 -0.311*** -0.211 
 (0.252) (0.494) (0.0869) (0.122) (0.0404) (0.0578) (0.124) (0.116) (0.118) (0.165) 
Firm has formal business -0.112 -0.0579 0.0152 0.0111 0.000120 0.000284 0.0935** 0.0728 0.275*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0755) (0.0871) (0.0135) (0.0175) (0.00864 (0.0129) (0.0381) (0.0556) (0.0534) (0.0667) 
Firm has non-executive -0.0530 -0.0455 0.00908 -0.00385 0.000111 0.000513 0.0180 0.0507 0.0727 0.0772 
 (0.0757) (0.0876) (0.0164) (0.0289) (0.0114) (0.0199) (0.0368) (0.0700) (0.0735) (0.117) (Owner-)Manager: equity in 0.000509 0.0273 -0.0129 -0.00446 -6.83e- - 0.0299 -0.00813 0.0949 0.0764 
 (0.0502) (0.0685) (0.0182) (0.0213) (0.0121) (0.0169) (0.0321) (0.0517) (0.0595) (0.0618) 
Owner-Manager 25<35 years -0.0268 -0.0502 0.0386 -0.0142 0.0785** 0.000316 0.0817 0.148 0.444 0.145 
 (0.252) (0.102) (0.0409) (0.0356) (0.0398) (0.0268) (0.120) (0.130) (0.318) (0.253) 
Owner-Manager 35<45 years -0.112 -0.119 0.0182 -0.0201 0.0783* - 0.0377 -0.00361 0.321 -0.0806 
 (0.250) (0.0751) (0.0443) (0.0258) (0.0406) (0.0170) (0.123) (0.0457) (0.298) (0.0892) 
Owner-Manager 45<55 years -0.00416 -0.0894 0.0380 -0.00705 0.0785** -7.24e- 0.0336 0.0164 0.304 -0.0860 
 (0.240) (0.0817) (0.0417) (0.0213) (0.0398) (0.0152) (0.124) (0.0575) (0.295) (0.103) 
Owner-Manager had 0.0104 0.0496 0.00320 0.00361 -7.61e- -6.27e- 0.0204 0.0324 0.0256 0.0150 
 (0.0487) (0.0870) (0.0157) (0.0190) (0.00941 (0.0143) (0.0283) (0.0397) (0.0494) (0.0691) 
SIC: Manufacturing 0.106 0.197* -0.0100 -0.00344 - - -0.00692 -0.00188 0.0581 0.0549 
 (0.0743) (0.108) (0.0198) (0.0259) (0.0133) (0.0197) (0.0372) (0.0660) (0.0699) (0.107) 
SIC: Construction -0.0482 0.0501 -0.00738 0.0111 0.000408 0.000765 0.117** 0.0961 0.152* 0.153 
 (0.0844) (0.166) (0.0318) (0.0410) (0.0197) (0.0283) (0.0580) (0.0779) (0.0850) (0.115) 
SICH: Retail & Wholesale 0.130 0.150 0.0100 0.0147 9.17e-05 2.89e-05 -0.0323 -0.0629 -0.0542 1.95e-06 
 (0.0926) (0.114) (0.0188) (0.0273) (0.0133) (0.0208) (0.0328) (0.0843) (0.0812) (0.116) 
SIC: Education -0.0228 0.0177 -0.0172 -0.00846 - - -0.0363 -0.0642 -0.0445 -0.0583 
 (0.0836) (0.120) (0.0226) (0.0290) (0.0158) (0.0219) (0.0408) (0.0770) (0.0702) (0.0956) 
Assistance Effect (IA) 0.0373 0.0593 0.00792 0.00113 0.000222 0.000253 0.00675 0.0200 -0.0650 0.0223 
 (0.0559) (0.0873) (0.0140) (0.0241) (0.00918 (0.0188) (0.0329) (0.0775) (0.0483) (0.0930) 
Selection Effect (inverse  0.0923  -0.00280  -  0.0244  0.0830 
  (0.0979)  (0.0210)  (0.0162)  (0.0538)  (0.110) 
Constant^ x x x x x x x x x x 
 x x x x x x x x x x 
           
Observations 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 323 256 
Standard errors in           
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
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Appendix F – Reports and conference papers as a result of this research 
 
Research reports 
Drews, C.-C. and M. Hart (2015); “Feasibility Study: Exploring Long-Term Impacts of Business 
Improvement Services”, Report for the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills; 
made available through the Enterprise Research Centre (ERC) as Research Paper No 29, 
2015. 
 
Conference papers  
Drews, C.-C. and M. Hart (2014); “Business support and long-term impact - building the 
evidence base”. Paper for the Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship (ISBE) 
Conference (5-6 November 2014), Manchester (not presented due to illness).   
Drews, C.-C. and M. Hart (2014); “Business Support Policy – Is there a Case for Long-Term 
Evaluation?”. Paper presented at the International Council for Small Business - World 
Conference on Entrepreneurship 2014 (11-14 June 2014), Dublin.   
Drews, C.-C. and M. Hart (2013); “Business Support Impact – getting the evaluation timeframe 
right”. Paper presented at the Nordic Conference on Small Business and Entrepreneurship 
Research (NCSB) (14-16 May 2014), Bodø.  
Drews, C.-C. and M. Hart (2013); “Measuring the Long-Term Benefits of Business Support?”. 
Paper presented at the Institute for Small Business and Entrepreneurship (ISBE) Conference 
(12-13 November 2013), Cardiff.   
 
Other Conferences 
Drews, C.-C. (2014); “Does local economic performance matter for the choice of how to deliver 
a national business support programme?”. Abstract accepted for the Regional Studies 
Association European Conference (15-18 June, 2014), Izmir (not presented due to illness).  
Drews, C.-C. (2014); “Measuring the long-term benefits of Business Support?”, Poster 
presented at the UK Evaluation Society Annual Conference 2014, London.  
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